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Non-government organisations (NGOs) are prominent and influential actors in all areas 
of international law. NGO behaviours in international treaty bodies have largely been 
the focus of governance rather than legal analysis. A legal analysis of the manner in 
which international treaties and treaty body rules affect NGO conduct has not been the 
subject of scholarship. This thesis presents a legal analysis framework that uses the 
objects and purposes of international treaties as a means of evaluating whether NGO 
behaviours comply with the expectations and animating principles of treaties. 
This thesis evaluated NGO conduct in two regional fisheries bodies – the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (‘CAMLR Convention’) and the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (‘Whaling Convention’). The 
primary focus was on NGOs in the role of observer at annual or biennial Commission 
meetings, with a secondary focus on the intersessional conduct of NGOs. The methods 
used were primary and secondary research, object and purpose construction, treaty 
interpretation, and case study analysis. Surveys and interviews were conducted with 
NGO and state delegates attending the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission. 
As a result of applying the object and purpose analysis, this thesis found that NGO 
behaviours were more likely to reflect the treaty object and purpose where Commission 
rules and procedures demonstrated clear expectations for NGOs to support the work of 
the Commission according to its object and purpose. It also found that where NGOs had 
a predominantly environmental focus, the NGO behaviour was more likely to be non-
compliant with the object and purpose and to undermine Commission decision-making.  
The CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission presented contrasting cases, with 
the former experiencing high degrees of NGO compliance with the object and purpose, 
which appeared to result from clear expectations on NGO engagement. The Whaling 
Commission presented the opposite, with unclear expectations on NGOs in their 
engagement and extensive non-compliant NGO behaviours. These case studies 
demonstrate the importance of maintaining clear rules of engagement for NGOs 




NGO behaviours in international treaty bodies should support effective decision-making 
in treaty bodies, according to the treaty’s object and purpose.  By referring to the 
common language of the object and purpose in assessing NGO behaviour, it is also 
possible to facilitate greater transparency in both state and NGO behaviours. The object 
and purpose analysis framework is applicable in any treaty body and supports the rule 




Chapter One  
Introduction 
Non-government organizations (NGOs) are prominent actors in international law. How 
they interact with various treaty bodies in international law is the subject of significant 
scholarship, as is the question of whether they should be accorded legal status 
commensurate with, or similar to, that of states in international law. However, 
unexamined in the literature is the question of how NGOs interact with current treaties 
and their treaty bodies in terms of legality or respect for the rule of law. So, to this end, 
this thesis proposes and applies a legal analytical framework comprised of the 
principles of the object and purpose in a treaty in order to evaluate the contributions 
NGOs make to the substantive work of international treaty bodies. To allow for depth of 
analysis this thesis investigates non-government organization (NGO) conduct in two 
international treaty bodies with reference to the objects and purposes of the treaty 
bodies’ respective treaties. The two international treaty regimes evaluated are the 
Whaling Commission under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
(‘Whaling Convention’) and the CAMLR Commission under the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (‘CAMLR Convention’). This thesis 
evaluates whether NGO behaviours do demonstrate accordance with the object and 
purpose principles of each Commission’s respective conventions before considering 
whether they should conform. It finally makes recommendations for amending the Rules 
of Procedure and Rules of Debate of the two Commissions to better align NGO 
engagement with the fundamental purposes of the Commissions. 
1.1 The significance of the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission  
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) classifies the CAMLR Commission and 
Whaling Commission as regional fishery bodies (RFBs). The FAO Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Department defines RFBs as ‘a group of States or organizations that are 
parties to an international fishery arrangement – work[ing] together towards the 
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conservation and management of fish stocks.’1 According to the FAO there are 52 RFBs. 
These RFBs are classified according to their jurisdiction over fish stocks in seas, oceans 
or in coastal waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).2 The Whaling Commission 
and CAMLR Commission are two of six global or trans-ocean FRBs3 and are also the only 
two that operate in the 20.33 million kilometres2 of the Southern Ocean.4 Unlike some 
other RFBs,5 which were established by resolution of the FAO Council, the two 
Commissions were established by the governments party to the Conventions. 
‘Commission’ is the nomenclature for treaty bodies established by this method. 
The Southern Ocean is a unique area in regional fisheries; it is home to a variety of 
unique species – krill, fish, seals, whales, birds – and ecosystems.6 It is also a significant 
research point for exploring the possible impacts of climate change.7 The value of the 
 
1 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ‘Regional Fishery Bodies (RFB)’, Regional 
Fishery Bodies (2019) http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/en.  
2 FAO, ‘RFB Fact Sheets’, Regional Fishery Body Secretariat Network: RFB Fact Sheets 
(2019) http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/en. 
3 Ibid.  
4 The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for signature 01 June 
1972, 11 ILM 251 (entered into force 11 March 1978) (‘Antarctic Seals’) has no treaty 
body performing regulatory functions, so is effectively inactive. 
5 See for example the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF) 
established by the FAO Council in 1967: http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/cecaf/en 
(2019). 
6 Valerie J Loeb, ‘Climate variability and spatiotemporal dynamics of five Southern 
Ocean species’ (2015) 134 Progress in Oceanography 93; Jessica Melbourne-Thomas et 
al., ‘Optimal control and system limitation in a Southern Ocean ecosystem model’ 
(2015) 114 Southern Ocean Dynamics and Biogeochemistry in a Changing Climate, Deep-
Sea Research Part II 64; Szymon Surma, Evgeny Pakhomov and Tony J Pitcher, ‘Effects of 
Whaling on the Structure of the Southern Ocean Food Web: Insights on the “Krill 
Surplus” from Ecosystem Modelling’ (2014) 12(9) PLOS ONE; George A Knox, Biology of 
the Southern Ocean (Knox, 2006). 
7 Julian Gutt et al., ‘The Southern Ocean ecosystem under multiple climate change 
stresses – an integrated circumpolar assessment’ (2015) 21 Global Change Biology 
1434; Andrew J Constable et al, ‘Climate change and Southern Ocean ecosystems I: how 
changes in physical habitats directly affect marine biota’ (2014) 20 Global Change 
Biology 3004; Paul GK Rodhouse, ‘Role of squid in the Southern Ocean pelagic 
ecosystem and the possible consequences of climate change’ (2013) 95 Deep Sea 
Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography 129; Paul Newman et al., ‘The Effects 
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Antarctic also lies in its capacity to facilitate international cooperation in scientific and 
peaceful endeavours under the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).8 Beyond these unique 
qualities, both Commissions provide insight into regulatory practices in RFBs that could 
be applicable to other RFBs in their engagement with NGOs.  
 Within the context of fisheries and the Southern Ocean, the CAMLR Commission 
provides insights into the operation of both the ATS and RFBs. While the Commission is 
specifically housed within the ATS framework, it is considered an RFB in broader 
international law, and is also considered to be an example of best practice in marine 
conservation initiatives.9 The Whaling Commission provides insights into an NGO-dense 
RFB. The Commission struggles to address modern issues of non-state engagement, and 
polarised approaches to a highly charged environmental issue – whaling. With the 2019 
withdrawal of one of its founding members, Japan, from its membership,10 the 
Commission also demonstrates the difficulties associated with non-state engagement, as 
 
of Interactive Stratospheric Chemistry on Antarctic and Southern Ocean Climate Change 
in AOGCM’ (NASA Technical Reports, NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI), 
Fall Meeting, 2014); Neil Adams, ‘Climate Trends at Macquarie Island and Expectations 
of Future Climate Change in the Sub-Antarctic’ (2009) 143(1) Papers and Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of Tasmania 1. 
8 Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into 
force 23 June 1961) Articles I and II (‘Antarctic Treaty’). ‘“Antarctic Treaty system” 
means the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under that Treaty, its associated 
separate international instruments in force and the measures in effect under those 
instruments’ (Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Article 
1(e)). 
9 The Food and Agriculture Organization body, Regional Fishery Body Secretariats 
Network (RSN) clearly places the CAMLR Commission within its membership: FAO, 
‘RFB Fact Sheets’, Regional Fishery Body Secretariat Network: RFB Fact Sheets (2019) 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/en; Denzil Miller and NM Slicer, ‘CCAMLR and 
Antarctic conservation: The leader to follow?’ in Serge M Garcia, Jake Rice and Anthony 
Charles (eds), Governance of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity Conservation: Interaction 
and Coevolution (Wiley, 2014) 253; Marika Ceo et al, Performance Reviews by Regional 
Fishery Bodies: Introduction, Summaries, Synthesis and Best Practices. Volume I: CCAMLR, 
CCSBT, ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NASCO, NEAFC, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 
1072, FIPI/C1072 (En) (Rome, 2012) 12, 13, 65, 78. 
10 International Whaling Commission, Statement on Government of Japan Withdrawal 
from the IWC (14 January 2019) International Whaling Commission 
https://iwc.int/statement-on-government-of-japan-withdrawal-from-t; Peter 
Bridgewater, ‘Japan leaving the International Whaling Commission is a disaster, but not 
for the reasons you think’ ABC News Online (31 December 2018). 
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NGOs have been, in part, blamed for Japan’s exit.11 This makes analysis of NGO 
engagement particularly relevant, relevant both with the increasing polarisation of 
environmental politics and to inform future engagement with NGOs for the Whaling 
Commission. 
Object and purpose analysis of NGO behaviours in these two Commissions could be a 
useful tool for treaty bodies engaged with the conservation and management of highly 
migratory and non-migratory marine resources. Work areas of particular relevance are 
highly migratory fish stocks and marine mammals, both significant for management in 
international law,12 and fisheries resources management in distinct geographical 
areas.13 The analysis is relevant to other RFBs that currently engage or are considering 
engagement with NGOs in fisheries conservation and management. 
1.2 The significance of NGOs 
NGOs are important actors in international institutions. They affect decision making 
among states and in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).14 In the international 
 
11 Peter Bridgewater, ‘Japan leaving the International Whaling Commission is a disaster, 
but not for the reasons you think’ ABC News Online (31 December 2018).  
12 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 
1982, 1883 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) Articles 64 and 65, Annex I 
(‘Law of the Sea Convention’); United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (entered 
into force 11 December 2001); Marcos A Orellana, ‘The Law on Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks: ITLOS Jurisprudence in Context’ (2004) 34 Golden Gate University Law Review 
459; Cassandra M Brooks, ‘Challenging the ‘Right to Fish’ in a Fast-Changing Ocean’ 
(2014) 33(3) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 289, 290, 293-295; Austin Dieter, 
‘From Harbor to High Seas: An Argument for Rethinking Fishery Management Systems 
and Multinational Fishing Treaties’ (2014) 32(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 
725, 731, 736; Dalal Al-Abdulrazzak et al, ‘Opportunities for improving global marine 
conservation through multilateral treaties’ (2017) 86 Marine Policy 247; Emanuele 
Bigagli, ‘The international legal framework for the management of the global oceans 
social-ecological system’ (2016) 68 Marine Policy 155. 
13 Many RFBs focus on non-migratory fish stocks. The work of the CAMLR Commission 
on fish stocks in designated management areas aligns closely with such work. 
14 Shamima Ahmed, ‘The Impact of NGOs on International Organizations: Complexities 
and Considerations’ (2010-2011) 36 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 817, 820; 
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arena they have been credited with representing otherwise unrepresented polities and 
demographics.15 NGOs are also credited with facilitating transparency and 
accountability of institutions otherwise inaccessible to the public through their 
observation and presence at institutional meetings.16 NGOs also contribute funds, 
expertise, and resources that may not be otherwise available to states and IGOs.17 They 
provide access for states and international organizations to informal and/or non-state 
networks to facilitate the implementation of policies and projects, particularly across 
 
Peter Dauvergne, Handbook of Global Environmental Politics (at 2012) ‘International 
environmental regimes as decision machines’. 
15 Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation’ (2011) 36(3) 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 891, 894; Jens Steffek, ‘Explaining cooperation 
between IGOs and NGOs – push factors, pull factors, and the policy cycle (2013) 39 
Review of International Studies 993, 993; Daniel Berlin, ‘The Key to Green Power – 
Explaining NGO-Influence in Global Environmental Governance Structures’ (August 11-
13, 2005 NISA-NOPSA Conference, Reykjavik) Globalization as Individualization and 
Destabilization Workshop 16-17; see contra: Peter Willetts, ‘The Cardoso Report on the 
UN and Civil Society: Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy? (2006) 
12(3) Global Governance 305, 315. 
16 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15; Dana Brakman Reiser and Claire R Kelly, 
‘Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global Governance’ (2011) 36 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1011, Part I. Regulators, Legitimacy and 
Accountability; Allen Buchanan and Robert O Keohane ‘The Legitimacy of Global 
Governance Institutions’ (2006) 20(4) Ethics and International Affairs 405, 428; 
Willetts, ‘The Cardoso Report’, above n 15. 
17 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15; Alex Grigorescu, ‘The Governmental-
Nongovernmental nexus in Global Governance’ (January 7-9, 2016, San Juan, Puerto 
Rico) Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association 
10; Daniel Berlin, ‘The Key to Green Power – Explaining NGO-Influence in Global 
Environmental Governance Structures’ (August 11-13, 2005 NISA-NOPSA Conference, 
Reykjavik) Globalization as Individualization and Destabilization Workshop 2. 
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borders.18 They take an ethical, political, and/or moral standpoint in international 
dialogue to open up debate,19 and develop political will.20  
Despite these significant practical contributions made by NGOs in international forums, 
there is no discussion in the literature of NGOs in terms of the legal expectations on or 
legal boundaries around their participation within treaty regimes. For example, Steve 
Charnovitz discusses the exclusion of NGOs but not how engagement of NGOs is 
regulated.21  
Karsten Nowrot writes about what NGOs have done in international forums, but not the 
structures enabling engagement.22 She, as well as many others, also writes on the 
nature or existence of international legal personality of NGOs in international law23 but 
 
18 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15; Dorothy C Zbicz, ‘Imposing Transboundary 
Conservation’ (2003) 17(1-2) Journal of Sustainable Forestry 21, 35; Gloria Yolanda 
Guevara, Assessing the Effectiveness of Transnational Activism: An Analysis of the Anti-
Whaling and Anti-Sealing Campaigns (Doctoral Thesis, University of Southern 
California, 2008) 2-10, 148-149, 155; Kerstin Martens, ‘Examining the (Non-)Status of 
NGOs in International Law (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 1, 5, 21; 
Vivek Kumar Mishra, ‘The Role of Global Civil Society in Global Governance’ (2012) 3 
Beijing Law Review 206, 208-209.  
19 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15, describes NGOs as ‘correct[ing] for the 
pathologies of governments and IOs.’; LA Langley, ‘Global Civil Society and Global 
Governability’ in RD Germain (ed.), The Idea of Global Civil Society: Politics and Ethics in 
a Globalizing Era (Routledge, 2005); Mishra above n 18, 210.  
20 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15, 894-895; BK Woodward, ‘Global Civil Society 
and International Law in Global Governance: Some Contemporary Issues’ (2006) 8 
International Community Law Review 247 265 citing the Cardoso Report: Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global 
governance; Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society 
Relations, UNGAOR, 58th sess, Agenda Item 59, UN Doc A/58/817 (11 June 2004).  
21 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15, which discusses issues of NGO exclusion but not 
how to regulate their engagement. 
22 Karsten Nowrot, ‘Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations Under International Law’ (1999) 6 Global Legal Studies 
579, 589-595. 
23 Nowrot, above n 22, 589-595; Bosire Maragia, ‘Almost there: Another way of 
conceptualizing and explaining NGOs’ quest for legitimacy in global politics’ (2002) 2 
Non-State Actors and International Law 301, 308 who writes that the general 
recognition of NGOs indicates a ‘quasi or a limited form of international legal 
personality.’; and generally, it is recognised that non-state actors have limited legal 
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not the current status of NGOs engaging with legal frameworks. Alan Hemmings, writing 
on non-state actors in the Southern Ocean, provides a simple overview of the 
domestically administered laws regulating non-state actors in the Antarctic generally, 
and a brief overview of the restricted formal roles of NGOs at meetings of Antarctic 
Treaty bodies. However, he provides no analysis.24 Dinah Shelton explores the 
mechanisms by which NGOs have been enabled to engage with international courts,25 
however this does not extend to either of the judicial forums, the Law of the Sea 
Tribunal and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to which member states of the two 
Commissions could be subject. In short, legal analysis of NGOs is restricted to the 
existence of international legal personality and judicial standing. Neither discussion 
applies directly to the subject matter at hand.  
NGO behaviours are discussed extensively in governance literature.26 These are 
important discussions, and scholars address issues such as the accountability and 
 
personality in international law: Stephen Hall, Principles of International Law 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2014) [4.2-4.3]; see also discussion in Cedric Ryngaert, 
‘Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International 
Law’ in Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor Dynamics in 
International Law (Ashgate, 2010) 69; Janne E Nijman, ‘Non-State Actors and the 
International Rule of Law: Revisiting the ‘Realist Theory’ of International Legal 
Personality’ in Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor Dynamics in 
International Law (Ashgate, 2010) 91; Noemi Gal-Or, ‘Observations on the Desirability 
of an Enhanced International Legal Status of the Non-State Actor’ in Math Noortmann 
and Cedric Ryngaert (eds), Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law (Ashgate, 
2010) 125. 
24 Alan D Hemmings, ‘The Changing Face of Non-State Actors in Antarctica’ (2014) 
32(3) Antarctic 30, 30-32. 
25 Dinah Shelton, ‘The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Judicial Proceedings’ (1994) 88 The American Journal of International Law 611, 641-
642. 
26 Anton Vedder, ‘Chapter 1. Questioning the legitimacy of non-governmental 
organizations’ in Anton Vedder (ed), NGO Involvement in International Governance and 
Policy: Sources of Legitimacy (Brill, 2007) 1; Vivien Collingwood and Louis Logister, 
‘Chapter 2. Perceptions of the legitimacy of international NGOs’ in Anton Vedder (ed), 
NGO Involvement in International Governance and Policy: Sources of Legitimacy (Brill, 
2007) 21; Jennifer Brass et al, ‘NGOs and international Development: A Review of 
Thirty-Five Years of Scholarship’ (2018) 112 World Development 136; Carolei 
Domenico, ‘Survival international v. World Wide Fund for Nature: Using the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as a Means of Ensuring NGO Accountability’ 
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legitimacy of NGOs in their engagement with international bodies. Charnovitz 
memorably writes that the role of NGOs is to ‘correct for the pathologies of 
governments and IOs [international organizations]’.27 More concretely, Peter Willetts 
notes the issue of representativeness in relation to the influence of NGOs in 
international law.28 Nowrot acknowledges the significant need for limits on NGO 
influence.29 Charnovitz traverses the two centuries of influence exerted by NGOs in 
shaping international law,30 citing various means by which NGOs have affected decision 
making in various forums. This includes the International Committee for the Red Cross 
influencing the recognition of rape as a war crime under the Geneva Conventions.31  
In their fundaments, governance issues are intimately related to questions of legal 
regulation and what is considered acceptable conduct of NGOs in terms of international 
law.32 To ensure certain standards of applicants for observer status, most international 
treaty bodies require civil society applicants to demonstrate legal incorporation that 
ensures transparency of governance structures, and NGOs are generally compliant. 
However, there remain questions of legitimacy, transparency and accountability of 
NGOs to treaty bodies,33 and attaining a fair balance of perspectives in NGO 
 
(2018) 18(2) Human Rights Law Review 371; Steve Charnovitz, ‘Recent Scholarship on 
NGOs’ (2009) 103(4) the American Journal of international Law 777. 
27 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15, 894. 
28 Peter Willetts, ‘From Stockholm to Rio and beyond; the impact of the environmental 
movement on the United Nations consultative arrangements for NGOs’ (1996) 22 
Review of International Studies 57, 58, 60-61.  
29 Nowrot, above n 22, 580. 
30 Steve Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International 
Governance’ (1997) 18 Michigan Journal of international Law 183, later he revises it to 
100 years of influence: Steve Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Law’ (2006) 100 The American Journal of International Law 348, 349. 
31 Charnovitz ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’, above n 30, 353. 
32 Jens Steffek, ‘Explaining cooperation between IGOs and NGOs – push factors, pull 
factors, and the policy cycle (2013) 39 Review of International Studies 993, 993-994; 
Rephael Harel Ben-Ari, The Normative Position of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations under International Law. An Analytical Framework (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012). 
33 Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15, 893. 
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representation.34 There also remains the question of how NGOs have contributed to 
RFBs, as there is little extant literature on this question,35 and none specifically on how 
RFBs engage NGOs through their legal documents. 
The capacity of NGOs to influence decision making in international forums should be 
subject to legal analysis. This thesis contributes an original proposal for the evaluation 
of NGO behaviours in international treaty bodies through a legal analysis framework. 
This can be applied to NGOs as both formal and informal actors. This includes NGOs 
engaging as protesters, NGOs engaging as accredited observers, and NGOs using “in the 
margins” spaces to promote their agenda to other NGOs and member states. The 
significance of this contribution is that it is the first in an otherwise governance 
scholarship dominated field. 
An object and purpose legal analysis framework is elaborated for use in determining 
whether formal and informal NGO engagement adheres to the fundamental principles 
and purposes of the treaty body. The object and purpose analysis framework provides 
an objective means of evaluating NGO behaviours within the two Commissions. The 
reference point for analysis is the text of the treaty itself and is readily accessible to 
legal and other scholars as a touchpoint.  
Two limitations should be noted. Firstly, the analysis is directed only to NGOs in RFBs. 
This limits the findings to a small but important area of international law – both 
topically and geographically. However, this limitation may be overcome with further 
research and application to other areas of international law or geographies of RFBs. 
These possibilities are explored in the concluding chapter. Secondly, NGOs in the 
Whaling and CAMLR Commissions are only evaluated in the roles that are separable 
from their domestic state engagement. This means that NGOs on member state 
delegations are not evaluated under the analysis framework. Informal NGO engagement 
– both at Commission meetings and the intersessional periods, is evaluated. Most 
 
34 Charnovitz ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’, above n 30, 367. 
35 See the doctoral dissertations: Liza Danielle Fallon, The Role of State and Non-state 
Actors in the Management of the Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) 
(Doctoral thesis, University of Tasmania, 2007) and Gloria Yolanda Guevara, Assessing 
the Effectiveness of Transnational Activism: An Analysis of the Anti-Whaling and Anti-
Sealing Campaigns (Doctoral Thesis, University of Southern California, 2008). 
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significantly for any other treaty bodies, the role of observer is evaluated. The status of 
observer is a common role for NGOs in a variety of international treaty bodies. So, while 
there are limitations to the analysis, the analysis itself demonstrates transferability to 
other similar roles in other areas of international law. 
1.3 The object and purpose analysis framework 
The reason for using the object and purpose of a treaty as the basis for an analysis 
framework lies in its fundamental importance to the work of international bodies. The 
object and purpose of a convention is a central tool of interpretation.36 Treaty 
interpretation and a treaty’s object and purpose are at the centre of most disputes 
around state obligations.37 Interpretation of articles of a convention is a significant 
action in international law, undertaken for the purposes of supporting the rule of law, 
achieving legal certainty38 and giving effect to the sovereign agreement of States.39 
Martti Koskeniemmi argues that states drafted and agreed to the expression of their will 
in a treaty and should therefore ‘know their will’, making later interpretive disputes 
 
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (‘Vienna Convention’) Article 31(1); Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 7th ed, 2008) 631-636. 
37 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Elias Olufemi and Panos Merkouris(eds), Treaty Interpretation 
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); 
Philippe Sands and Jeffery Commission, ‘Treaty Custom and Time: 
Interpretation/Application?’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos 
Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
30 Years on (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 39. 
38 UN Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies UN Doc S/2004/616 (23 August 2004); Charter of the United Nations, 
Article 2(1). 
39 FH Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System (Oceana Publications, 1973) 5; 
Roland Axtmann, ‘The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its 
Contemporary Transformation’ (2004) 25(3) International Political Science Review 259; 
David A Lake, ‘The New Sovereignty in International Relations’ (2003) 5 International 
Studies Review 303, 305-306; Frank Xaver Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty: From 
Independence to Interdependence in the Structure of International Environmental Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 2000); Max H Hulme, ‘Comment: Preambles in Treaty 
Interpretation’ (2016) 164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1281, 1282. 
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absurd.40 The passage of time and unanticipated or complex circumstances make this 
an abstract criticism; new diplomats and new circumstances may account for disputes 
over interpretation, as may political interests as they evolve over time.41 Whatever the 
cause of a dispute over the interpretation of an aspect of an international convention, 
the object and purpose is central to its interpretation by states, IGOs, and by courts and 
tribunals. 
The object and purpose is significant because states bind themselves to the legal 
obligations they have created and ratified, acceded to, or succeeded to. As a substantive 
aspect of a treaty, the object and purpose is a measure of the legality of a state’s 
behaviour, and part of the interpretative process. States presumably like to know the 
specifics of what a treaty binds them to, and generally why it does so. The object and 
purpose provides a reference point to understand the why of a treaty, and to animate 
the what of a treaty organization’s work.  
Just as the object and purpose can be used to measure the legality of a state’s behaviour, 
it can also be used to measure the propriety or compliance of a non-state actor’s 
behaviour in relation to the treaty. The significance here rests on the need to ensure 
that non-state actors, particularly NGOs, contribute to the work mandated under a 
convention, consistent with the object and purpose. This brings to the fore the 
underlying logic of a treaty as a valuable tool for directing NGO engagement, 
particularly where other mechanisms, such as voting structures, membership and Rules 
of Procedure provide inconsistent means of measuring or governing behaviour. 
In developing the object and purpose analysis framework, the use of established 
interpretative methods was paramount to provide as broadly applicable, and as faithful 
a construction of the conventions as possible. In applying the analysis framework, two 
questions were foremost: 
1. In interacting with treaty bodies, are NGOs guided by the object and purpose 
principles of the treaty? 
 
40 Martti Koskeniemmi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 298. 
41 David S Jonas and Thomas N Saunders, ‘The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three 
Interpretive Methods’ (2010) 43(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 565, 582. 
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2. Can NGO behaviours be assessed by this standard to promote effective 
engagement? 
And, as with most human undertakings, one more question arose:  
3. If NGO behaviour can be regulated according to the object and purpose 
principles, should it be?  
While it may appear desirable to require NGOs to act in accordance with a treaty’s 
object and purpose, it is possible that applying this approach could constrain the 
capacity of NGOs to agitate for reform, to challenge or question international decision-
making, or even present a ‘non-government’ perspective. Requiring compliance with the 
object and purpose of a treaty may restrict the ability to present moral, ethical or 
political viewpoints. It may also minimise the NGO’s representative capacity by 
restricting the scope of engagement to those principles underlying a treaty.  
However, in considering the specifics of NGO engagement, there are likely to be more 
neutral or positive outcomes. In terms of neutral outcomes, current valued NGOs roles 
such as relationship-building, resource sharing, or promoting transparency and 
accountability are unlikely to be negatively impacted. Relationship-building and 
resource sharing are generally important at the implementation phase of the work of 
IGOs, and object and purpose principles underlying IGO work will already have been 
considered before this time.  
There are several possible positive outcomes. Guidance from the object and purpose 
will assist transparency and accountability roles. It will provide a common language for 
communicating with stakeholders, states and IGOs alike. It will also allow NGOs to refer 
to the rule of law in undertaking transparency and accountability roles – holding states 
accountable to their legal obligations is a central pursuit of NGOs in international law.42 
Lastly, the capacities to present non-state viewpoints and represent a polity may be 
enhanced by object and purpose-based guidance. The principles can aid in articulating 
an NGO position, and align their work with the work of an IGO, by making their position 
clear to the IGO, its member states and the NGO’s polity in similar language. 
 
42 ‘Charnovitz, ‘Illegitimacy’, above n 15; Brakman Reiser and Kelly, above n 16; 
Buchanan and O Keohane, above n 16; Willetts, ‘The Cardoso Report’, above n 15. 
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The contribution of this thesis is largely practical. In considering the engagement of 
NGOs in the two Commissions it became clear that the implementation and wording of 
the Rules of Procedure and the Rules of Debate were the key to regulating the nature of 
NGO engagement. The congruence of the Rules with the content of the conventions, both 
in terms of substantive Articles on non-state engagement and the object and purpose, 
bore a clear relation to the functionality of the Rules in ensuring NGO compliant 
behaviour. While it became clear that there were serious questions of functionality in 
the Whaling Commission Rules, there were also some aspects of the CAMLR Commission 
Rules that could bear improvement. Amending for context, the discussions and 
amendments could also be of relevance to other international treaty bodies that wish to 
ensure NGOs support the effective work of their governing body.  
The thesis makes a small but original contribution to scholarship addressing NGOs in 
international law. While NGOs are not parties to international treaties or members with 
voting rights, NGOs have attained prominence and influence in international law, yet 
their regulation is not widely discussed in terms of the legal parameters of their roles. 
Secondly, it contributes to the body of knowledge relating to NGO behaviours in 
international fisheries law by evaluating the ways in which legal frameworks affect NGO 
behaviours in their interactions with RFBs. The scholarship on NGOs in international 
law has hitherto been dominated by governance analysis.43 Thirdly, this thesis will 
contribute to Southern Ocean resource governance literature, offering unique insights 
into the enhancement of governance mechanisms and the question of whether states 
party are entitled to expect NGOs to demonstrate fidelity to the object and purpose of 
treaty instruments in international law.  
  
 
43 Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries’, above n 30; Mishra, above n 18; Willetts, ‘The Cardoso 
Report’, above n 15; BK Woodward, ‘Global Civil Society and International Law in Global 
Governance: Some Contemporary Issues’ (2006) 8 International Community Law Review 
247; Eric Suy, ‘New Players in International Relations’ in Kreijen et al (eds), State, 
Sovereignty, and International Governance (Oxford University Press, 2002) 373; Thomas 
G Weiss, and Leon Gordenker, NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance (Lynne Rienner, 
1996); Peter Willetts, Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics. The 
Construction of Global Governance (Routledge, 2010). 
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1.4 Method and Methodology 
Research conducted for this thesis adopted a mixed methods approach combining 
traditional legal doctrinal analysis and empirical research. Doctrinal analysis relied on 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the Vienna Convention). The 
empirical work involved close documentary analysis of meeting transcripts, survey 
instruments (questionnaires), and semi-structured interviews with CAMLR Commission 
and Whaling Commission meeting delegates. Documentary analysis relied on keyword 
recognition and categorisation by keyword. Survey instruments and semi-structured 
interviews aimed to determine the subjective evaluation of NGO contributions to the 
work of both Commission, from NGO and state perspectives. They were also used to 
explore undocumented NGO behaviours within the Commissions, and to obtain a 
general picture of the engagement of NGOs and their representatives outside of official 
documentation.  
Research questions 
In this research, the following questions will be answered: 
1. What is the content of the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention and 
CAMLR Convention? This question is addressed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
2. What are the legal obligations imposed by the CAMLR Commission and Whaling 
Commission in respect of NGO participation, as understood by reference to the 
object and purpose? This question is addressed in Chapter 3 and 4. 
3. What does current international law scholarship suggest are the preconditions 
and limits to NGO participation in international bodies? This question is 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
4. How do NGO behaviours reflect an understanding of, or concern for the object 
and purpose? This question is addressed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
5. What is current accepted practice relating to NGO participation in the 
Commissions, and to what extent does accepted practice reflect formal 
obligations with reference to the object and purpose? This question is addressed 
in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
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6. Should NGOs adhere to object and purpose considerations?  This question is 
addressed in Chapter 8.  
7. What are the gaps in procedural rules, and what reforms are needed to ensure 
that NGO behaviour promotes compliance with and support for the underlying 
object and purpose, and thereby promote effective state action? This question is 
addressed in Chapter 8. 
Case study approach 
The case study approach was chosen to provide depth of analysis, as case studies focus 
‘intensively on individual cases to draw insights about causal relationships in a broader 
population of cases.’44 There are two levels to the case study approach here. The first 
investigates the general characteristics of the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions. The 
Commissions possess characteristics that provide insights into other international 
institutions, particularly RFBs. The second level investigates the Commissions 
themselves. There are ‘within case’ case studies in the comparisons of enforcement 
approaches, MPA decision-making and catch allocation. These are relevant to other 
RFBs and to other international institutions, as well as in making comparisons between 
these two Commissions. 
Legal doctrinal analysis and interpretation: theory 
The methodology employed for engaging with treaties, Commission documents and 
other legal documents was a doctrinal analysis of the object and purpose of the Whaling 
Convention and the CAMLR Convention. This doctrinal analysis is grounded in the Vienna 
Convention. The legal analysis framework incorporates the elements of conservation, 
use and common concern, articulated in both conventions and present in other 
significant documents in international environmental law.45 A fundamental assumption 
 
44 Amy R Poteete, Marco A Janssen and Elinor Ostrom, Working Together (Princeton 
University Press, 2010) 33.  
45 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature UNTS (entered 
into force) Part VII, Section 2, articles 116-119; World Commission on Environment and 
Development, Our Common Future, Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development, UNGAOR, 42nd sess, Provisional Agenda Item 83(e) UN Doc A/42/427 
(4 August 1987) Annex (‘Our Common Future’); United Nations General Assembly, The 
future we want, GA Res 66/288, UNGAOR, 6th session, 123rd mtg, Agenda Item 19, UN 
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of this thesis is that the object and purpose is integral to the effective decision-making 
of the Commissions that administer conventions and associated documents. This aligns 
the object and purpose analysis framework as a form of doctrinal legal analysis, as it 
relies on accepted forms of treaty interpretation and established international treaties. 
Legal doctrinal construction is the foundation for interpretation of the CAMLR 
Convention and the Whaling Convention, and construction of the object and purpose in 
each convention. International law was analyzed, interpreted and constructed from a 
positivist perspective.46 Construction of the two conventions’ objects and purposes 
relied on reconciling possible conflicts between core principles of the objects and 
purposes. ‘Use’ and ‘conservation’ can be seen as conflicting, for example. Instead of 
seeing these as conflicting principles, construction relied on the interdependence of 
object and purpose principles. Decision-making in the two Commissions gives practical 
effect to the symbiotic principles of ‘use’ and ‘conservation’. This concept of 
interdependency was suggested by the oppositional character of the words ‘use’ and 
‘conservation’ in conjunction with the interpretive expectations of the Vienna 
Convention. A holistic interpretation of the treaties is required in order to reconcile the 
tensions between these competing concepts. 
A criticism of legal doctrinal analysis and interpretation is that it cannot ‘fill a gap’ in an 
area of scholarship and that it lacks empirical foundations.47 It is important to stress 
that issues of enforceability in international law and its dependence on state will and 
good faith creates a gap that must be filled, by repeated insistence on the legal 
obligations of international actors. These obligations must be determined by traditional 
 
Doc A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012) [I] referring to ‘sustainable development 
…environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present and future 
generations’. 
46 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Non-state actors from the perspective of legal positivism. The 
communitarian semantics for the secondary rules of international law’ in Jean 
d’Aspremont (ed), Participants in the International Legal System. Multiple perspectives 
on non-state actors in international law (Routledge, 2011) 23; Andria Naudé Fourie, 
‘Expounding the Place of Legal Doctrinal Methods in Legal-Interdisciplinary Research’ 
(2015) 3 Erasmus Law Review 95; Theunis Roux, ‘Judging the Quality of Legal Research: 
A Qualified Response to the Demand for Greater Methodological Rigour’ (2014) 24 
Legal Education Review 177, 178. 
47 Roux, above n 46, 181-182, 186. 
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methods of legal interpretation. For this reason, this thesis relies on a positivist 
understanding of international law,48 and rejects the validity of criticism of legal 
doctrinal analysis in this context. 
Criticism of the absence of empirical foundations in legal doctrinal work can be set aside 
by considering that legal doctrinal interpretation relates to normative obligations and 
concepts. The interpretations and constructions put forward here are normative, 
insofar as law is normative. Nonetheless, the criticism of legal doctrinal work forces the 
question of whether there is value in legal doctrinal interpretation of treaties and legal 
doctrinal analysis of NGOs at all. As noted, there is significant non-legal analysis of NGO 
behaviours in international law. These theoretical models for discussing issues of 
accountability and legitimacy are applied to empirical research. Here, the interpretation 
of the two conventions and construction of their objects and purposes is the theory 
through which empirical research is evaluated. This demonstrates the value of legal 
doctrinal analysis in generating empirical evidence. 
Documentary analysis: empirical research 
Documentary analysis involved accessing primary and secondary resources. Some of 
the primary resources were publicly available. Other sources were not. This includes 
historical archives of NGO Opening Statements to the Whaling Commission, and 
documents circulated by NGOs at CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission 
meetings in 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017. Access to the meeting-based primary 
materials was through attendance at the CAMLR Commission meetings in 2011, 2013, 
2014, and 2017, and at the Whaling Commission meetings in 2014 and 2016. Access to 
historical archives of NGO Opening Statements was through the Whaling Commission 
Secretariat, with the help of staff Julie Hunt and Stella Duff in tracking down and 
providing these in electronic form. 
Qualitative data was gathered from two key sources: anonymous questionnaires 
administered to member state delegates and NGO delegates, and from a series of semi-
 
48 d’Aspremont, above n 46. 
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structured interviews49 with NGO participants, state representatives, and Secretariat 
staff at the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission participating.  The interviews 
can be described as qualitative stakeholder interview research design. Questions were 
exploratory and an informal structure was adopted to take advantage of the individual's 
knowledge, skill sets, and position in the organization.  
The animus of the interviews was curiosity about interviewees’ understanding and 
knowledge of NGO engagement with the Commissions. This sits within the broader 
scholarship on qualitative interviews, that focuses on determining ‘the intentions and 
perspectives of those involved in social interactions.’50 The interviews explored actors’ 
knowledge of the history of the organizations not apparent from annual meeting 
reports, as well as their own attitudes toward the value of NGO activities, perceptions of 
state responsiveness, and knowledge of otherwise undocumented NGO influences on 
and engagement around Commission agenda items.  
The structured components of the interviews used questions that aimed at gauging the 
nature of interviewee involvement with NGOs and the Commission, and their depth of 
knowledge, engagement and experience with NGOs and the Commissions. Generally, 
there were two aspects beyond this that were then explored. The first was establishing 
the interviewee’s view of the importance or value of NGOs in engaging with the 
Commissions. The second was engaging interviewees to determine whether questioning 
them about their perspective on legal obligations and regulation would be valuable. 
There were only three interviewees that demonstrated knowledge of the legal 
frameworks of the Commissions.51  
The interviews with NGO representatives began with a series of structured questions.52 
These questions aimed to determine the length of Commission engagement of the NGO 
 
49 University of Tasmania Ethics Reference No: H0014221: Role of nongovernment 
organizations in the International Whaling Commission and the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.  
50 Jane Agee, ‘Developing qualitative research questions: a reflective process’ (2009) 
22(4) International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 431, 432. 
51 Interviewee 2 (16 September 2014); Interviewee 9 (17 September 2014); 
Interviewee 11 (2 November 2015). 
52 See Appendix 3. 
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and of the representative. Other aspects of the interview focused on establishing 
whether the organization had engaged with specific or broad issues, such as animal 
welfare, environmental protection, scientific research, encouraging industry 
engagement, or cultural representation. Some questions probed into organizational 
agendas, general value of the organization’s contributions to the Commission, the 
organization’s influence in Commission decisions or state policy positions, and specific 
examples of such influence. These questions were designed to understand the identity 
and position of each NGO within the Commission with which it engaged, and to 
determine if there was more to NGO engagement than was reflected in meeting records.  
Questionnaires were aimed at gathering quantifiable data of delegate views on NGO 
engagement, both generally and on the issue of marine reserves. Questionnaires were 
distributed to member state delegates at the 2016 CAMLR Commission and Whaling 
Commission meetings. The questionnaires contained several questions seeking views 
on NGO engagement on the issue of marine protected areas and sanctuaries. Both were 
key agenda items at the 2016 plenary meetings. General views were also sought, in 
categories relating to usefulness of NGOs, as well as categories of NGO activity. See 
Appendices 1 and 2 for these questionnaires. 
For the 2016 questionnaires approximately a third of the member states for each 
Commission submitted a completed questionnaire. For the Whaling Commission this 
was 40 member states, for the CAMLR Commission, eight member states. This low 
response rate in the CAMLR Commission is attributable to the author’s absence due to 
attendance at the Whaling Commission meeting, and at the Whaling Commission 
meeting to the sheer size of the meeting itself. Language barriers were also an issue, as 
both Commissions work in multiple languages and questionnaires could only be 
administered in English, due to a lack of funding and linguistic capability.  
Limitations 
A limitation in administering interviews and questionnaires was the language barrier 
(the author only speaks English). It was possible to interview several Spanish speakers 
in English, however there were barriers to accessing many Russian speakers and French 
speakers. The working languages of the Whaling Commission and the CAMLR 
Commission are:  
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Table 1.1 Working languages of the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission 
Both Commissions use simultaneous translation during meetings. In the CAMLR 
Commission, this means that English, French, Russian and Spanish interpreters work 
during the meeting times to provide live interpretation of discussions. In the Whaling 
Commission this is restricted to English, French and Spanish. The same simultaneous 
interpretation is provided, allowing attendees at the meeting to follow all comments 
from all delegates in their preferred language. To this extent, there was no language 
limitation during meeting observations. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis proceeds in 8 chapters. Chapters Two, Three and Four provide the analysis 
framework for discussion of whether NGO behaviours are guided by object and purpose 
principles. Chapters Two and Three engage with the research question of ‘what is the 
content of the object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention and Whaling Convention? 
Chapter Two begins with a discussion of the rules of construction of the object and 
purpose, and interpretation of international treaties. Chapter Three applies these rules 
to the Whaling Convention and the CAMLR Convention to provide a clear explanation of 
the fundamental object and purpose principles of each convention, and the mandate of 
each Commission under its convention. Chapters Three and Four explore the research 
question of what legal obligations are imposed by the two Conventions in respect of 
NGO participation, as understood by reference to the object and purpose. Chapter Four 
also engages with what current international law scholarship suggests are the 
preconditions and limits to NGO participation in international bodies. It refines the 
 
53 CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure, Part VIII, Rule 37 Languages. 
54 Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule N Languages of the Commission. 
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concept of NGO to ensure specificity in the broad field of ‘civil society’ interaction with 
IGOs. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven explore two research questions. These chapters explore 
how NGO behaviours reflect an understanding of, or concern for the object and purpose 
of the Conventions. They also explore what current accepted practice relating to NGO 
participation is and the extent to which accepted practice reflects formal obligations 
with reference to the object and purpose. These chapters apply an object and purpose-
based analysis framework to historical behaviours of NGOs (Chapter Five), to marine 
reserves (Chapter Six), and catch regulation and enforcement (Chapter Seven). These 
chapters evaluate whether NGOs act in accordance with object and purpose principles. 
After this exploration of the question of NGO actions, Chapter Eight asks whether object 
and purpose principles should guide NGO behaviour in relation to that treaty, and if so, 
how that should be done. Chapter Eight considers the possibility of reform to Rules of 
Procedure and Secretariat practice. It considers what gaps exist in procedural rules, and 
what reforms are needed to ensure that NGO behaviour promotes compliance with and 
support for the underlying object and purpose, and thereby promote effective state 
action. 
Chapter Two explains the interpretation of treaties and construction of the object and 
purpose in international law. It clarifies what is meant by object and purpose, explores 
why the object and purpose is important to both state and non-state actors, and 
proposes an approach to its construction that strictly adheres to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties rules. The construction of the object and purpose of each 
convention is explored in relation to the Vienna Convention. This chapter demonstrates 
the fundamental soundness of the doctrinal analysis under the Vienna Convention in 
then developing the object and purpose analysis framework employed from Chapters 
Three onward. 
Chapter Three interprets the Whaling Convention and the CAMLR Convention according 
to the Vienna Convention. The contents of the conventions are discussed using an object 
and purpose analysis. The historical context of the two conventions is discussed, in 
order to address the relevant historical factors that influenced drafting and thus 
interpretation. In interpreting the Conventions, this chapter engages with the respective 
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jurisdiction of each Commission.  Also discussed are the influence of the Conventions’ 
subject matter and jurisdiction on the operation of the Commissions.  
Chapter Four engages with the NGO as a type of non-state actor. This chapter explores 
the literature on what constitutes an NGO and defines NGOs according to their unique 
set of characteristics. This chapter also explores the observer role allowed to NGOs in 
the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission through an object and purpose lens. 
This part of the chapter looks at the Conventions, as well as Rules of Procedure and Rules 
of Debate to understand the nature of NGO positions, independent of state delegations, 
in the Commissions. 
Chapter Five provides an analysis of NGO attendance applications and engagement 
across the life of each Commission. This chapter highlights object and purpose 
consideration and the influence of Commission behaviour on NGO behaviours. This 
discussion of context demonstrates that there are correlations between Commission 
expectations on NGOs and NGO regard for object and purpose. In relation to the rules 
and practice surrounding NGO engagement, analysis was conducted of the initial 
expectations placed on NGOs in their applications for admission as observers at 
Commission meetings. This analysis demonstrates that a Commission insisting on NGO 
support for object and purpose principles encourages continued consideration of these 
principles later in NGO engagement, particularly where NGOs are reminded of these 
expectations. 
Chapter Six engages an in-depth analysis around catch regulation and enforcement, 
looking at illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing of Patagonian toothfish 
(Dissostichus eleginoides) and Japanese scientific whaling in the Southern Ocean. This 
chapter looks at two contexts of NGO behaviours: The first is the forum of meeting 
spaces, focusing on accredited meeting observer NGOs and non-accredited NGOs acting 
as protesters. Meeting observers are also evaluated in terms of their adherence to 
convention-based definitions of the roles of NGOs, through an object and purpose 
framework. The second is intersessional conduct of accredited and non-accredited 
NGOs, particularly in relation to attempted enforcement of perceived breaches of 
international law under the jurisdiction of the Commissions. This chapter demonstrates 
that NGO behaviours on these two issues were largely considerate of object and 
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purpose principles and the cooperative nature of their role, sometimes despite the 
intentions of NGOs themselves.  
Chapter Seven provides an in-depth analysis of NGO behaviours as accredited meeting 
observers on the issues of marine sanctuaries and marine protected areas. An argument 
is introduced, based on survey data, that the subjective evaluations of states and other 
stakeholders in the Commission need an objective reference point for evaluation of NGO 
behaviours. This reference point is the object and purpose. The object and purpose 
analysis in this chapter demonstrates that environmental NGO behaviours in relation to 
protected areas is frequently lacking in sufficient engagement with object and purpose 
principles and acting outside a supportive role. The International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has demonstrated deferral to the Commissions, and a 
clearly supportive role, as has the scientific NGO, the Scientific Committee for Antarctic 
Research (SCAR). Industry NGOs in both Commissions had minimal engagement with 
the issue of protected areas but demonstrated clear engagement with the object and 
purpose principles, and their subordinate roles as observers. The findings in this 
chapter lead into the recommendations contained in Chapter Eight.  
Chapter Eight provides an overview of the findings of the preceding three chapters. It 
then concludes that NGOs should be expected to adhere to the object and purpose 
principles of conventions. It presents several recommendations for amendments to the 
Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate in the Commissions to enhance NGO engagement 
with the object and purpose. However, the majority of these recommendations focus on 
the Whaling Commission. These recommendations are intended to make clear the 
subordinate, cooperative roles of NGOs under the conventions, and to clarify an 
expectation of NGOs contributing to the work of the Commission in light of the object 
and purpose principles. Recommendations on the admissions process for observers 
stress the importance of the capacity of NGOs to contribute in the consideration of their 
admission as observers. This chapter concludes that within the broader context of NGO 
contributions in international law, there is room to clarify rules and processes to 
maximize the effectiveness of NGO contributions to intergovernmental organizations.  
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Chapter 2 Object and purpose: interpretation and 
substantive obligations 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates whether the object and purpose of an international agreement 
guides or limits NGO engagement with the CAMLR Commission and Whaling 
Commission, both formally and informally. This is done through the application of an 
object and purpose analysis framework. To develop the necessary investigative tools, 
this chapter clarifies what is meant by object and purpose, explores why the object and 
purpose is important to both state and non-state actors, and proposes an approach to 
the construction of the object and purpose that adheres to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.  
The chapter then constructs the object and purpose of the Whaling and CAMLR 
Conventions, by reference to convention text, structure, and the sources of the object 
and purpose in each Convention as found in their negotiating history. This chapter 
concludes that a construction of the object and purpose of the two Conventions as 
consisting of mutually supportive rather than competing elements is the best 
application of those elements. 
2.2 The definition and role of a Convention’s object and purpose 
2.2.1 What is the object and purpose and what is its role? 
The object and purpose of a treaty is a ‘single overarching notion’55 that indicates the 
fundamental logic, essence56 or reasons behind a treaty.57 The International Court of 
 
55 Jan Klabbers, Oxford Public International Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (at December 2006) ‘Treaties, Object and Purpose’ [6]; Richard K 
Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2008) 193-194. 
56 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 567 citing Buffard, Isabelle and Zemanek, Karl, ‘The 
“Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ (1998) 3 Austrian Review of International 
and European Law 311, 343. 
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Justice (ICJ) first used the term ‘object and purpose’ in 1951 in Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion).58 The current wording ‘object and purpose’ can be regarded as a progression 
from the idea of the spirit of a treaty.59 It has become a key aspect of treaty 
interpretation through Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties60 
(Vienna Convention). A treaty’s object and purpose is recognised as an essential 
reference point for interpretation of international treaties. It is central to many judicial 
decisions in international appellate bodies, tribunals and the ICJ, all of which use the 
Vienna Convention Article 31, and so rely on the object and purpose as a means of treaty 
interpretation.61 
Treaty interpretation with the object and purpose is not without complication. David 
Jonas and Thomas Saunders refer to the concept of object and purpose as abstract, 
stating that we can simply define it broadly, as ‘a treaty’s goals’ but that giving the 
concept more definition would detract from its importance.62 Jan Klabbers notes that 
the specific object and purpose of a treaty cannot be defined in the abstract.63 The 
construction of object and purpose must be contextual, resulting in a connection 
between construction of the object and purpose and its application to facts and specific 
treaty provisions.64 So, while a broad construction of the object and purpose is possible, 
 
57 Ulf Linderfalk, ‘On the Meaning of the ‘Object and Purpose’ Criterion, in the Context of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 19’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 429, 434; Klabbers, above n 55 [11]. 
58 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Reports 15. 
59 Klabbers, above n 55 [1]. 
60 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (hereinafter ‘Vienna Convention’). 
61 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Elias Olufemi and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation 
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); 
Sands and Commission, above n 37, 39; Gardiner, above n 55, 198-202; Hulme, above n 
39, 1303-1329. 
62 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 571. 
63 Klabbers, above n 55 [6]. 
64 Klabbers, above n 55 [6]; Sands and Commission, above n 37, 58. 
 
 26 
for each exercise of a treaty body’s jurisdiction, the treaty’s object and purpose depends 
on what the treaty wording is, the circumstances in which the object and purpose is to 
be understood, and the particular Article or obligation to be interpreted and applied.65  
The object and purpose is also indivisible – it is to be read as a whole concept from the 
context within which it is defined.66 This means that multiple principles may need to be 
considered in construction and application of the object and purpose. This indivisibility 
counters criticisms of the object and purpose as too ambiguous, flexible, and 
manipulable.67 Retaining flexibility in treaty interpretation can ensure the best 
interpretation available to a court or tribunal,68 but flexibility and ambiguity are two 
different things. The many-headed nature of the object and purpose militates against 
ambiguity as each mutually supportive principle creates a boundary by which to define 
the object and purpose. If the object and purpose could be separated into multiple, 
unconnected principles there would be ambiguity and manipulability because any one 
or more principles, as derived from the treaty text could be excluded. As an indivisible 
concept both in the abstract and in context, the object and purpose is flexible in 
application but sufficiently definite in construction to serve both the need for broad 
application, and for sufficient certainty.69  
The object and purpose can have both substantive and methodological functions. It can 
be used as an ‘independent substantive element’ of a treaty, against which the legality of 
state behaviours can be measured.70 This is important to the object and purpose 
analysis framework proposed in Chapter Three. In most instances, the object and 
 
65 Klabbers, above n 55 [7] and [11] citing Special Rapporteur of the UN ILC A Pellet, 
Pellet, Alain, Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report on reservations to treaties, addendum, 
International Law Commission, 57th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 June 2005) 
(‘Tenth Report’); Gardiner, above n 55, 194. 
66 Gardiner, above n 55, 192, 194-201. 
67 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 569; Klabbers, above n 55 [22] citing Pellet, Tenth 
Report 57th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 June 2005); Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
(Special Rapporteur), Third Report on the law of treaties, UN Doc A/CN.4/167 and 
Add.1-3; Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1964, Vol II, 53. 
68 Hulme, above n 39, 1284. 
69 Klabbers, above n 55 [8]; Gardiner, above n 55, 200-201. 
70 Klabbers, above n 55 [3]; Hulme, above n 39, 1288-1289. 
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purpose is central to the methodological approach of treaty interpretation; its 
construction is an aid to ensure that the textual reading of a treaty71 is made in light of 
the object and purpose.72 Whether the object and purpose of a treaty is used as a 
substantive legal assessment tool or as part of the process of interpretation, judiciaries, 
tribunals, governments and others require the definition to have sufficient certainty in 
order to apply it to policy, to legal disputes. Definition is also required so that states, 
which may later accede to or succeed to the treaty, know the purpose of the treaty to 
which they are becoming party.73 
2.2.2 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention – significance of the object and purpose to 
treaty interpretation  
The primary interpretative document for treaties is the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention), which is considered customary international 
law74 and therefore applies to the CAMLR Convention, the Whaling Convention and to the 
Schedule to the Whaling Convention.75 The ICJ has relied upon it in interpreting the 
Whaling Convention,76 and it is a reference point for interpretation in both Whaling and 
CAMLR Commission plenary meetings.77 The key Articles of the Vienna Convention of 
 
71 Vienna Convention, Article 31; Jonas and Saunders, above n 41; Stephen Hall, 
Principles of International Law (LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2014) 105. 
72 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1). 
73 Hulme, above n 39, 1288. 
74 Gardiner, above n 55, 12-13; Hulme, above n 39, 1282. 
75 Vienna Convention, Article 4. 
76 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Judgment) 
[2014] ICJ Reports 226 (‘Whaling in the Antarctic’). 
77 IWC 53rd Annual Meeting of July 2001, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2001 – covering the 2000-2001 financial year (53rd)’ (London, United 
Kingdom, adopted July 2001) 2-3, and Resolution on Transparency within the 
International Whaling Commission, Resolution 2001-1, IWC/53/23Rev; IWC 55th Annual 
Meeting of June 2003, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2003 – 
covering the 55th 2002-2003 financial year’ (Berlin, Germany, adopted June 2003) 27; 
IWC 58th Meeting of June 2006, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 
2006 – covering the 2005-2006 financial year’ (St Kitts and Nevis, West Indies, adopted 
June 2006) 7; CCAMLR-XIV Meeting of 24 October – 3 November 1995, ‘Report of the 
Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 1995) 
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relevance to construction of the object and purpose are Articles 19, 31 and 32. Article 
31 provides that: 
Article 31, GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION  
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
Article 31 presents a nuanced approach to interpretation that requires a textual, 
objective reading, which then requires object and purpose-oriented (teleological) and 
 
71; CCAMLR-XIX Meeting of 23 October – 3 November, 2000, ‘Report of the Nineteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November, 2000) 64; 
CCAMLR-XXVII Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 2008, ‘Report of the Twenty-Seventh 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 2008) 68; 
CCAMLR-XXVIII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 2009, ‘Report of the Twenty-Eight 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 2009) 52; 
CCAMLR-XXXIV Meeting of 19-30 October 2015, ‘Report of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of 
the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 30 October 2015) 163. 
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intention-based (subjective) approaches to provide a comprehensive interpretation of a 
treaty. Article 31(1) provides that a treaty is to be interpreted ‘with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty’. This is the initial objective, or textual 
approach to treaty interpretation. This considers the text as the primary source of 
treaty interpretation and construction of the object and purpose.78  
Article 31(1) then states that the textual, objective interpretation of treaty provisions 
must be ‘in their context and in light of the object and purpose’. This combines the 
textual, objective approach with a teleological, or purpose-based, element.79 The 
teleological approach considers the object and purpose a fundamental interpretive 
tool.80 But wait, there’s more! Article 31(2) incorporates subjective aspects of 
interpretation. A key source of interpretation is the intentions of the states party at the 
conclusion of the treaty. The subjective approach to interpretation is also present 
through the inclusion of instruments and agreements made by all parties at the time of 
the conclusion of the treaty as relevant to interpretation.81  
The balance between the three methods – objective, subjective and teleological – is clear 
in Article 31 as well as Article 32. These Articles refer to consideration of treaty text, 
and the treaty preamble as central to construction. Annexes,82 agreements83 and 
practices84 are also significant. Article 32 refers to contextual understanding of the 
 
78 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1); Waldock, above n 67, 54, [8]; Jonas and Saunders, 
above n 44, 578; Gardiner, above n 55, Ch 5; Hall, above n 71; contra see Hulme, above n 
39, 1285. 
79 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 578; Gardiner, above n 55,Ch 5; Hall, above n 71; 
contra, see Hulme, above n 39, 1285. 
80 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41; Gardiner, above n 545 189; Shaw, Malcolm N, 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 7th ed, 2014) 676; Hall, above n 73, 105; 
Waldock, above n 67, 54, [7]. 
81 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1); Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 578; Gardiner, 
above n 55, Chapter 5. 
82 Vienna Convention, Article 31(2). 
83 Vienna Convention, Article 31(2)(a)(b), 31(3)(a)(b). 
84 Vienna Convention, Article 31(3)(b). 
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parties’ intentions with reference to the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion,85 and 
to the travaux préparatoires.86  
Article 31(3)(c) also requires that interpretation take into account relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between parties in establishing context.87 
For example, legal principles affecting regional fisheries include the duty to cooperate,88 
the duty on regional fishery bodies (RFBs) to take primary responsibility for high seas 
marine living resource management89 and other principles of marine environmental 
conservation arising from the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.90  
There are also soft law instruments focussing on managing common or global 
environmental concerns, a recurrent focus in international law,91 beginning with the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration.92 While these soft law instruments are not binding, they 
are useful context for interpretation as subsequent practice, particularly in light of the 
 
85 Vienna Convention, Article 32. 
86 Vienna Convention, Article 32. 
87 Vienna Convention, Article 31(3)(c); Gardiner, above n 55, 250-251. 
88 Elise Anne Clark, ‘Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management – An Analysis of the 
Duty to Cooperate’ (2011) 9 New Zealand Journal of Public International Law 223; 
Gardiner, above n 55, 268-269 citing The Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Railway (Belgium v 
Netherlands) (Award) (2005) RIAA 35–125.  
89 Law of the Sea Convention, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1883 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 16 November 1994) Article 197 (‘Law of the Sea Convention’). 
90 Ibid Articles 64, 65, 87, 88, 116-120 and Part XII. 
91 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment UN Doc 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev 1 (1973) (‘Stockholm Declaration’); Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol 1) (1992) (‘Rio Declaration’); 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development A/CONF.199/20 (2002) 
(‘Johannesburg Declaration’); Gro Harlem Brundtland, Report of the World Commission 
of Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 42nd session, Agenda item 83(e) 
of the provisional agenda, UN Doc A/42/427 (4 August 1987) Annex (‘Our Common 
Future’). 
92 Stockholm Declaration UN Doc A/Conf.48/14/Rev 1 (1973). 
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temporal aspect of interpretation, requiring interpretation to be made in light of 
contemporary norms and not those at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.93 
While a hierarchy exists between Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention,94 Rahim 
Moloo argues that within Article 31 there is no hierarchy, and that subsequent practice 
is of equal footing to the text in interpreting the meaning of a treaty. This understanding 
of Article 31 is supported by the International Law Commission (ILC).95 Context, 
subsequent practice, and subsequent agreements are as significant to interpreting 
treaty text as the text itself, as these reflect the interpretation of the treaty by parties to 
it, and provide special meaning or depth of meaning to terms and provisions that may, 
on the face of the text, have a different meaning.  
For construction of the object and purpose, and treaty interpretation generally, Article 
32 is only of use where interpretation under Article 31 leaves the meaning of a treaty 
provision or text ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable.96 Thus, the materials listed at Articles 31(2) and (3) have more 
interpretative value than the preparatory materials in section 32.97 The primary 
reference point for treaty interpretation is Article 31, which engages textual, 
teleological and contextual means of interpretation.  The object and purpose under 
Article 31 is a key aspect of treaty interpretation, and a clear understanding of its 
fundamental principles, or aspects, is necessary to treaty interpretation and the work of 
international treaty bodies. 
 
93 Ulf Linderfalk, ‘Is Treaty Interpretation an Art or a Science? International Law and 
Rational Decision Making’ (2015) 26(1) The European Journal of International Law 169, 
169-170.  
94 Rahim Moloo, ‘When Actions Speak Louder Than Words: The Relevance of 
Subsequent Party Conduct to Treaty Interpretation’ (2013) 31(1) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 39, 43. 
95 Ibid; ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ (1966) 2 Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 187, 219-20. 
96 Vienna Convention, Article 32 (a) and (b). 
97 Hulme, above n 39, 1298. 
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2.2.3 Construction of the object and purpose  
The Vienna Convention contains no specific rules for divining the object and purpose of a 
treaty. However, it has been accepted that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is the 
reference point for the construction of the object and purpose, depending upon the text 
of a treaty and its context.98 This entails a two-step process: consideration of the text of 
the treaty, followed by consideration of the context listed at Article 31(2) and (3). 
Construction of the object and purpose is subject to the same interpretative rules as 
those for treaty obligations, under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. The 
Vienna Convention is silent on the source of the object and purpose,99 but it has been 
accepted that the matters listed for elucidation of context can also apply to the 
construction of object and purpose.100 The Preamble to a treaty is a primary source of 
the object and purpose,101 explaining the motivations and objectives behind the 
treaty.102  
Commentators have noted that there is a circularity in the argument that the object and 
purpose can be found in the text of the treaty in order to interpret the text of the 
treaty.103 Jonas and Saunders note that this is not a problem when we consider that the 
object and purpose is a general statement used for the purposes of understanding 
 
98 Hulme, above n 39, 1300; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for 
signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980); 
Linderfalk, ‘Art or Science?’, above n 93, 178 citing Case Concerning Sovereignty over 
Pulau Ligitan and Pulay Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) Judgment, 17 December 2002, ICJ 
Reports (2002) 625; Klabbers, above n 43 [11] citing Pellet Tenth Report, 57th sess, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 June 2005); Waldock, above n 67, 53. 
99 Hulme, above n 39, 1296. 
100 Hulme, above n 391, 1300; Vienna Convention; Linderfalk, ‘Art or Science?’, above n 
93, 178 citing Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulay Sipadan 
(Indonesia/Malaysia) Judgment, 17 December 2002, ICJ Reports (2002) 625; Klabbers, 
above n 43 [11] citing Pellet Tenth Report, 57th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 
June 2005); Waldock, above n 67, 53. 
101 Makane Moïse Mbengue, Oxford Public International Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (at September 2006) ‘Preamble’ [5] citing Beagle Channel 
Arbitration (Argentina v Chile) (Awards) (1977) 52 ILR 132; Hulme, above n 39, 1287, 
1297-1300. 
102 Hulme, above n 39, 1288; Gardiner, above n 55, 186. 
103 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 574; Koskeniemmi, above n 25, 298. 
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specific provisions or behaviours.104 So, while the treaty as a whole is the primary 
source of definition for the object and purpose, the object and purpose is a general 
concept for the interpretation of specific obligations in the treaty.  
Object and purpose construction is aided by historical and subsequent practices, 
instruments and agreements of the parties. Historical and subsequent practices have 
been generally accepted in practice and scholarly commentary as bearing on the object 
and purpose.105 Subsequent practices and agreements are of particular interest, as they 
can indicate how treaty organizations have changed with time and how the approach to 
treaty obligations may give a special meaning to words in the treaty. Sources of 
subsequent practice and agreements or instruments depend on one key factor: common 
practice, agreement or understanding amongst all parties to a treaty.106 These can 
impact on principles within the object and purpose, particularly where words have not 
been defined in the treaty text.  
The question of precedent can arise when considering construction of the object and 
purpose. Where a treaty has been the subject of a dispute in the ICJ the decision of the 
court applies only to the parties that submitted to its jurisdiction,107 and decisions of 
the court or other courts are not considered precedential.108 However, there is 
widespread use of previous judicial decision to inform the reasoning of courts.109 The 
question of an authoritative or precedential construction of the object and purpose of 
 
104 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 582. 
105 Linderfalk, ‘Art or Science?’, above n 93, 178 citing Case Concerning Sovereignty over 
Pulau Ligitan and Pulay Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) Judgment, 17 December 2002, ICJ 
Reports (2002) 625; Klabbers, above n 43 citing Pellet, Tenth Report, 57th sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 June 2005). 
106 Rodoljub M Etinski, ‘Means of Interpretation and their Interrelationship’ (2016) 1 
Novi Sad Faculty of Law Serbia Collected Papers 9, 23 (doi:10.5937/zrpfns50-10844); 
Waldock, above n 67, 53. 
107 Statute of the International Court of Justice, (26 June 1945) 59 Stat 1055 (ICJ Statute) 
Articles 36(1) and 59. 
108 ICJ Statute, Articles 38(1)(d) and 59.  
109 Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Chapter 13: Theorizing Precedent in International Law’ in 
Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor, Interpretation in International Law 
(Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015) 269-270. 
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the Whaling Convention arises because of the Whaling in the Antarctic case. However, 
the decision of the ICJ is only authoritative in relation to the parties to the case, in 
accordance with its own statute, and its decision can only inform later reasoning or 
decision-making. 
Two principles of treaty interpretation that are also useful in considering the 
construction of the object and purpose are the principles of contemporaneity and 
effectiveness. The application of these principles is subject to Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention.110 The principle of contemporaneity recognises applicable aspects of 
subsequent practice or agreement, and relevant rules of international law. The principle 
of effectiveness focuses on ensuring the stability of a treaty through interpretation and 
definition that carries out the treaty provisions most effectively. Contemporaneity can 
also be described as the principle of ‘system integration’, recognising the contemporary 
legal system within which a treaty regime operates.111 
The principle of contemporaneity recognises that no legal relationship remains 
unaffected by the passage of time, and that the meaning of treaties can present 
difficulties if change is not taken into account in interpretation.112 The principle reflects 
the need to take into account changes in legal principles and circumstances, recognised 
between all parties, without undermining the fundamental object and purpose of a 
treaty, maintaining a balance between stability and change.113  
 
110 Unless ambiguity brings Vienna Convention Article 32 into operation: Moloo, ‘Actions 
Speak Louder’, above n 94, 43. 
111 Margaret A Young and Sebastian Rioseco Sullivan, ‘Evolution Through the Duty to 
Cooperate: Implications of the Whaling Case at the International Court of Justice’ (2015) 
16 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 12 citing Fragmentation of International 
Law UN Doc A/CN.4/L.702. 
112 Martin Dawidowicz, ‘The Effect of the Passage of Time on the Interpretation of 
Treaties: Some Reflections on Costa Rica v. Nicaragua’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 201, 201. 
113 Georg Nolte, Treaties Over Time in Particular: Subsequent Agreement and Practice, 
International Law Commission, 365 [1-2] UN Doc A/63/10 (2008) cited in Rahim 
Moloo, ‘Changing Times, Changing Obligations? The Interpretation of Treaties over 
Time (2012) 106 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International 
Law) 261, 262. 
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The limits of reference for determining the materials that can be used in application of 
the contemporaneity principle are those listed in Article 31: 
any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. 
any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
The principle of contemporaneity does not override the intentions of parties to a treaty, 
but permits the recognition of subsequent practices and agreements that reflect either 
the specific understanding of the parties to a treaty, or subsequent practices and 
agreements that incorporate relevant rules of international law.114 This is particularly 
important when considering the object and purpose, as later political constructions of 
the object and purpose still require reference back to consensus decisions of all parties 
to a treaty to expand the meaning of terms and provisions. 
The principle of effectiveness is a means of ensuring treaties have their proper effect, 
and states cannot ‘narrow down treaty obligations through political manipulation’.115 
The principle of effectiveness requires interpretation of treaty provisions that best 
carry into effect the object and purpose. This reinforces the significance of the object 
and purpose and the importance of clearly constructing the object and purpose.  
The principle of effectiveness also requires that ‘none of the provisions in the treaty is 
deprived of meaning’116 and so construction of the object and purpose requires that no 
aspect of the object and purpose is rendered meaningless. During the ILC Codification 
 
114 Moloo, ‘Changing Times’, above n 113, 263. 
115 Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International 




work, Special Rapporteur Waldock formulated the effectiveness rule as ‘to give effect to 
the plain meaning and the object and purpose of the treaty’, which is reflected in Article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention.117 The text, which includes the object and purpose, is 
the primary instrument for interpretation, ensuring effectiveness.118 
2.2.4 The relevance of the object and purpose in assessing non-state and NGO behaviours 
Construction of the object and purpose must comprehend all elements of the object and 
purpose of the treaty. An holistic construction of the object and purpose provides a 
sound basis for a substantive use of the object and purpose as a measure of legality or 
propriety of state and NGO behaviour. It is also an interpretive basis from which 
disputes can begin with common ground. The focus should be on the balance within the 
object and purpose as to its elements or principles, not a competition between these 
principles. 
Without an holistic construction, the object and purpose can become a selective account 
of the object and purpose: the construction most favourable to the state putting it 
forward.119 The object and purpose, by its nature and its sources, is flexible and open to 
nuanced application.120 But constructions that exclude important elements undermine 
the treaty and its application and can prevent states parties to treaties resolving 
disputes within the treaty organization itself. Selective accounts of the object and 
purpose create opposing positions based on political understanding rather than legal 
understanding.  
Without a level of certainty in the construction of the object and purpose, political 
disputes within a treaty organization continue without reference to the fundamental 
spirit of the treaty, and without reference to key aspects of the contemporaneity and 
effectiveness rules, which require consensus agreement and full construction of the 
 
117 Ibid 397. 
118 Ibid 398. 
119 Hulme, above n 39, 1300; Michael Bowman, ‘“Normalizing” the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling’ (2008) 29(3) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 293, 383. 
120 Jonas and Saunders, above n 41, 569; Klabbers, above n 43 [22] citing Pellet, Tenth 
Report, 57th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 June 2005). 
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object and purpose. Without due reference to such rules, states could be said to violate 
their fundamental obligations under international law,121 and create conflicts that go 
against the common understanding of the object and purpose as a unified concept.122 
The extent to which non-state actors should also be affected by the object and purpose 
of treaties has not been addressed in any of the literature on NGOs and treaty 
interpretation. NGOs, while not parties to any international conventions, engage with 
treaty organizations and states party to treaties. As a matter of logic, it makes little 
sense to have the primary actor in international law subject to its own agreement, but 
allow subordinate actors engaging with that agreement, a free hand in the advocacy, 
information, or action they bring to engagement with a treaty organization, unfettered 
by consideration of the object and purpose of the treaty. Accordingly, the text of a treaty 
should be the limit of their abilities in their formal role within a treaty organization, as it 
is for states. Where legal instruments in a treaty organization create rights of 
engagement for non-state actors, it is logical to require a parallel set of procedural and 
substantive responsibilities in exercising those rights.  Organizational structures, Codes 
of Conduct and Rules of Procedure govern many aspects of NGO behaviours, but 
consideration of the object and purpose of a treaty can improve and add weight to these 
structures, codes and rules through ensuring recognition of the legal parameters of the 
treaty organization.  
2.2.5 Summary 
This part has offered an approach to the object and purpose as the fundamental logic 
underlying a treaty. This is significant because the fundamental logic or ‘spirit’ of a 
 
121 United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2 UN GAOR, Main Comm, 55th 
sess, Agenda Item 60(b), UN Doc A/RES/55/2; The rule of law at the national and 
international levels, GA Res 64/116 UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 64th sess, Agenda Item 83, UN 
Doc A/RES/64/116 (16 December 2009); The rule of law at the national and 
international levels, GA Res 66/102 UNGAOR, 6th Comm, 66th sess, Agenda item 83, UN 
Doc A/RES/66/102 (6 December 2011); Declaration of the high-level meeting of the 
General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels, GA Res 67/1 
UN GAOR, Main Comm, 67th sess, Agenda Item 83, UN Doc A/RES/67/1 (24 September 
2012); International Law Commission, Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States 
with commentaries, GA Res 375(IV) UN GAOR, 270th plenary meeting (6 December 
1949) Annex, Article 14. 
122 Klabbers, above n 55 [7]. 
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treaty informs the work of treaty bodies and related organs. This part identified the 
sources of the object and purpose within the text of the treaty, and outside it, according 
to the Vienna Convention. It further discussed the significance of the object and purpose 
as a unified concept, in both interpreting treaty text and assessing state and non-state 
conduct. It highlighted key issues in the construction and application of the object and 
purpose and demonstrated the parallels between treaty interpretation and object and 
purpose construction. The next section constructs the object and purpose the CAMLR 
Convention and Whaling Convention before examining Articles key to the exercise of 
each Commission’s jurisdiction. 
2.3 Defining the object and purpose in the CAMLR Convention and Whaling 
Convention 
2.3.1 Introduction to object and purpose of the conventions 
A comprehensive construction of the object and purpose can provide a means of 
interrogating whether non-state actors, particularly NGOs use their position under a 
treaty to advance the object and purpose. This section constructs the CAMLR Convention 
object and purpose, and the Whaling Convention object and purpose, with reference to 
three primary principles at the core of both conventions: use, conservation, and 
common concern.  
The object and purpose of both conventions is defined using the textual and contextual 
approaches under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, with particular reference to 
applicable instruments and agreements existing at the time of drafting of the treaty,123 
subsequent practice,124 and applicable norms and rules of international law.125 These 
constructions take into account the difficulties of giving too much specificity to concepts 
that rely on context and application for specific meaning.126 
 
123 Vienna Convention, Article 31(2)(a). 
124 Vienna Convention, Article 31(3)(b). 
125 Vienna Convention, Article 31(3)(c). 
126 Klabbers, above n 55 [7] and [11] citing Pellet Tenth Report, 57th sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (14 June 2005); Gardiner, above n 55, 194. 
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Conservation and use 
The primacy of use and conservation is clear through Article II of the CAMLR Convention, 
and the preambular text of the Whaling Convention. Use, conservation and common 
concern are the primary elements of the object and purpose clearly articulated as such 
in the CAMLR Convention and the Whaling Convention.  
Use refers to the extraction of marine living resources – in the Whaling Commission this 
is species of toothed and baleen whales, in the CAMLR Commission, these are fish, krill, 
and crab species within the CAMLR Convention Area. In the CAMLR Convention ‘use’ is 
rational use. Article II states that conservation includes rational use. In the Whaling 
Convention, the preambular text and the treaty as a whole makes clear that use is a 
primary purpose of the convention, supported by conservation, and concern for future 
generations having access to whaling resources. 
Conservation is a word commonly used in international environmental law. Its meaning 
is presumed to be commonly known, and writers often do not bother to define it. 
Defining conservation without context among competing stakeholders can lead to 
conflict about the precise nature of conservation in context, because the contents of the 
term are reliant on context.127 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines 
conservation as ‘preservation, protection or restoration of the natural environment and 
of wildlife’ and ‘the practice of seeking to prevent the wasteful use of a resource in order 
to ensure its continuing availability.’128 Firstly the use of the word ‘preservation’ in this 
definition confuses some of the language in international environmental law. 
Preservation, as a legal concept has been viewed as antiquated as preservation attempts 
to freeze ecosystems or resources in perpetuity, without reference to the dynamism of 
ecosystems and species.129 However, it also has connotations of future generations’ 
access to resources.  
 
127 Peter J Brosius and Diane Russell, ‘Conservation from Above: Imposing 
Transboundary Conservation’ (2008) 17(1-2) Journal of Sustainable Forestry 39, 42-44. 
128 Oxford English Dictionary (online), Conservation n. (e) (November 2010) 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39564?redirectedFrom=conservation#eid.   
129 Anastasia Teletsky, An Cliquet, and Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, Ecological Restoration in 
International Environmental Law (Taylor & Francis, 2016) 21. 
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A general definition in international environmental law, reflecting the OED, and without 
the complication of preservation is conservation as the ‘saving of natural resources for 
later consumption’, in terms of both non-consumptive and consumptive use.130 
Definitions of conservation in international environmental law can recognise the 
complexity of conservation in terms of the array of practices and concepts that inform 
and define conservation. These include sustainable use, commercial use, rational use, 
and protecting and preserving resources for future generations.131 The CAMLR 
Convention clearly incorporates rational use as an aspect of conservation.132 
Fundamentally, conservation has to be a goal of a treaty body or system. That body or 
system must seek to maintain, protect, or rebuild resources for consumptive or non-
consumptive values. The context, both legal and practical, will inevitably inform the 
precise nature of the conservation actions undertaken, and the limits of its application, 
as well as the meaning of the term ‘conservation’ itself.  
Common concern  
The general recognition of what is considered to be ‘in common’ in academic literature 
points to both geographical and topical issues affecting a global community.133 It 
emphasises a common issue.134 Common concern can be found in international 
documents, such as Article 7 of the Rio Declaration, as the need ‘to conserve, protect and 
 
130 Ibid citing John Arthur Passamore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature (Duckworth, 
1974) 73. 
131 Edward J Goodwin, International Environmental Law and the Conservation of Coral 
Reefs (Routledge, 2011). 
132 CAMLR Convention, Article II(1). 
133 Jimena Murillo, ‘Common Concern of Humankind and its Implications in 
International Environmental Law’ (2008) 5 Macquarie Journal of International 
Comparative Environmental Law 133, 133; Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons’ (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243. 
134 Murillo, above n 133; Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP, 2007) 552; R St John MacDonald 
and Douglas M Johnston, The Structure and Process of International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2nd ed, 1986); Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International 
Law and the Environment (OUP, 2nd ed, 2009) 137. 
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restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem’.135 A common concern has 
been defined as an environmental issue that affects humans as a species, often focussed 
on the avoidance of irreversible harm and the protection of ‘resources of global 
significance’.136 Brunnée notes that common concern entitles, ‘perhaps even’ requires, 
‘all states to cooperate internationally to address the concern’.137 This obligation ties 
closely with the duty to cooperate.138  
Common concern is recognised as environmental issues that either have a global 
impact, such as climate change, ozone depletion and biodiversity, or an environmental 
issue that is a matter of concern for humankind because of the qualities perceived in the 
geographical area, species or particular issue.139 There are common concern references 
in the two conventions. In the CAMLR Convention preamble ‘it is in the interest of all 
mankind to preserve the waters surrounding the Antarctic continent for peaceful 
purposes only’. In the Whaling Convention preamble there is ‘the interest of the nations 
of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources 
represented by the whale stocks’ The CAMLR Convention common concern covers 
several aspects of a general definition of common concern, including geographical area, 
species-based concern, biodiversity and climate change. The Whaling Convention falls 
within the definition as biodiversity and species-based topics of common concern.  
2.3.2 The object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention 
This section constructs the object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention. This section 
covers Article II of the CAMLR Convention, the Antarctic Treaty, subsequent practice of 
 
135 Rio Declaration, Principle 7; Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, above n 134, 564. 
136 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 134, 122, 130. 
137 Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, above n 134, 566.  
138 Law of the Sea Convention, Article 118. 
139 Jutta Brunnée ‘International Environmental Law: Rising to the Challenge of Common 
Concern?’ (2006) 100 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 307-310, 308; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Advisory Opinion) ICJ Reports 1996, Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui [13]; Case 
Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) ICJ Rep 1997, 118; 
Murillo, above n 134, 133; Hardin, above n 133; Brundtland, above n 91; Birnie, Boyle 
and Redgwell, above n 134, 119; Sands et al, Principles of International Environmental 
Law (CUP, 3rd, 2012) 209. 
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the CAMLR Commission members in defining common concern, conservation and 
rational use, and incorporation of the precautionary approach into Article II. This 
section then locates the CAMLR Convention in the context of applicable international law 
rules, including the duty to cooperate, and primary responsibility of regional fishery 
bodies (RFBs) for the management of high seas marine living resources.  
The CAMLR Convention was negotiated by Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) 
pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty Article IX conservation mandate.140 The CAMLR 
Convention object and purpose cannot be defined in isolation from the Antarctic Treaty 
and the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS); they are connected to such a degree that the 
CAMLR Convention can be described as ‘an integral part of the Antarctic Treaty 
System.’141 The CAMLR Convention recognises the Antarctic Treaty numerous times in 
the Preamble and its substantive parts,142 and the object and purpose of the Antarctic 
Treaty is ‘in CCAMLR’s genetic make-up’.143 Common concern for the preservation of 
the Antarctic for peaceful purposes for all mankind elements of the object and purpose 
in the CAMLR Convention has firm roots in the Antarctic Treaty.144 However, the rational 
use and conservation145 elements of the object and purpose in the CAMLR Convention 
are unique to the context from which the convention arose. 
Article II of the CAMLR Convention is the source of the use and conservation principles. 
It spells out the objective of the convention and articulates an ecosystem approach146 to 
 
140 Antarctic Treaty, Article IX(1) (f):preservation and conservation of living resources 
in Antarctica; Jessica Nilsson, Elizabeth A Fulton, Marcus Haward, Craig Johnson, 
‘Consensus management in Antarctica’s high seas – Past success and current challenges’ 
(2016) 73 Marine Policy 172, 173.  
141 New Zealand, CCAMLR in the Antarctic Treaty System 2006/WP14/ATCM-5, 3. 
142 Ibid; CAMLR Convention Preamble, Articles III, IV, V, XV; Article V is not of direct 
interpretative relevance and so has not been discussed. 
143 New Zealand, CCAMLR in the Antarctic Treaty System 2006/WP14/ATCM-5, 3. 
144 CAMLR Convention, Preamble; Antarctic Treaty, Preamble. 
145 Although Article IX(1)(f) of the Antarctic Treaty recognises the role of member 
states in drafting and proposing measures for the preservation and conservation of 
Antarctic living resources. 
146 CAMLR Convention Article II.3.c.; Nilsson et al, above n 124, 176. 
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marine living resource management.147 Article II.1 sets out conservation and use in the 
following terms: 
1. The objective of this Convention is the conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘conservation’ includes rational use. 
On this basis, conservation, including rational use is the foremost principle of the 
CAMLR Convention object and purpose. Article II.3 goes on to define rational use 
through a number of principles of conservation by which harvesting and associated 
activities are to be conducted.148  
The definition of rational use is part of the object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention, 
as well as part of the substantive obligations on states party. Firstly, it indicates the that 
the conservation and use of marine living resources as an essential aspect of 
Commission decision-making under the convention. Secondly, the interpretation of 
rational use in the decision-making of the Commission under the CAMLR Convention 
affects the object and purpose construction, and vice versa; interpretation and 
application over time can account for subsequent practice or agreement. Rational use 
and conservation are essential to the practices of the Commission, as later aspects of 
Article II make clear: 
3. Any harvesting and associated activities in the area to which this Convention applies 
shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and with the 
following principles of conservation: 
a) prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels 
below those which ensure its stable recruitment. For this purpose its size 
 
147 Lawrence Cordonnery, Alan D Hemmings, Lorne Kriwoken, ‘Nexus and Imbroglio: 
CCAMLR, the Madrid Protocol and Designating Antarctic Marine Protected Areas in the 
Southern Ocean’ (2015) 30 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 727, 
735; Denzil GM Miller, Eugene N Sabourenkov, and David C Ramm, ‘Managing Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources: The CCAMLR Approach’ (2004) 19(4) The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 317, 317. 
148 Dr Robert Hofman, The intent of Article II of the CAMLR Convention (Discussion paper 





should not be allowed to fall below a level close to that which ensures the 
greatest net annual increment; 
b) maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, dependent 
and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources and the 
restoration of depleted populations to the levels defined in sub-paragraph 
(a) above; and 
c) prevention of changes or minimisation of the risk of changes in the marine 
ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades, 
taking into account the state of available knowledge of the direct and 
indirect impact of harvesting, the effect of the introduction of alien species, 
the effects of associated activities on the marine ecosystem and of the 
effects of environmental changes, with the aim of making possible the 
sustained conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. 
These fundamental principles have significant influence in the work of the Commission 
and its Scientific Committee. Article II affects the drafting, deliberation and passage of 
conservation measures, and other substantive functions of the Commission as they 
provide the object and purpose boundaries for conservation and rational use.  
The preventative aspect of Article II.3 is clearly marked by the use of the word 
‘prevention’. However, changes to the substantive application of Article II.3 reflect 
subsequent practice incorporating applicable international law rules that override 
‘prevention’.149 This affects the object and purpose as much as interpretation of 
convention obligations.150 Interpretation of Article II of the CAMLR Convention by the 
CAMLR Commission has expanded the preventative approach to incorporate the 
precautionary approach.151 The precautionary approach152 was stipulated under the 
Fish Stocks Agreement and other international agreements and instruments, and has 
been incorporated into CAMLR Commission conservation measures and scientific 
 
149 Vienna Convention, Article 31(3)(c). 
150 Nilsson, Fulton and Haward, above n 140, 172. 
151 Miller, Sabourenkov, and Ramm, above n 147, 317. 
152 Delegation of Australia, The Relevance to CCAMLR of the UN Agreement relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
CCAMLR-XV/12 Rev 1, 1 and 5. 
 
 45 
modelling. This has created subsequent practice153 in the application of the 
precautionary approach norm, expanding the fundamental principles of conservation 
under Article II.3.  
The change lies in the difference between prevention and precaution. Prevention is an 
approach that relies on certainty of scientific knowledge.154 The precautionary 
approach is action consistent with the precautionary principle in that uncertainty or a 
lack of scientific knowledge should not be a reason to delay cost effective action to 
prevent or address potential and serious environmental degradation.155 This means 
that the conservation and use aspects of object and purpose have been affected by 
developments in international environmental law.156 These changes are consistent with 
the principles of effectiveness and contemporaneity.157  
 
153 I Everson and W K de la Mare, ‘Some Thoughts on Precautionary Measures for the 
Krill Fishery’ (1996) 3 CCAMLR Science 1; CCAMLR meeting reports show that 
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CCAMLR-XXI Meeting of 21 October – 1 November, 2002, ‘Report of the Twenty-First 
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154 James Cameron, ‘Chapter 5: The Precautionary Principle in International Law’ in Tim 
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Whaling in the Antarctic. Significance and implications of the ICJ judgment (Brill, 2016) 
11 -37, 21; the definition in the Rio Declaration at Principle 15 is: ‘Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.’ 
156 The conservation focus in the CAMLR Convention is a confirmation of development in 
the Antarctic Treaty to an increasing focus on the importance of conservation in the 
Antarctic as an object and purpose of the Antarctic Treaty. The Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora was drawn up at the third Antarctic Treaty 
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Common concern in the CAMLR Convention connects the convention to its place in the 
ATS.  
The CAMLR Convention replicates the Antarctic Treaty Preamble on peaceful purposes 
for the marine environment. The Antarctic Treaty states:  
it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international 
discord.  
The CAMLR Convention confirms the peaceful purposes principle imported from the 
Antarctic Treaty in its Preamble: 
BELIEVING that it is in the interest of all mankind to preserve the waters surrounding the 
Antarctic continent for peaceful purposes only and to prevent their becoming the scene or 
object of international discord; 
Common concern is fundamental to the operation of the convention, and to the work of 
the Commission because it manifests in the consensus decision making structure158 and 
informs deliberations of the Commission.159 Common concern can be seen in the 
 
Consultative Meeting (ATCM), indicating the immediate consideration of the 
importance of conservation to the work of the ATCPs within the ATS. Subsequent 
practices at the ATCM indicated a continuing and extensive concern for conservation 
values in Antarctica. Confirmation of the subsequent practice of the ATCPs to a 
conservation focus is reflected in the preambular text of the CAMLR Convention. The 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol) was 
further confirmation of the subsequent practices of the ATS to focus on conservation, as 
have been the development of the CAMLR Convention and the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals. This position is further reinforced by the 2016 Santiago 
Declaration, which highlights protection and conservation of the Antarctic environment 
and ecosystems as a legal obligation and central focus of the Antarctic Treaty. The 
Antarctic Treaty object and purpose, which initially had little conservation focus, has 
moved in both practice and agreement toward greater engagement with the 
conservation aspect of the object and purpose, as well as the specific obligations under 
the treaty. This interpretation of the object and purpose, acknowledging the increased 
focus on Article IX, 1(f), is in line with Vienna Convention, Article 31, 3(a) and (b), and 
the principle of contemporaneity. 
157 Dawidowicz, above n 112; Moloo, ‘Actions Speak Louder’, above n 94, 43; Young and 
Sullivan, above n 111. 
158 Nilsson, Fulton and Haward, above n 140, 174; CAMLR Convention, Article XII.1. 
159 CCAMLR-XXV Meeting of 23 October – 3 November, 2006, ‘Report of the Twenty-Fifth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2006) 
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essentially peaceful ends achieved through various CAMLR Commission initiatives for 
conservation, such as the prevention of seabird bycatch mortality.160  
As the Law of the Sea Convention notes, in international law states must be ‘conscious 
that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a 
whole.’161 The preservation of Antarctic waters for peaceful purposes focuses on the 
resources and ecosystems of the Antarctic marine environment, which fits the criteria of 
‘common concern’. The creation of the CAMLR Convention Area, the use of the 
ecosystem approach, and the fact that the Convention Area is a meeting point of the 
Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans gives us both geographical and topical commons. The 
preservation of the Antarctic waters for peaceful purposes and scientific cooperation 
can be a focus on the resources and ecosystem of the Antarctic marine environment, 
and a concern for the future of mankind, referencing global, topical issues including 
climate change, biodiversity, 162 and freedom from nuclear threats.163 This gives the 
 
‘Implementation of the Objectives of the Convention’ [17.1] 78; CCAMLR-XXI Meeting of 
21 October – 1 November, 2002, ‘Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission’ 
(Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2002) [13.9] 73; CCAMLR-XXVIII Meeting of 26 
October – 6 November 2009, ‘Report of the Twenty-Eight Meeting of the Commission’ 
(Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 2009) Annex 7 ‘Washington Ministerial 
Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty and the International 
Polar Year and Polar Science’195; CCAMLR-V Meeting of 8 – 19 September, 1986, ‘Report 
of the Fifth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 19 September 1986) 
[10] 3; and concerning continued dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom 
over territorial sovereignty within the Antarctic and CCAMLR areas: CCAMLR-XIX 
Meeting of 25 October – 3 November, 2000, ‘Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the 
Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November, 2000) [5.17] 17; CCAMLR-XXII 
Meeting of 27 October – 7 November, 2003, ‘Report of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the 
Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 2003) [8.65] 46.  
160 Longline weighting for seabird conservation Conservation Measure 24-02, 2014; 
Minimisation of the incidental mortality of seabirds in the course of longline fishing or 
longline fishing research in the Convention Area Conservation Measure 25-02, 2015; 
Minimisation of the incidental mortality of seabirds and marine mammals in the course of 
trawl fishing in the Convention Area Conservation Measure 25-03, 2015. 
161 Law of the Sea Convention, Preamble. 
162 Brunnée, above n 139, 308. 
163 Consider the specific recognition of the Antarctic Treaty, Articles I and VI, which 
prohibit the use of Antarctica for nuclear testing or nuclear waste dumping.  
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concept of ‘the interest of all mankind’ a depth of common concern that animates the 
object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention. 
2.3.3 Other principles of the object and purpose 
Two aspects of the CAMLR Convention that affect the operation of the convention are the 
freeze on sovereign claims and the keeping of Antarctica for scientific purposes. These 
both affect decision-making and Commission behaviours and are essential to the 
scientific basis for the precautionary approach and rational use under Article II, as well 
as the consensus decision-making of the Commission. Consensus decision-making 
demonstrates that no state’s will overrides that of another. 
Scientific cooperation is an aspect of the object and purpose imported from the 
Antarctic Treaty. It finds expression in the CAMLR Convention focus on requiring a 
scientific basis for giving effect to Article II.164 To maintain the conservation aspect of 
the object and purpose, rational use must be defined in accordance with Article II, and 
its application interpreted in line with the scientific functions of the Commission under 
Article IX.165 The extensive mandate under Article IX for scientific research and the 
drafting and approval of conservation measures are the key operational aspects of the 
Convention. Articles XIV and XV of the CAMLR Convention embed the Scientific 
Committee in the structure of the Commission, creating a forum for scientific 
cooperation, and as an essential organ of the Commission. Scientific cooperation is 
evident in the multi-state representation of scientists within the Scientific Committee. 
Scientific cooperation as an aspect of the object and purpose is a balancing mechanism 
that prevents political reformulation of the object and purpose. The interpretation of 
legal obligations under the CAMLR Convention is not without controversy. The given 
definition of rational use under Article II has not prevented some creative 
interpretation of the meaning of ‘rational use’ to be ‘the right to fish’,166 similar to the 
 
164 CAMLR Convention, Article IX. 
165 Nilsson, Fulton and Haward, above n 140, 175. 
166 Jennifer Jacquet, Eli Blood-Patterson, Cassandra Brooks, David Ainley, ‘‘Rational use’ 
in Antarctic waters’ (2016) 63 Marine Policy 28, 29, 30-31. 
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right contained in the Law of the Sea Convention.167 For this interpretation to be 
accepted as practice would in turn affect the scope of the object and purpose through 
indications that the intentions of parties to the Convention have emphasized 
‘conservation includes rational use’ to mean ‘conservation includes the right to fish’. 
This in turn would affect the nature of precautionary and conservation principle of the 
object and purpose, removing the deliberative barriers that these principles bring to 
bear. It would also violate the principle under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention to 
give a primarily textual reading of a treaty. 
There is a clear need to recognise the practical importance of scientific cooperation as a 
principle of the object and purpose. Difficulties with the application and interpretation 
of rational use in Commission discussions,168 and the development of over-emphasis on 
harvesting versus conservation in CAMLR Commission practices169 demonstrate this 
need. A matrix of use, conservation, common concern, and scientific cooperation 
together create a matrix of principles informing the interpretation of the text. This also 
remains faithful to the Commission’s place within the ATS, and the concerns of the 
parties to the draft CAMLR Convention for conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources.170 
The freeze on sovereign claims to the Antarctic is a passive aspect of the object and 
purpose in that it is not actively engaged by any of the management tasks of the CAMLR 
Commission. The freezing of sovereign claims, central to the Antarctic Treaty is 
acknowledged at Article IV of the CAMLR Convention.171 The operational aspects of the 
CAMLR Convention that express this object and purpose principle is in consensus 
 
167 Law of the Sea Convention, Article 87. 
168 Jacquet et al., above n 166, 29, 30-31. 
169 New Zealand, CCAMLR in the Antarctic Treaty System 2006/WP14/ATCM-5. 
170 Antarctic Marine Living Resources Recommendation IX-2, Antarctic Treaty IX of 19 
September – 7 October 1977, ‘Final Report of the Ninth Consultative Meeting (London, 
UK, adopted 7 October 1977); ND Banks, ‘Environmental Protection in Antarctica: A 
Comment on the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources’ 
(1981) The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 303, 309; CAMLR Convention, 
Preamble. 
171 CAMLR Convention, Article IV. 
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decision-making and the geographical jurisdiction that exists within the CAMLR area. 
For states party to the CAMLR Convention, the high seas begin at the Antarctic continent 
edge,172 not at the edge of a 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the Antarctic 
coast, as the jurisdiction of the Commission extends down from the coordinates 
determined in the convention, with no exceptions.173 Consequently, the maritime 
delimitations relating to sovereignty defined in the Law of the Sea Convention do not 
apply in the CAMLR area due to the freezing of sovereign claims.174 To this degree, 
consensus decision-making in conservation measures in areas incorporating what areas 
that would otherwise be EEZs reflects acceptance of the absence of sovereign claim for 
the purposes of the CAMLR Commission.175 For this aspect of the object and purpose to 
become part of overt deliberations, there would need to be a dispute over asserting 
Exclusive Economic Zone jurisdiction by a state party. Without this conflict the freezing 
of sovereign claims remains expressed through the ordinary practices of the 
Commission. 
2.3.4 Summary of the CAMLR Convention object and purpose 
This section has offered an analysis of the text of the CAMLR Convention and its context 
to understand the scope of its object and purpose. The primary principles of the object 
and purpose are conservation, use and common concern. A clear understanding of the 
object and purpose provides us with the framework for analysing the contributions of 
NGOs in later chapters. Article II places conservation at the forefront of the CAMLR 
Convention object and purpose, within which is included rational use. Rational use is 
understood with reference to preventative and precautionary principles and an 
ecosystem approach to conservation.  
 
172 CAMLR Convention, Article I(1). 
173 CAMLR Convention, Article I(4). 
174 Cordonnery, Hemmings, Kriwoken, above n 147, 738. 
175 Except in the case of France and the waters adjacent to the Crozet and Kerguelen 
Islands. The Statement by the Chairman of the Conference on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources recognises that in these waters, France maintains the 
capacity to pass domestic regulations as it deems appropriate. Further, any CAMLR 
Conservation Measures that affect these waters must attain the consent of France to 
come into force. Although, with the continuing French membership of the Commission, 
this is equivalent to consensus.  
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Behind conservation and rational use is common concern for preserving Antarctica for 
peaceful purposes. All three principles are supported by scientific cooperation, which is 
a peaceful purpose that in turn supports the conservation and rational use principles of 
Article II. The freeze of sovereign claims is a passive, and accepted aspect of the object 
and purpose. Scientific cooperation is an important control on deliberations in the 
Commission, as determination of the scope of rational use is subject to scientific data.  
The object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention is influenced by a number of sources 
outside the Convention itself, through the provisions in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention. Some, such as the Antarctic Treaty are referenced directly in the Convention 
text. Others, such as the principles from the Fish Stocks Agreement (which post-dates the 
CAMLR Convention) have been incorporated through subsequent practice recognising 
these relevant rules of international law. Others are implicitly part of the structure of 
the CAMLR Convention object and purpose, such as the duty to cooperate and 
responsibility for high seas management of marine living resources. Other principles, 
such as common future, are the recognition of global issues within the regional focus.  
2.3.5 The object and purpose in the Whaling Convention text 
This section constructs the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention in relation to 
a number of key principles, using the same process as with the CAMLR Convention, with 
reference to the textual and contextual interpretative methods of Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention. Relevant rules of international law and common agreements are 
considered.  
As with the CAMLR Convention, the core principles of the Whaling Convention are use, 
conservation and common concern, with a functional emphasis on use and 
conservation. The object and purpose has only one additional principle and that is an 
emphasis on human welfare in relation to exploitation of whaling resources.176  
The intention of this chapter is to provide a neutral, legal and apolitical understanding 
of the object and purpose, rooted solidly in the text of the treaty. To aid this, the object 
and purpose of the Whaling Convention in this section incorporates only consensus-
based agreement on the nature of the object and purpose within the Commission and 
 
176 Whaling Convention, Article V.2(d). 
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only rules of international law that are the subject of a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) or have the status of a norm in international law. 
The Preamble is the primary source for understanding the object and purpose177 in the 
Whaling Convention, read in conjunction with the treaty as a whole. Article I of the 
Whaling Convention acknowledges the Schedule as part of the Convention. There is also 
specific context, in the form of an Agreement and instruments agreed between parties 
to be relevant to interpretation at the time of drafting,178 and the issue of subsequent 
practice and agreement indicating the incorporation of international law norms into the 
understanding of the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention.179 The invocation 
of travaux preparatoires as a means of determining the object and purpose is rejected, in 
light of the hierarchy between Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention,180 and the 
clarity possible from examination of the text and context without recourse to 
supplementary materials. 
Outside the text of the Whaling Convention, the precautionary approach,181 the duty to 
cooperate,182 and the Law of the Sea Convention are relevant rules of international law. 
However, the Law of the Sea Convention Articles on marine mammals contribute very 
little to the interpretation or application of the Whaling Convention.183 The relationship 
between the Whaling Convention and the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)184 and the Convention on Biological 
 
177 Bowman, above n 119, 320. 
178 Whaling Convention, Preamble; Vienna Convention, Article 31(2)(a) and (b). 
179 Vienna Convention, Article 31. 
180 Ulf Linderfalk, ‘Is the hierarchical structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention real or not? Interpreting the rules of interpretation’ (2007) 54(1) 
Netherlands International Law Review 133. 
181 Foster, above n 155; Rio Declaration, Principle 15.  
182 Young and Sullivan, above n 111, 5. 
183 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Whaling Convention and Thorny Issues of Interpretation’ 
in Fitzmaurice, Malgosia and Dai Tamada (eds), Whaling in the Antarctic. Significance 
and implications of the ICJ judgment (Brill, 2016) 55. 
184 Convention in International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
opened for signature 3 March 1973 993 UNTS243 (entered into force 1 July 1975). 
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Diversity (CBD)185 are the subject of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that give 
primary jurisdiction for the regulation of whaling to the Whaling Commission.186 Within 
the Commission the establishment of a Southern Atlantic Whale Sanctuary has been 
characterized by its proponents as necessary for compliance with the Law of the Sea 
Convention on marine mammals, and with the CBD.187 The precautionary approach is a 
norm of international environmental law,188 and recognized by the Whaling 
Commission as part of the Whaling Convention conservation principle.189 The duty to 
cooperate is inherent in the international legal system and within the Whaling 
Commission itself via the Whaling Convention.190 
Use and conservation are the central principles of the object and purpose of the Whaling 
Convention. This reflects the decision of the ICJ in Whaling in the Antarctic.191 The 
commentary in the ICJ decision on the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention 
was brief. In paragraphs [56–57] the judgment of the Court recognised that the primary 
heads of the object and purpose were use and conservation, and that these cannot be 
separated.192 The Court also noted that ‘amendments to the schedule and 
recommendations by the IWC may put an emphasis on one or the other objective 
 
185 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, [1993] ATS 32; 
1769 UNTS 79 (1992) 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993). 
186 Fitzmaurice, above n 183.  
187 IWC 60th Meeting of June 2008, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2008 – covering the 2007-2008 financial year’ (Santiago, Chile, adopted 
June 2008) Brazil explaining, and paraphrasing the preambular phrase as ‘safeguarding 
whale stocks for future generations’ excluding ‘great natural resource’ and conservation 
reflecting compliance with the Convention Biological Diversity and the Law of the Sea 
Convention, 25-26. 
188 Jonathan B Wiener, ‘Precaution’ in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, above n 134, 599; 
Daniel Bodansky, ‘Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle’ in Caron DD and HN 
Scheiber (eds), Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters (Brill, 2004) 381; Ulrich Beyerlin, 
‘Policies, Principles, and Rules’ in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, above n 134, 440. 
189 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [107]: ‘The Parties 
agree that the RMP is a conservative and precautionary management tool’. 
190 Young and Sullivan, above n 111, 22. 
191 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [56 – 57]. 
192 Young and Sullivan, above n 111, 13. 
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pursued by the Convention, but cannot alter its object and purpose.’193 This was, in 
effect, a repudiation of the Australian argument that subsequent practice and relevant 
rules of international law had extinguished the industrial use aspect of the Convention. 
To have use without conservation or conservation without use would create conditions 
in which aspects of the treaty would be rendered meaningless, violating the principle of 
effectiveness. This is central to an apolitical understanding of the Whaling Convention 
object and purpose, and to surmounting historically dominant division in the 
Commission between pro-whaling and anti-whaling Contracting Governments and 
NGOs. 
The Whaling Convention structure has a strong focus on use and conservation, neither of 
which can be alienated from the core logic of the treaty. This focus on use and 
conservation is highlighted in the powers of the Commission defined at Article V, which 
are powers of amendment of the Schedule for ‘regulations with respect to the 
conservation and utilization of whale resources.’ The Schedule confirms the place of 
‘use’ in relation to whales with the extent of its definitions at C. General. The definitions 
provided are of ‘strike’, ‘take’, ‘lose’, ‘dauhval’194, ‘lactating female’ and ‘small-type 
whaling’. Other structural aspects of the Convention and Schedule confirming the use 
focus are Article I(2) of the Convention, defining the extent of application of the 
Convention, which covers factory ships, land stations and whale catchers – all of which 
are defined in Article II. Under the Schedule, Part II. Seasons, the regulations are broken 
into ‘Factory Ship Operations’, ‘Land Station Operations’ and ‘Other Operations’; Part III. 
Capture creates classifications of area and division limits for the operation of factory, 
and other whaling ships, as well as stock classification. Parts IV, V and VI concern the 
process once a catch has been brought on board, with IV. Treatment, V. Supervision and 
Control, and VI. Information Required. The use aspect of the Convention and Schedule 
are clear and unambiguous, just as the conservation aspect of Article V can easily be 
incorporated into the same regulatory measures for use, found in the Schedule. 
The centrality of both use and conservation is also evident in the Whaling Convention 
Preamble, which provides: 
 
193 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [56]. 
194 A dauhval being any unclaimed dead whale found floating: Schedule to the Whaling 
Convention, C. General. 
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The Governments whose duly authorised representatives have subscribed hereto, 
Recognizing the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations 
the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks; 
Considering that the history of whaling has seen overfishing of one area after another and 
of one species of whale after another to such a degree that it is essential to protect all 
species of whales from further over-fishing; 
Recognizing that the whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases if whaling is 
properly regulated, and that increases in the size of whale stocks will permit increases in 
the number of whales which may be captured without endangering these natural 
resources; 
Recognizing that it is in the common interest to achieve the optimum level of whale stocks 
as rapidly as possible without causing widespread economic and nutritional distress; 
Recognizing that in the course of achieving these objectives, whaling operations should be 
confined to those species best able to sustain exploitation in order to give an interval for 
recovery to certain species of whales now depleted in numbers; 
Desiring to establish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure 
proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks on the basis of the 
principles embodied in the provisions of the International Agreement for the Regulation of 
Whaling, signed in London on 8th June, 1937, and the protocols to that Agreement signed 
in London on 24th June, 1938, and 26th November, 1945; and 
Having decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale 
stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry; 
As the Table below demonstrates every significant phrase in the Preamble references 
conservation and use. Each paragraph of the Preamble can be distilled to: ‘safeguard a 
natural resource’, ‘protect from over-fishing’, ‘increase numbers through whaling 
regulation’, ‘capture without endangering’, ‘achieve stock increase without economic or 
nutritional distress’, ‘confine exploitation to permit recovery’, ‘regulation of whale 
fisheries for conservation’, and proper conservation to develop the whaling industry’. 
The reasons for pursuing conservation are clear: resource use, both at the time of 
drafting and into the future. The intention to address this conservation need through 
proper regulation of exploitation and use is equally clear.  
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Phrase Conservation Use Common 
concern 
interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future 
generations the great natural resources represented by the whale 
stocks 
X X X 
the history of whaling has seen overfishing of one area after another 
and of one species of whale after another to such a degree that it is 
essential to protect all species of whales from further over-fishing 
X X  
whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases if whaling is properly 
regulated 
X X  
increases in the size of whale stocks will permit increases in the 
number of whales which may be captured without endangering these 
natural resources 
X X  
in the common interest to achieve the optimum level of whale stocks 
as rapidly as possible without causing widespread economic and 
nutritional distress 
X X X 
whaling operations should be confined to those species best able to 
sustain exploitation in order to give an interval for recovery to certain 
species of whales now depleted in numbers 
X X  
establish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to 
ensure proper and effective conservation and development of whale 
stocks 
X X  
a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks 
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling 
industry 
X X  
Table 2.1 Preambular phrasing in the Whaling Convention: use, conservation and common 
concern 
The Whaling Convention preamble considers use and conservation as interconnected 
principles – neither can exist without the other. The Convention is, after all, a Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling, indicating that use is a key aspect, as much as 
conservation. 
Two aspects of the Preamble were not examined in the Whaling in the Antarctic case: 
the notion of future generations and the reference to the principles of the 1937 
International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling (the Agreement),195 and its 
Protocols.196 Both of these are secondary principles to the use and conservation aspects 
of the object and purpose. Australia and Japan made extensive submissions on the 
 
195 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling opened for signature 8 June 
1937, 1946 ATS 10 (entered into force 7 May 1938) (‘8 June 1937 Whaling Agreement’). 
196 Protocol for the Regulation of Whaling for the 1947-48 Season, opened for signature 
2 December 1946, 1948 ATS 5 (entered into force 5 February 1948); Protocol amending 
the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling of 8 June 1937, and the 




nature of the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention.197 Both parties made 
submissions that accepted that the two primary aspects of the object and purpose are 
conservation and use.198 Australia diverged from this perspective by arguing that 
subsequent practice and relevant rules of international law had altered the object and 
purpose to such a degree that conservation has become preservation,199 and so 
subsumed the use aspect of the Whaling Convention. This would violate the principle of 
effectiveness and is not accepted here. 
Supporting the essential interconnection of use and conservation are principles from 
the earlier International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling (the Agreement),200 
and its Protocols,201 recognised in the Preamble as the basis on which to ‘establish a 
system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective 
conservation and development of whale stocks’. The Agreement states that the 
Contracting Governments desire ‘to secure the prosperity of the whaling industry and, 
for that purpose, to maintain the stock of whales’.202 The 1947 Protocol, specifically 
addressing post-war issues of food supply and the utility of increased whale catches to 
 
197 ‘Memorial – Government of Australia’, Whaling in the Antarctic [2014] ICJ Pleadings, 
Chapter 2, Part C: The object and purpose of the ICRW; ‘Counter-Memorial – 
Government of Japan’, Whaling in the Antarctic [2014] ICJ Pleadings, Introduction, Part 
B.1; Chapter 2, section 3. 
198 ‘Memorial – Government of Australia’, Whaling in the Antarctic [2014] ICJ Pleadings 
[2.19 – 2.20]; ‘Counter-Memorial – Government of Japan’, Whaling in the Antarctic 
[2014] ICJ Pleadings [6.1 – 6.6]. 
199 ‘Memorial – Government of Australia’, Whaling in the Antarctic [2014] ICJ Pleadings 
[2.46]. 
200 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling opened for signature 8 June 
1937, 1946 ATS 10 (entered into force 7 May 1938). 
201 Protocol for the Regulation of Whaling for the 1947-48 Season, opened for signature 2 
December 1946, 1948 ATS 5 (entered into force 5 February 1948); Protocol amending 
the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling of 8 June 1937 and the 
Protocol for the Regulation of Whaling 24 June 1938, 1947 ATS 9 (entered into force 3 
March 1947). 
202International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling opened for signature 8 June 
1937, 1946 ATS 10 (entered into force 7 May 1938). 
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feed the population, addresses the need to ‘meet the emergency produced by post-war 
conditions without prejudice to the conservation of stocks of whales’.203  
The concern for stock replenishment through industry regulation and human reliance 
on whale stocks of the earlier instruments are significant to the Whaling Convention, 
both through the Protocols and the text of the Convention itself.204 An important 
principle is clearly the consideration of the impact of conservation on human 
populations, in managing whale stocks.  
The 1947 Protocol and the Agreement do not give clear guidance on assessing whether 
catch quotas are ‘without prejudice to the conservation of whales’. The 1948 Protocol 
highlights the balance between conservation and use. The preamble in the 1948 
Protocol states ‘having due regard both to the world shortage of oil and fats and to the 
necessity for the conservation of the whale stocks.’ While this particular concern with a 
shortage of oils and fats is no longer a problem, it reinforces the 1947 Protocol 
consideration of the impact on human populations. Subsequent practices of the 
Commission continue to recognise the human impact. 
The second paragraph of the Preamble refers to the common concern of safeguarding 
the resource of whale stocks for future generations. Later, the Preamble references the 
common interest in achieving optimal levels of whale stock to prevent widespread 
economic or nutritional distress. This latter paragraph has diminished relevance 
because of the lack of widespread economic or nutritional dependence on whale stocks. 
However, the former paragraph continues to have great significance. In terms of 
international law rules, this paragraph evokes connections to intergenerational 
equity,205 and the Brundtland Report Our Common Future,206 contemplating the 
intergenerational considerations of conservation. The interest in future generations as a 
question of common concern refers to ‘entitling, perhaps even requiring, all states to 
 
203 Protocol for the Regulation of Whaling for the 1947-48 Season. 
204 Whaling Convention, Article V(2)(d). 
205 Dinah Shelton, ‘Equity’ in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, above n 134, 643-644. 
206 Brundtland, above n 91. 
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cooperate internationally to address the concern.’207 Common concern, or a concern for 
future generations is language familiar to other RFB treaties.208 Within the Whaling 
Commission, reference to concern for future generations in the reasoning of Contracting 
Governments has been a regular feature of meetings in the 21st century, across the 
breadth of Commission membership from both sides of the conservation/use debate,209 
 
207 Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ in 
Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey, above n 134, 566.  
208 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, opened for signature 5 September 2000, 2275 UNTS 
43 (entered into force 19 June 2004) Preamble; Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of the High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, opened for 
signature 14 November 2009, 113 UNTS 2 (entered into force 24 August 2012) 
Preamble; Agreement for the Establishment of the Regional Commission for Fisheries 
(RECOFI), opened for signature 11 November 1999 UNTS 2144 (entered into force 26 
February 2001) Preamble; The Antigua Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), opened for signature 14 November 2003, 
80 UNTS 4 (entered into force 27 August 2010) Preamble; Agreement on Cooperation in 
Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic 
(NAMMCO Agreement, opened for signature 9 April 1992, 1954 UNTS 4 (entered into 
force 8 July 1992) Preamble.  
209 IWC 52nd Annual Meeting of July 2000, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2000 – covering the 1999-2000 financial year (51st)’ (Adelaide, Australia, 
adopted July 2000) Republic of Guinea Opening Statement, 11; IWC 53rd Annual Meeting 
of July 2001, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2001 – covering 
the 2000-2001 financial year (53rd)’ (London, United Kingdom, adopted July 2001) 
Japan on safe sea food for future generations, 29; IWC 54th Annual Meeting of May 2002, 
‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2002 – covering the 2001-
2002 financial year (54th)’ (Shiminoseki, Japan, adopted May 2002) Portugal Opening 
Statement, 8; Italy on small-type whaling, 37; Japan on marine food safety, 39; IWC 64th 
Annual Meeting of July 2012, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 
2012 – covering the 2011-2013 financial year (64th)’ (Panama City, Panama, adopted 
July 2012) Appendix 9 Statement of the Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Caucus, 
Denmark, Russian Federation, St Vincent and the Grenadines, USA, 92; IWC 55th Annual 
Meeting of June 2003, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2003 – 
covering the 55th 2002-2003 financial year’ (Berlin, Germany, adopted June 2003) New 
Zealand on the Berlin Initiative [4.2], 8; Annex C, Annex II: IWC Conservation Work, An 
Annotated Compilation (1976 – 2001) 61, 68, 75; IWC 56th Annual Meeting of July 2004, 
‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2004 – covering the 2003-
2004 financial year’ (Sorrento, Italy, adopted July 2004) Belgium Opening Statement, 6; 
IWC 58th Meeting of June 2006, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 
2006 – covering the 2005-2006 financial year’ (St Kitts and Nevis, West Indies, adopted 
June 2006) Israel Opening Statement, 6; IWC 59th Meeting of May 2007, ‘Annual Report 
of the International Whaling Commission 2007 – covering the 2006-2007 financial year’ 
(Anchorage, Alaska, USA, adopted May 2007) intensive debate on a Resolution on the 
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indicating a recognition of its relevance as an objective of the Convention. Concern for 
future generations also featured in the MOU between the Whaling Convention 
Secretariat and the Secretariat for the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals (CMS).210  
Discussion of the common concern – future generations has not given rise to meaningful 
consensus within the Commission on the content of object and purpose of the 
Convention or the direction of the Commission. Where consensus exists on a Resolution 
no subsequent substantive agreements have emerged, and where no consensus exists 
on a Resolution, the three-fourth majority voting rule has prevented subsequent 
practice developing to affirm a conservation interpretation of ‘future generations’.211  
 
non-lethal use of cetaceans between conservation and use states, debating the meaning 
of the objective, and the interpretation of the second preambular paragraph on future 
generations, 46-47, the Resolution on the non-lethal use of cetaceans 2007-7, IWC/59/29 
was carried 42 for, 2 against, 2 abstention and 20 not participating; IWC 60th Meeting of 
June 2008, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2008 – covering the 
2007-2008 financial year’ (Santiago, Chile, adopted June 2008) Brazil explaining, and 
paraphrasing the preambular phrase as ‘safeguarding whale stocks for future 
generations’ excluding ‘great natural resource’ and conservation reflecting compliance 
with the Convention Biological Diversity and the Law of the Sea Convention, 25-26; IWC 
61st Meeting of July 2009, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009 
– covering the 2008-2009 financial year’ (Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, adopted July 
2009) Cambodia in discussion of the Irrawaddy dolphin in the Mekong River, 30; IWC 
63rd Meeting of July 2011, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 
2011 – covering the 2010-2011 financial year’ (St Helier, Jersey, adopted July 2011) the 
Secretariat discussed the value of information and education on whales to future 
generations, 104-105.  
210 IWC 52nd Annual Meeting of July 2000, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2000 – covering the 1999-2000 financial year (51st)’ (Adelaide, Australia, 
adopted July 2000) Appendix 2: Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Secretariat of the International Whaling Commission (IWC Secretariat) and the 
Secretariat of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(CMS) (UNEP/CMS Secretariat). 
211 IWC 55th Annual Meeting of June 2003, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2003 – covering the 55th 2002-2003 financial year’ (Berlin, Germany, 
adopted June 2003) Annex C, The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation 
Agenda of the International Whaling Commission, Resolution 2003-1, IWC/55/4Rev2; 
the Commission vote on this Resolution was passed 25 for, 20 against with 1 abstention, 
diminishing the value of this conservation-oriented Resolution; IWC 56th Annual Meeting 
of July 2004, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2004 – covering 
the 2003-2004 financial year’ (Sorrento, Italy, adopted July 2004) Annex C, Resolution 
on Japanese Community-based Whaling Resolution 2004-2, IWC/56/2 Rev1, 67, was 
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As regards the object and purpose there has been an absence of consensus on the 
direction of the Whaling Commission under its convention.212 However, one area of 
meaningful consensus has been the substantial amendments to the Rules of Procedure to 
reflect serious pursuit of consensus decision-making and an end to polarisation of the 
Commission.213 
Finally, it is necessary to address reliance on scientific data as an aspect of the object 
and purpose. Science-based management being an aspect of the object and purpose, it is 
a tool of substantive obligations but not part of the object and purpose. The subsequent 
practice of the Whaling Commission in establishing the Scientific Committee has 
affected the interpretation of substantive obligations in such a way as to indicate that 
conservation and use both rely on best scientific evidence. Both Australia and Japan 
accepted the importance of the Scientific Committee to the functioning of the 
Commission under the Whaling Convention.214 However, this is a matter of 
interpretation and implementation of substantive functions, rather than alteration of 
the object and purpose. Unlike in the CAMLR Convention, scientific advice is not an 
aspect of the Convention structure or object and purpose. But it is a tool of application 
that aids in the carrying out of the object and purpose. 
The interpretation of the Whaling Convention has been impacted by its age, as many of 
the environmental issues that have arisen were not thought of in 1949.215 In addition, 
 
passed by consensus but the recognition of the value of whaling to small communities 
and their future generations has not led to the allocation of whaling quotas for Japanese 
coastal small-type whaling communities. 
212 IWC 59th Meeting of May 2007, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2007 – covering the 2006-2007 financial year’ (Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 
adopted May 2007), 31; Resolution on the extension of Small Working group on the 
Future of the IWC until the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Commission 2009-1, IWC/61/10 
amended. 
213 Reforming the working procedures of the IWC IWC/60/24; Progress Report on the 
September 2008 meeting of the Small Working Group (SWG) on the Future of the 
International Whaling Commission presented by Alvaro de Soto, SWG Chairman, St 
Petersburg, Florida, USA IWC/S08/Rep 1; An overview of the elements/issues identified as 
being of importance to one or more Contracting Governments in relation to the future of 
the IWC IWC/S08/SWG 3. 
214 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [83], [109], [159]. 
215 Young and Sullivan, above n 111, 2. 
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the three-fourths majority voting structure causes issues with subsequent practice as 
there is very little consistency of interpretative expectations among member states.216 
The controversy surrounding whaling in international politics has also created 
circumstances of great difficulty in interpreting and applying the Convention.217 
Fitzmaurice has written extensively on the many issues that are present through Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, concerning the application of relevant rules of 
international law in understanding the object and purpose of the Whaling 
Convention.218 There are also many reference points that highlight the fundamental 
conflict in position within the Whaling Commission.219 However, by simply considering 
the fundamental terms of the convention, and its object and purpose, in light of 
consensus decisions and broader environmental principles of customary international 
law, a clear, and apolitical interpretation is possible. 
2.3.6 Summary of the Whaling Convention object and purpose 
The Whaling Convention has two primary focal points of use and conservation. Both are 
subject to the duty to cooperate in relation to conserving the great natural resource 
represented by whale stocks for future generations, and concern for the human impact 
of effective regulation. In practice, the effect of the object and purpose on the decisions 
of the Commission is without direction, due in large part to the division in the 
Commission between pro- and anti- whaling factions. The use and human concern 
aspect of whaling decisions remain actively engaged through aboriginal subsistence 
whaling (ASW) regulation, and conservation also remains a dominant concern through 
the Scientific Committee, and various Resolutions of the Commission on conservation 
issues. The common concern for future generations’ access to whale resources is a 
significant aspect of conservation, but its practical implementation is hampered by the 
decision-making processes of the Commission. The place of science in relation to the 
 
216 Whaling Convention, Article III.2. 
217 Fitzmaurice, above n 183, 55. 
218 Fitzmaurice above n 183, 92-99 [4.2]. 
219 Fitzmaurice above n 183, 66-79 [2.3]; ‘Memorial – Government of Australia’, 
Whaling in the Antarctic [2014] ICJ Pleadings; ‘Counter-Memorial – Government of 
Japan’, Whaling in the Antarctic [2014] ICJ Pleadings; St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration 
Resolution 2006-1 IWC/58/16. 
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object and purpose is clearly as a means of implementation of substantive functions of 
the Commission under the Convention. It is not part of the object and purpose. The 
precautionary approach is part of the functional definition of conservation in 
international law. This has affected the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention as 
the Commission must now consider the precautionary approach in its deliberations and 
decision-making.  
2.4 Conclusion: use, conservation, science and mankind 
This chapter lays the foundation for the rest of the thesis by providing a clear summary 
of the object and purpose of each convention, in order to appraise NGO behaviours in 
light of the object and purpose. The next chapter contains an analysis of the 
Conventions in terms of their jurisdiction and functions, and the provisions for 
engagement with non-state actors. The Articles of the Whaling and CAMLR Conventions 
that provide for non-state actor engagement are analyzed using an object and purpose 
analysis. Following from this, the case study chapters describe and evaluate NGO 
behaviours and their engagement with the object and purpose of the Conventions. 
Both the Whaling and CAMLR Conventions have use and conservation as interconnected 
and interdependent principles of the object and purpose. Supporting these dominant 
principles in both Conventions is the satellite principle of a common concern for the 
conservation or preservation of the area or species within the jurisdiction of the 
Convention. A point of difference between the Whaling Convention and CAMLR 
Convention is the nature of scientific advice. The CAMLR Convention has scientific 
considerations as part of the object and purpose, and science is an integral part of the 
Convention, whereas the Whaling Convention contains no scientific principle. 
Furthermore, scientific considerations are a tool for adherence to the substantive 
obligations of the Whaling Convention, and the consideration of the object and purpose, 
but are not embedded in the object and purpose. The resulting confusing may impact on 
the clarity of decision-making and the basis for these decisions. 
The Whaling Convention contains very little guidance on the content of conservation or 
use, where the CAMLR Convention contains extensive reference to principles and 
functions that direct the capacity of the Commission and its Scientific Committee to 
make recommendations and decide on Measures that implement the object and 
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purpose. As explored in the next chapter, while the functions of the Commissions have 
significant overlap, the presence or absence of scientific conservation and use 
parameters is a Convention feature that affects NGO behaviours. The fidelity with which 
Articles of the Conventions are interpreted with reference to the object and purpose, 
the care with which NGO engagement is filtered through these Articles, and in how the 
Rules of Procedure reflect this interpretation, are also significant aspects of analysing 
NGO engagement through substantive and administrative obligations. 
The next chapter, Chapter Three, takes the object and purpose of the conventions and 
provides a discussion of each Commission’s jurisdiction through significant Articles of 
the conventions. This adheres to the Vienna Convention. Chapter Four sets the scene for 
discussing the case studies in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  
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Chapter 3: The International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (the 
Whaling Convention) and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (the CAMLR Convention). The historical context of the two conventions is 
discussed, considering the relevant historical factors that influenced their drafting. Also 
explored are the subject matter and jurisdiction, how these differ and how subject 
matter and jurisdiction influence the operation of the Commissions under the 
conventions. The contents of the conventions are discussed using an object and purpose 
analysis. This analysis is divided into three sections: membership, voting and 
reservations; and substantive powers. The influence of the object and purpose in 
interpretation is made clear, with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention the starting point 
for exploring the provisions of the Whaling and CAMLR Conventions. 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an interpretation of the conventions in line with 
their object and purpose. It provides the context for the composition of Commission 
membership, the decision-making processes of the Commissions, and the substantive 
work of the Commissions outside of diplomatic and scientific meeting spaces. This 
chapter also provides the working context for the interpretation and application of the 
non-state actor provisions that are discussed in Chapter 4 on NGO behaviours. 
The last chapter considered the object and purpose of the Whaling and CAMLR 
Conventions, noting the overlaps of principle in the object and purpose in relation to 
conservation, use and a common concern for humankind in the present and future. The 
difference in relation to the place of the Scientific Committee was also noted. This 
chapter applies the methodology of the object and purpose in treaty interpretation to 
examine the Articles in relation to non-state actor engagement in the Whaling and 
CAMLR Conventions.  
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The first section of this chapter highlights the substantive similarities and the 
differences of the two Conventions, the powers that are given to the Commissions 
through various Articles, and how these contribute to the position of NGOs in relation to 
the Commissions as observers, members of delegations, and even as actors outside the 
established frameworks. Significant similarities lie in the substantive powers of the 
Commissions to regulate catch limits, open and closed seasons, methods of catch and 
other aspects of fishing. Significant differences lie in the procedural aspects of the 
Conventions: state membership requirements, the voting structure, and the non-state 
actor engagement provisions. The second section of this chapter evaluates the nature of 
the Convention Articles on non-state actor engagement and how non-state actor 
engagement has come to be embedded in the administration of the Conventions 
through the Secretariats, Commissions, and Rules of Procedure.  
This chapter concludes that the membership, jurisdiction and decision-making aspects 
of the two conventions create two very different Commissions. Both Commission are 
bounded in their work by the object and purpose interrelationship of conservation and 
use in relation to their jurisdiction. However, there are key differences in membership 
preconditions, the nature of the jurisdiction detailed in the respective Conventions, and 
in consensus and majority decision-making. These differences create unique 
circumstances in each Commission for NGO influence, and directly affect how NGO 
behaviours can exist within the forums of the Commissions themselves. It must be 
remembered that both Commissions ‘despite their regulatory powers, are essentially 
also political forums in which discussions and negotiations take place…’220 The 
conventions that create these forums matter.  
3.2 Historical context 
3.2.1 CAMLR Convention 
The 1982 CAMLR Convention is embedded within the Antarctic Treaty System, and so 
has ties to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, and the concern for preservation of Antarctica for 
 
220 Patricia Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling: From Conservation of Whaling to 
Conservation of Whales and Regulation of Whale-Watching Volume II (Oceana 
Publications, 1985) 642. 
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peaceful purposes stated within.221 The CAMLR Convention is also a contemporary of 
the Law of the Sea Convention, having been drafted and opened for signature in the early 
1980s, at a time when concern for management of common resources was high on the 
international agenda, post-Stockholm.222 
The CAMLR Convention was drafted amidst anticipatory concern around the potential 
for harm through unregulated fishing in the Southern Ocean.223 Drafters of the CAMLR 
Convention were well aware of the problems that the Whaling Commission faced: no 
entrenched Scientific Committee, unclear conservation aims, poorly developed stock 
management procedures, and extremely limited knowledge of whale stocks. The 
watershed of the 1972 Stockholm United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment and its subsequent Declaration, commonly called the ‘Stockholm 
Declaration’, contributed to the processes within the Whaling Commission leading to 
the commercial whaling moratorium in 1982.224 Indicative of these historical 
differences, the Articles of the two Conventions are markedly different in depth of 
detail, with the CAMLR Convention displaying concerted efforts to ensure a clear 
Convention in its object and purpose, its substantive powers, and organizational detail. 
3.2.2 Whaling Convention 
The Whaling Convention, despite its age, has many aspects in common with the later 
CAMLR Convention. The language of the convention is concerned with conservation and 
sustainable use, and it provides a number of significant regulatory measures for the 
Commission to use in order to conserve and use whale resources. However, the Whaling 
Convention is also, because of its age, devoid of measures by which the Commission may 
 
221 Antarctic Treaty, Preamble. 
222 Yee Keong Choy, ‘From Stockholm to Rio+20: The ASEAN Environmental Paradox, 
Environmental Sustainability, and Environmental Ethics’ (2015) 12(1) The International 
Journal of Environmental Sustainability 1, 1. 
223 Nilsson, Fulton and Haward, above n 140, 173. 
224 Anastasia Telesetsky and Seokwoo Lee, ‘After Whaling in the Antarctic: Amending 
Article VIII to Fix a Broken Treaty Regime’ (2015) 30 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 700, 702; Robert J Hofman, ‘Sealing, whaling and krill fishing in 
the Southern Ocean: past and possible future effects on catch regulations’ (2017) 
53(268) Polar Record 88, 91. 
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impose penalties or require its Contracting Governments to impose domestic penalties 
on flag state vessels.  
The Whaling Convention has strong elements – the interrelationship of use and 
conservation, as well as concern for the long-term sustainability of whale resources are 
clear concerns underpinning the work of the Commission in its text. However, three 
aspects of the convention clearly create divisive issues within the Commission: The 
voting structures, which require between a simple and two-thirds majority; the capacity 
of Contracting Governments to object to and so not be bound by schedule amendments; 
and the open membership structure,225 which requires only the depositing of an 
instrument of ratification. Together, these create a Commission that is prone to division, 
conflict, and partisan political control that steers away from the original intent of the 
Commission, without the strength to effect sufficient interpretative change so as to 
move the Commission away from being a use-oriented body.  
3.2.3 Discussion 
The spirit of the Whaling Convention is clearly aimed at rehabilitating whale stocks 
sorely tried by over a century of unregulated use, but the capacity for states to direct 
their own scientific research and to object to any amendments to the Schedule of 
conservation and regulation measures,226 makes the Convention toothless. The context 
of its drafting includes two earlier instruments that had clear interests in the human 
value of the whaling industry, its support, and continuation. These interests are 
specifically referred to in the Whaling Convention preambular text, as are the earlier 
instruments. 
The Whaling and CAMLR Conventions opened for signature just over 35 years apart, the 
Whaling Convention in 1946 and the CAMLR Convention in 1980. The circumstances of 
their drafting were vastly different. The Whaling Convention opened for signature in a 
climate of particular concern about declining commercial whale stocks – arguably, one 
 
225 Shirley V Scott, ‘Intergovernmental Organizations as Disseminators, Legitimators, 
and Disguisers of Hegemonic Policy Preferences: The United States, the International 
Whaling Commission, and the Introduction of a Moratorium on Commercial Whaling’ 
(2008) 21(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 581, 591 and 600. 
226 Whaling Convention, Articles 5.3(a) and 8.1. 
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of the most significant environmental issues of the 20th century.227 The 1946 Whaling 
Convention has historical roots in the 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of 
Whaling,228 but the 1946 Convention emerged around the same time as the Charter of 
the United Nations, during an upswing in international legal cooperation preceding and 
following the end of the Second World War.229 
The CAMLR Convention, coming out of the 1970s and mounting concern about 
environmental management of global commons, is a forceful contrast to the loose, and 
undemanding language of the Whaling Convention, which has no enforcement 
procedures, and relies heavily on the good faith of states to carry out their treaty 
obligations.  
3.3 Jurisdiction and geographical operation 
The Whaling and CAMLR Conventions regulate marine living resource use in the 
Southern Ocean. The Southern Ocean is globally important because it is home to a 
variety of unique species – krill, fish, seals, whales, birds – and ecosystems.230 It is also a 
significant area for researching the impacts of climate change.231 The Whaling 
 
227 Jacques-Yves Cousteau and Yves Paccalet, Jacques Cousteau Whales (Abrams & Allen, 
1988) 7; Peter Convey and Marc Lebouvier, ‘Environmental change and human impacts 
on terrestrial ecosystems of the sub-Antarctic islands between their discovery and the 
mid-twentieth century’ (2009) 143(1) Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Tasmania 33, 35 & 39; Charlotte Epstein, ‘The Making of Global Environmental Norms: 
Endangered Species Protection’ (2006) 6(1) Global Environmental Politics 32, 32 and 43. 
228 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, opened for signature 8 June 
1937, 1946 ATS 10 (entered into force 7 May 1938). 
229 Dan Plesch and Thomas G Weiss, ‘1945’s Forgotten Insight: Multilateralism as 
Realist Necessity’ (2016) 17 International Studies Perspectives 4, 7. 
230 Valerie J Loeb, ‘Climate variability and spatiotemporal dynamics of five Southern 
Ocean species’ (2015) 134 Progress in Oceanography 93; Jessica Melbourne-Thomas et 
al., ‘Optimal control and system limitation in a Southern Ocean ecosystem model’ 
(2015) 114 Southern Ocean Dynamics and Biogeochemistry in a Changing Climate, Deep-
Sea Research Part II 64; Surma, Szymon, Pakhomov, Evgeny and Pitcher, Tony J, ‘Effects 
of Whaling on the Structure of the Southern Ocean Food Web: Insights on the “Krill 
Surplus” from Ecosystem Modelling’ (2014) 12(9) PLOS ONE; Knox, George A, Biology of 
the Southern Ocean (Knox, 2006). 
231 Julian Gutt et al., ‘The Southern Ocean ecosystem under multiple climate change 
stresses – an integrated circumpolar assessment’ (2015) 21 Global Change Biology 
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Convention regulates conservation and use of cetacean species in the Southern Ocean 
through the establishment of the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, the commercial 
whaling moratorium, and some oversight of scientific whaling. The CAMLR Convention 
regulates the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems, krill and Toothfish fisheries 
below the Antarctic Convergence and in adjacent high seas waters, through 
conservation measures. At the 2016 annual meeting, the CAMLR Commission also 
added marine protected areas (MPAs) to its protection mandate. 
The conventions establish the only two regional fishery bodies that operate in the 20.33 
million kilometres of Southern Ocean. Globally, the Whaling Convention also regulates 
catch limits for aboriginal subsistence whaling as well as whale killing methods, and 
marine threats to cetacean health and populations. The overlap between the Southern 
Ocean Whale Sanctuary and the CAMLR Convention area is significant, with the borders 
of the sanctuary starting at 40° south (see below Figure 3.1). To this extent the 
operation of the CAMLR Convention is comparable with that of the Whaling Convention, 
however the Whaling Convention has global aspects to its jurisdiction that are not 
geographically comparable with the CAMLR Convention. So, while the Whaling 
Convention applies to all cetaceans and the CAMLR Convention to a geographical area, 
the geographical focus of both Commissions has strong connections. 
3.3.1 CAMLR Convention  
The CAMLR Convention is a zonal management treaty, with a regional focus; its coverage 
is the waters of the Southern Ocean below the Antarctic Convergence232 (the 
‘Convention Area’). The commercially-fished species that are within this management 
 
1434; Andrew J Constable et al, ‘Climate change and Southern Ocean ecosystems I: how 
changes in physical habitats directly affect marine biota’ (2014) 20 Global Change 
Biology 3004; Rodhouse, Paul GK, ‘Role of squid in the Southern Ocean pelagic 
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Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography 129; Paul Newman et al., ‘The Effects of 
Interactive Stratospheric Chemistry on Antarctic and Southern Ocean Climate Change in 
AOGCM’ (NASA Technical Reports, NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI), Fall 
Meeting, 2014); Adams, Neil, ‘Climate Trends at Macquarie Island and Expectations of 
Future Climate Change in the Sub-Antarctic’ (2009) 143(1) Papers and Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of Tasmania 1. 
232 Article I(4) of the CAMLR Convention deems the Antarctic Convergence to be the 
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area and regulated by the CAMLR Commission are Antarctic krill (Euphausia superba), 
Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides), Antarctic toothfish (D mawsoni), 
(Mackerel icefish (Champsocephalus gunnari), Lanternfish (Electrona carlsbergi), Grey 
rockcod (Notothenia squamifrons) and Antarctic crabs (Paralomis spinosissima and P. 
formosa).233 
The boundaries of the CAMLR Convention Area are divided into statistical subareas for 
the purposes of research and fishing catch allocation.234 The boundaries of the Area 
range from 45° south in the Western Indian Ocean sector, including the McDonald, 
Heard, Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward and Marion Islands235 to 60° south in the 
Southwest Pacific region, encompassing the Ross Sea. While the geographical 
coordinates vary, the Convention Area is generally the high seas area below the 
Antarctic Convergence. Within the Convention Area, the McDonald, Heard, Kerguelen, 
Crozet, Prince Edward and Marion Islands belong to member states, and are 
surrounded by Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). States with fishing interests within 
their EEZ below the Antarctic Convergence have applied the conservation measures 
decided by the CAMLR Commission to fishing activities within those waters.236 The 
ongoing diplomatic dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the 
Falkland Islands has prevented any application of CAMLR Convention obligations to 
those waters through the Commission.237 
The Commission Secretariat is located in Hobart, where the annual meetings of 
Commission and Scientific Committee take place.238 Working Groups, ad hoc 
 
233 Delegation of Australia, The Relevance to CCAMLR of the UN Agreement relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
CCAMLR-XV/12 Rev 1, 4. 
234 See below, Figure 3.1. 
235 The subject of Australian, French and South African national jurisdictions. 
236 Statement by the Chairman of the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (1982). 
237 For an example of the diplomatic badinage around the Falkland Islands see: 
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Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 5 November 1999) [5.37], 
]13.1], [17.2-17.3]. 
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committees, workshops and other meetings take place around the world, in various 
Contracting Party territories.  
3.3.2 Whaling Convention  
The Whaling Convention is a species-specific management treaty. It applies globally for 
all Contracting Parties, in respect of a number of cetacean species, including highly 
migratory species. Whether it covers all cetacean species, including dolphins, is a 
contentious issue in the Commission: while the Whaling Convention Preamble states 
that the Convention is concerned to ‘protect all species of whales from further over-
fishing’, there is some dispute about whether this includes dolphins and non-
commercial cetacean species, or only those listed in the Schedule.239 Conservation of 
small cetaceans has been on the Scientific Committee agenda since as early as 1982.240 
The Small Cetaceans Voluntary Fund was established in 2009 to address conservation 
issues with dolphin species, succeeding earlier expenditure on research into small 
cetacean conservation.241 However, there is no consensus on this practice within the 
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Commission 2000 – covering the 1999-2000 financial year (51st)’ (Adelaide, Australia, 
adopted July 2000) Chairman’s Report of the 52nd Annual Meeting ‘Appendix 3: Income 
and Expenditure Account for 2000-2001’, 60; IWC 51st Annual Meeting of May 1999, 
‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 1999 – covering the 50th 
financial year 1998-1999’ (Grenada, adopted May 1999) ‘Budget 1999-2000 Income 
and Expenditure Account’, 57; IWC 50th Annual Meeting of May 1998, ‘’Annual Report of 
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Commission242 and small cetacean conservation activities are not indicative of 
subsequent practice affecting the interpretation of the Convention or Schedule in 
relation to defining ‘all species of whales’. The Whaling Schedule defines Baleen and 
Toothed whales243 but not whales generally. To this extent, the absence of a general 
definition, and the specific references to species of commercial interest indicates that 
the Whaling Convention and its Schedule are concerned with the regulation of 
commercial whale species, and not whales in general.  
Unlike zonal management, species management of highly migratory species can create 
conflict among parties to a treaty as the effect of exploitation along migratory routes 
may be detrimental, or the science is unclear as to the impact on later sections of the 
migration route. As discussed below, jurisdiction, and membership and voting rules in 
the Whaling Convention create a situation in which a majority of Contracting 
Governments lack an interest in commercial whaling but have an interest in non-lethal 
whale-oriented industries, such as whale watching.244 This has given rise to a 
significant political impasse in the Whaling Commission around whether the interests of 
states prevail over the rule of law presented by the Whaling Convention itself. 
 
the International Whaling Commission 1998 – covering the 1997-98 financial year 
(49th)’ (Muscat, Oman, adopted May 1998) ‘Income and Expenditure 1998’, 59; IWC 47th 
Annual Meeting of May/June 1995, ‘Forty-Sixth Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the 46th financial year 1994-1995’  (Dublin, Ireland, adopted 
June 1995) 4, where expenditure was £286. 
242 IWC 55th Annual Meeting of June 2003, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2003 – covering the 55th 2002-2003 financial year’ (Berlin, Germany, 
adopted June 2003) Chair’s Report of the 55th Annual Meeting [1.3], 5, Nicaragua 
disputed the Commission’s mandate over small cetaceans; [15.1], 21 Denmark and 
Norway; also [15.1.1] Japan; 35, Russia; 36, Denmark. IWC 52nd Annual Meeting of July 
2000, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2000 – covering the 
1999-2000 financial year (51st)’ (Adelaide, Australia, adopted July 2000) Chairman’s 
Report of the 52nd Annual Meeting, [8.1], 17: the Chair recognised that ‘the IWC has no 
competence in regulating killing methods of small cetaceans’ while the contrary view 
was put forward by New Zealand; [17.1.4], 46, Japan ‘reiterated its view that the 
management of small cetaceans is outside the Commission’s competence.’ 
243 Whaling Convention Schedule I. Interpretation 1A and B. Baleen whale being whales 
with baleen in the mouth, or other than a toothed whale: blue, bowhead, Bryde’s, fin, 
grey, humpback, minke, pygmy right, and sei whales. Toothed whale: any whale which 
has teeth in the jaws: beaked, bottlenose, killer, pilot, and sperm whales. 
244 Hofman, above n 224, 92. 
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Alternatively, if the use made of the Whaling Convention by current parties can alter the 
object and purpose of the Convention and so redirect the Commission to a purely 
conservation-based mandate.  
3.3.3 Discussion 
The management system of the CAMLR Convention, which stipulates the necessity of 
considering the Antarctic marine ecosystem c as well as individual species management 
in its conservation measures, avoids the issues that have presented under the Whaling 
Convention.245 The ecosystem approach under the CAMLR Convention ultimately 
addresses what the Whaling Convention, as a species management treaty struggles to 
address: the place of cetacean species within an ecosystem.246 The mandated ecosystem 
considerations in Article II of the CAMLR Convention give clear parameters for both 
political deliberations and scientific advice. Species managed by the CAMLR 
Commission are considered within the broader ecosystem context by both the 
Commission and its Scientific Committee because of the terms of Article II. The broad 
remit for conservation measures also gives the CAMLR Commission a clear mandate to 
address issues such as pollution and bycatch.247 
By contrast, the Whaling Commission has no context for considering the ecosystem 
within the terms of the Whaling Convention.248 The broad terms of consideration under 
both Articles IV and V give rise to uncertainty about what precisely falls within the 
meaning of phrases such as: ‘information concerning the current condition and trend of 
the whale stocks and the effects of whaling activities thereon’; ‘methods of maintaining 
and increasing the population of whale stocks’; ‘regulations with respect to the 
conservation and utilization of whale resources’. Consideration of ecosystem 
management could fall within these phrases but what the precise contents of these 
 
245 The CAMLR Convention specifically recognises the jurisdiction of the Whaling 
Convention and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals over cetacean and 
seal species for management purposes. The Scientific Committee does take account of 
these species in ecosystem modelling but does not account for management. 
246 Hofman, above n 224, 637. 
247 Hofman, above n 224, 92-94. 
248 Birnie, above n 220, 637. 
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broad statements are is difficult for the Commission to determine. The regulation of the 
whaling industry was clearly addressed in the early years of the Commission although 
the conservation effect of that regulation was contested.   
With the suspension of commercial whaling imminent in the late 1970s, the regulatory 
purview of the Commission expanded to include aboriginal subsistence whaling. The 
inclusion of aboriginal subsistence whaling within a treaty that alleges to be for the 
regulation of commercial whaling was accepted. But the inclusion of the regulation of 
small cetacean species has remained outside the Commission’s accepted jurisdiction as 
a ‘voluntary fund’, rather than a true aspect of Commission work. At the time of the 
implementation of the moratorium there were hopes among some in the academic, NGO 
and non-whaling country community that the Commission would turn its full attention 
to the conservation of whales in place of whaling, and to the regulation of whale-
watching, rather than consumptive use of whales.249 This has not come to fruition in the 
Whaling Commission, but it has resulted in complex regulatory issues coming before the 
Commission. 
The fragmentations of intention and focus are arguably a result of the unclear terms of 
the Whaling Convention on what subject matter falls within the scope of the convention. 
Conversely, inclusion for regulation of aspects of whale killing methods has led to 
acceptance by most Contracting Parties. These aspects of whale hunting clearly attach 
to the language of Article IV.1.e ‘time, methods, and intensity of whaling’ and f. ‘types 
and specifications of gear and apparatus and appliances which may be used’. The clarity 
with these functional questions, as opposed to the broader questions of whether 
ecosystem management should be central to the considerations of the Whaling 
Commission in managing whale stocks, is straightforward.  
NGO roles meets at a complex intersection of characteristics within the two 
Commissions. The intersections of the CAMLR Commission’s work are clearly rooted in 
the text of the CAMLR Convention, with clear Commission commentary on its own role 
and treaty interpretation. NGOs in the CAMLR Commission must fit within this 
environment where the text of the convention is deeply significant to Commission 
deliberations. The Whaling Commission is hampered by the general language of the 
 
249 Birnie, above n 220. 
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Whaling Convention, finding the roles of NGOs placed within a confusing intersection of 
interpretation. The precise nature of the work of the Commission is not clear by the 
terms of its own convention, and what the Commission can do when there is no 
commercial whaling, is not easily determined by either commentators or the 
Commission, with such political variation available in interpretation of the treaty text. 
The clarity and the confusion of the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission 
respectively, are in contrast to each other, and can be directly connected to the contents 





Image 3.1 Official CCAMLR Map with Whaling Convention Southern Ocean Whale 
Sanctuary in purple dot (original map courtesy of CCAMLR Secretariat; additions courtesy 
of Dr Petr Smejkal) 
As can be seen from Image 3.1 the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary (SOWS), defined in 
the Whaling Convention Schedule overlaps the CAMLR Convention Area to a significant 
degree, with only a small part of the CAMLR Convention Area outside of the SOWS, and 
the SOWS extending to a large area in the Southwest Pacific, beyond the CAMLR 
Convention Area. This demonstrates the jurisdictional geographical overlap in the 
Southern Ocean, although it should be remembered that as a global RFB, the Whaling 
Convention applies across all high seas and into coastal waters, attaching to species 





3.4 Membership and voting 
Membership and voting structures, while they may not seem to bear on the place of 
NGOs in the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions are central to the political atmosphere 
that prevails in each Commission. This in turn impacts on the status accorded to NGOs. 
The discretion-dependent access NGOs enjoy to speaking rights is reflective of the 
political climate of the Commission. The value with which NGO documents, both formal 
and informal, are approached, is also dependent on the political climate. The 
significance of this is that in the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions, the diametrically 
opposed membership and voting structures have given rise to two very different 
organizational climates. These appear connected to the number of observers and to the 
roles accorded to NGOs. 
3.4.1 CAMLR Convention  
Article XII(1) of the CAMLR Convention stipulates consensus decision making for all 
matters of substance.250 A simple majority is sufficient for matters that are not of 
substance, though this is rare.251 Provision is also made for the taking of a secret ballot 
when asked for.252  
The CAMLR Convention recognises contracting parties and members. Only members 
have a right to vote in the CAMLR Commission. There are two categories of 
membership. The first category is State Parties that were involved in the drafting 
processes and meetings for the establishment of the CAMLR Convention.253 The second 
category is acceding states engaging in research or extraction of marine living resources 
in the CAMLR Area. Contracting Parties who do not engage in research or extraction of 
marine living resources in the CAMLR Area are not entitled to membership.254 In this 
way, the CAMLR Convention distinguishes clearly between contracting parties and 
 
250 CAMLR Convention, Article XII(1). 
251 CAMLR Convention, Article XII (2). 
252 CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule 5. 
253 CAMLR Convention, Article VII(2)(a). 
254 CAMLR Convention, Article VII(2)(b). 
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members.255 There are, as of 2017, 11 contracting parties that are not members of the 
Commission, and 25 members.256  
The requirement for members to be engaged in research or harvesting activities within 
the CCAMLR Area257 limits membership.258 Early commentary on the draft CAMLR 
Convention indicates that this was a deliberate choice to locate control of decision-
making with the parties affected by decisions. 259 The result of pre-CAMLR Convention 
meetings was a coupling of this limited membership with consensus. By limiting the 
field of voters to those with a direct interest in the region, and requiring substantive 
decision-making to be consensus-based, the CAMLR Convention emphasises cooperative 
action in the Antarctic.260 Consensus voting also avoids prejudicing the position of 
Contracting Governments, unlike the majority voting of the Whaling Convention. 
However, reservations under Article IX(6)c and the Chairman’s Statement provide for 
the capacity of any Contracting Government to maintain domestic policy despite 
decisions of the Commission. 
 
255 CAMLR Convention, Article VII 2(a) and (b).  
256 CCAMLR Basic Documents, Preface iii.  
257 CAMLR Convention, Article X. 
258 Of the current 36 Contracting Parties, 11 are acceding states, not members, and so 
do not have a vote. The original fourteen (14) member states are now 13, with the 
reunion of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
European Economic Community was also a member at the first CAMLR Commission 
meeting. With 11 acceding states and 14 original members (including the now 
European Union) leaves an increase of 11 member states. With 25 current members, an 
increase of only 11 votes has occurred in the 34 years since the first meeting of the 
CAMLR Commission. 
259 Australia, Commentary on the Draft Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Treaty Ninth Consultative Meeting, Provisional 
Agenda Item 6 (London, 19 September 1977) ANT/IX/21, CAMLR Convention, Draft 
Article 3 [2]; CAMLR Convention, Draft Article II (3) 9. 
260 Working Group, Draft Report of the Working Group on Marine Living Resources, 
Antarctic Treaty Ninth Consultative Meeting, Agenda Item 6 (London, 7 October 1977) 
ANT/IX/82 Rev 1, CAMLR Convention Draft Article II.1(a) at 4; United States, Draft 
Recommendation on Antarctic Marine Living Resources submitted by the United States, 
Antarctic Treaty Ninth Consultative Meeting, Agenda Item 6 (London, 23 September 
1977) ANT/IX/43 at 3, [2]. 
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3.4.2 Whaling Convention  
The Whaling Convention stipulates a three-fourths majority for amendments to the 
Convention Schedule and a simple majority for other decisions of the Commission.261 
Amendments to the Schedule involve amendments to whale killing methods, whaling 
seasons and locations, size and sex of whales, and other matters related to the hunting 
and processing of whales. The ‘other decisions’ of the Commission in Article III include 
Resolutions, which if passed by consensus contribute to the interpretation of the 
Convention and the Schedule.262 This is an important limitation on the simple majority: 
where consensus on a Resolution has not been reached, the consequence is that the 
Resolution has no impact on interpretation of Member State obligations under the 
Whaling Convention.  
The three-fourths majority is arguably a major contributory factor in several issues 
involving NGOs in the Whaling Commission. Vote-buying263 and voting blocs have 
contributed to a divisiveness in the Whaling Commission since the early 1980s that has 
not emerged in the CAMLR Commission. Much of the anti-whaling sentiment can be 
traced to domestic campaigns of NGOs in western democracies.264 Domestic behaviour 
is outside of the scope of this thesis, but the weakness of the three-fourths majority is 
important as it amplifies issues in diplomatic relationships between member states in 
the Whaling Commission and draws a contrast in relation to the capacity for NGO 
influence.  
No provision is made in the Whaling Convention for amendment of the Convention itself. 
Articles 40 and 41 of the Vienna Convention permit the amendment of Convention 
Articles, subject to the right of Contracting Governments to lodge an objection to any 
such amendment, and for individual Contracting Governments to agree on alteration of 
terms of a Convention between those states. The Vienna Convention is silent on the 
numbers needed for such amendment, not indicating whether consensus or a majority 
 
261 Whaling Convention, Article III(2). 
262 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226 [46]; Whaling 
Convention, Article VI. 
263 Andrew Gillespie, Whaling Diplomacy (Edward Elgar, 2005) 425-446. 
264 Rex Weyler, Greenpeace: An Insider’s Account (Rodale, 2004). 
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is necessary. The Whaling Convention is also silent on amendment of the Convention 
itself, although additions may be developed by the use of Protocols and previous 
practices of the Commission have been to amend the convention via consensus.265  
By contrast with the CAMLR Commission, membership of the Whaling Commission has 
no limitations – any state that accedes to the Convention is a member, called ‘a 
Contracting Government’ in the Convention.266 Any Government which has ‘deposited 
an instrument of ratification or has given notice of adherence to this Convention’267 is a 
member. Unlike the CAMLR Convention, the Whaling Convention does not make 
distinctions between a Contracting Party and a member.268 A Contracting Government 
that has paid its membership dues is entitled to vote, whether it was an original 
contracting party, or has never engaged in whaling related activities in the recent or 
distant past. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
The result of the jurisdiction, membership and voting structures is that the Whaling and 
CAMLR Commissions are two very different Commissions for NGO engagement. The 
open membership rules in the Whaling Convention have resulted in an expanding 
membership in the Whaling Commission:269 from 15 in 1946270 to the current number 
of 88.271 The differences in membership growth between the two Conventions and 
Commissions are represented in Figure 2. It shows that the growth in voting members 
for the Whaling Commission has almost tripled since 1982 and the CAMLR Commission 
 
265 Birnie, above n 220. 
266 Whaling Convention, Article II (4). 
267 Whaling Convention, Article II (4). 
268 Unlike the CAMLR Convention, the Whaling Convention does not make distinctions 
between a Contracting Party and a member. The only limitation to voting is that in the 
event of failure to pay the annual contribution, a member has its vote suspended.: 
Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule E(2)(a). 
269 Bowman, above n 119, 295. 
270 IWC 1st Annual Meeting of 1st June 1949, ‘First Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the 1st fiscal year 1st June 1949 – 31st May 1950’ (Oslo, Norway, 
adopted July 1950).  
271 Delegates and Observers attending the 66th Annual Meeting IWC/66/3 Rev1.  
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increased by only two thirds its original size -a 300% growth versus a 66.6% growth. 
On its own timescale, the Whaling Commission has moved from an original membership 
of 15 to hover around the 90 mark, making it six times larger than when it first met in 
1950.  
 
Figure 3.2 Changes in membership in the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions from 1982 - 
2016 
The steady, and marginal growth in state parties to the CAMLR Convention reflects the 
preconditions for application and subsequent obligations of membership. A 
requirement that a state be actively engaged in a fisheries area is a limitation that 
minimises state party numbers. By contrast, since 2000, it is clear that there has been 
an increase of more than double the states parties to the Whaling Convention. This does 
not mean that all state parties to the Convention lack an economic interest in whales but 
only a small number have active engagement with lethal whaling. The membership 
interests in the Whaling Commission are diverse – from landlocked Czech Republic, 
with no ostensible interest in whaling, to Norway, which lodged a reservation to the 
commercial whaling moratorium and hunts whales commercially within the Norwegian 
EEZ. 
It is clear that the jurisdiction, membership and voting structures result in the Whaling 
and CAMLR Commissions being two very different Commissions for NGO engagement. 
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Domestic influence is a key sphere of NGO activity272 and the open membership and 
three-quarter majority of the Whaling Convention leaves the Commission open to 
influence that is not necessarily by the terms of the treaty itself. The controlled 
membership and consensus voting of the CAMLR Convention closes avenues of influence 
to NGOs and reinforces the primacy of the Convention as the source of law.273 
3.5 Substantive Powers 
3.5.1 CAMLR Convention 
The jurisdiction and guiding principles of the CAMLR Convention are found in Article II, 
and Articles IX–XI. This jurisdiction is extensively detailed with significant provisions 
made for the content of conservation measures in Article IX 1(f) and (2). Conservation 
measures are the core means by which the CAMLR Commission achieves its work in 
furthering the conservation principles and object and purpose in Article II. The 
Commission is required to take full account of the recommendations of the Scientific 
Committee in making decisions.274 The roles of the Commission are set out in Article IX: 
1. The function of the Commission shall be to give effect to the objective and 
principles set out in Article II of this Convention. To this end, it shall: 
(a) facilitate research into and comprehensive studies of Antarctic marine living resources 
and of the Antarctic marine ecosystem; 
(b) compile data on the status of and changes in population of Antarctic marine living 
resources and on factors affecting the distribution, abundance and productivity of 
harvested species and dependent or related species or populations; 
(c) ensure the acquisition of catch and effort statistics on harvested populations; 
 
272 BK Woodward, ‘Global Civil Society and International Law in Global Governance: 
Some Contemporary Issues’ (2006) 8 International Community Law Review 247, 335; 
Nowrot, above n 18, 587; Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’ above n 30, 364. 
273 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble; Declaration of the high-level meeting of the 
General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels, GA Res 67/1 
UN GAOR, Main Comm, 67th sess, Agenda Item 83, UN Doc A/RES/67/1 (24 September 
2012) [8]; Kenneth J Keith, ‘John Dugard Lecture – 2015: The International Rule of Law’ 
(2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 403, 406, 409, 413-414. 
274 CAMLR Convention, Article IX (4). 
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(d) analyze, disseminate and publish the information referred to in sub-paragraphs (b) 
and (c) above and the reports of the Scientific Committee; 
(e) identify conservation needs and analyze the effectiveness of conservation measures; 
(f) formulate, adopt and revise conservation measures on the basis of the best scientific 
evidence available, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article; 
 (g) implement the system of observation and inspection established under Article XXIV of 
this Convention; 
(h) carry out such other activities as are necessary to fulfil the objective of this Convention. 
These roles underscore the central importance of conservation measures. Research, 
data acquisition and dissemination, analysis, performance review, and enforcement 
procedures all support the system of conservation measures in place for the CAMLR 
Area. The subject matter and content of conservation measures is set out in Art IX(2): 
(a) the designation of the quantity of any species which may be harvested in the area to 
which this Convention applies; 
(b) the designation of regions and sub-regions based on the distribution of populations of 
Antarctic marine living resources; 
(c) the designation of the quantity which may be harvested from the populations of regions 
and sub-regions; 
(d) the designation of protected species; 
(e) the designation of the size, age and, as appropriate, sex of species which may be 
harvested; 
(f) the designation of open and closed seasons for harvesting; 
(g) the designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions or sub-regions for purposes 
of scientific study or conservation, including special areas for protection and scientific 
study; 
(h) regulation of the effort employed and methods of harvesting, including fishing gear, 
with a view, inter alia, to avoiding undue concentration of harvesting in any region or 
sub-region; 
(i) the taking of such other conservation measures as the Commission considers necessary 
for the fulfilment of the objective of this Convention, including measures concerning 
the effects of harvesting and associated activities on components of the marine 
ecosystem other than the harvested populations. 
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The object and purpose of conservation including rational use, and ancillary 
considerations is clearly identified and reiterated in Article IX (1)(e). Article IX as a 
whole provides extensive substantive powers to the CAMLR Commission, including the 
general power to take other conservation measures ‘necessary for the fulfilment of the 
objective of this Convention’. But it is the conjunction of extensive substantive 
capacities under Article IX (2) with the requirement at (1)(e) for the Commission to 
identify conservation needs that reinforces the direction of the conservation measures: 
in carrying out conservation measures, there is a requirement to consider conservation 
needs and assess the effectiveness of any conservation measure in achieving that end. 
The object and purpose with conservation as the dominant concern is reinforced. 
Since 1982, the CAMLR Commission has utilised its substantive powers to address a 
number of key issues in the Antarctic: seabird bycatch mitigation, catch documentation, 
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), a Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) related to 
illegal unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), conservation management, 
catch method regulation and flags of convenience.275 Included within this array of 
considerations are general fishery regulations over seasons, catch size, area, type and 
method. 
One strength of the CAMLR Commission lies in its small size. It regulates only 24 vessels 
that operate in the CAMLR area, and has a strong focus on implementation and 
compliance, with a well-established Standing Committee on Implementation and 
Compliance (SCIC). The provisions of the CAMLR Convention also require that each 
Contracting Party ‘take appropriate measures within its competence to ensure 
compliance with the provisions’ of the CAMLR Convention and its conservation 
measures.276 Contracting Parties are also expected to ‘undertake to exert appropriate 
efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages 
in any activity contrary to the objective’ of the CAMLR Convention. The SCIC settles 
matters to be addressed by the Commission in plenary in relation to the compliance of 
Contracting Parties to both Articles XXI and XXII under Article X(2), which requires that: 
 
275 See the Current Conservation measures online at CCAMLR, Conservation Measures 
CAMLR (20 October 2014) https://www.ccamlr.org/en/conservation-and-
management/browse-conservation-measures.  
276 CAMLR Convention, Article XXI (1). 
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The Commission shall draw the attention of all Contracting Parties to any 
activity which, in the opinion of the Commission, affects the implementation by a 
Contracting Party of the objective of this Convention or the compliance by that 
Contracting Party with its obligations under this Convention. 
The CAMLR Convention contains extensive powers to provide for conservation with 
science-regulated rational use and peaceful conduct. The Convention prioritises 
regulation with legal force at the domestic and international levels, with Article X 
creating a space for direct diplomatic engagement on the issue of compliance. Articles 
XXI and XXII create legal obligations to ensure domestic compliance with conservation 
measures, prevent breaches, report activities that are contrary to the objective of the 
Convention and impose sanctions within jurisdiction.  
important issues of Southern Ocean conservation have been addressed by the CAMLR 
Commission most significantly through the use of conservation measures. In addition to 
this, the degree of compliance expected of Contracting Parties, and the rights of the 
Commission to address issues of compliance make the CAMLR Convention a strong 
Convention, particularly in comparison to the Whaling Convention, which exhibits a 
dearth of enforcement Articles and an abundance of good faith. 
3.5.2 Whaling Convention and its Schedule 
Articles IV and V of the Whaling Convention contain the substantive powers of the 
Commission, in conjunction with the Schedule, which is amended according to these 
articles. In addition to Articles IV and V, Article VI is part of the Convention prescribing 
the work of the Commission. 
The combined effect of Articles IV, V and VI is to confer on the Commission the power to 
gather information about whales and whaling (IV) make decisions about whales and 
whaling by amending the Schedule (V) and make recommendations to Contracting 
Governments on matters relating to whales and the object and purpose of the 
Convention (VI). There is no stipulated connection between any of the Articles in terms 
of reliance on scientific or statistical information obtained under Article IV. There is no 




Article IV provides the basis for the formation of the Scientific Committee, giving the 
Commission power to independently organise studies and investigations into whales, 
whaling, statistical information on whale stocks, the impacts of whaling, and methods of 
increasing and maintaining whale stocks. The current moratorium on commercial 
whaling demonstrates a lack of connection between decisions of the Commission under 
Article V and the data available on whales and whaling, stock status and the other areas 
covered by Article IV.277 The scientific data and advice provided by the Scientific 
Committee to the effect that management should be on a stock by stock basis278 was set 
aside in favour of a politically acceptable alternative to have an interim moratorium – a 
temporary cessation279 that has now lasted more than 30 years. While Article IV was 
essential to establishing the Scientific Committee, the lack of a clear connection may not 
be the root cause of the dissociation between data and decision, as there are indications 
in the CAMLR Commission that even with clear connections there can be shortfall 
between advice and decision. 
Article V contains the most significant of the substantive powers, which is the power to 
amend the provisions of the Schedule to the Whaling Convention. The Whaling 
Convention and the Schedule operate together. Amendment of the Schedule falls under 
Article V, specifically recognised in Article III as requiring a three-quarter majority vote 
for amendment.280 Decisions to amend the Schedule are made by the Commission on 
advice from the Scientific Committee, although politically fractious decisions may not 
follow such a clear course.  
It is beyond doubt that the Scientific Committee has made significant contributions to 
the understanding of whale killing methods, stock status, stock management, and non-
lethal research methods, with many amendments and Resolutions reflecting the strong 
 
277 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1981 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (1982) 32 
Report of the International Whaling Commission 43, 45, Agenda Item 7; 48 Agenda Item 
8, [8.2.2]. 
278 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1982 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (1983) 33 
Report of the International Whaling Commission 43, 47, Agenda Item 8 [8.1]. 
279 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1982 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (1983) 33 
Report of the International Whaling Commission 43, 47, Agenda Item 8 [8.1]. 
280 Whaling Convention, Article III(2). 
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relationship between the Scientific Committee and the Commission. However, even here 
there is a gap between the recommendations of the Scientific Committee and the 
political decisions of the Commission. For example, the conservation-oriented Revised 
Management Procedure (RMP) was not incorporated into the Schedule as the basis for 
catch-related decisions of the Commission, despite clear advice from the Scientific 
Committee of the benefits of the RMP.281 
The Schedule is concerned with commercial whaling. This is clear from its definition 
section, and its overall structure. This does not exclude conservation, as indicated in 
Article V, but it does intertwine use and conservation. The discussions around the 
moratorium acknowledged this connection.282 The Schedule contains catch allocation 
for aboriginal subsistence whaling,283 the terms of a moratorium on commercial 
whaling,284 the establishment of the Southern Ocean and Indian Ocean Whale 
Sanctuaries,285 and the ban on the use of cold grenade harpoons.286 The Schedule also 
notes reservations made by Contracting Governments to the regulations contained in 
the Schedule.287  
The Whaling Convention, Article VI gives the Commission power to make 
recommendations to one or all Contracting Governments. These recommendations lack 
 
281 IWC 40th Annual Meeting of July 1989, ‘Fortieth Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the 40th financial year, 1988-1989’ (San Diego, US, June 1989), 
Report of the Scientific Committee, Agenda Item 7 and Annex E; IWC 43rd Annual Meeting 
of July 1992, ‘Forty-Third Report of the International Whaling Commission – covering 
the 33rd financial year, 1991-1992’ (Glasgow, United Kingdom, July 1992), Report of the 
Scientific Committee, Agenda Item 6, 57-61. 
282 For example, ‘a negotiated interim cessation of commercial whaling was a 
reasonable alternative to other methods that have been tried to ensure the future 
productivity of whale resources’: IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1982 Report of the 
Scientific Committee’ (1983) 33 Report of the International Whaling Commission 43, 47 
Agenda Item 8, [8.1]. 
283 Whaling Convention Schedule, III Capture; Baleen Whale Catch Limits section 13. 
284 Whaling Convention Schedule, III Capture; Classification of Stocks 10(e). 
285 Whaling Convention Schedule, III Capture section 7(a) – Indian Ocean Whale 
Sanctuary; Schedule III Capture section 7(b) – Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary. 
286 Whaling Convention Schedule, III Capture section 6. 
287 Whaling Convention Schedule, 3, footnotes; 5, footnotes; 6, footnotes. 
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legal force.288 There is no comparison in the CAMLR Convention to Article VI except 
perhaps Article X (1), which applies to non-State parties and State parties, in addition to 
other enforcement requirements.289 There is some uncertainty over whether Article VI 
is the basis for the Resolutions of the Whaling Commission, with consideration being 
given to Article VI as a basis for expanding the voluntary jurisdiction of the Commission 
in relation to small cetaceans.290 This development would mean that the competence of 
the Commission would be divided from its object and purpose as a use-oriented 
conservation organization and its substantive business by a very narrow demarcation, 
based on the non-binding nature of Article VI. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
There is a significant difference in the clarity with which the object and purpose is 
articulated under the two conventions. Where the Whaling Convention spreads the main 
aspects of its object and purpose throughout the Preambular text, the CAMLR 
Convention contains its primary concerns in Article II, using direct language. 
Nonetheless, both conventions are concerned with the balance between conservation 
and use, bearing in mind the interests of future generations.  
A key difference is the lack of hard regulatory power in the Whaling Convention as 
compared to the CAMLR Convention. Another key difference is the unclear legal 
relationship in the Whaling Commission between decisions of the Commission and 
advice from the Scientific Committee as the Whaling Convention makes no provision for 
a Scientific Committee. 
Article IV of the Whaling Convention is comparable with Article IX(1) of the CAMLR 
Convention insofar as both Articles are concerned with the gathering of data. The 
 
288 The terms of the Whaling Convention, Article VI itself are simply the power to make 
recommendations to any or all Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to 
whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of the convention. Whether, in 
Article VI the Commission is constituted of a consensus decision or a simple or ¾ 
majority is unclear. 
289 CAMLR Convention, Articles X, XXI, XXII.  
290 IWC 58th Meeting of June 2006, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2006 – covering the 2005-2006 financial year’ (St Kitts and Nevis, West 
Indies, adopted June 2006) 7, Agenda Item 2. 
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specificity of the CAMLR Convention is not found in the Whaling Convention, which goes 
only so far as providing general guidelines on data to be sought through studies and 
investigations of whales and whaling, the collection and analysis of statistical 
information on trends and conditions of whale stocks and the effect of whaling 
activities, and the study, appraisal and dissemination of information on methods for 
maintenance and increase of whale stocks. Article IX(1) of the CAMLR Convention, by 
comparison is clear in its focal points and direction of research as there is a clear 
relationship between the Scientific Committee and the Commission.291  
The regulatory powers under Article V of the Whaling Convention are similar to those of 
the CAMLR Convention. As with the CAMLR Convention Article IX(2), the powers for 
regulation of whaling are listed as discrete items and are comparable in their focus. As 
with the CAMLR Convention reference in Article IX to the purposes and principles of the 
Convention, Article V also refers to the amendments to the Schedule regulations being 
for the ‘conservation and utilization of whale resources’.  
However, unlike the CAMLR Convention, which relies on conservation measures as the 
document of decision-making,292 the decisions of the Whaling Commission are made 
through the Article V powers as amendments to the Schedule. Article V is the most 
powerful Article in the Whaling Convention for the Commission, as the adoption of 
regulations in relation to species, seasons, waters, sanctuaries, size and catch limits, 
time, methods, gear and other aspects of whaling are what has facilitated the work of 
the Commission in relation to whale killing methods, aboriginal subsistence whaling, 
and the commercial whaling moratorium, which came into effect in 1986. But, again – 
there are no provisions for enforcement of regulations in the Whaling Convention. This 
creates a weak system with no functional implementation or compliance except through 
expected good faith. The observer scheme trialled in the 1970s was not effective in 
ensuring size limits on caught whales.293 
The basic powers of the two Commission are the same: the capacity for research and the 
capacity for decision-making. However, the CAMLR Convention makes clear connections 
 
291 CAMLR Convention, Article IX (4).  
292 CAMLR Convention, Article IX(1)(e)(f).  
293 Weyler, above n 264, 312-315. 
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between the research to be conducted and the decisions to be made, whereas there is 
no direct connection between Articles IV and V in the Whaling Convention. The texts of 
the Whaling and CAMLR Conventions contribute to the circumstances of their current 
operation, but so too do the circumstances of the managed marine living resources. An 
additional factor to consider is how NGO engagement interacts with these factors. A 
clear discussion of the various powers and relationships of the Conventions and the 
Schedule to the Whaling Convention facilitates discussion in the case study chapters, 
with a definite reference point for weighing the behaviours of NGOs against the 
structures of the Conventions. 
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CHARACTERISTIC CAMLR CONVENTION WHALING CONVENTION 
Opened for signature Opened for signature 1982; entered into force 1983 Opened for signature 1946; entered into force 1953 
Substantive aspects of the conventions 
Object and purpose 
Central to the object and purpose in both 
Conventions 
Defined under Article II; clearly specified 
Not specified; heavy reliance on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention to 
define from a whole-of-text reading 
Mandate of the Commission 
Connection to the use and conservation principles 
of the object and purpose 
Clearly and extensively defined under Articles IX, X, XI and XII with 
reference to specific and enumerated functions 
 
Defined under Articles III, IV, V and VI with reference to some specific and 
enumerated functions, with some broad functions, less clearly defined. 
Jurisdiction/management 
Zonal – “global” beneath the Antarctic Convergence “the CCAMLR 
area” 
Species – global, including territorial seas of Contracting governments, and 
the Southern Ocean; some confusion over degree to which ‘whale’ includes 
small cetaceans and extent of jurisdiction. 
Conservation focus 
Connection to the conservation and common 
future elements of the object and purpose 
Defined in Article II: conservation includes rational use; broad 
capacities for conservation measures outside of stock management 
Referred to without definition: conservation measures possible through 
management procedures related directly to stock management 
Stock status 
Stock status 
Dissostichus eleginoides (Patagonian toothfish/Chilean Sea Bass) 
and krill; regulated by the Commission 
With the exception of aboriginal subsistence whaling (ASW) regulated by 
the Commission, stock regulated by the Commission is not commercially 
exploited; Norway and Iceland have lodged reservations to the moratorium 
and continue to hunt minke whales within EEZs. 
Procedural and structural aspects of the Conventions 
Scientific Committee 
Scientific Committee embedded in the CAMLR Convention Articles 
XIV and XV. 
Scientific Committee established under the Rules of Procedure with 
reference to Article IV of the Whaling Convention 
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CHARACTERISTIC CAMLR CONVENTION WHALING CONVENTION 
Membership 
States seeking recognition as member states under the Convention 
must be researching or harvesting Antarctic waters under Article VII 
requirements; allows for accession but not membership under 
Article XXIV 
Open to any state under Article X 
Voting structure 
Consensus for substantive decisions, including Resolutions and 
conservation measures – (consensus includes abstention) 
Addresses the avoidance of conflict aspect of the Antarctic Treaty  
Consensus preferred but failing this three-fourths majority for substantive 
decisions (amendments to the Schedule); simple majority for Resolutions of 
the Commission. Where consensus for subsequent practice is sought, 
(consensus includes abstention). 
Reservations/objections Post-consensus (often administrative, domestic issue) Post-majority (reservations/objections often reflective of voting preference) 
Place of meeting Static – Hobart  Variable – Contracting government territories 
Observer rights and obligations 
Application process 
Requires statement of accord with and capacity for material 
support for or contribution to the principles of the CAMLR 
Convention 
Demonstrate interest in the area with a letter of accreditation from the 
relevant organization represented  
Accessibility for observers Limited access – three to four NGOs invited Open – up to, and over 100 different observers, NGOs and others 
Speaking and document rights 
Limited speaking rights; information documents permitted; informal 
roles limited 
Broad speaking rights; information documents permitted; informal roles 
extensive 
Definition of NGO 
No clear definition of NGO – has categories for NGO and ‘other 
organizations’ under Article XXIII 
No clear definition of NGO – has ‘public or private agencies, establishments 
or organizations’ under Article IV(1)  
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CHARACTERISTIC CAMLR CONVENTION WHALING CONVENTION 
Other aspects of the Conventions 
Other Commission bodies Ad hoc working groups, standing committees on finance and 
administration, and implementation and compliance 
Ad hoc working groups; Bureau; Committees for ASW, finance and 
administration; WKM; conservation. 
Intersessional participation NGOs are limited to attendance at workshops that inform the work 
of the Commission but do not form the work of the Commission; 
indicative of standing aligned to limited observer rights 
NGOs can attend both workshops and working groups and other bodies 
that form the work of the Commission, indicative of standing aligned to 
broad observer rights 
Relationship to other Conventions Is part of the Antarctic Treaty System and subject to the object and 
purpose of the Antarctic Treaty; references the Charter of the 
United Nations 
References prior whaling Agreements and Protocols as significant to the 
work of the Commission  




3.6.1 CAMLR Convention 
Consensus voting in the CAMLR Commission limits the need for reservations to 
decisions on conservation measures. 294 If a Member of the Commission invokes the 
reservation procedure, any Member of the Commission may request a meeting of the 
Commission to review the conservation measure. If this course of action is taken, any 
Member may declare they are not bound by the conservation measure at the meeting, or 
within thirty days following the meeting.295 Yet prior to any of these actions being taken, 
consensus on a conservation measure must have been reached, so it perhaps 
unsurprising that in the history of the CAMLR Commission the reservation procedures 
has generated no contentious reservations.296 
3.6.2 Whaling Convention 
By contrast, in the Whaling Convention, a Contracting Government can lodge an 
objection to a Schedule amendment if the notification is made within ninety days of the 
amendment.297 Japan, Norway, Peru and Russia have lodged several objections, 
particularly in relation to the commercial moratorium,298 and the Schedule amendment 
banning the use of cold grenade harpoons.299 The capacity to lodge an objection to the 
text of the Convention’s Schedule has created fractures in the Whaling Commission that 
 
294 CAMLR Convention, Article IX.6(c). 
295 CAMLR Convention, Article IX.6(d).  
296 CCAMLR-XVI Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 1997, ‘Report of the Sixteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 1997) [8.14]; 
CCAMLR-XXXII Meeting of 23 October – 1 November, 2013, ‘Report of the Thirty-Second 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November, 2013) [7.61]; 
CCAMLR-XXXIII Meeting of 20 – 31 October, 2014, ‘Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of 
the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 31 October, 2014) [7.4]. 
297 Whaling Convention, Article V.3. 
298 Whaling Convention Schedule, section 10(e). Iceland’s accession to the Whaling 
Convention was made with a reservation to section 10(e).  
299 Whaling Convention Schedule, III Capture sections 6 and 7(b). 
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are not evident in the CAMLR Commission.300 It is important to note that reservations to 
the commercial whaling moratorium contained in 10(e) of the Schedule, while politically 
controversial are nonetheless legitimate under both the Convention Articles and the 
Articles of interpretation in the Vienna Convention.301  
3.6.3 Discussion 
The reservation provisions in the CAMLR and Whaling Conventions have different uses, 
time frames and results. In the CAMLR Commission, reservations are made when there 
is a domestic inability to meet the agreed standard because of an unforeseen intervening 
factor; reservations are made with a view to withdrawing them once domestic 
circumstances permit the member state to comply. These reservations are made 
infrequently and are withdrawn when compliance becomes possible. In the Whaling 
Commission, reservations are made because of a lack of political will to comply with 
amendments to the Schedule, and so results in long standing variation in the legal 
obligations of Contracting Governments. The use of the reservation is thus reflective of 
the voting structure – the CAMLR Commission decides and acts in consensus, while the 
Whaling Commission decides in the majority and acts in the majority, permitting 
minority dissent. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the legal frameworks of the Whaling and CAMLR 
Conventions. Aspects of the Conventions considered were the geographical and species 
jurisdiction of the Commissions, the difference in membership and voting structures, the 
ability to lodge a reservation to the treaty, and the substantive regulatory powers.  
The nature of the jurisdiction – geographical under the CAMLR Convention, and species-
based under the Whaling Convention, has some ramifications for the exercise of 
regulatory powers, due to the narrow focus inherent in a species-based jurisdiction, but 
also in the broad terms of the Whaling Convention itself. These broad terms accentuate 
 
300 The objection of Iceland to the commercial whaling moratorium in the Schedule was 
itself the subject of an objection lodged by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, San 
Marion, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA: Whaling Convention Schedule, 6, footnotes. 
301 Gillespie, above n 263, 387-389; Fitzmaurice, above n 183. 
 
 97 
the political nature of the Commission as a forum. Coupled with the two-thirds majority 
voting system for substantive regulatory decisions, NGOs in the observer position have 
significant scope to exert influence, both domestically and within the forum of the 
Whaling Commission itself. This stands in contrast to the position of the CAMLR 
Commission, which operates under a geographical jurisdiction, relying on clear 
insistence on there being a scientific basis for deliberations and consensus decision-
making. While the broad jurisdiction under the CAMLR Convention enables wide-ranging 
contributions from NGO observers, the clear terms of Articles II and IX require that NGO 
contributions fall within well-defined expectations.  
The differences engendered by majority versus consensus decision-making, coupled 
with membership prerequisites and obligations are significant. Where the CAMLR 
Convention requires acceding nations to be involved in the Antarctic in a scientific or 
commercial capacity, the Whaling Convention requires only that a state notify the 
depositary state of the intention to ratify the convention.302 The closed membership 
circle of the CAMLR Commission, with consensus decision-making creates a forum 
where NGO contributions must meet not just the strict criteria of the Convention, but 
also the expectations of all states, all of which have vested interests in the Antarctic, and 
the capacity to veto the observer status of the NGO. The Whaling Commission is made up 
largely of non-whaling countries, its membership fluctuates greatly over time, and with 
a two-thirds majority, NGOs are free to present contributions to the Commission more 
contentious and political than those of CCAMLR-based observer NGOs. The broad terms 
of the Whaling Convention can be interpreted so multitudinously, if so wished, that with 
the addition of the voting and membership aspects, NGO contributions can draw wide of 
the mark and receive little or no reproof.  
In terms of reservations, the significant capacity of states in the Whaling Commission to 
lodge a reservation contributes to the disunity inspired by a two-thirds majority voting 
structure, and open membership. Without clear consensus-based acceptance by the 
Commission of the decisions of the Commission, the capacity for NGOs to rely on discord 
is increased – the reservation itself can be seen as an attack point, through which to 
push an agenda. Compared to the CAMLR Commission, where reservations are 
 
302 Scott above n 225, 600 noting that this has caused issues of hegemonic domination of 
the Whaling Commission agenda.  
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infrequent due to the nature of the voting system, the use of the reservation capacity 
under Article VI in the Whaling Commission, is contentious, and seeds discord to which 
NGO observer contribute. 
The clarity with which a convention ties its object and purpose to its regulatory mandate 
also supports functionality, and safeguards from pressure exerted by NGOs and/or non-
parties to the convention. The CAMLR and Whaling Conventions provide similar 
regulatory powers in relation to setting season, area, size and quantity of catch. 
However, the CAMLR Convention creates clear ties between the decisions of the 
Commission and the Scientific Committee, as well as between the object and purpose of 
the Convention and the decision-making function of the Commission. By contrast, the 
Whaling Convention has no clear relationship between the decisions of the Commission 
and Scientific Committee, while the ties between the object and purpose and regulatory 
powers are non-specific.  
While some of the chaos of the Whaling Commission has been hinted at in discussing the 
jurisdictional, voting, membership and reservation function of the Convention, the 
absence of clear connections between scientific advice and evidence, and the substantive 
regulatory functions of the Commission contribute to the discord. This chapter has 
provided both the context of the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions, in terms of 
jurisdiction and function, and also an object and purpose interpretation of the non-state 
actor Articles as a reference point for analysis of the observer position and the roles that 
attend upon that status. 
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Chapter 4: Defining NGOs and their behaviours in 
international law and the Commissions 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two presented the methods of treaty interpretation and object and purpose 
construction in international law. Chapter Three applied those methods to the CAMLR 
Convention and Whaling Convention, construing the object and purpose of each, and 
outlining the jurisdiction of the two Commissions under their respective conventions. 
This chapter engages with the NGO as a type of non-state actor. This has two aspects. 
The first aspect is what qualities define an NGO? This question is approached by looking 
at literature, international definitions of NGO, and finally at what makes NGOs unique 
from other non-state actors. The second aspect of this chapter involves an object and 
purpose analysis of the observer position in the CAMLR Commission and Whaling 
Commission. The observer position is available to NGOs for formal engagement. This 
part of the chapter looks at the Conventions, as well as Rules of Procedure and Rules of 
Debate to understand the nature of the observer position.  
This chapter considers the literature on NGOs in international law and explores the 
roles of NGOs in the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions in relation to the role of 
observer, as the dominant means of NGO engagement with the Commissions.  This 
chapter defines the NGO as a distinct legal entity. It proposes distinguishing among 
NGOs on the basis of the purpose of the organization. This chapter also looks at current 
international law scholarship to explore how the term ‘NGO’ is used in international 
bodies to define non-state actors. The first section looks at some definitions in 
international instruments and literature on NGOs. It identifies a lack of clarity and 
certainty in what constitutes an NGO as distinct from what validates an applicant 
organization for approval to engage with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). 
Section two provides a simple definition of ‘non-governmental organization’ that is 
transferable across all types of NGOs and IGOs, particularly treaty bodies, and avoids 
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many of the problems identified in section one.303 The third section considers the NGOs 
in the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions according to the purpose of the NGO, and 
categorises the relevant NGO observers into four types: industrial, environmental, 
scientific and hybrid NGOs. These four types were not derived from literature but from 
observation of the NGOs in the two organizations 304 
This chapter lays the foundations for discussion of the roles available to NGOs as 
observers and otherwise under the CAMLR and Whaling Conventions. It provides the 
foundation for an object and purpose analysis of these roles. This chapter concludes 
that the identity of the NGO must be grounded in its legal identity. The purpose of an 
NGO provides nuance amongst NGO actors, allowing for an analysis that distinguishes 
between NGOs on the basis of purpose. This facilitates a discussion based on the 
specifics of NGOs in the case studies rather than on a generalised overview of non-state 
actors as an indistinct caste. 
4.2 The challenge of defining “NGOs” 
NGOs are a type of non-state actor. A wide range of non-state actors – corporations, 
private military companies,305 terrorist organizations, universities, research bodies, 
pseudo-states, individuals, private contractors and others are significant participants 
 
303 Karima Bennoune, ‘Productive tensions: women’s rights NGOs, the “mainstream” 
human rights movement, and international lawmaking’ in Cecilia M. Bailliet, Non-State 
Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes: From the Margins (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) 125, 127-128. 
304 There is a fifth category – cultural NGO, which is not relevant to the Southern Ocean.  
305 Laura A Dickinson, ‘Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies Under 
Public International Law (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law 589; Won 
Kidane, ‘Status of Private Military Contractors under International Humanitarian Law’ 
(2010) 38(3) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 361; Joseph C Hansen, 
‘Rethinking the regulation of private military and security companies under 
international humanitarian law’ (2012) 35 Fordham International Law Journal 698; 
Franceso Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti, War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian 
Law, and Private Contractors (OUP, 2011); Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Business goes to 
war: private military/security companies and international humanitarian law’ (2006) 
88(863) International Review of the Red Cross 525. 
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across international law.306 While an object and purpose analysis can be applied to any 
actor in a treaty body, the restriction in this thesis to NGOs is founded on the 
proliferation of NGOs in intergovernmental bodies.307  
NGOs are the most consistent presence across a broad range of international law, 
including international humanitarian, and international trade law.308 NGOs can engage, 
reflect and influence public opinion across geographical and population limitations that 
hinder states in their influence simply because they represent ideas, or ideals, rather 
than a geographically defined nation state.309 NGO behaviours are “sovereignty-free”,310 
in terms of obligations and rights. Where NGOs engage in transnational activities, 
particularly, but not only, where they extend beyond accepted roles such as networking 
and coalition-building, this “sovereignty-free” status can challenge the effective 
 
306 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors: Carving out a Space in a State-Centred 
International Legal System’ (2016) 63(2) Netherlands International Law Review 183; D 
Robert DeChaine, ‘Humanitarian Space and the Social Imaginary: Médecins sans 
frontieres/Doctors Without Borders and the Rhetoric of Global Community’ (2002) 
26(4) Journal of Communication Inquiry 354. 
307 Nowrot, above n 22, 579-580; Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental organizations’, above n 
272; Kal Raustiala, ‘States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions’ (1997) 
41(4) International Studies Quarterly 719, 719; Peter Willetts, ‘From Stockholm to Rio 
and beyond’ above n 28, 57. 
308 Mark Fathi Massoud, ‘Work Rules: How International NGOs Build Law in War-Torn 
Societies’ (2015) 49(2) Law & Society Review 333; Daniela Irrera, ‘NGOs and 
humanitarian action’ in Daniela Irrera, NGOs, crisis management and conflict resolution 
(Edward Elgar, 2013) 44-67; Claudie Barrat, Status of NGOs in International 
Humanitarian Law (Brill, 2014); Russy D Sumariwalla, ‘Making a Difference: The role of 
international NGOs in the evolution of international human rights and humanitarian law 
(HRHL)’ (2011) 19 Williamette Journal of International Law & Dispute Resolution 287; 
Daniel C Esty, ‘Non-governmental organizations at the World Trade Organization: 
Cooperation, Competition or Exclusion’ (1998) 1 Journal of International Economic Law 
123; Gunnar Sjöstedt, ‘NGOs in WTO Talks: Patterns of Performance and What They 
Mean’ (2011) 17 International Negotiation 91.  
309 Hein-Anton van der Heijden, ‘Globalization, Environmental Movements, and 
International Political Opportunity Structures’ (2006) 19(1) Organization & 
Environment 28; Thomas G Weiss and Leon Gordenker, NGOs, the UN, & Global 
Governance (Lynne Rienner, 1996); Liza Danielle Fallon, The Role of State and Non-state 
Actors in the Management of the Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) 
(Doctoral thesis, University of Tasmania, 2007). 
310 Fallon, above n 35, 181, 186. 
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operation of treaty bodies.311 Sovereignty-free activity on the part of NGOs can be 
moderated by treaty bodies, in order to support effective operations, by analysis of NGO 
behaviours through an object and purpose framework, and by normalising engagement 
rules and procedures of NGOs in line with the convention under which their 
engagement is prescribed.  
There is a category of prominent, visible non-state actors in international law that 
informs the concept of NGO.312 Questions of organizational legitimacy and 
accountability of these actors in IGOs have become the focus of commentary, and 
increasingly, criticism.313 Pervading such commentary is the fundamental issue of 
defining NGO: what type of organizations are the focus of questions of accountability? 
For a focused analysis, it is necessary to define the unique quality of the NGO as a non-
state actor distinct from both other non-state actors and from states. It is also necessary 
to refrain from a simply negative definition of NGO. 
Peter Willetts notes the difficulties associated with providing a clear definition of NGO 
in light of the diverse literature and practice,314 particularly with numerous definitions 
of NGO in international law. For example, the definition decided upon by the Panel of 
Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (Cardoso Panel) defines 
NGO as ‘shorthand for public-benefit NGOs – a type of civil society organization that is 
formally constituted to provide benefit to the general public or world at large’315 
However, public benefit is a value judgement and difficult to objectively define. Another 
 
311 Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries’, above n 30, 280-282; Sebastian Oberthür et al, 
Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Environmental 
Governance: Legal Basis and Practical Experience Final Report, June 2002 (ecologic) 53-
70. 
312 Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental organizations’, above n 30. 
313 Lutz Schrader and Tobias Denskus, ‘Introduction: Transnational NGOs and 
Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation’ in Jens Steffek and Kristina Hahn (eds), 
Evaluating Transnational NGOs (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 1, 2; Charnovitz, 
‘Nongovernmental organizations’, above n 30. 
314 Willetts, ‘Stockholm to Rio’, above n 28, 8-9. 
315 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and 
global governance; Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society 
Relations, UNGAOR, 58th sess, Agenda Item 59, UN Doc A/58/817 (11 June 2004) 13. 
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example is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
which defines NGOs as ‘private non-profit-making agencies, including co-operative 
societies and trade unions’.316 The Cardoso definition relies on value judgement, and 
the OECD definition includes societies and trade unions, which have their own domestic 
legal identities. Fundamentally, these definitions make use of the term NGO as a general 
reference for non-state actors, rather than seeking to truly define a class of actor. 
Definitions of NGO have been provided by a number of other reputable international 
sources, including the Council of Europe,317 the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC),318 the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD),319 the Yearbook of International Organizations, and the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).320 None of these definitions are consistent, and 
all are relative to the organization defining the group. The definitions depend on the 
application process for an observer invitation, which depends on the NGO being 
involved in activities within the sphere of a treaty body’s jurisdiction.  
An example of this relativity of definition is found in the definition of international NGO. 
An international NGO under the European Convention on the Recognition of Legal 
Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations requires four 
characteristics in an international NGO: 
a) have a non-profit-making aim of international utility; 
b) have been established by an instrument governed by the internal law of a Party; 
c) carry on their activities with effect in at least two States; and 
 
316 Willetts, ‘Stockholm to Rio’, above n 28, 8-9. 
317 European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-
Governmental Organizations, opened for signature 24 April 1986, ETS 124 (entered into 
force 1st January 1991). 
318 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 
June 1992, [1994] ATS 2; (1992) 31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994) 
319 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, [1993] 
ATS 32; 1769 UNTS 79 (1992) 31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) 
320 Oberthür et al, above n 311, 26-39 provides an overview of definitions of NGOs from 




d) have their statutory office in the territory of a Party and the central management 
and control in the territory of that Party or another Party.321 
Omitting the requirement for activity in at least two states, which defines the 
international element of NGO, leaves three characteristics of an NGO; yet none requires 
NGOs to identify as possessing a significant membership outside of government, and so 
does not appear to need NGOs to, in fact, be non-government. The non-profit-making 
aim may also clash with statutory incorporation, if the statutory incorporation does not 
have a non-profit, tax-exempt or charitable legal status. If the statutory requirement is 
simply to have an office in the territory of a Party to a treaty, and carry out a non-profit-
making aim, then a corporation with a statutory office that engages with a treaty body 
for a non-profit purpose can be defined as an NGO. 
The question of international utility in the definition is of limited relevance in defining 
an NGO as it is a relative assessment of purpose that is less about the legal form of the 
organization and more about recognition of value to an IGO. This is not defining, 
although it is important for NGOs engaging with IGOs to demonstrate their context-
specific international utility to the organization. 
A 21st century example of the definition of NGO is under the UNFCCC, where the 
definition is contained in the standard admission policy;322 the Convention itself does 
not define NGOs.323 The requirements for admission as an NGO observer in the UNFCCC 
are clear and objective. An NGO must have: non-profit or tax-exempt status; be legally 
incorporated/registered/established in a jurisdiction; be properly financially governed, 
demonstrate transparency of funding; and have affiliations with other NGOs. However, 
the admission requirements also make room for universities, indicating that the 
definition of NGO includes universities, thus precluding sufficient independent 
 
321 European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-
Governmental Organizations, opened for signature 24 April 1986, ETS 124 (entered into 
force 1st January 1991) Art 1. 
322 United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, Standard admission process for non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (no date) https://oas.unfccc.int/oas. 
323 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 
June 1992, [1994] ATS 2; (1992) 31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994), Article 
IV(1)(i); Article 7(2)(l).  
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definition of NGO, as a university is a distinct entity in itself. Aside from this and the 
NGO affiliation characteristics, the legal elements of the definition are clear – 
incorporation and transparency are key aspects of NGOs.  
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has a Standing Committee 
on Non-Governmental Organizations, which coordinates participation of NGOs in United 
Nations conferences and meetings.324 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 sets out the criteria 
for admission to consultative status, none of which includes legal incorporation as a not-
for profit or tax-exempt body. The focus is on purpose, activity, governance and 
membership.325 The emphasis within these criteria is on purpose – a relational 
definition that bears on the value of the NGO to the work of the United Nations, rather 
than on the characteristics of the NGO itself. This definition is inadequate as an 
independent legal definition of an NGO. 
The treaty body under the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) has significant interaction 
with NGOs,326 and the practice of the CBD is an interesting example of the confusion 
around the term NGO. The reference to NGOs in the CBD text is restricted to the 
Preamble and refers only to ‘the non-governmental sector’:  
Stressing the importance of, and the need to promote, international, regional and global 
cooperation among States and intergovernmental organizations and the non-
governmental sector for the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of 
its components; 
 
324 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Consultative relationship between the 
United Nations and non-governmental organizations, 49th plenary meeting of the 
Economic and Social Council, UN Doc Resolution 1996/31 (25 August 1996). 
325 ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, [44]. 
326 As does the CITES Commission under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES). Both Conventions have connections to the CAMLR and 
Whaling Conventions: Duncan E J Currie (submitted by Austria? Australia – isn’t he one 
of ours?), Ecosystem-Based Management in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
Progress towards Adopting the Ecosystem Approach in the International Management of 
Living Marine Resources IWC/59/18; Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), 
Position statement on Listing Toothfish under Appendix II of the Commission on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) CCAMLR-XXI/BG/29. 
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The practice of the CBD indicates strong engagement with ‘civil society’: A newsletter 
published by the CBD Secretariat is directed at civil society organization engagement.327 
The expectations of the CBD for admission of all observers to meetings of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP) are, firstly, relational: the organization must have qualifications 
relating to conservation and biological diversity. The requirements then include the 
organization possessing a website, documentation demonstrating its legal legitimacy in 
a domestic jurisdiction, as well as internal governance documents.328 As with the 
UNFCCC, the legal legitimacy and governance requirements are clear in defining NGO, 
but for the CBD, it is clear that any legal incorporation is acceptable. The broad 
interpretation of NGO by the CBD and its associated bodies is reinforced by a message 
issued by the CBD Secretariat in which the Executive Secretary describes ‘non-
governmental organizations, including environmental not-for-profit organizations’. This 
broad reference to NGOs is tantamount to the nomenclature ‘civil society’329 as a catch 
all for any organization that is not either a state or an IGO.  
While treaty body definitions lack consistency and reflect a utilitarian use of the term 
‘NGO’ to encompass many and sundry actors, academic literature is also not an 
adequate guide to defining NGO. Willetts’ discussion of the high variance among 
definitions of NGOs highlights a number of characteristics that are widespread through 
various definitions but are not ubiquitous. Some traits include: NGOs are for public 
benefit or cooperative; they act for others, or on behalf of others; they are not for profit; 
and they are independent.330 The definition Willetts gives, however, is entirely negative: 
‘not direct agents of individuals or governments, not pursuing criminal activities, not 
engaged in violent activities, and not primarily established for profit-making purposes’ 
 
327 None, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (no date) Convention on Biological 
Diversity https://www.cbd.int/ngo/. 
328 None, Meetings (no date Convention on Biological Diversity 
https://www.cbd.int/ngo/meetings.shtml Rule 7.1. 
329 Dr Ahmed Djoghlaf, Message of Dr Ahmed Djoghlaf, the New Executive Secretary of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, to the Environmental NGOs of our Planet (22 May 
2006) Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/doc/speech/2006/sp-
2006-02-21-ngo-en.pdf.  
330 Willetts, ‘Stockholm to Rio’, above n 28, 8-9. 
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[emphasis added].331 The only positive aspect of Willetts’ definition is that an ‘NGO is 
any organization that has, or is eligible to have, consultative status with the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations.’332 This is, again, a relative definition and does 
not independently define NGOs – it defines an organization’s value to an IGO. 
The works of Willetts, Betsill and Correll, and Oberthür, identify three common traits for 
the definition of NGO in the documents of IGOs; one positive trait and two negative 
traits.333 The positive trait is that the NGO must demonstrate expertise or interest in the 
subject matter of the organization they wish to address or meetings attend; the negative 
traits are that the NGO is not established by intergovernmental agreement and it must 
not be part of a government and so is free to express its views unhindered by 
government.334 This definition is dependent on the relationship of an organization with 
a state-based institution or organization. Under this definition, there is no reference to 
the legal status of the organization within domestic jurisdictions, and truly 
distinguishing features are not present – corporations, trade unions and other bodies 
could fall within this definition. To qualify as an NGO under such a broad definition an 
organization must simply not be governmental and bring an independent expertise or 
interest to an international organization.335 
A definition of NGO should avoid the lack of clarity that comes from such terms as ‘civil 
society,336 which gives too broad a classification, including any organization that isn’t a 
state or state-based. As this review has demonstrated, IGOs and academic literature 
have yet to address a definition of “NGO” as an entity rather than a nomenclature. To 
overcome the limitations of a utilitarian use of the term “NGO” and give the term some 
 
331 Willetts, ‘Stockholm to Rio’, above n 28, 31. 
332 Willetts, ‘Stockholm to Rio’, above n 28, 30. 
333 Michele M Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, ‘Introduction to NGO Diplomacy’ in Michele M 
Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, NGO Diplomacy (The MIT Press, 2008) 1, 4; Willetts, above n 
29, 31, Oberthür et al, above n 291, 1-2. 
334 Betsill and Corell, above n 333; Willetts, ‘Stockholm to Rio’, above n 28, 31, Oberthür 
et al, above n 311, 1-2. 
335 Betsill and Corell, above n 333. 
336 Jan Aart Scholte ‘Civil Society and the Legitimation of Global Governance’ (2007) 
3(3) Journal of Civil Society 305, 311; Willetts, ‘The Cardoso Report’, above n 15. 
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real meaning, the definition here has removed “NGO” from dependency on an NGO’s 
relationship with a treaty body and focuses on the core legal composition of NGOs as 
definitive. The definition below uses concrete legal identity as the basis for defining 
“NGO”, and the purpose of the organization as a distinguishing rather than defining 
characteristic. This overcomes the limitations of the many and disparate definitions of 
‘NGO’ and ‘civil society’ and focuses specifically on the legal identity of prominent 
pressure groups acting in international law. 
4.3 A definition of NGO 
The previous section critiqued the issues of definition of NGO in international law and 
academic literature. This section provides a simple definition of NGO that is transferable 
to any international law context to distinguish NGOs from all other types of non-state 
actor. This definition is derived from common qualities noted in IGOs and academic 
literature, particularly the work of Anna-Karin Lindblom.337 This definition removes 
relational characteristics, and refers to the fundamental requirement for an NGO to have 
a specific legal identity in one or more domestic jurisdictions. According to Lindblom, an 
NGO has four fundamental defining characteristics:338 
1. Possessing legal personality as a not-for-profit/ tax exempt organization; 
2. Freely created by private initiative (i.e. non-government);339 
3. Composed of voluntary and primarily private membership; and 
4. Having an organizational purpose or purposes. 
The fourth characteristic of purpose distinguishes the NGO from universities, research 
institutes, churches and trade unions, just as not-for-profit distinguishes NGOs from 
corporations. but it also distinguishes between NGOs. The fundamental purpose of 
universities, research institutions, trade unions and churches is implicit in the 
 
337 Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law (CUP, 
2009). 
338 Lindblom, above n 337, 53. 




organization. Distinct from these organizations, NGOs must have a purpose, but that 
purpose is unique to each NGO.  
4.3.1 Legal Status 
To be an NGO, an organization must be incorporated within one or more domestic 
jurisdictions as a not for profit group. There is no requirement that an NGO in either the 
Whaling or CAMLR Commissions be an international NGO. To be an international NGO, 
as prescribed by the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of 
International Non-Governmental Organizations, an NGO must carry on activities in at 
least two States. This is simple enough, and a relevant characteristic necessary for 
classification as an international NGO (or INGO). 
The primary states that engage with NGOs are Western democracies, such as the United 
States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and various states within the European 
Union.340 These domestic jurisdictions have legislation for non-profit incorporation. In 
the United States, to be an NGO requires being a 501(c)(3) organization.341 In Australia, 
there is the federal Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012; and 
the Tasmanian Associations Incorporation Act 1964, and the Western Australian 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987, amongst other state-based legislation. In the 
United Kingdom environmental NGOs, such as the Environmental Investigation Agency 
(EIA) are registered as charities, and identify as NGOs.342 In Switzerland, the home of 
the IUCN and the Red Cross, incorporation for legal personality requires compliance 
with the Swiss Civil Code Articles 80–89. International NGOs have automatic legal 
personality within Switzerland.343 
Non-western nations also have legislation allowing for the establishment of non-profit 
status organizations. South Korea has two primary legal bases for NGOs – foundations 
and associations. Associations are the most commonly used legal basis for NGOs. Groups 
wishing to become legally recognised associations must apply through a registration 
 
340 Willetts, above n 30. 
341 US Code, 1947, section 501(c)(3). 
342 UK Companies Act, 2006, section 5.  
343 210 Swiss Civil Code, 1907, Chapter III, Articles 80-89. 
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procedure with the ministry relevant to the purpose of the association. When 
registered, the association has legal capacity.344 The legal form of a foundation is 
popular with industry and government interests, but also increasingly with individuals. 
Foundations must be not for profit and tend to be ‘so well organized and funded that in 
certain fields they play a significant role.’345 To this end, the distinction between 
industry and other NGO types may be indicated within the domestic sphere of South 
Korea in the type of legal form chosen. 
While the Russian Federation does have legislation that allows for the incorporation of 
non-profit entities, it invited international and domestic criticism with its introduction 
in 2012 of restrictive laws regarding ‘Foreign Agents’ and NGOs operating within 
Russia.346 The means of applying for legal status in the Russian Federation are unclear, 
however academic work indicates that there are three recognised types of civil society 
association within the Russian federation: ‘(1) associations with close financial and 
political links to the state; (2) western financed organizations; and (3) domestic self-
financed movements.’347 
 
344 Kim, Inchoon and Hwang, Changsoon, Defining the Nonprofit Sector: South Korea 
(Working Papers of the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, No 41, 
2002) 9-10. 
345 Inchoon and Hwang, Defining the Nonprofit Sector: South Korea (Working Papers of 
the John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, No 41, 2002) 10.  
346 Freedom House, Factsheet: Russia’s NGO Laws, Freedom House (no date) 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf; International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs and Institute for Ecology and Action Anthropology, Parallel 
information: Civil and political rights of indigenous minority peoples of the North, Siberia 
and the Far East of the Russian Federation, CCPR 113 Session (16 March – 02 April 2015) 
7th periodic reports of the Russian Federation CCPR/C/RUS/7, 13 [26]; YV 
Ivashchecnko, Soviet whaling: past history and present impacts (Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Southern Cross University, Lismore, NSW, 2013); ATMMHC, Association of 
Traditional Marine Mammal Hunters of Chukotka, ATMMHC (no date) 
http://ansipra.npolar.no/english/items/ATMMHC.html; Galina Diatchkova, ‘Chukotka’s 
Indigenous Peoples: Issues and Prospects for Development’ in Natalia Loukacheva (ed), 
Polar Law Textbook (TemaNord, 2010) 11.4. 
347 Elena Chebankova, ‘State-sponsored civic associations in Russia: systemic 
integration or the ‘war of position’? (2012) 28(4) East European Politics 390 – 408, 391. 
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4.3.2 Private initiative 
Private initiative is a requirement of being an NGO that bears on the ‘non-government’ 
aspect of the NGO identity. It ties closely to the incorporation of the organization as non-
commercial, not-for-profit, or tax-exempt aspects of incorporation. Private initiative 
may nonetheless be cooperative with government or government entities. 
The separation between public and private is a qualifying characteristic – government 
cannot be the sole motivating actor in the development of an organization that will be 
termed an NGO. While states or government departments may participate in the 
establishment of the organization, the organizational documents must express 
independence from individual governments. Even in the early phases of establishing an 
NGO, indications of government cooperation with the organization is not fatal. Where 
several governments, in collaboration with private organizations create an organization 
that has independent purposes from any member government, it is neither an 
intergovernmental organization (IGO) or an NGO – it is a hybrid NGO, because of its 
membership composition.  
4.3.3 Membership 
Membership of an NGO must be voluntary. However, another aspect of membership to 
note is that government or government body membership of an NGO is not fatal to the 
identity of an NGO.348 Membership can be used as a distinguishing factor, much like 
with purpose. In the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions it is possible to distinguish 
between the types of organizations that seek observer status or that are present on 
national delegations, and it is possible to distinguish between NGOs on the basis of 
purpose, as well as membership – although, purpose is the primary distinguishing 
factor. There are four categories of NGO observed in the Whaling and CAMLR 
Commissions: environmental NGOs, with subclasses of scientific and animal welfare 
oriented NGOs; industry NGOs, the purpose of which is to represent industry interests, 
and whose membership is restricted to for-profit companies and their representatives; 
cultural NGOs, the purpose of which is the represent the interests of particular cultural 
groups, and whose membership is restricted to individuals and organizations associated 
with the cultural group represented; and hybrid NGOs, an NGO type that may fit any of 
 
348 Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’, above n 30, 351-352. 
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these categories but whose membership includes states. Hybrid NGOs are worth noting 
because the most prominent of such NGOs, the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN), has special status at both the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions 
because of its membership. A second hybrid NGO, the international Wildlife 
Management Consortium World Conservation Trust (IWMC WCT) is less prominent but 
fits the definition of a hybrid NGO due to its membership.349 
4.3.4 Purpose – distinguishing NGOs amongst NGOs 
The purpose of an NGO distinguishes one from another. There are five broad types of 
NGO within the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions: environmental, scientific, cultural, 
hybrid, and industrial NGOs. These terms were developed for this thesis to describe the 
NGOs observed in the two Commissions. Environmental, scientific, cultural and 
industrial NGOs are defined by purpose. Hybrid NGOs are defined by inclusion of 
government or state membership in the NGO. Hybrid NGOs transcend the 
public/private divide through cooperative initiatives between private and government 
interests. Hybrid NGOs are initiated by private citizens, maintain independent purpose, 
and are incorporated as an NGO. While the interests of the NGO and government may 
coincide, the hybrid NGO is not a ‘puppet’ of government.  
The purpose of an NGO is useful in distinguishing among the NGOs involved in the two 
commissions. It is a means of grouping NGOs according to their general type as well as 
facilitating comparative analysis of these groups. The contributions made by various 
NGOs in their observer roles are to the subject of primary analysis, while the 
organization purpose and type facilitates the secondary analysis of how different NGO 
types behave within the commissions. This means that purpose and therefore type is 
important in providing a deeper analysis of object and purpose adherence among NGOs. 
4.3.5 Benefits of a legal definition of NGO 
There are a number of benefits to this definition. First, a simple definition allows for the 
specific purpose/s of an NGO to be a distinguishing feature among types of NGOs rather 
 
349 See Appendix 5. 
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than purpose as defining of an organization being an NGO.350 Using the purpose of an 
NGO as a defining trait has proved problematic because of the diversity of positions and 
goals of NGO actors.351 Second, this definition can be used to distinguish between NGOs 
on the basis of membership. Membership can be a distinguishing factor where 
membership of the NGO by states or government organs is present. Where an NGO has 
government membership it nonetheless remains an NGO if it maintains an 
independence of purpose from the government members and satisfies all other criteria.  
Third, a legal definition of NGO steers away from the lack of clarity we find in the 
definition of civil society,352 a broad and inclusive category that can include NGOs but 
should not be a synonym for NGO. A legal definition gives a specific legal personality – 
this is significant as the ‘mere fact of possessing rights and obligations based on 
international law is not sufficient to claim international legal personality.’353 Having 
rights and obligations within a treaty body is not enough to define ‘NGO’. An NGO should 
be defined by its domestic legal personality not by its relationship to an organization.354 
Fourthly, and finally, the legal definition gives specificity to NGOs as a group and allows 
NGOs themselves to be separated out and the variety of types of NGO identified. This is 
 
350 Willetts, ‘From Stockholm to Rio’, above n 28, rejecting moral value of purpose as 
defining, 12. 
351 Lutz Schrader and Tobias Denskus, ‘Introduction: Transnational NGOs and 
Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation’ in Steffek, Jens and Kristina Hahn (eds), 
Evaluating Transnational NGOs (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 1, 2; Bennoune, above n 
283, 125. 
352 Scholte, above n 336, 311 defining civil society as ‘a political arena where 
associations of citizens seek, from outside political parties, to shape the rules that 
govern one or the other aspect of their common life.’ See also Willetts, ‘From Stockholm 
to Rio’, above n 30, 21-22, 25. 
353 Wladyslaw Czaplinski, ‘Recognition and International Legal Personality of Non-State 
Actors’ (2016) Pecs J Int’l & Eur L 7. 
354 Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’, above n 30, 356-357 discussing issues 
with granting international legal personality to NGOs; also, see CCAMLR-IV Meeting of 2 
– 13 September, 1985, ‘Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, 
Australia, adopted 13 September 1985) [48] where the CAMLR Commission was 
concerned with the adherence of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 
NGO to the domestic legal personality requirement of possessing a Constitution. 
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where membership and purpose is relevant as they are NGO-specific identification 
factors. 
The process of identification of NGO types is represented in Figures 1-3 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 simple equation demonstrating what constitutes an NGO 
 
Figure 4.2 Identifying a hybrid NGO 
 
Figure 4.3 Identifying other NGO types 
NGO type is a means of distinguishing between different NGOs. Being able to distinguish 
between NGOs on the basis of purpose allows us to evaluate contributions by different 
NGOs. The contributions of scientific NGOs versus those of environmental NGOs may be 



















































radically different. However, if neither was defined by their purpose, the contributions 
of each could be conflated as the contributions of NGOs as a class.  
The purpose of NGOs engaging with international environmental law tends toward four 
categories mentioned earlier: environment, culture, science and industry. These are 
discussed in depth below at [4.4]. However, it is sufficient here to note that to 
distinguish NGOs from each other, purpose provides a clear means of doing so, and 
allows for greater analysis and understanding of NGOs as actors within the legal 
frameworks of treaty bodies. 
In summary, this definition of NGO is a means of clearly identifying NGOs as opposed to 
other organizational types that operate within the legal framework of treaty bodies. 
This makes it possible to provide individual analyzes of the contributions of each 
distinct NGO type. All non-state actors function within the same parameters of 
engagement in roles such as observers or delegation members, but all non-state actors 
are distinct organizational types and should be recognised as such to give value to 
analysis. 
The next section addresses the normative roles that might be available to NGOs within 
the legal frameworks of treaty bodies. It also addresses the issues around NGOs 
engaging in non-normative roles, called here ‘subversive roles’. 
NGOs have been recognised as beneficial contributors to international law, providing 
financial assistance, expertise and representation in the development and 
implementation of international law.355 Roles of NGOs have been extensively 
categorised in the literature,356 and it is not necessary to go into depth on these, as the 
roles of NGOs here are defined by the legal regimes with which they engage, either as 
accredited observers, or aberrant actors. 
 
355 Martens, above n 18; Raustiala, above n 307; Willetts, ‘From Stockholm to Rio’, 
above n 28; William E DeMars, NGOs and Transnational Networks. Wild Cards in World 
Politics (Pluto Press, 2005). 
356 Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries’, above n ; Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations’, 
above n 30; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: 
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1998) 
Chapter 11, 252; Oberthür et al, above n 311. 
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In pursuit of their purpose, NGOs may perform both normative roles and roles that fall 
outside of this and may be termed ‘subversive’.357 Normative roles are roles that NGOs 
perform with the permission and authority of states for the role.358 These normative 
roles of NGOs are tied specifically to the legal regimes in which the NGOs engage. The 
following discussion of formal roles tends to the normative, while the discussion of 
intersessional roles notes the subversive. Subversive is a term developed for this thesis. 
Subversive refers to roles undertaken by NGOs that fail to meet the normative 
standards of international organizations and states, and which seek to challenge the 
existing mechanisms for dispute resolution and/or law enforcement in those 
organizations. Key examples of this are the engagement of Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society (Sea Shepherd) in “policing” the JARPA II scientific whaling programs of the 
Japan in the Southern Ocean, and the pursuit of the vessel, the Thunder to prevent IUU 
fishing.  
The boundaries of NGO roles should be found in the Conventions and in the Rules of 
Procedure and other subordinate documents, such as Meeting Reports, Resolutions and 
Conservation Measures. This doesn’t mean that they are found there. Ideally, NGO 
behaviours and international legal personality in treaty bodies should be confined by 
the legal regimes.359 Of course, this just means that ideally, NGO roles should remain 
normative roles to support treaty regimes. However, many aspects of NGO engagement 
is informally defined, and the nature of international law, such as freedom of the high 
seas, prevents some aspects of prevention or regulation in relation to non-state 
behaviours.  
 
357 The term ‘subversive’ arose during my research. Observing the actions of groups 
such as Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (Sea Shepherd), and to a lesser extent, 
Greenpeace, it became clear that there were behaviours on the part of NGOs that 
attempted to exploit a lacuna in international law and so ‘subvert’ the assumed order 
with states as the primary and dominant actors. This was observable in Sea Shepherd 
and Greenpeace interference in Japanese research voyages to the Southern Ocean, and 
the ongoing claims of ‘jurisdiction’ from Sea Shepherd in pursuing Japanese research 
vessels. 
358 Dinah Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 The American 
Journal of International Law 291, 299. 
359 Ryngaert, above n 306, 184; Raustiala, above n 307, 720-724; Hein-Anton van der 
Heijden, ‘Globalization, Environmental Movements, and International Political 
Opportunity Structures’ (2006) 19(1) Organization & Environment 28, 33-38. 
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4.4 NGO roles as observers  
The observer position is the formal access point for non-state actors, including NGOs, to 
the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions. The observer position defines most roles, both 
formal and informal, available in the Commissions. It is largely defined by convention 
Articles, and Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate developed for Commission 
meetings. Literature supports the view that NGO behaviours, and international legal 
personality, are ideally confined by the legal regimes in which they act.360 A 
convention’s influence on NGO roles, and the effect of Rules of Procedure and Rules of 
Debate in defining NGO behaviour is important to consider in order to determine to 
what extent the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission confine NGO behaviours. 
This section looks at the aspects of the observer position that give NGOs access to the 
Commissions and to member states and the convention and rule-based origin of this 
position. This section details the capacities available to NGOs as observers. The 
capacities available to observers are formal – those provided for in the Rules of 
Procedure and/or Rules of Debate, and informal – those that are incidental to having a 
presence at meetings or other Commission-based gatherings, such as workshops in the 
intersessional period.  
The formal and informal roles of NGOs allow NGOs to engage with international 
organizations behaviours that have been documented and studied among international 
governance scholars.361 The roles generally attributed to NGOs in international law are 
engaged through the observer position. Roles that attach to the observer position 
 
360 Ryngaert, above n 306, 184; Raustiala, above n 307, 720-724; Hein-Anton van der 
Heijden, ‘Globalization, Environmental Movements, and International Political 
Opportunity Structures’ (2006) 19(1) Organization & Environment 28, 33-38. 
361 Lutz Schrader and Tobias Denskus, ‘Introduction: Transnational NGOs and 
Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation’ in Jens Steffek and Kristina Hahn (eds), 
Evaluating Transnational NGOs (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Charnovitz, ‘Two 
Centuries’, above n 30; Oberthür et al, above n 311; Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental 
Organizations’, above n 30; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New 
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University 
Press, 1998) Chapter 11, 252; Nowrot, above n 22; Raustiala, above n 307; Willetts, 
above n 28; Massoud, above n 308; Irrera, above n 308, 44-67; Barrat, above n 308; 




include providing transparency of institutional decision-making to global 
populations,362 and engaging public opinion across geographical and population 
limitations that otherwise hinder states in their influence.363 Other capacities include 
networking and coalition-building,364 gathering, analysing and disseminating 
information or data that bears on decision-making, 365 promoting policy development 
or change through advocacy, 366 and contributing to the development of prescriptive 
rules or policies that have authority over member states of treaty bodies.367 As becomes 
clear below, all of these capacities are engaged in by NGOs through the position of 
observer. Attendance at meetings facilitates transparency activities, networking and 
coalition building through the relationships developed ‘in the margins’ of the meetings. 
The capacity to comment on the agenda and provide documents for the Commission’s 
consideration facilitates advocacy, policy and rule development and the provision of 
data to bear on decision-making. However, as will also be explained, there is a capacity 
for NGOs to hinder the work of international organizations in performing these 
functions.368 
4.4.1 The position of observer in the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions  
The observer position in the Whaling Commission and the CAMLR Commission is open 
to non-state actors and non-member states. NGO observers differ from other observers, 
 
362 Oberthür et al, above n 311, 46. 
363 Hein-Anton van der Heijden, ‘Globalization, Environmental Movements, and 
International Political Opportunity Structures’ (2006) 19(1) Organization & 
Environment 28; Thomas G Weiss and Leon Gordenker, NGOs, the UN, & Global 
Governance (Lynne Rienner, 1996); Fallon, above n 35. 
364 See Schrader and Denskus and others above n 360. 
365 Oberthür et al, above n 311, 40; Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental organizations’, above 
n 30, 353, 362. 
366 Oberthür et al, above n 311, 43. Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental organizations’, above 
n 30, 350, 352, 362, 364. 
367 Oberthür et al, above n 311, 48-50. Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental organizations’, 
above n 30, 349, 354, 359. 




such as companies, IGOs, and non-member states because of their distinct legal 
identities.369  
The Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate provide a useful starting point for 
considering NGO roles. This section looks at the official roles of observers, as well as 
roles that attach to unofficial aspects of observer NGO engagement, such as ‘in the 
margins’ relationships with state delegates, and intersessional behaviours that may not 
be Commission-sanctioned. After this, the following section considers an object and 
purpose analysis of the Rules in relation to the Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention 
and Article IV of the Whaling Convention.   
A distinction is drawn between formal and informal roles, as well as sessional, 
intersessional and subversive. Formal roles of NGOs are those that take place within the 
legal structures of treaty bodies. Observer status, membership of a government 
delegation, and amicus curiae are all examples of formal roles. Informal engagement 
takes place in the margins of formal. These spaces give rise to informal roles that mirror 
their formal counterparts. NGOs speak with government representatives, and lobby in 
that context. Documents are often made available, presenting information and policies 
from particular NGOs. Informal roles that exist outside the narrow margins of a formal 
position can be subversive, particularly in cases where protest takes the form of verbal 
or physical violence rather than articulate demonstration.370  
Sessional engagement is where observer NGOs interact during meetings of the 
Commission or its subsidiaries. These periods include both formal and informal roles. 
Intersessionally, there are limits to what NGO observers can do. However, NGOs can 
 
369 This definition does reclassify one organization, the IUCN, as an NGO where it has 
frequently been classified as an IGO. The legal status of the IUCN is as an NGO through 
the Swiss Civil Code, and it is not established in the same way as IGOs, including the 
Whaling and CAMLR Commissions; It is also important to distinguish roles attributable 
to NGO observers as distinct from roles attributable to NGO actors that act outside the 
observer position. NGO representatives as delegation members, or as domestic actors, 
are not the subject of this thesis as their roles are filtered directly through the state 
entity and are not engaged with the Commission directly. The focal relationship is that 
between the Commission and the NGO observer. 
370 For example, representatives of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (Sea Shepherd) 
are often seen at Whaling Commission meetings, outside of the meeting place, and while 
some protests are a peaceful and articulate opposition to a particular policy position, 
usually of Japan, others devolve into verbal abuse. 
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engage in unsanctioned support of the decisions of the Commissions – such as reporting 
information on IUU fishing vessels to a Commission’s Secretariat or attempting to 
enforce what they perceive to be breaches of a treaty. These latter two are, respectively, 
formal intersessional and subversive intersessional behaviours.   
4.4.2 Attendance 
The CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure permit all observers to attend any private or 
public sessions of the Commission.371 Current practice excludes observers from 
attending working group meetings. Observers may attend the meetings of the Standing 
Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC) but not the Standing Committee 
on Administration and Finance (SCAF). Observers may also, depending on their 
expertise, be invited to, or even fund or organise workshops that contribute to the work 
of the CAMLR Commission. Observers are also permitted to observe at the Scientific 
Committee meetings, if they hold relevant scientific qualifications.372 
The Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure permit observers to attend all meetings of 
the Commission, including subsidiary committees, but excluding meetings of the 
Bureau, closed meetings of the Finance and Administration Committee, or meetings 
constituted only of Commissioners.373 Similarly, the Scientific Committee of the Whaling 
Commission generally only permits observers with suitable scientific qualifications, as 
long as they are also associated with an observer group accredited by the 
Commission.374  
The relevance of accreditation as an observer and the capacity to attend other meetings 
related to the Commissions is relevant to considering the range of papers submitted by 
NGO observers, as well as in understanding how, and to what degree, observer 
 
371 CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule 33. 
372 CAMLR Commission Scientific Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 19.  
373 Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure (2014) in IWC 65th Annual Meeting of 15th – 
18th September 2014, ‘Sixty-Fifth Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2014 – covering the July 2012 – October 2014 financial year’ (adopted 
Portorož, Slovenia, October 2016) Rule C.2. (‘Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure’). 
374 Whaling Commission Scientific Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule A.5. 
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behaviours, such as addressing the Commission on an agenda item, are controlled by 
existing rules.  
4.4.3 Formal: Speaking to the agenda  
The Rules of Procedure of the two Commissions grant observers the capacity to speak to 
the agenda of the Commission plenary meeting. Observers may also to speak to the 
agenda in subcommittee meetings in both Commissions. The speaking rights of NGO 
observers in both Commissions are currently framed as the right to speak to an agenda 
item, although this is a recent development in the Whaling Commission.375  
Speaking to the agenda can be an influential activity in both Commissions. However, 
there are clear differences in how it is used. For example, in the Whaling Commission in 
2014, the capacity to speak to the agenda was utilised by the Animal Welfare Institute 
(AWI) to address the New Zealand Commissioner on perceived hypocrisy in New 
Zealand’s condemnation of Japanese scientific whaling, and its own critically 
endangered Hector and Maui dolphins.376 In the CAMLR Commission, the use of the 
capacity to speak to the agenda is reserved for restating policy positions of the observer 
NGO. 
The difference may be attributable to the consensus requirement of Article XII of the 
CAMLR Commission, which means that a Member State of the CAMLR Commission can 
exclude an observer by withdrawing consent to their accreditation and invitation as an 
observer. A second contributing factor is that in the Whaling Commission, where 
observer numbers have risen to over 100 at various times, there is a level of 
expendability if, or when, a Member State objects to the presence of a particular NGO for 
their conduct.  
Outside of the formal means of engaging, NGOs utilise the ‘margins’ of CAMLR 
Commission meetings to engage with Commissioners, delegates, other observers, and 
Secretariat staff to put forward their agenda.  
 
375 IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the period July 2012 – October 2014 (65th)’ 
(Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) 8 and 48-49. 
376 Personal observation of candidate; IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, 29. 
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4.4.4 Formal: Document submission  
The document submission rules of the two Commissions differ in key respects. The 
CAMLR Commission has two types of document: Working Papers and Briefing Papers. 
Working Papers are papers for the direct consideration of the Commission under the 
agenda and may become Resolutions or Conservation Measures. Background papers are 
contributory information around agenda items. Only briefing papers may be submitted 
by NGOs. 
The Whaling Commission has more restrictive document submission rules, with 
observers having the right to submit Position Statements at the beginning of the 
Commission meeting. Until 2014, observers had no power to submit information 
documents to the agenda of the meeting, however amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure now permit this engagement.377 The previous restriction means that 
observers engage extensively in the margins of meetings distributing media around 
whaling issues.378 Until 2014, Position Statements were the only formal means of 
engagement available to NGOs, but until 1980, Position Statements were read aloud at 
the beginning of meetings.379 
As with speaking rights, the capacity to engage with delegates outside of the formal 
structure is also present and engaged in with an informal equivalent. In the margins of a 
plenary meeting, observers can distribute or display documents that support their 
position, and which seek to influence delegations or at the minimum maintain visibility 
for a policy. This formal–informal use of document submission is mirrored with the 
strong speaking relationships that exist between states and NGOs, with much informal 
discourse taking place within the Commission plenary meeting margins at the regular 
break intervals, and at evening or lunch time functions.  
 
377 Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule 3.1.(c).  
378 The display of information documents in areas outside the meeting rooms are not 
part of the formal Commission process is governed by informal and unwritten rules. 
379 Thirty-second meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1980, Resource ID 422. 
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4.4.5 Informal: In the margins 
In the margins, NGOs utilise the capacity to have conversations and distribute 
documents to Commissioners and delegates. In addition to conversation, which is 
readily available at the morning and afternoon tea breaks, NGO observers also use other 
means of communication, including demonstrations, street art, and temporary banner 
advertising on nearby buildings. These have varying degrees of prominence. For 
example, at the 2017 CAMLR Commission meeting ASOC placed temporary banners 
supporting MPA designation on The Duke, a hotel facing the CCAMLR Secretariat 
building where the meeting is held. In addition, there was pavement stencilling 
involving depictions of penguins and the message to ‘Designate Now’ and the ASOC logo.  
At the Whaling Commission meetings in 2014 and 2016 in Slovenia, several protesters 
associated with Sea Shepherd and affiliate groups attended outside the Commission 
meeting. These representatives were corralled into a small fenced area nearly 20m from 
the formal entrance to the conference venue, resulting in very little contact between 
delegates and protesters, except where delegates deliberately chose to engage. 
Delegates most often used the rear entrance to the conference venue, or remained 
within its confines, as it was both a conference venue and a hotel. This meant that 
delegate could avoid unpleasant interactions with protesters. However, in 2016, a small 
number of Sea Shepherd protesters positioned themselves at the rear entrance of the 
hotel and took the opportunity to verbally abuse the Japanese Commissioner, Joji 
Morishita. Unsanctioned engagement such as this falls outside both international 
norms380 but it does demonstrate the capacity for NGOs to affect the tone of meetings, 
and so influence decision-making.  
4.4.6 Nature of contributions as observer and other NGO roles 
NGO observers and NGOs in the intersessional period make a range of contributions, 
including providing general data or data systems, implementation of conservation 
measures or programs, such as research, communication of data, compliance with 
 
380 John S Dryzek, ‘Global Democratization: Soup, Society, or System?’ (2011) 25(2) 
Ethics & International Affairs 211, 221; Nowrot, above n 18, 635; Jozef A Kosc, ‘Engaging 
Global Civil Society: Shifting Normative Frameworks, Moral Diplomacy, & the Future of 
International Relations’ (2015) 1(1) The Journal of International Relations, Peace 
Studies, and Development 1, 4-5. 
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regulatory requirements, and attempts to enforce perceived or actual breaches of 
conservation measures enshrined in law. Implementation of conservation measures or 
programs by NGOs is rare in the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions, although other 
international environmental law forums utilise NGO resources more fully.381  
Areas of key contribution for NGOs around the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions are 
what Charnovitz describes as ‘intelligence function’ and ‘promotion function’. The 
intelligence function involves gathering, analysing and/or disseminating information or 
data that bears on decision-making, usually by states or IGOs. The promotion function is 
directed advocacy, seeking to either maintain, bolster or alter decision-maker policy 
positions. 382  
Invocation, which is invoking rules or laws and advocating for the adherence to those 
laws in relation to a perceived breach by states or other actors has been engaged with in 
both Commissions, with invocation being used to highlight issues with state 
implementation of treaty obligations. Invocation was used to great effect in the CAMLR 
Commission, as is discussed in Chapter Six by COLTO in relation to IUU fishing. 
Invocation is also associated with the actions of Sea Shepherd in relation to the Japanese 
JARPA II scientific whaling in the Southern Ocean, and with a few instances in the 
Whaling Commission, in relation to cold grenade harpoons. 
Other areas, such as prescription, while possible in the two Commissions, are not 
available to observers. Prescription requires partnership with a state and is therefore 
 
381 TRAFFIC, an NGO wildlife trade monitoring network collaborates with the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) on implementation of programs, as well as other aspects of addressing the trade 
in endangered species: K Nowell, Species Trade and conservation. Rhinoceroses. 
Assessment of rhino horn as a traditional medicine. A report prepared for the CITES 
Secretariat (CITES/TRAFFIC, 2012); the partnership between the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) and TRAFFIC involves significant input of resources, training and 
strategic knowledge for project implementation, TRAFFIC, WCO and TRAFFIC sign MOU 
to build the enforcement capabilities of Customs frontline officers (21 October 2013) 
TRAFFIC, http://www.traffic.org/home/2013/10/21/wco-and-traffic-sign-mou-to-
build-the-enforcement-capabiliti.html; see also the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between CITES and TRAFFIC: Memorandum of Understanding Concluded between 
TRAFFIC Intl and the United Nations Environment Programme, Secretariat of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (The 
CITES Secretariat) (1 November, 1999). 
382 Charnovitz, above n 30, 271-273. 
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subsumed by domestic relations between NGO and state. It falls outside the observer 
position.  
The fundamentals of contributions, as will be seen in the case study chapters, involve 
providing information, lobbying for a policy position, highlighting perceived breaches of 
law, or assisting, usually to a limited degree, in implementation. NGO observers in the 
CAMLR and Whaling Commissions have two possible forms of formal contribution: 
documentary and oral, and a third is added for informal or intersessional roles: action-
based. There are two possible forums: in the Commission framework or outside of the 
Commission framework. However, if action is unsanctioned by either Commission, it is a 
subversive NGO role, either by virtue of undermining the authority of a Commission, or 
by defying the object and purpose of a Convention. 
4.5 Subversive roles 
This section considers the nature of NGO engagement outside of the framework of 
either the CAMLR Convention or Whaling Convention, particularly that of the Sea 
Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS). Since this conduct falls outside of the 
Commission meetings and formal Commission recognition of NGOs, it is best considered 
“subversive”. This section then concludes with a summary of the roles available to NGOs 
both as observers, and in subversive conduct with the Commissions. 
Subversive roles are not directly sanctioned by states, but act on, or attempt to influence 
the legal regimes that have created normative NGO roles. For example, NGOs admitted 
as observers to a plenary meeting of Contracting Governments to a treaty are engaging 
with the legal regime in order to carry out normative roles. Non-admitted NGOs may 
nonetheless engage with the legal regime from a non-normative standpoint, such as 
protests, media-directed boycott or critical coverage of a treaty body event. Subversive 
roles may even extend to attempted enforcement of perceived legal transgressions by 
states or other parties.383  
 
383 Joseph Elliott Roeschke, ‘Comment: Eco-Terrorism and Piracy on the High Seas: 
Japanese Whaling and the Rights of Private Groups to Enforce International 
Conservation Law in Neutral Waters’ (2009) 20 Villanova Environmental Law Journal 
99; Donald K Anton, ‘Protecting Whales by Hue and Cry: Is There a Role for Non-State 
Actors in the Enforcement of International Law?’ (2011) 14 Journal of International 
Wildlife Law & Policy 137. 
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Obvious subversive NGO roles are not common in international law, but they do occur, 
and they are addressed in academic literature.384 Subversive roles are not simply 
antagonistic roles of protest; protest and lobbying are recognized as normalised 
behaviours. However, subversive roles can take place in the space between the formal 
roles conferred upon NGOs, and they can inhabit ‘grey areas’ in the law. Where grey 
areas exist, the subversive activities of NGOs may be politically strong or publicly-
applauded, but they are legally weak, relying on vigilante sentiment and specious legal 
argument.385 They can also have no legal basis at all, and are presented simply as policy 
positions on the part of NGOs. These generally fail to take account of the legal mandate 
of a Convention and its treaty body. This is particularly so where the policy position of 
an NGO is at odds with the legal mandate of an IGO, and the treaty’s object and purpose. 
4.6 Object and purpose analysis of the non-state actor provisions in the 
Conventions 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The non-state actor provisions in the Whaling and CAMLR Conventions are markedly 
different. Article IV of the Whaling Convention directs the capacity of non-state actors to 
three specific topics of engagement, while Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention 
 
384 Gillian Triggs, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System: A Model of Legal Creativity and 
Cooperation’ in Berkman, Paul Arthur et al, Science Diplomacy. Antarctica, Science, and 
the Governance of International Spaces (Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2011) 
47; Sam Blay and Karen Bubna-Litic, ‘The interplay of international law and domestic 
law: The case of Australia’s efforts to protect whales’ (2006) 23 Environmental Policy 
and Law Journal 465, 466; Mike Iliff, ‘Contemporary initiatives on the future of the 
International Whaling Commission’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 461, 466; Avi Brisman, 
‘Crime-Environment Relationships and Environmental Justice’ (2007-2008) 6 Seattle 
Journal of Social Justice 727, 755; Guevara, above n 35, 63; Christopher J Covill, 
‘Greenpeace, Earth First! and The Earth Liberation Front: The Progression of the Radical 
Environmental Movement in America (2008) 5 Senior Honors Projects. Paper 93, 16, 23, 
101; Julia Jabour and Mike Iliff, ‘Theatre sports in the Southern Ocean: engagement 
options for Australia in whale research protest action’ (2009) 63(2) Australian Journal 
of International Affairs 268, 276-281, 284-285; Gerry Nagtzaam and Peta Lentini, 
‘Vigilantes on the High Seas?: The Sea Shepherds and Political Violence’ (2007) 20 
Terrorism and Political Violence 110; Fallon, above n 35, 77; Anton, above n 383, 138, 
145; Roeschke, above n 383, 136. 
385 Consider Anton, above n 383 and his thorough repudiation of the poorly executed 
legitimisation of Sea Shepherd activities put forward by Roeschke, above n 383. 
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provides broad cooperative directions on engagement with non-state actors. Much of 
the difference can be attributed to the age of the Conventions, as the Whaling 
Convention was drafted at a time when the issues that were contemporary to the 
drafting of the CAMLR Convention were not yet imagined – particularly the proliferation 
of NGOs in international law. Between 1946 and the admission of the first NGO observer 
in 1962, engagement in the Whaling Commission with outside actors was primarily with 
organs of the United Nations.386 From 1972, due to the success of lobbying around the 
Stockholm Conference,387 NGOs became increasingly present in international law, and 
so the drafting of the CAMLR Convention had time to anticipate the presence of such 
actors in the Commission. 
The legal basis for engagement with non-state actors in the Whaling and CAMLR 
Commissions is found in their respective Conventions, the Whaling Convention in Article 
IV and the CAMLR Convention in Article XXIII. These are the first reference points for the 
argument that NGOs should conform to the object and purpose of the specific 
Convention with which they engage, and by which we can assess the compliance of 
NGOs with substantive obligations within the object and purpose. The Articles are also 
the first reference point for defining the types of NGO behaviours formally permitted by 
the Commissions. 
Subsequent practice, Resolutions and the Rules of Procedure are also significant. The 
Rules of Procedure detail the mechanisms of engagement for Commission plenary 
meetings and for communication during the intersessional period. The Rules of 
Procedure, and the Rules of Debate, define the nature of engagement. Resolutions, 
particularly in the Whaling Commission are significant in establishing existing practice 
that was not anticipated by Article IV. This is akin to subsequent practice but does not 
amount to subsequent practice. 
Both the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions require any actor seeking observer status to 
apply for status and to demonstrate an interest in or possible contribution to the 
 
386 IWC 1st Annual Meeting of 1st June 1949, ‘First Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the 1st fiscal year 1st June 1949 – 31st May 1950’ (Oslo, Norway, 
adopted July 1950) 21: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
sent a representative to the 1st Whaling Commission meeting. 
387 Birnie, above n 220, 637, 639-640. 
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organization. The requirements for the CAMLR Commission have historically been more 
stringent, and the Commission continues to limit the number of observers. The Whaling 
Commission, by contrast has a less onerous process, and admits many more observers 
than are permitted at CAMLR Commission meetings. 
The intention of this section is to clarify the nature of the non-state actor provisions, 
Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention and Article IV of the Whaling Convention 
according to an object and purpose interpretation of each provision.  
4.5.2 The observer under the CAMLR Convention: Article XXIII and the Rules of Procedure  
Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention considers collaborative arrangements between 
the Commission and non-state actors, and the admission of observers to Commission 
meetings. The CAMLR Convention provides only three categories: inter-governmental, 
nongovernmental and ‘other organizations’. Observer status is the primary engagement 
mechanism for non-state actors. Article XXIII (3) specifies that ‘The Commission and the 
Scientific Committee shall seek to develop co-operative working relationships, as 
appropriate, with inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations which could 
contribute to their work…’, while subsection 4 includes ‘other organizations as may be 
appropriate’.  
Article XXIII reads: 
1. The Commission and the Scientific Committee shall co-operate with the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties on matters falling within the competence of the latter. 
2. The Commission and the Scientific Committee shall co-operate, as appropriate, with the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and with other Specialised 
Agencies. 
3. The Commission and the Scientific Committee shall seek to develop co-operative working 
relationships, as appropriate, with inter-governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations which could contribute to their work, including the Scientific Committee on 
Antarctic Research, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research and the International 
Whaling Commission. 
4. The Commission may enter into agreements with the organizations referred to in this 
Article and with other organizations as may be appropriate. The Commission and the 
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Scientific Committee may invite such organizations to send observers to their meetings 
and to meetings of their subsidiary bodies. 
The text of the Convention at Article XXIII outlines the basic relationship with the FAO 
and the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP), as well as with non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors. It permits engagement with the 
Commission and Scientific Committee through cooperative working relationships on the 
basis of the organization’s capacity to contribute to the work of the Commission or 
Scientific Committee.  
The role giving effect to this participatory Article is the observer role. The observer role 
is situated within Commission plenary meetings, but extends to the intersessional 
period, as well as into some other meetings. The CAMLR Commission has instituted an 
application process for NGOs to apply for accreditation as observers. The role of 
observer is governed by the CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure. Ideally, the 
application process and the CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure around observers 
should reflect the content of Article XXIII, indicating the qualities of cooperation, 
functionality, and contribution to the work of the Commission. The current abilities of 
the observer role reflect these aspects of Article XXIII.  
In accordance with Article XXIII, beginning in 1982, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the Whaling Commission, the International Oceanographic 
Commission (IOC) and the IUCN were regular presences at CCAMLR meetings. From 
1984, the Scientific Committee on Ocean Research (SCOR) and the Scientific Committee 
on Antarctic Research (SCAR) began regular attendance. The Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean Coalition (ASOC) became an observer in 1988 at CCAMLR-VII, the Coalition of 
Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) at CCAMLR-XXII in 2003, and the Association of 
Responsible Krill Harvesting Companies (ARK) at CCAMLR-XXXI in 2012. The IUCN has 
had almost consistent observer presence, with an absence between CCAMLR-VII in 
1988 lasting through to CCAMLR-X in 1991, reappearing at CCAMLR-XI in 1992. 
Article XXIII(4) provides a broader scope for the approval of any organization referred 
to in Article XXIII. Subsection 4 reads that the ‘Commission may enter into agreements 
with the organizations referred to in this Article and with other organizations as may be 
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appropriate.’388 Subsection 4 allows the Commission freedom of association with any 
organization deemed to be useful and appropriate to the Convention’s object and 
purpose, no matter the organization’s legal identity.   
An object and purpose reading of Article XXIII requires that principles of conservation, 
use, science, and the future of mankind, are considered in relation to the participation of 
NGOs, and other non-state actors. The direction of Article XXIII makes clear that while 
NGOs can inform decisions within the forum of the Commission, it cannot set the agenda 
in that forum. Domestic avenues remain open to NGOs, but the formal mechanisms 
around NGO engagement in the CAMLR Commission plenary meetings prevent 
interference. This does not necessarily reflect the capacity of NGOs to influence or 
interfere with Member decision-making through other means. 
4.5.3 Document submission in the CAMLR Commission 
Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention and the CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure 
have clear object and purpose boundaries set for NGO engagement as observers. The 
discussion below connects NGO roles and the rules and Articles applicable to them as 
observers.  
Within the CAMLR Commission, there are two important classes of documents: Working 
Papers and Background Papers. Background Papers are also referred to as information 
documents in Rule 35. Contracting Governments can submit both Working Papers and 
Background Papers.389 As observers, NGOs can only submit Background Papers. 
Working Papers ‘relate directly to agenda items. Background Papers contain more 
general information and are related to overall objectives of the Convention.’390 
Background Papers are covered by Rule 35 of the CAMLR Commission Rules of 
Procedure, which gives observers the capacity to –  
 
388 CAMLR Convention, Article XXIII.4. 
389 Rules for Access and Use of CCAMLR Data, [3] and [11]. 
390 CCAMLR-IV Meeting of 2 – 13 September 1985, ‘Report of the Fourth Meeting of the 
Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 13 September 1985) [53]; another difference, 
highlighting the higher status of Working Papers is that ‘Working Papers are translated 
entirely into the four languages of the Commission. Background Papers are distributed 
in their original language with only a short, translated summary and translated figure 
and table captions.’ [54]. 
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(a) … submit documents to the Secretariat for distribution to Members of the 
Commission as information documents. Such documents shall be relevant to 
matters under consideration in the Commission; 
(b) Unless a Member or Members of the Commission request otherwise such 
documents shall be available only in the language or languages and in the 
quantities in which they were submitted; 
(c) Such documents shall only be considered as Commission documents if so decided 
by the Commission. 
Rule 35 requires that the documents ‘shall be relevant to matters under consideration 
in the Commission’. In addition, the Commission has made it clear that Background 
Papers should also relate to the overall objectives of the Convention [emphasis added].  
There is a strong relationship between Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention and Rule 
35. Article XXIII emphasises that the relationship between the Commission and NGOs is 
a cooperative working relationship founded in contributing to the work of the 
Commission. As the work of the Commission is fundamentally the furtherance of the 
CAMLR Convention object and purpose, the requirement of Rule 35 that Background 
Papers relate to the overall objectives of the Convention clearly connects the observer 
rules of engagement with the specifics of Article XXIII and with the object and purpose. 
NGOs have contributed to information roles of knowledge enhancement review, and to 
a limited degree, transparency. The NGO roles of policy development, legal 
interpretation and advocacy/lobbying are variously engaged through the document 
submission rights of observers.  
Within the margins of the CAMLR Commission meetings, ASOC members engage with 
informal information and input roles through distribution of the ‘ECO’, a newsletter 
containing commentary on the course of the meeting, with a bias toward the position of 
ASOC in relation to issues before the Commission. Industrial NGOs – COLTO and ARK – 
do not engage with informal documentary submission but do engage on the basis of 
formal rights of access under Rule 35. 
4.5.4 Speaking rights in the CAMLR Commission 
Speaking rights attach to either the introduction of a paper, or to addressing an agenda 
item on a salient point. Observer speaking rights are carefully managed during CAMLR 
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Commission meetings, with some notable exceptions. Rule 34 of the CAMLR Commission 
Rules of Procedure states that: 
(a) The Chairman may invite observers to address the Commission unless a Member 
of the Commission objects; 
(b) Observers are not entitled to participate in the taking of decisions. 
Observers have addressed the Commission at least once every meeting since 1987. 
Observers speak to agenda items with reference to the Background Papers, and policy 
positions. Speaking rights require an invitation to speak by the Chairman.  This means 
that during meetings, observers are subject to the discretion of the Chair, the agenda 
item, the time available during the meeting, and the objection of any State party. 
Observer speaking rights are a truly secondary aspect of engagement. The place on the 
agenda of Cooperation with other Organizations has remained the final or near final 
item on the agenda for the life of the Commission. 
In terms of the object and purpose, the relationship between Rule 34 and the CAMLR 
Convention is slightly more complex than that of Rule 35 and the Convention. While the 
document rule in Rule 35 has clear connections to the Convention through the agenda-
relevant requirement in (a), the control in Rule 34 is through Rule 30. The nexus 
between Rules 30 and 34 and Article XII requires that the Chairman consider whether 
an invitation to an NGO to speak will inhibit consensus decision-making. While this does 
not reference the object and purpose directly, it reinforces the primacy of the 
Commission and its agenda under the Convention. 
Rule 30 requires that the Commission consider Article XII in its invitations to observers, 
including in relation to Rule 34, which governs invitations to observers to speak to the 
agenda. Article XII of the CAMLR Convention is the basis for consensus decision making 
on all matters of substance in the Commission. Consensus decision-making is central to 
the CAMLR Commission process. This consideration influences the discretion of the 
Chair to allow an observer to address the Commission on an agenda item. Consensus is 
based on a Commission-wide agreement on the work at hand complying with the 
fundamental object and purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention. So, clearly, 
speaking to the agenda, an NGO observer must speak to support consensus, and in doing 
so, support the object and purpose principles of the convention. 
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The informal engagement of NGO observers with the CAMLR Commission members 
takes place within the margins of the meetings – ranging from discussion of an agenda 
item within the break times between sessions, to events paid for by NGOs at which their 
campaigns can be discussed with the lure of free wine and food to bring delegates to 
attend. The extent to which these informal aspects of speaking affect the Commission or 
demonstrate NGO capacities is impossible to measure. Specific incidents, such as the 
“scoreboard” for the Ross Sea MPA in 2014, where the Antarctic Ocean Alliance (AOA), a 
member of ASOC, set up a huge scoreboard, approximately 4 x 1.5 m in length and 
height, on which were indicated the Commission members that were preventing a 
consensus decision. Specific incidents such as the “scoreboard” are not measurable in 
terms of their impact, but they are in terms of their adherence to the object and purpose 
of the Convention.  
4.5.5 Intersessional roles 
Intersessional roles are largely implementation-based. These roles include aspects of 
formal engagement, such as Commission associated workshops, but also include ad hoc 
support or enforcement of conservation measures, through supporting the Secretariat 
in data collection, and in communication with Commission members.  
The CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure do not address intersessional behaviour for 
observers, as the Rules are for Commission meetings only. However, the Article XXIII 
prescription for the Commission ‘to develop co-operative working relationships, as 
appropriate’ with NGOs affects the intersessional period. This has resulted in a 
workshop, bearing on the work of the Commission being organised, funded, and 
attended by a variety of actors,391 as well the informal ad hoc attempts by Sea Shepherd 
to support the CAMLR Commission in its efforts to stop IUU fishing.392 
4.5.6 The observer under the Whaling Convention: Article IV and the Rules of Procedure  
The Whaling Convention Article IV provides for non-state actor engagement with 
‘independent agencies of the Contracting Governments or other public or private 
 
391 ARK, ARK Workshop for Krill Fishery Representatives and the Scientific Community to 
Share Information on Krill (5 and 6 July 2014, Punta Arenas, Chile) SC-CAMLR-
XXXIII/BG/21 (20 September 2014). 
392 Interview with Interviewee 7 (Hobart, 17 September 2015). 
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agencies, establishments, or organizations’. As with the CAMLR Convention, the Whaling 
Convention does not provide for the observer position – it is a position that has 
developed in practice, regulated by the Secretariat, the Whaling Commission Rules of 
Procedure and the Whaling Commission Rules of Debate.  
The Whaling Convention has seven categories of actor – independent agencies of the 
Contracting governments, public agencies, public establishments, public organizations, 
private agencies, private establishments and private organizations. The nature of the 
focus in the subparagraphs 1 (a) – (c) are self-evidently scientifically oriented, 
indicating that the focus implicit in Article IV relies, if not on scientific organizations, 
then on organizations relying upon scientific data. 
Article IV reads: 
1. The Commission may either in collaboration with or through independent agencies of 
the Contracting Governments or other public or private agencies, establishments, or 
organizations, or independently 
a. Encourage, recommend, or if necessary organize studies and investigations 
relating to whales and whaling; 
b. Collect and analyze statistical information concerning the current 
condition and trend of the whale stocks and the effects of whaling activities 
thereon; 
c. Study, appraise, and disseminate information concerning methods of 
maintaining and increasing the populations of whale stocks. 
2. The Commission shall arrange for the publication of reports of its activities, and it may 
publish independently or in collaboration with the International Bureau for Whaling 
Statistics at Sandefjord in Norway and other organizations and agencies such reports as it 
deems appropriate, as well as statistical, scientific, and other pertinent information 
relating to whales and whaling. 
Article IV creates a legal space within which non-state actors can engage collaboratively 
with the Commission or be delegated tasks around research into whales and whaling. 
Its scope is limited by the need for either a collaborative relationship with the 
Commission or delegation from the Commission.  
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A significant shift has taken place in the Whaling Commission since the drafting of the 
Whaling Convention, and Article IV. At times, over 100 different NGOs with one or more 
representatives have attended plenary meetings of the Commission. Subsequent 
practice has been toward opening the Commission to observers and commentators who 
may not fit within the scope of Article IV. Subsequent practice as well as Resolutions on 
civil society participation have demonstrated that the Commission has moved toward a 
broad, non-Convention based practice in relation to NGOs. This is not necessarily 
reflective of the decisions of all Contracting Governments.  
Two aspects are notable by their absence from Article IV: the first is that no mention is 
made of non-state actors attending or participating in plenary meetings of the 
Commission or participating in intersessional processes. The second and most 
significant omission is that there is no independence of action for non-state actors 
provided for by Article IV. Action is only collaborative or delegated, indicating that the 
Convention and the Commission define the direction of any work, undertaken by non-
state actors. An aspect of Article IV that favours a strict interpretation of the role of non-
state actors, is the subsection 2 retention of the Commission’s responsibility for 
publication of reports pertaining to work undertaken in subsection 1. 
The permissible activities for non-state actors under Article IV are based in 
collaboration with the Commission, or delegation from. It also appears to implicitly 
require scientific bases for engagement. The collaboration or delegation extend to three 
areas: encouraging, recommending or organizing studies and investigations relating to 
whales and whaling; collecting and analysing statistical data on whale stocks and 
whaling impacts; and the study, appraisal and dissemination of information concerning 
methods of maintaining and increasing whale stock populations. 
The three types of work under Article IV circumscribe the extent of permissible non-
state engagement with the Whaling Commission – engagement must be in one of these 
three areas: whale and whaling studies, statistical data, and population health. So, to 
understand the implications for this, the terms of Article IV need to interpreted in 
accordance with their ordinary meaning,393 and in light of the object and purpose.394  
 
393 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1). 
394 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1). 
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The first clause of Article IV is: ‘The Commission may either in collaboration with or 
through …’. The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase is a clear intention to 
promote direct collaboration between the Commission and other organizations or 
delegation of Commission-formulated activities. The Commission is the primary actor as 
the subject of Article IV. Consider that the Commission may … through … private 
agencies encourage, recommend … organize/collect and analyze…/study, appraise and 
disseminate;’ To this extent, the inclusion of NGOs as private agencies was intended 
under the Whaling Convention to be that of an actor to whom activities were delegated 
by the Commission. The non-state actor is the object while the Commission is the 
subject. The extent of the relationship remains unsettled.395 
Considering the categories for collaboration under Article IV, of use, conservative 
management and forward planning for stock increase, through scientific endeavor, the 
contents of Article IV reflect consideration of all object and purpose principles. While 
the language is dated, the contents of Article IV clarify the extent of consideration for 
non-state actor engagement as predicated on a basis of support and cooperation in 
pursuit of the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention. 
The Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure were amended in 2014, giving speaking 
rights and extended document submission rights to observers.396 The connection of 
Article IV and object and purpose of the Whaling Convention to the Whaling Commission 
Rules of Procedure are less clear in the Whaling Commission. The convention-basis for 
the Commission to engage with non-state actors rests on collaboration or delegation. 
The capacity for delegation and collaboration is restricted in Article IV to: studies and 
investigations relating to whales and whaling; the collecting and analysis of information 
on the condition and trends of whale stocks and whaling activity impacts; and study, 
appraisal and dissemination of information on methods of maintaining and increasing 
whale stock populations. These broad categories include a wide range of topics in 
relation to whaling, including killing methods. 
 
395 Resolution on NGOs IWC/53/33 rev1. 
396 IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the period July 2012 – October 2014 (65th)’ 
(Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) 8 and 48-49. 
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However, unlike the CAMLR Commission, where the Rules of Procedure subordinate 
their operation to the requirement for consensus under Article XII of the CAMLR 
Convention, the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure are detached from the 
requirements of the Whaling Convention. The provisions, as of 2014, of the Whaling 
Commission Rules of Procedure, relevant to NGO observers are: 
C. Observers 
1.  (a) … 
(b) Any non-governmental organization which expresses an interest in matters covered by 
the Convention, may be accredited as an observer. Requests for accreditation must be 
submitted in writing to the Commission 60 days prior to the start of the meeting and 
the Commission may issue an invitation with respect to such request. Such submissions 
shall include the standard application form for non-governmental organizations which 
will be provided by the Secretariat. These applications shall remain available for review by 
Contracting Governments.  
Once a non-governmental organization has been accredited through the application 
process above, it will remain accredited until the Commission decides otherwise.  
Observers from each non-governmental organization will be allowed seating in the 
meeting. However, seating limitations may require that the number of observers from 
each non-governmental organization be limited. The Secretariat will notify accredited 
non-governmental organizations of any seating limitations in advance of the meeting.  
(c) The Commission shall levy a registration fee and determine rules of conduct, and 
may define other conditions for the attendance of observers accredited in accordance 
with Rule C.1.(a) and (b). The registration fee will cover attendance at the Biennial 
Commission Meeting to which it relates and any other meeting of the Commission or its 
subsidiary groups as provided in Rule C.2 in the interval before the next Biennial 
Commission Meeting.  
2. Observers accredited in accordance with Rule C.1.(a) and (b) are admitted to all 
meetings of the Commission and the Technical Committee, and to any meetings of 
Committees and all subsidiary groups of the Commission and the Technical Committee, 
except the Commissioners-only meetings, meetings of the Bureau and closed 
meetings of the Finance and Administration Committee.  
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3. Observers accredited in accordance with rule C.1.(a) and (b) will have speaking rights 
during Plenary sessions and sessions of Commission subsidiary groups and 
Committees to which they are admitted to under C.2, in accordance with the Rules of 
Debate of the Commission. Observers might also submit documents for information to 
the delegations and observers participating in such sessions, provided these are 
submitted through the Secretariat at least 48 hours before the session in which they are 
intended to be made available, and are duly authored or endorsed by the accredited 
organization making the submission, which is to be held responsible for its contents. 
[emphases added] 
In addition to the provision allowing the submission of information documents 
observers can submit Opening Statements as well:  
Q. Commission documents 
3. Observers admitted under Rule of Procedure C.1.(a) and (b) may submit Opening 
Statements which will be included in the official documentation of the Biennial or other 
Meeting concerned. They shall be presented in the format and the quantities determined by 
the Secretariat for meeting documentation. 
The content of the Opening Statements shall be relevant to matters under consideration by 
the Commission, and shall be in the form of views and comments made to the Commission 
in general rather than directed to any individual or group of Contracting Governments.  
4. All meeting documents shall be included in the Commission's archives in the form in 
which they were considered at the meeting. All such documents dating from 2011 onwards, 
and also earlier years where feasible, shall be archived on the Commission’s public web site 
in an accessible fashion by year and category of document.  
Under the Rules of Debate, as with the CAMLR Commission Rules, observers can only 
speak if called upon, and if there is time, after Commissioners have spoken to the 
agenda:  
A. Right to Speak 
1. The Chair shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to 
speak, with the exception of accredited Observers, which should be allowed to speak only 
after all Commissioners desiring to speak do so. As a general rule, Observers will only be 




2. A Commissioner or Observer may speak only if called upon by the Chair, who may call a 
speaker to order if his/her remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.  
3. A speaker shall not be interrupted except on a point of order. He/she may, however, with 
the permission of the Chair, give way during his/her speech to allow any other 
Commissioner to request elucidation on a particular point in that speech.  
While the 2014 amendments (bolded in the text above, and in the Whaling Commission 
Rules of Procedure) have significantly increased the capacity for observers to engage 
with the Commission and its agenda, it is also clear that there is little to no connection 
between the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate and the 
Whaling Convention. The following sections expand on this in relation to the object and 
purpose. 
4.5.7 Document submission in the Whaling Commission  
The document submission rules for the Whaling Commission are contained in the Rules 
of Debate Q.3 and the Rules of Procedure C.3. 
The document submission rules for observers, post-1979 but pre-2014, were restricted 
under Rule Q.3 to the submission of Opening Statements. The format and quantities of 
these were to be determined by the Secretariat. Prior to 1979, Opening Statements were 
recorded in the verbatim record of meetings, but not maintained in the same way as 
Opening Statements from 1980 onwards, as required by Rule Q.3.  
The two relevant controls for Opening Statements require that the content be ‘relevant 
to matters under consideration by the Commission’ and be directed ‘to the Commission 
in general rather than directed to any individual or group of Contracting Governments.’ 
Only the first connects the Opening Statements to the Whaling Convention. The latter is a 
matter of form and courtesy. 
Matters that are under consideration by the Commission are, by their nature, related to 
the work of the Commission, which is in most part determined by the Whaling 
Convention. This does not hold true entirely, however. For example, the agenda item for 
the Voluntary Fund for Small Cetaceans is not an accepted part of the Whaling 
Convention mandate by the Whaling Commission as a whole. Opening Statements may 
address the Voluntary Fund as a matter under consideration, but it does not address the 
object and purpose of the Whaling Convention.  
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Rule Q.3 makes no specific mention of the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention 
or bears any clear relationship to Article IV. It permits a variety of contributions on 
Commission work. It is open to being interpreted so broadly as to include any topic that 
might relate generally to whales, such as when Opening Statements were oral, and 
James Taylor represented a group of environmental NGOs in the giving of Opening 
Statements and sang a conservation song to the Commission.397 Without clear reference 
to expectations on the nature of contributions from observers, there is no official 
capacity to moderate content. 
When considered in conjunction with Article IV of the Whaling Convention, which 
stipulates Commission collaboration with or through other parties as the basis of the 
engagement of those other parties, Rule Q.3 can be seen as a broad interpretation of the 
terms of Article IV. Nor are there are any connections between the heads of 
engagements stipulated in Article IV, which are: 
(a) encourage, recommend, or if necessary, organize studies and investigations relating to 
whales and whaling; 
(b) collect and analyze statistical information concerning the current condition and trend 
of the whale stocks and the effects of whaling activities thereon; 
(c) study, appraise, and disseminate information concerning methods of maintaining and 
increasing the populations of whale stocks. 
None of these terms are engaged in Rule Q.3 to restrict the contributions of observers. 
There is, in fact, very little apparent connection between observer rule Q.3 and Article 
IV of the Convention, let alone the object and purpose. 
This non-connection is also evident in the amended Rule C.3 that simply requires that 
documents be information documents, submitted 48 hours before the session, and 
authored, endorsed and full responsibility for their contents claimed by the submitting 
and accredited organization. Rule C.3 lacks even the caveat that the information 
documents be on matters under consideration by the Commission or its subsidiary 
bodies. While functional interpretation would require it, its absence is another missed 
connection between the Whaling Convention and its governing meeting rules.  
 




4.5.8 Speaking rights in the Whaling Commission 
The governing rules on speaking rights are contained in the Rules of Procedure at C.3 
and the Rules of Debate at Rule A. Rule C.3 refers the speaking rights of observers to the 
Rules of Debate, so it is Rule A that must be scrutinised. 
Rule A is a general rule that applies to all speakers in Commission and subsidiary body 
meetings. The fundamental hierarchy of international law is enforced, requiring that 
observers only speak after all Commissioners have spoken. A further caveat is that to 
each Agenda item under discussion only one observer may speak. This has resulted, in 
two years of the Rule’s operation, in the possibility for two observers to speak, from 
each side of the floor: anti-whaling and pro-whaling being the two sides.398 
Aside from enforcing the hierarchy of the Commission, and perhaps reflecting a strong 
historical memory of what happened when speaking rights were unchecked by 
numbers, Rule A.1 does not engage with treaty-based tempering of observer speaking 
rights. Rule A.2, which applies to both Commissioners and observers, requires that the 
remarks addressed on the agenda item be relevant to the subject under discussion. This 
is certainly useful in maintaining order in a meeting, but it does little to address the 
terms of Article IV of the Whaling Convention.  
Fundamentally, the same analysis of document submission holds for speaking rights, 
and that gives no treaty-based form to the engagement of observers to the Commission. 
4.5.9 Intersessional roles 
The Whaling Convention, the Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate do not circumscribe 
intersessional roles of NGOs. Intersessionally, accredited NGO observers are simply 
NGOs, and so they may engage in a variety of domestic relationships that fall outside the 
direct sphere of the Commissions. However, there are intersessional roles, such as 
 
398 IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the period July 2012 – October 2014 (65th)’ 
(Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) 12 (agenda item 5: sanctuaries) where the 
NGO, IWMC World Conservation Trust spoke in opposition to the proposed Sanctuaries, 
and the NGO, Instituto de Conservación de Ballenas de Argentina spoke in support of 
the proposed sanctuary; Two NGOs, Intervention on Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling 
(Agenda item 7) observed by candidate at the IWC66 meeting (IWC66, Portorož, 
Slovenia, 26 October 2016), also observed by candidate at the IWC66 meeting 
(Portorož, Slovenia, 26 October 2016). 
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Commission associated workshops, but there is also ad hoc support or enforcement of 
conservation measures, through supporting the Secretariat in data collection, and in 
communication with Commission members.  
The Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate do not address intersessional behaviour for 
observers, as the Rules are for Commission meetings only. Nor is there any guidance in 
the Rules on how the Whaling Commission may engage with NGOs. The terms of Article 
IV, so clearly requiring collaboration or delegation from the Commission to other 
bodies, are not facilitated in the Rules. However, this does not mean that the 
Commission cannot engage under the terms of Article IV in the intersessional period 
with NGOs. There is no evidence, however, that the Commission has done so.  
Despite this, Sea Shepherd has clearly engaged intersessionally with the work of the 
Commission, through the protests and direct action against the JARPA-II whaling vessels 
in the Southern Ocean. While the purported legal basis upon which Sea Shepherd 
fronted these seasonal and yearly actions is explored later, the fundamentally 
subversive nature of the engagement of Sea Shepherd against the JARPA-II vessels is 
important to note here. In terms of the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention, 
and the authority of the Whaling Commission itself, the actions of Sea Shepherd 
undermined the full range of considerations within the object and purpose, as well as 
the credibility of the Whaling Commission as an organization.  
4.6 Discussion 
Interpretation in light with the object and purpose, of the non-state actor provisions of 
each Convention, is incomplete if the substantive outcome of these provisions is not 
considered. The substantive outcome is most commonly the observer role. A supportive, 
cooperative relationship between both Commissions and non-state actors is clearly 
indicated by the terms of both the CAMLR and Whaling Conventions’ Articles. In Article 
XXIII.3 of the CAMLR Convention, the phrase ‘co-operative working relationships, as 
appropriate … which could contribute to their work’ connects Article XXIII.3 to the 
object and purpose through ‘their work’, as the work of the Commission is subject to 
Article II and the object and purpose outside of Article II. Article IV of the Whaling 
Convention similarly expresses a connection to the object and purpose principles, as the 
sub paragraphs each denote consideration of scientific engagement with whaling, whale 
 
 143 
conservation and population increase – all of which reflect the use, conservation, 
common future, and scientific aspects of the object and purpose. 
How the Articles are carried out in effect depends on the working processes of the 
Commissions. The CAMLR Convention Article XXIII has clear directions about the 
position of observers in terms of the role’s capacity, the application for observer status, 
and Article XXIII itself. There is the Article XXIII requirement that a cooperative working 
relationship based in the capacity to make contributions to the work of the Commission 
appropriately defines the role of observer. This has been Commission practice since the 
first meeting of the CAMLR Commission. The CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure and 
the deliberative processes of the CAMLR Commission reflect an expectation of support 
and cooperation from observers and NGOs. The Whaling Commission and its Convention 
have come to a position where the terms of the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure 
and the Whaling Commission Rules of Debate clearly connect the work of the 
Commission with the position of observer but without expectation of supportive or 
cooperative content.  
In light of these observations, it is important to test the boundaries of NGO observer 
engagement with reference to the object and purpose principles of each Convention. In 
testing these boundaries, the central question is whether observers indicate 
consideration of the object and purpose principles. The case studies and general history 
of both Commissions will test this question. In light of the Rules of Procedure and 
practice of the Commissions, do NGO observers and intersessional NGO actors reflect 
consideration of object and purpose principles? Do observer NGOs evince a 
commitment to the cooperative, and fundamentally subordinate, position given to NGOs 
under Article IV of the Whaling Convention and Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention?  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter set the framework for understanding the roles of NGOs within the CAMLR 
and Whaling Commissions, in relation to the object and purpose principles and legal 
regimes of the Whaling and CAMLR Conventions. The chapter proposed a definition of 
NGO for the purposes of clarity of analysis of this subset of civil society. 
NGO-types are comprised of voluntary membership of citizens or organizations. 
Membership of governments from one or several states does not prevent an 
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organization being defined as an NGO, but exclusive membership of states would do so. 
NGOs are most often supported by member donations, but government grants, 
philanthropic donations or endowments, and industry funding can also support NGOs. 
NGOs are organizations that are not-for-profit, driven by a common interest, task, or 
concern that seeks to achieve the purposes of that organization, and those ends present 
an independent voice from government policy, even if they parallel government policy. 
The roles available to observer NGOs are explored in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, 
which look at the specific circumstances of NGO engagement. The following Chapters 
consider the degree to which NGO behaviours, as observers and intersessional actors 
reflect engagement with the object and purpose principles of the two conventions. If 
NGOs do engage with Commissions in support of object and purpose principles, the 




Chapter 5: NGOs as observers in the Whaling and CAMLR 
Commissions 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four narrowed the focus of ‘NGO’ to specific types of organizations within the 
non-state actor category. NGOs are incorporated as not-for profit in one or more 
jurisdictions, are aligned with private interests independent of government, comprised 
of voluntary members, and manifest a distinct purpose. Chapter Four also defined the 
observer position with reference to interpretative rules under the Vienna Convention, 
the Conventions, Rules of Procedure and other documents. This chapter is the first of 
three chapters to apply the object and purpose analysis framework. It relies on the 
object and purpose interpretation of Chapter Three and the definitions of Chapter Four 
to analyze the behaviours of NGOs as observers. This chapter also evaluates the 
admissions processes for observer attendance, considering how Commission and 
Secretariat practice may affect the engagement of NGOs. This is performed through an 
object and purpose analysis of the admissions processes. 
As explained in Chapter Four, the CAMLR and Whaling Conventions provide means for 
Commissions to engage with non-state actors. The CAMLR Convention makes specific 
reference to the development of co-operative relationships with non-state actors, 
including NGOs, in pursuing the work of the Commission and the objectives and 
principles of Article II.399 Similarly, Article IV of the Whaling Convention makes 
provision for relationships between the Commission and public and private actors, of 
which NGOs fall into the latter. These relationships are strictly confined to cooperative 
or delegated relationships restricted to research on whales, whaling, the status of 
stocks, and the potential for increasing stocks of whales.400 The observer position is not 
specifically described in either Convention, although it is fleshed out more fully in Rules 
of Procedure and Debate. 
 
399 CAMLR Convention, Article XXIII(3) and (4). 
400 Whaling Convention, Article IV(1). 
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The reasons for considering NGO contributions to international organizations as 
significant were outlined in Chapter Four. This chapter looks specifically at 
contributions of NGOs in the position of observers at Commission meetings. This 
chapter will explore the NGO admittance processes in the CAMLR and Whaling 
Commissions; and the nature of their acknowledgement of the object and purpose 
principles of the CAMLR Convention and Whaling Convention in oral and written 
contributions to each Commission. How and if NGOs adhere to object and purpose 
principles is considered with reference to the object and purpose principles of the 
Commissions’ respective Convention, Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate, Code of 
Conduct, and the practices of the Secretariats in relation to NGOs.  
The admissions process demonstrates the extent to which the object and purpose 
informs the expectations of Commissions on NGOs in their engagement. The state and 
institutional responses to NGO observer conduct in meetings also illustrate Commission 
approaches to their legal mandates. This chapter reveals that where the Commission 
expects NGOs to refer to the Convention’s object and purpose in their admission 
applications, submissions and behaviours, the Commission itself is also more likely to 
engage in effective decision-making according to its mandate.  Conversely, where 
expectations about NGOs being guided by object and purpose principles are low, the 
Commission is conflicted over the nature of its legal mandate. 
In this chapter, analysis of NGO contributions in both Commissions demonstrates that 
scientific, industrial and hybrid NGOs generally present broad consideration of most or 
all object and purpose principles in their role as observers. Environmental NGOs are the 
most likely to act in a manner that overlooks the use principle of a Convention, both in 
the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions. The NGO category into which an NGO falls401 
may indicate the probability of consideration of the object and purpose. 
This chapter is presented in three parts. Part 5.2 considers the observer application 
process itself in the early years of the CAMLR Commission, and for the Whaling 
Commission across its history at significant points in time where rules and practices 
have changed. This is significant in understanding how the object and purpose has 
guided the Commissions in inviting observers to participate in Commission meetings. 
 
401 See above at Chapter 4 [4.3.4]. 
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Part 5.3 illustrates parallels between early engagement and later Commission standards 
applied to NGOs. The early roles and engagement of NGOs are discussed in this context 
with reference to the administrative structures of the Rules of Procedure and Rules of 
Debate. The behaviours of NGOs are explored primarily through meeting records. The 
Code of Conduct is considered in its role as a tool for ensuring decorous behaviour 
during meeting times, and its effectiveness in steering observers toward object and 
purpose adherence. 
The discussion and conclusion at Part 5.4 summarise the Commission approaches that 
have most influenced NGO behaviours, and how these may be tailored or supported to 
better align NGO engagement with the object and purpose of the two Conventions. This 
discussion forms the backbone of Chapter Eight in which recommendations are made 
for future NGO engagement in the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions. The strengths and 
weaknesses of Commission–NGO relationships identified in this chapter are further 
highlighted through the in-depth case studies on regulatory powers and protected areas 
in Chapters Six and Seven. 
5.2 Observer admittance and the object and purpose 
This section relates to observer application processes and the terms of admission for 
observers at the Commissions. In the CAMLR Commission, the period of evaluation of 
application and admittance extends from 1982 – 1989 and is marked by the attendance 
of the IUCN in 1982, the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) in 1983, 
and by extensive correspondence on the admittance of the Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean Coalition (ASOC) from 1983 to 1989.  
In the Whaling Commission there are several significant years and periods of 
engagement with observer admissions. In 1963, the first attendance of an NGO sets the 
scene for the continued engagement of NGOs. The first year in which observers made 
oral Opening Statements was 1967, while. 1979 saw a change in Opening Statements to 
a written form. In 2005 a discussion of the place of NGOs in the Whaling Commission 
was conducted and in 2014 changes were made to the Rules of Procedure to allow 
observers agenda-based speaking rights, and the capacity to submit information 
documents to the Commission. 
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There is a contrast between the approaches of the Commissions in their early years. The 
CAMLR Commission written record contains extensive evidence of the strictness with 
which the Commission and its member states approached NGO engagement in the early 
years, with annual meetings and intersessional correspondence engaging thoroughly 
with the interpretation and application of the CAMLR Convention to the Commission–
NGO relationship.402The early years of the relationship between the Whaling 
Commission and NGOs demonstrate significant tolerance on the part of Commission 
members for a wide variety of NGO views. These differences arguably continue in NGO 
behaviour and Commission practice. 
5.3.1 CAMLR Commission on observer admission 
The observer accreditation process of the CAMLR Commission is clearly reflective of the 
object and purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention. Non-state actors and NGOs 
applying for observer status to attend plenary Commission meetings must satisfy the 
requirements of Article XXIII of the Convention.403 This sets out that the relationship 
between NGOs and the Commission needs to be ‘co-operative’ and of a nature ‘which 
could contribute to [the Commission’s] work.’404 
Hybrid and scientific NGOs – the IUCN, SCAR and SCOR405 – whose purposes and 
histories clearly and closely align with the principles of the CAMLR Convention, were 
invited observers from 1982. There was no application process for any of these NGOs. 
By contrast, environmental NGOs – ASOC and Greenpeace – whose interests and history 
 
402 CCAMLR Secretariat, Cooperation with other organizations ASOC and Greenpeace – 
observer status CCAMLR-III/11 (1984); CCAMLR Secretariat, Requests for observer status 
by ASOC and Greenpeace International CCAMLR-IV/10 (1985); CCAMLR Secretariat, 
Request for observer status by Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) CCAMLR-
V/08 (1986); CCAMLR Secretariat, Report of informal group of CCAMLR members dealing 
with the application for observer status by ASOC and Greenpeace CCAMLR-V/20 (1986); 
CCAMLR Secretariat, Applications of ASOC and Greenpeace International for observer 
status at the 1987 CCAMLR meeting CCAMLR-VI/BG/07 (1987); Chairman of the 
Commission, Invitation to ASOC from the Chairman of the Commission CCAMLR-VII/14 
(1988). 
403 CAMLR Convention, Article XXIII.3. 
404 CAMLR Convention, Article XXIII. 




were less clear to the Commission, had their applications for observer status closely 
scrutinised. Firm conditions for attendance were applied, reflecting the object and 
purpose concerns of the Commission in its relationships with these NGOs.406 
Subsequent applicants – COLTO and ARK – received no such attention, indicating that 
their applications for invitations as observers met the standard set by the CAMLR 
Commission.407 
Part VI of the CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure contains rules governing observer 
invitations, notification and conduct at meetings of the Commission and its bodies.408 
Rule 30 stipulates that the Commission may extend observer invitations to 
organizations, including NGOs. This is subject to voting requirements under the CAMLR 
Convention Article XII.409 Commission practice is that for an invitation to be extended, 
consensus among Commission members is required as observer applications are 
considered a substantive matter.410 Further, Rule 30 provides that invitations to NGOs 
are through the requirements of Article XXIII.3. This requirement preserves the 
relationship between the Commission and NGO observers as a cooperative relationship. 
 
406CCAMLR-VII Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 1988, ‘Report of the Seventh Meeting 
of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 1988) [153] – [154]. 
407 Letter from Mr Martin Exel, COLTO to Dr Denzil Miller, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 
5th September 2003, COMM CIRC 03/72; Request by the Coalition of Legal Toothfish 
Operators (COLTO) for Observer Status at CCAMLR-XXII COMM CIRC 03/72 (10 
September 2003); Request by the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) for 
Observer Status at CCAMLR-XXII COMM CIRC 03/79 (3 October 2003); COLTO Observer 
Status at CCAMLR-XXIII COMM CIRC 04/59 (28 June 2004); Invitation to COLTO to 
Attend CCAMLR-XXIII as an Observer COMM CIRC 04/71 (2 August 2004); Letter from 
Sigve Nordrum, ARK Secretary to Mr Andrew Wright, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 5th 
October 2011 COMM CIRC 04/71; Request for Observer Status at CCAMLR-XXX and SC-
CAMLR-XXX COMM CIRC 11/98; SC CIRC 11/47 (7 October 2011). 
408 There is a substantially similar set of rules for the observers admitted to the 
Scientific Committee meetings. One additional requirement for observation of Scientific 
Committee meetings is the possession by observer delegates of appropriate scientific 
qualifications: CCAMLR Scientific Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule 19. 
409 CCAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule 30. 
410 CCAMLR-VI Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 1987, ‘Report of the Sixth Meeting of 
the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 1987) [126-127] indicating 




It also ensures that NGOs contribute to the Commission’s work. This is clearly tied to 
object and purpose principles, as all Commission work is undertaken with reference to 
use and conservation in Article II of the CAMLR Convention. 
The attendance of different types of NGOs followed a gradual progression under these 
rules. Hybrid NGO – IUCN – attended CAMLR Commission meetings from 1982. The 
scientific NGOs – SCAR and SCOR – attended from 1983 and 1984 respectively. The 
environmental NGO – ASOC – was admitted as an observer in 1988, and the industry 
NGOs – COLTO and ARK – were welcomed in 2003 and 2012 respectively.411 
Two applicant environmental NGOs, Greenpeace and ASOC, applied for observer status 
with the CAMLR Commission in 1983. This generated significant communication and 
debate during plenary sessions of the CAMLR Commission412 and intersessionally.413 
Greenpeace had its application firmly rejected on a number of occasions on the basis of 
its membership of ASOC,414 but the Commission continued to consider ASOC’s 
application for observer status. 
 
411 Invitation to COLTO to Attend CCAMLR-XXIII as an Observer COMM CIRC 04/71 (2 
August 2004); CCAMLR-XXX Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 2011, ‘Report of the 
Thirtieth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 2011) 
[17.4]. 
412 CCAMLR-II Meeting of 29 August – 9 September, 1983, ‘Report of the Second Meeting 
of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 9 September, 1983) [43]; CCAMLR-III 
Meeting of 3 – 14 September 1984, ‘Report of the Third Meeting of the Commission’ 
(Hobart, Australia, adopted 14 September 1984) [54] – [61]; CCAMLR-IV Meeting of 2 – 
13 September, 1985, ‘Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, 
Australia, adopted 13 September 1985) [48] – [51]; CCAMLR-V Meeting of 8 – 19 
September, 1986, ‘Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, 
adopted 19 September 1986) [79] – [83]; CCAMLR-VI Meeting of 26 October – 6 
November 1987, ‘Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, 
adopted 6 November 1987) [126] – [127]. 
413 For example: Letter from CCAMLR Executive Secretary to David McTaggart, 
Chairman of Greenpeace International, 23rd September 1985, CCAMLR-V/8, 1. 
414 Letter from CCAMLR Executive Secretary to David McTaggart, Chairman of 
Greenpeace International, 10th October 1984, CCAMLR-IV-10, 1; Letter from CCAMLR 
Executive Secretary to David McTaggart, Chairman of Greenpeace International, 23rd 
September 1985, CCAMLR-V-08; CCAMLR-IX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 1990, 
‘Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 
November 1990) [15.3]-[15.8]. 
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There is some evidence in the deliberation process that the Commission was concerned 
to ensure institutional cooperation and deter political agitation of environmental 
NGOs.415 The six-year delay between the ASOC application for observer status in 1983 
and approval in 1988416 has connections to the Whaling Commission experiences of 
NGO behaviours, however no official documentation indicates a direct consideration of 
this point in the CAMLR Commission. Two interviewees indicated that Japan, a member 
of both Commissions, was hostile to the presence of NGOs in the CAMLR Commission.417 
This supports the possibility of a connection between the Whaling Commission NGO 
experience and the delay in the CAMLR Commission approval, as the Japanese 
delegation was the target of NGO agitation on the commercial whaling moratorium.418 
The Commission required ASOC to demonstrate compliance with domestic legal 
requirements to operate under a Constitution, and so indicate purpose and 
accountability.419 ASOC eventually complied and demonstrated that it would operate in 
fundamental accord with the Article II aims of the CAMLR Convention.420 It was invited, 
on an ad hoc basis, to observe the 1988 plenary meetings of CCAMLR-VII.421 
 
415 CCAMLR-VII Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 1988, ‘Report of the Seventh 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 1988) [153] – 
[154]. 
416 CCAMLR Secretariat, Cooperation with other organizations ASOC and Greenpeace – 
observer status 1984 CCAMLR-III/11. 
417 Interview with Interviewee 11 (2 November 2015); Interview with Interviewee 4 
(30 October 2014). 
418 For example, one interviewee recalled they and some NGO representatives blocked 
the hotel hallway of the Japanese delegation with plastic inflatable whales, preventing 
the delegation from accessing the elevators to attend the meeting: Interview with 
Interviewee 6 (15 September 2014). 
419 CCAMLR Secretariat, Report of informal group of CCAMLR members dealing with the 
application for observer status by ASOC and Greenpeace CCAMLR-V/20, 3. 
420 CCAMLR-II Meeting of 29 August – 9 September, 1983, ‘Report of the Second 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 9 September, 1983) 10-11; 
CCAMLR Secretariat, Cooperation with Other Organizations: ASOC and Greenpeace – 
Observer Status 1984 CCAMLR-III/11, 1; Letter from CCAMLR Executive Secretary to 
David McTaggart, Chairman of Greenpeace international, 10th October 1984, CCAMLR-
IV-10; CCAMLR Secretariat, Request for observer status by Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean Coalition (ASOC) CCAMLR-V/08, 2; CCAMLR Secretariat, Report of informal 
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The Commission effectively set the object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention as the 
standard by which the application and admittance of NGO observers were to be judged. 
This is evidenced by the terms of admittance expressed to ASOC in their 
correspondence with the Secretariat, as well as in the content of applications by other 
NGOs.422 This initial lengthy process also set a standard that no subsequent applicant 
has failed to address in its initial application. By the time COLTO in 2002 and ARK in 
2012 applied, both industry NGOs clearly and directly articulated organizational aims 
that supported the object and purpose of the Convention.423 There has been no 
discussion of the granting of observer status for COLTO or ARK in the Commission 
meeting reports, as these organizations have satisfied the Commission criteria 
established through initial engagement with ASOC.424 
5.3.2 Trends in admissions and attendance behaviours in the CAMLR Commission 
In the CAMLR Commission, there has been a steady growth in the number of delegates 
sent by COLTO and ASOC to attend meetings. While there are clear expectations for 
NGOs to demonstrate a capacity to contribute to Commission work, Commission silence 
 
group of CCAMLR members dealing with the application for observer status by ASOC 
and Greenpeace CCAMLR-V/20 [4]; Letter from CCAMLR Executive Secretary to Michael 
Kennedy, Co-ordinator ASOC, 10 October, 1984, CCAMLR-IV-10, 2; CCAMLR Secretariat, 
Applications of ASOC and Greenpeace international for observer status at the 1987 
CCAMLR meeting CCAMLR-VI/BG/07 [7] – [10]. 
421 CCAMLR-VII Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 1988, ‘Report of the Seventh 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 1988) [153] – 
[156]. 
422 Letter from CCAMLR Executive Secretary to Michael Kennedy, Co-ordinator ASOC, 
10 October, 1984, CCAMLR-IV-10 (1986); CCAMLR Secretariat, Request for observer 
status by Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) CCAMLR-V/08 (1987); CAMLR 
Commission Chairman, Invitation to ASOC from the Chairman of the Commission 
CCAMLR-VII/14 (1989); Letter from Mr Martin Exel, COLTO to Dr Denzil Miller, 
CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 5th September 2003, COMM CIRC 03/72; Letter from Sigve 
Nordrum, ARK Secretary to Mr Andrew Wright, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 5th 
October 2011 COMM CIRC 04/71. 
423 Letter from Mr Martin Exel, COLTO to Dr Denzil Miller, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 
5th September 2003, COMM CIRC 03/72; Letter from Sigve Nordrum, ARK Secretary to 
Mr Andrew Wright, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 5th October 2011 COMM CIRC 04/71. 
424 Letter from Mr Martin Exel, COLTO to Dr Denzil Miller, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 
5th September 2003, COMM CIRC 03/72; Letter from Sigve Nordrum, ARK Secretary to 
Mr Andrew Wright, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, 5th October 2011 COMM CIRC 04/71. 
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on observer delegation numbers has seen NGOs increase their delegation numbers, 
where previously delegations were restricted to single observers.425 
Meeting records show that delegations contain a diversity of umbrella NGO 
representatives from within the environmental and industry lobbies. This indicates that 
despite the early intentions of the CAMLR Commission to limit the number of observers 
to single delegates for each umbrella organizations, the umbrella organizations 
themselves exploit the silence of the Commission on observer numbers to have multiple 
representatives from within their membership in attendance. An issue with this is that 
these organizations may not, on their own, satisfy the Commission of their intentions 
regarding the CAMLR Convention object and purpose principles. In fact, Greenpeace, as a 
member of ASOC clearly fits this characterisation.  
A growth in observer delegate numbers diminishes the control of the Commission over 
the interpretation of their proceedings by outside parties. It has previously exposed the 
Commission to an unwanted breach of confidentiality by such a party.426  However, as is 
observable, SCAR and the IUCN have remained consistent in sending low numbers of 
delegates, rather than taking advantage of the creeping silence of the Commission to 
saturate the meeting with delegates. 
 
425 CCAMLR-VII Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 1988, ‘Report of the Seventh 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 1988) [153]. 
426 CCAMLR-XVII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 1998, ‘Report of the Seventeenth 





Figure 5.1 Delegates per NGO observer at the CAMLR Commission meetings, 1982-2017 
The cause of this growth is unknown. In interview, delegates were not candid about this 
development. However, there are issues in uncontrolled delegation numbers, both in 
terms of practicality – the size of the CCAMLR Secretariat building is small, but also in 
terms of confidentiality and adherence to object and purpose principles. In Chapter 
Eight, it is suggested that the Commission implement observer fees, and set a maximum 
delegation size. 
5.3.3 The Whaling Commission on observer admission 
Admission rules in the Whaling Commission have gone through several stages. There 
have been three significant admission events in the course of Whaling Commission 
history that reflect the characters of these periods. Prior to 1980, admission of 
observers was on an ad hoc basis.427 From 1980 – 2005, the Whaling Commission Rules 
of Procedure contained current administrative requirements that a request for observer 
status be submitted at least 60 days prior to the next Commission meeting, and that 
observers remained accredited unless the accreditation was revoked.428 Grounds for 
 
427 No meeting records or annexes contain rules for admission of observers. 
428 Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure (May 1999) in IWC 51st Annual Meeting of 
24th – 28th May 1999, ‘Fifty-First Annual Report of the International Whaling 
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revocation are not anywhere codified. This was also indicative of a greater level of 
seriousness with which NGO engagement was approached, and a concern for ensuring 
orderly engagement. The third period is post-2012, after the speaking rights and 
information document amendments, with NGOs being permitted to address the 
Commission on agenda items. Significant changes in observer practice occurred 
between 1963 and 1980, however, this section will deal with admissions events first, 
and then practice-based events. 
The first significant admission event in the pre-1980 period was the appearance of 
environmental NGO, International Society for the Protection of Animals (ISPA) in 1963. 
The attendance of ISPA was not preceded by any plenary discussion, and ISPA was 
accommodated in the same manner as IGO observers such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), which was ad hoc and informal.429 There was no controversy and 
no discussion as the presence of NGOs in international environmental law forums was 
new.  
The second significant admission event was the 1986 banning of Sea Shepherd from 
ever attending Whaling Commission meetings as an observer. This ban arose from the 
scuttling by Sea Shepherd of two private whaling vessels in a Reykjavik harbour.430 No 
Sea Shepherd representative has ever been granted admission to the meeting as an NGO 
observer delegate.431 In the history of the Whaling Commission only one other NGO, 
 
Commission 1999 – covering the financial year 1998-1999’ (adopted Adelaide, 
Australia, July 2000) C. Observers 1.b. 
429 IWC 15th Meeting of July 1963, ‘Fifteenth Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the fifteenth fiscal year 1963-1964’ (Sandefjord, Norway, 
adopted 1964) 15; Fifteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1963, Resource ID 
402, 3-4 – the verbatim records indicate an informal written application through letter 
and a general consideration of the Commission to be the entirety of the admissions 
process. 
430 Roeschke, above n 383, 107. 
431 Letter from Ms Sarah Hambly, UK Director of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society UK 
to Dr Ray Gambell, Secretary to the International Whaling Commission, 19 February 
1987; Letter from Dr Ray Gambell, Secretary to the International Whaling Commission 
to Ms Sarah Hambly, UK Director of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society UK, 6 March 
1987; Letter from Mr Paul Watson, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society to Mr [sic] Ray 
Gambell, International Whaling Commission, May 26 1995; Letter from Dr Ray Gambell, 
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unnamed by the Commission, has had their credentials revoked, for protest actions 
outside the Secretariat headquarters in the UK.432 The continued rejection of Sea 
Shepherd reflects the IWC’s concern for maintaining orderly and lawful engagement 
during Commission meetings. 
Another significant event was the failure of the Commission to revoke the observer 
accreditation of Greenpeace after a high seas confrontation with Japanese whaling 
vessels in the 1998/1999 Austral summer. Greenpeace boats had acted against Japanese 
whaling vessels on the high seas. This generated significant discussion in the 
Commission.  Japan alleged that Greenpeace had engaged in illegal and violent actions 
against their research vessels, resulting in a high seas collision.433 It sought the 
revocation of Greenpeace observer credentials. There was no consensus on the 
revocation of credentials, with several members highlighting the “alleged” nature of 
Japan’s version of the high seas confrontation, and the existence of a different narrative. 
Without consensus Greenpeace remained an observer.434  
The significance of the Greenpeace issue lies in the sharp contrast it presents to the 
previous decision of the Commission to reject Sea Shepherd for observer status. In 
1980, failure on the part of NGOs to observe proper behaviour in meetings resulted in 
the removal of opening statements as an agenda item.435 In 1986, the scuttling of two 
 
Secretary to the International Whaling Commission to Mr Paul Watson, Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society, 28 May 1995. 
432 IWC 51st Annual Meeting of May 1999, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 1999 – covering the financial year 1998-1999’ (St George’s, Grenada, 
adopted May 1999) 11. 
433 IWC 51st Annual Meeting of May 1999, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 1999 – covering the financial year 1998-1999’ (St George’s, Grenada, 
adopted May 1999) 11. 
434 IWC 51st Annual Meeting of May 1999, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 1999 – covering the financial year 1998-1999’ (St George’s, Grenada, 
adopted May 1999) 12. 
435 The International Wildlife Coalition, Declaration of Concern for Small Island Nations 
Being Subjected to Japanese Influence at International Conservation Treaty Deliberations 
IWC/50/OS Int Wild Coal (1998) was withdrawn; see also discussion in Chairman’s 
Report of the 50th Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (16-20 May 
1998, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman) 3, 40 contained in IWC 50th Annual Meeting of May 
 
 157 
vessels in Icelandic waters resulted in a life ban of Paul Watson from attending 
Commission meetings. This was reinforced in 1995 when Sea Shepherd as a whole was 
denied accreditation.436 But, in 1999, confrontation between a Greenpeace vessel and 
Japanese whaling vessels on the high seas, which resulted in a vessel collision ended 
with no revocation of Greenpeace accreditation. This showed a clear divide in the 
Commission as to what was acceptable conduct for NGOs. 
It is possible to argue that the laissez-faire approach to the object and purpose of the 
Whaling Convention among a majority of environmental NGOs, unchecked by the 
Commission, contributed to a growing disregard for the rule of law in both states and 
observers. By 1999, this had developed to the extent that direct antagonism of a 
member state by an observer NGO was met with no censure from the broader 
community of member states in the Commission. However, a broader debate began 
within the Whaling Commission about the future of the Commission, its observer rules, 
and the place of observers within it.437 
 
1998, ‘Fiftieth Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 1998 – covering 
the 1997-98 financial year’ (Muscat, Oman, adopted May 1998). 
436 Letter from Ms Sarah Hambly, UK Director of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society UK 
to Dr Ray Gambell, Secretary to the International Whaling Commission, 19 February 
1987; Letter from Dr Ray Gambell, Secretary to the International Whaling Commission 
to Ms Sarah Hambly, UK Director of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society UK, 6 March 
1987; Letter from Mr Paul Watson, Sea Shepherd Conservation Society to Mr [sic] Ray 
Gambell, International Whaling Commission, May 26 1995; Letter from Dr Ray Gambell, 
Secretary to the International Whaling Commission to Mr Paul Watson, Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society, 28 May 1995; see also Chairman’s Report of the 52nd Annual 
Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (3-6 July 2000 Adelaide, Australia) 11, 
11 in IWC 52nd Annual Meeting of July 2000, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2000 – covering the 1999-2000 financial year’ (Adelaide, Australia, 
adopted July 2000). 
437 Iliff, above n 384; Government of Japan, Conference for the Normalization of the 
International Whaling Commission February 13-15, 2007 Tokyo, Japan Chair’s Summary 
IWC/M08/INFO 2 (2008); Government of New Zealand, Chair’s Summary: Symposium on 
the State of the Conservation of Whales in the 21st Century 26th April 2007 
IWC/M08/INFO 3 (2008); Government of Argentina, Buenos Aires Group 
IWC/M08/INFO 4 (2008); Buenos Aires Group, Latin American Cooperation Strategy for 
the Conservation of Cetaceans IWC/M08/INFO 7 (2008); Governments of Argentina and 
the Netherlands, The Second Pew Whale Symposium, Tokyo, 30-31 January, 2008 
Chairman’s Summary IWC/M08/INFO 9 (2008). 
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In 2005, the Whaling Commission reviewed the observer attendance rules (the old 
rules) that had prevailed from 1980 – 2005. Several issues with these old rules were 
identified. One was the standing requirement for NGOs to demonstrate they were 
‘international’ in character, with offices or addresses in at least four countries; a 
requirement that was removed.438 This requirement fundamentally conflicted with the 
nature of some NGOs and bodies that would wish to attend, including NGOs 
representing cultures or industries restricted to a single jurisdiction, for example 
Japanese cultural whaling associations and Alaska Eskimo representatives..439 The 
second was the restriction to one observer per NGO to be permitted in the meeting 
room at any one time.440 These restrictions affected the capacity for smaller NGOs to 
attend meetings.441  
The international requirement resulted in ‘flag of convenience’ organizations being 
created to facilitate access for more than one representative from an international NGO 
to be present in the meeting room.442 Additional to this, there were issues of providing 
false addresses to demonstrate an international character, and other positions in the 
Commission being used as a vehicle for attendance by additional delegates. The 
Commission noted the use of the interpreter position as one such vehicle.443 The author 
has personally seen the use of the media role for the access of a Sea Shepherd member 
 
438 Whaling Commission, Report of the Finance and Administration Committee 
IWC/58/rev 2 (Monday 13 June 2006) 24. 
439 Whaling Commission, Report of the Finance and Administration Committee 
IWC/58/rev 2 (Monday 13 June 2006) 24; although it should be noted that the rules 
were laxly applied in relation to Alaska Eskimo representatives, who despite lacking 
‘international’ character attended numerous meetings before the rule change in 2006. 
440 Whaling Commission, Report of the Finance and Administration Committee 
IWC/58/rev 2 (Monday 13 June 2006) 24. 
441 Whaling Commission, Report of the Finance and Administration Committee 
IWC/58/rev 2 (Monday 13 June 2006) [6.2]. 
442 Whaling Commission, Report of the Finance and Administration Committee 
IWC/58/rev 2 (Monday 13 June 2006) [6.2]; Australia, Austria, Monaco, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States, non-governmental organization 
accreditation and participation in IWC Annual Meetings: a recommended approach 
IWC/58/24 Agenda item 23 (19 June 2006) 1. 
443 Whaling Commission, Report of the Finance and Administration Committee 
IWC/58/rev 2 (Monday 13 June 2006) 25. 
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to Whaling Commission meetings444 from which the organization is currently 
banned.445 So while the instituted reforms of the 2005 review have largely addressed 
issues of manipulation and misrepresentation, they have not entirely abolished them. 
Changes to the rules have not affected how NGOs address the object and purpose. The 
rule changes are entirely administrative. Additions to the rules include the requirement 
to provide a letter of accreditation from the institution or organization an applicant 
intends to represent, and a brief explanation of why the organization wishes to 
attend.446 The application process itself does not express any expectations of applicants 
adhering to or understanding the object and purpose of the Convention, or the work of 
the Commission beyond an interest in its work. Functionally, this means that an NGO 
can apply, and will likely be accredited, by simply stating an interest in the work of the 
Commission, without demonstrating either a capacity to contribute to the its work, or 
any affinity with the underlying principles of that work.  
5.3.4 Trends in admissions and attendance behaviours in the Whaling Commission 
The rules of the Commissions affect NGO behaviours. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
engagement of environmental NGOs through Opening Statements reflected 
consideration of the object and purpose principles.447 However, content went 
unchecked as NGO statements moved further away from the fundamental principles of 
the Whaling Convention toward whatever position was held by the submitting NGO. This 
has largely prevailed because no rules or processes address this. 
 
444 IWC65 and IWC66, a prominent member of Sea Shepherd attended both 
Commission meetings as a media representative – personal observations and 
conversations of author.  
445 IWC 53rd Annual Meeting of July 2001, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2001 – covering the 2000-2001 financial year (53rd)’ (London, United 
Kingdom, adopted July 2001) 4-5; IWC 58th Meeting of June 2006, ‘Annual Report of the 
International Whaling Commission 2006 – covering the 2005-2006 financial year’ (St 
Kitts and Nevis, West Indies, adopted June 2006) 7. 
446 International Whaling Commission, Observers. Details for Non-Governmental 
Organizations (2018) https://iwc.int/observers_ngo. 
447 Eighteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1966, IWC/18/18, 66 per FPS, 
IUCN and WWF; Nineteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1967, IWC/19/14, 
73 per WWF; Twentieth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1968, IWC/20/12, 46 
per FPS and WWF. 
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The graph below illustrates the course of NGO attendance at the Whaling Commission, 
from 1963 to 2016. Arguably it demonstrates that rule changes do affect NGO conduct. 
There is a visible effect from the 2005 rule amendments, with a decrease in the number 
of NGOs in attendance in response to the capacity to have multiple delegates in the 
meeting room at one time. There are also several significant events in the Whaling 
Commission history that can be plotted to fluxes in attendance numbers. Discussion of 
these points follows. The significance of considering these points is that NGO presence 
in itself is a form of NGO behaviour. Representation of NGOs that do not acknowledge 
the object and purpose principles of the Whaling Convention can be as significant as 
their statements and organizational position. It is also significant to note that changes in 
the Commission rules do affect NGO behaviours, and so it is possible to amend rules to 
encourage greater recognition of object and purpose principles.  
Figure 5.2 Observer NGO (individual organization not delegate) numbers in the Whaling 
Commission 1963 – 2016 
There are several interesting points to observe on this graph. The first is the sharp 
increase in observers attending in 1978. The second is the climb in numbers up to 2001. 
The third is the steady and continued decline in observer NGO numbers that has 
continued across the 21st century. The sharp increase in observer numbers in 1978 is 
likely attributable to the growing international interest at the time in the proposal for a 
commercial whaling moratorium, although this is not verifiable except by way of 
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anecdote.448 The steady climb in numbers until 2001 can be attributed to the ongoing 
interest in the Whaling Commission among environmental groups, and to the meeting 
rule that only one observer per NGO was to be permitted in the meeting room at any 
one time.449 The original rule resulted in the attendance of many organizations with a 
single representative to maximise the number of observers present. 
The decline in observer organization numbers can be attributed to two changes in 
observer admission rules. The first was the abolition of the rule permitting only one 
observer per NGO in the meeting room at any one time. The second is a financial reason. 
The Commission website notes that in 2014 the first delegate of an observer 
organization would be charged at £580 GBP, and each subsequent delegate at £285 
GBP.450 The cost effectiveness of larger numbers of delegates under one banner, rather 
than many observer organizations with one representative may thus be partially 
responsible for the declining numbers of organizations represented. The impact of these 
rule changes can be seen in a comparison of the years 1999, 2001, 2009 and 2011 – two 
years preceding and two years following the amendments to the admission rules for 
observers.  
 
 1999 2001 2009 2011 
Ratio of NGOs to 
delegates 
88:130 102:154  57:131  40:102  
Delegates per NGO 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.5 
Figure 5.3 Ratio of delegates per NGO and average number of delegates per NGO in years 
before and after rule changes 
The average number of delegates per NGO increased in the years after the changes to 
admission rules. The removal of the limitation on the number of delegates per 
organization permitted in the meeting room at any one time, and the financial incentive 
 
448 Weyler, above n 264. 
449 Whaling Commission, Report of the Finance and Administration Committee 
IWC/58/rev 2 (Monday 13 June 2006) 24. 
450 International Whaling Commission, Observers. Details for Non-Governmental 
Organizations (2018) https://iwc.int/observers_ngo. 
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to have multiple delegates per organization is likely to be the cause for the increase in 
the average number of delegates per NGO. These changes indicate that the Commission 
can affect NGO behaviour if it wishes to do so. This observation is equally applicable to 
the CAMLR Commission in relation to its NGO observer delegation sizes. 
While there has been significant overhaul of the criteria for admittance in the Whaling 
Commission there are still no requirements for NGOs to demonstrate a capacity to 
contribute to the work of the Commission. The Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure 
and Rules of Debate show no connection between the observer position, the object and 
purpose, or the terms of Article IV of the Whaling Convention, which requires 
cooperative delegated engagement by other organizations within a range of research 
and data contributions.  
The Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure, Part C.1.b addresses the capacity of NGOs 
to become accredited as observers at a plenary meeting. The application process only 
requires applicants to demonstrate an interest in ‘matters covered by the Convention’. 
An applicant that satisfies this requirement, unless deemed otherwise unsuitable, can 
seek accreditation as an observer to attend Whaling Commission meetings.451 Requiring 
NGOs to express an interest in matters covered by the Convention does not meet the 
high standard of a demonstrated capacity to contribute to the work of the Commission, 
nor consideration of the Convention’s object and purpose. Comparing this situation with 
the CAMLR Commission, there are indications that failure to be clearer in terms under 
which NGOs may apply has impacted on how NGOs subsequently engage.  
If the attendance of NGOs was raised as an issue before the Commission, there is a clear 
argument available that the phrase ‘matters covered by the Convention’ does not 
include many issues that are of interest to NGOs, such as small cetaceans and whale 
watching. This clear absence of overlap between the interests of NGOs in some of the 
non-Convention work of the Commission and the Whaling Convention itself may offer a 
window through which to restrict access for NGOs.  
  
 
451 International Whaling Commission, Observers. Details for Non-Governmental 
Organizations (2018) https://iwc.int/observers_ngo. 
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5.3 Governing engagement activity of NGO observers 
5.3.1 CAMLR Commission 
The CAMLR Commission requirements for admission of NGO observers has consistently 
made connections between the terms of Article XXIII, the object and purpose of the 
CAMLR Convention and the application for and admission of observers. Expectations on 
NGOs to conform to a standard of behaviour reflecting this relationship have been 
consistently demonstrated in subsequent Commission conduct. Over the course of 
Commission meetings NGOs have been subject to censure (noted on the meeting 
record) where member states have disapproved of NGO behaviour, usually related to 
the content of papers or speeches. 
There are several early examples of states indicating their view of appropriate roles for 
observer participation and effectively curtailing NGO involvement. In 1990, Japan 
requested that all observers withdraw from the meeting room so a discussion on a 
specific compliance issue could be carried out among the Contracting Parties only.452 
The basis of this exclusion was the inability of observers to contribute to the diplomatic 
negotiations among member states on a compliance issue.453  
In 1995, Chile and Japan rebuked the IUCN representative for stepping outside the role 
of observer in criticising the Commission for failing ‘to adopt adequate measures’ in 
relation to IUU.454 Chile expressed reservations about the observer status of the 
IUCN455 after the IUCN representative made significant criticisms of both member state 
views of international law456 and the capacity of the Commission to curb IUU fishing.457 
There was also criticism of an ASOC information paper, which made extensive 
 
452 CCAMLR-IX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 1990, ‘Report of the Ninth Meeting of 
the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 1990) Annex 8, [2]. 
453 Ibid [3]. 
454 CCAMLR-XIV Meeting of 24 October – 3 November 1995, ‘Report of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 1995) [14.2] and 
[14.3]. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid [11.10]. 
457 Ibid [11.9]. 
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commentary on what ASOC felt were the directions the Commission should take.458  
Japan felt that ASOC should restrict itself to substantive contributions rather than 
opinions, as policy direction ‘more correctly fell within the Commission’s area of 
responsibility.’459 Chile withdraw its reservations about the involvement of the IUCN as 
observer460 the following year, when the IUCN observer acted within the perceived 
permissible range of the observer role by restricting her commentary to urging the 
Commission to consider designating a series of protected areas in the Southern Ocean 
as called upon in resolutions of the IUCN Congress.461 
States grappled to define appropriate behaviours for observers at the 1998 meeting. 
The Commission discussed how to address NGOs using inappropriate language, 
misrepresenting fact, and acting in breach of confidentiality.462 Japan suggested 
amending the CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure to address the issue of a breach of 
confidentiality that had arisen from a report written by the ASOC-member, ISOFISH, and 
published on its website.463 As a direct result, the Commission amended Rule 32.b.464 
Rule 32.b had previously allowed the Commission to restrict access to meeting sessions 
for NGO and IGO observers. The amendment allowed for selective invitations of non-
member state observers where other observers had been excluded.465 
 
458 ASOC, Report of the ASOC to the CCAMLR CCAMLR-XIV/BG/30 (1995). 
459 CCAMLR-XIV Meeting of 24 October – 3 November 1995, ‘Report of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 1995) [14.3]. 
460 CCAMLR-XV Meeting of 21 October – 1 November 1996, ‘Report of the Fifteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 1996) [11.14]. 
461 Ibid [11.13]. 
462 CCAMLR-XVII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 1998, ‘Report of the Seventeenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 1998) [12.22 – 
12.28]; this material is also discussed in Chapter 7 in depth.  
463 Ibid [12.29]. 
464 Ibid [16.2]. 
465 Ibid.  
Rule 32(b) 
If a Member of the Commission so requests, sessions of the Commission at which a particular agenda 
item is under consideration shall be restricted to its Members and Observers referred to in Rule 
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Such incidents aside, there is significant evidence to justify the view that the 
relationship between the Commission and observer NGOs, as well as NGO contributions 
have been largely defined by consideration of the principles of the object and purpose of 
the CAMLR Convention. NGOs from industry, environment, science and a hybrid position 
have assisted the Commission more often than not.466 For example, even in the midst of 
the IUU fishing issues that manifested in the mid-90s, the oral advocacy of ASOC for a 
zero-catch limit took account of the principles governing the CAMLR Commission’s 
work.467 Similarly, the IUCN strictly accounted for the object and purpose obligations of 
the Commission, noting issues of scientific data and the ongoing sustainability of stocks 
amidst the uncertainty of IUU fishing.468 Beyond the IUU issue, both the IUCN and ASOC 
also submitted extensive information papers assisting the work of the Commission. 
These information papers indicated accord with the underlying principles of the CAMLR 
Convention object and purpose, either through specific reference or by presenting data 
supportive of decision-making. Indicative of the value arising from adherence to object 
and purpose consideration is the thanks and appreciation expressed by the Commission 
 
30(a) and Rule 30(b). With respect to any session so restricted, the Commission may also agree to 
invite observers referred to in Rule 30(c). 
466 ASOC, Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition Paper on the creation of a CCAMLR 
enforcement regime CCAMLR-XVI/BG/38 (1997); ASOC, The international trade in 
Patagonian toothfish: international involvement, concerns and recommendations 
CCAMLR-XVII/BG/12 (1998); IUCN, Patagonian toothfish – are conservation and trade 
measures working? CCAMLR-XX/BG/28 (2001); ASOC, ASOC evaluation of CDS CCAMLR-
XX/BG/20 ASOC (2000); ASOC, Brief update on marine acoustic technology and the 
Antarctic environment CCAMLR-XXII/BG/41 (2003); COLTO, Working together to end 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XXXIII/BG/23 
(2014); SCAR/SCOR, The Southern Ocean Observing System (SOOS): an update CCAMLR-
XXX/BG/13 (2011).  
467 CCAMLR-XIX Meeting of 23 October – 3 November, 2000, ‘Report of the Nineteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November, 2000) [12.17]; 
CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November, 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth Meeting 
of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [12.11]; CCAMLR-XXI 
Meeting of 21 October – 1 November 2002, ‘Report of the Twenty-First Meeting of the 
Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2002) [10.30]. 
468 CCAMLR-XIX Meeting of 23 October – 3 November 2000, ‘Report of the Nineteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2000) [12.12]; 
CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth Meeting 
of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [12.12 – 12.14], 
Annex 5 [2.78]. 
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and individual member states to various observer NGOs for their contributions to the 
work of the Commission.469  
Arguably, the positive relationship between Commission and NGOs, and the overall 
adherence of NGOs to object and purpose arises from the seriousness with which the 
Commission approached both admittance to the Commission meetings and maintaining 
standards of conduct among observer NGOs, both during meeting time and 
intersessionally.  
5.3.2 Whaling Commission  
NGO observers in the Whaling Commission have a complicated history. This section 
explores NGO engagement with the privileges attached to observer status, noting the 
level of adherence to the object and purpose principles of the Whaling Convention. Key 
influences on the nature of NGO contributions include: the lack of clarity in the Whaling 
Convention for expectations on non-government actors engaging with the Commission 
and its members, the absence of expectations in the Whaling Commission Rules of 
Procedure and Debate on the content of written submissions, and the lack of clear 
parameters for oral submissions post-2012 amendments. 
 
469 CCAMLR-XVII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 1998, ‘Report of the Seventeenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 1998) [12.24] New 
Zealand to ASOC, [12.27] Uruguay on ASOC; CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 
November 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, 
Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [2.82] Chile to IUCN, [2.85] SCIC to ASOC and 
IUCN; CCAMLR-XXI Meeting of 21 October – 1 November 2002, ‘Report of the Twenty-
First Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2002) [14.10] 
UK to ASOC, [14.12] Chile to ASOC; CCAMLR-XXIV Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 
2005, ‘Report of the Meeting of the Twenty-Fourth Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, 
adopted 4 November 2005) [15.8] Spain to IUCN; CCAMLR-XXVI Meeting of 22 October – 
2 November 2007, ‘Report of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, 
Australia, adopted 2 November 2007) [13.74] EC to all NGOs, [16.6] and [16.8] EC and 
Argentina to ASOC respectively; CCAMLR-XXVIII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 
2009, ‘Report of the Twenty-Eight Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, 
adopted 6 November 2009)[16.13] Commission to COLTO; CCAMLR-XXXI Meeting of 23 
October – 1 November 2012, ‘Report of the Thirty-First Meeting of the Commission’ 
(Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2012) [9.9] Commission to COLTO and ARK; 
CCAMLR-XXXII Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2013, ‘Report of the Thirty-Second 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2013) [5.90] 
Commission to ASOC, [9.9] Commission to ASOC, [14.2] US to ASOC; CCAMLR-XXXIII 
Meeting of 20 – 31 October 2014, ‘Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of the Commission’ 
(Hobart, Australia, adopted 31 October 2014)[9.13] Commission to ASOC.  
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Oral submission of Opening Statements 
There are distinct phases of engagement with observer NGOs across the course of 
Whaling Commission history; the early years from 1963–1978/9 being the first 
involving oral representations. Environmental NGOs and the hybrid NGO, IUCN were the 
only NGO types operating at this stage – the second hybrid NGO in the Whaling 
Commission, the IWMC WCT did not appear until 1994. Before 1978, environmental 
NGO oral statements recognized a balance of conservation, use and future generations’ 
use, even from a moratorium position. Mention of science was limited to the IUCN. From 
1978, environmental NGO statements began to exclude mention of the lethal use to 
which whale stocks would be put once they had recovered, no longer accepting the 
possibility of ongoing lethal takes of whales. 
The first oral address to the Commission occurred in 1966 when an observer NGO 
spoke to the Commission agenda for the first time under Agenda item 18 Other 
Business.470 From 1966–1971, observers could address the Whaling Commission at the 
close of the meeting.471 At the twenty-fourth meeting in 1972, the Chairman permitted 
observers ‘to speak at an early part of the proceedings instead of at the end as in 
previous years.’472 This became the agenda item ‘Opening Statements’ in which 
Contracting Governments, non-party governments, IGOs and NGOs expressed their 
positions on the previous years’ and that year’s agenda. NGOs were restricted to five 
minutes speaking time each.473 
 
470 Eighteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1966, IWC/18/18, 66 Joint 
statement of WWF and IUCN, FPS associating itself with the statement; Twenty-Fourth 
Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1972, IWC/24/10: The position of observer and 
member state opening statements moved from ‘Other Business’ to a separate agenda 
item ‘Opening Statements’ in 1972. 
471 For example: Eighteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records: Friday 1st July 1966, 
IWC/18/18, 65-69; Nineteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records: Friday 30th June 
1967, IWC/19/14, 72-73; Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records: Friday 
29th June 1973, IWC/25/13, 24-25. 
472 IWC 24th Meeting of June 1972, ‘Twenty-Fourth Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the 24th fiscal year 1972-1973’ (London, United Kingdom, 
adopted June 1973) 22. 
473 Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records: Monday 26th June 1978, 
Resource ID 419, 44-45. 
 
 168 
Statements in the 1966–1979 period were varied in object and purpose content, but 
aside from one statement made by a trade union, the IUCN and environmental NGOs 
dominated Commission meetings. In 1967, WWF noted that ‘proper management of the 
whale stocks could support a healthy industry.’474 The Fauna Protection Society (FPS) 
associated itself with this statement.475 In 1968, the FPS similarly accepted industry as a 
part of the Whaling Commission, stating that conservation should be oriented toward 
building up stocks to ‘once more support a substantial whaling industry.’476 Such a 
position was never mentioned again.  
The IUCN maintained acceptance of lethal takes for longer than environmental NGOs. In 
1967, it advocated for greater consideration of future generations in continued 
conservation and use of the ‘great ocean resource’ of whales477 In 1970, the IUCN also 
sought to remind the Commission of the terms of the Convention as a document 
attempting to conserve in order to optimise yield.478 However, both the IUCN and 
environmental NGOs moved from acceptance of ongoing lethal whaling to a moratorium 
conservation perspective by 1971.  
Over the course of the 1970s, environmental NGOs demonstrated adeptness in 
balancing the various concerns of the Convention including advocating for ‘compromise’ 
between different viewpoints and arguing for a moratorium on the basis that it was a 
compromise that would best achieve a full recovery of whale stocks.479 The purpose of 
the recovery (i.e. lethal or non-lethal use) was not discussed. This capacity for balance 
was exemplified by the Sierra Club and WWF in 1974480 and 1978481 with clear 
 
474 Nineteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1967, IWC/19/14, WWF at 73. 
475 Nineteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1967, IWC/19/14, FPS, ISPA at 73. 
476 Twentieth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1968, IWC/20/12, 46 per FPS. 
477 Nineteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1967, IWC/19/14, IUCN at 72. 
478 Twenty-Second meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1970, IWC/22/10, 59.  
479 Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1973, IWC/25/13, 24-25. 
480 Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1974, IWC/26/12-1, 10-11. 
481 Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records 1978, Resource ID 419, 26. 
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references to intergenerational benefits of conservation as a tool for re-establishing a 
whaling industry.  
In terms of science and its centrality to the work of the Commission, there was clear 
consternation among NGOs in 1970 that agreed quotas in the Whaling Commission far 
exceeded the advice of the Scientific Committee.482 The moderately sarcastic terms in 
which this criticism was phrased483 followed on from a decade or more of significant 
frustration with the Commission’s will to sustainably manage whale stocks in 
accordance with scientific advice.484 Science was not frequently mentioned in NGO 
Opening Statements. However, this may simply have been deference to the privileged 
position of the Scientific Committee in providing its advice to the Commission. For 
whatever reasons, there was very little emphasis in environmental NGO Opening 
Statements on scientific bases to curtail whaling.  
The IUCN distinguished itself with clear balance among the object and purpose 
principles. It recognised the significance of both political and scientific reasons to 
minimise or stop commercial whaling. While acknowledging the dearth of scientific 
knowledge of the extent of whale population declines, the IUCN pushed for greater 
conservation efforts on the basis of the Stockholm Declaration in which 120 states 
expressed grave concerns for whale stocks.485 It also pushed for greater commitment to 
scientific research,486 and a cautious approach to the setting of quotas noting that ‘the 
margins of safety are not adequate to deal with potential errors in the estimate.’487 This 
 
482 Twenty-Second meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1970, IWC/22/10, 62, WWF. 
483 Twenty-Second meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1970, IWC/22/10, 62 – WWF 
stated that: By voting for a 2700 BWU quota in the Antarctic I think that the 
Commission appears to have gone on record to indicate that it apparently has 
reservations about the considered opinion of its own Scientific Committee.’. 
484 Gillespie, above n 263, 4-8; Interview with Interviewee 6 (Portorož, Slovenia 15 
September 2014). 
485 Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1972, IWC/24/10, 73. 
486 Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1974, IWC/26/12-1, 12-13; 
Twenty-seventh meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1975 IWC/27/12-1, 22. 
487 Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1972, IWC/24/10, 76. 
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statement was supported by five environmental NGOs.488 Other statements, by both 
environmental NGOs and IUCN referred to diminishing catches over the two centuries 
of whaling as of sufficient weight to require a pro-conservation policy.489 
Whatever the reasons for a broader absence of science as a reference point, 
environmental NGOs began to focus heavily on conservation outside the general 
mandate of the Whaling Convention. For example, whales are referred to as ‘a global 
property… [with their] own right to exist.’490 Others urged giving jurisdiction to manage 
whales to the United Nations.491 Greenpeace argued from an anti-consumerist view that 
‘conservation and non-consumptive values [were] embedded in the foundations of the 
Commission’ and that consumer ethics were the root cause of the issues besetting the 
Commission.492 Friends of the Earth urged that the Commission should begin to 
consider ‘whales as friends’.493 These statements fell clearly outside the Whaling 
Convention. 
The final Opening Statement that fell far outside the mandate of the Commission was 
the 1979 attendance of John Denver as a representative of an unnamed NGO.494 Mr. 
Denver came ‘not as an expert with facts and figures’ but simply a ‘being who has a very 
strong feeling of celebration for the life on this planet’.495 This fell far short of the 
fundamentally sound arguments valuing long-term conservation for current and future 
use of whale stocks by human generations. It arguably also indicates an issue with 
accreditation procedures because simply having an interest in the work of the 
 
488 Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1972, IWC/24/10, 76. 
489 Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1975, IWC/27/12-1, 13, 15 
per WWF; Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1976, Resource ID 416, 
33-34, IUCN. 
490 Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1974, IWC/26/12-1, 14. 
491 Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1975, IWC/27/12-1, 19, 27. 
492 Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1978, Resource ID 419, 39. 
493 Twenty-eighth meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1976, Resource ID 416, 40-43. 
494 Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1979, Resource ID 421, 
13. 




Commission qualified an NGO to send a representative, and the qualifications of 
individuals within an NGO were not questioned.  
This event encapsulated a shift among environmental NGOs toward emotion-based 
advocacy for whale conservation and moved NGO Opening Statements outside the 
confines of the Whaling Convention. Animal welfare groups similarly moved from 
advocacy for humane conduct in the catching and killing of whales496 to advocacy for no 
longer catching whales on the basis of what was described by pro-whalers as ‘a 
philosophical point of view arising from the relative value of the life of human beings 
and animals.’497 Without a reference point by which to weigh outcomes and arguments, 
oral statements of NGOs began to represent their own position rather than reference 
the work of the Commission and the legal regime by which it was bound.  
Written Opening Statements 
The IWC transitioned to written Opening Statements in 1980. The first use of written 
Opening Statements was in 1980 when Opening Statements moved from being orally 
presented to being circulated in document form.498 There were no express terms 
permitting the submission of Opening Statements by observers prior to 2005,499 
however the practice is now provided for in the Whaling Commission Rules of 
Procedure.500 The Chair cited matters of time.501 While this was undoubtedly an aspect 
of the issue, so too was NGO behaviour. The protests, violent clashes502 and abuse of 
 
496 Eighteenth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1966, IWC/18/18, 69. 
497 Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records,1978, Resource ID 419, 44. 
498 Thirty-second meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1980, Resource ID 422, 5. 
499 Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure (May 1999) in IWC 51st Annual Meeting of 
24th – 28th May 1999, ‘Fifty-First Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 1999 – covering the financial year 1998-1999’ (adopted Adelaide, 
Australia, July 2000) Q. Commission Documents.  
500 Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure (September 2015) Q. Commission 
Documents, 3. 
501 IWC 32nd Meeting of July 1980, ‘Thirty-Second Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the 32nd financial year 1980-1981’ (Brighton, United Kingdom, 
adopted June 1981) Chair’s statement. 




Commission time503 were likely unspoken reasons, potentially avoidable by 
Commission rules containing expectations that observers demonstrate a balanced 
engagement with object and purpose principles. However, there were no forthcoming 
rebukes from the Commission to observer NGOs on any matter of conduct. The Chair did 
not say anything about the appropriateness of having John Denver as an NGO 
representative or about his performance.504  
This transition to documentary Opening Statements continues to be the form employed 
for Opening Statements in the Whaling Commission today. From 1980 – 2016, the 
content of such Opening Statements has ranged across many agenda items. The Opening 
Statements bearing on the designation, review and continuation of the Southern Ocean 
Whale Sanctuary are explored in Chapter 7.  
Many NGOs have attended frequently and submitted Opening Statements between 1980 
and 2016, including World Wildlife Fund (WWF), World Society for the Protection of 
Animals (WSPA now WAP), Cetacean Society International (CSI) and the Animal Welfare 
Institute (AWI). Environmental NGOs dominate the written Opening Statement records, 
with the consistent but not annual attendance of the IUCN as a hybrid and notable NGO 
presence. Several cultural and industry NGOs have also been in regular attendance. A 
broad characterization of anti-whaling environmental NGO Opening Statements is 
conservation-oriented, advocating for a shift in the regulatory interests of the 
Commission to non-lethal, non-consumptive use of whale stocks. Pro-whaling 
environmental or hybrid NGOs, mostly visible as Global Guardian Trust (GGT) and the 
 
503 Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1979, Resource ID 421, 
13-15. 




IWMC World Conservation Trust (IWMC) focus on sustainable use,505 or emphasize the 
conservation–use intersection of the Whaling Convention object and purpose.506  
The documentary submissions of all Whaling Commission NGOs are largely 
characterized by political advocacy, often arguing for compliance with principles of 
international environmental law. The IUCN consistently propounded best practice 
approaches to whale regulation, in line with international law and environmental 
practice.507 The Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society (WDCS) and Tusk Force 
argued for the adoption of the precautionary approach in whaling regulation.508 The 
adoption of the precautionary approach within the Commission would satisfy the 
obligations of the Commission to international legal principles. However, other Opening 
Statements were more akin to a chorus of voices saying either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to whaling 
without any concrete reason for the choice. There were exceptions in which scientific 
argument and information was put forward,509 but these were not the rule.  
 
505 Global Guardian Trust, Opening Statement of Global Guardian Trust IWC/47/OS GGT 
(1995); Global Guardian Trust, Opening Statement of Global Guardian Trust to the 48th 
Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/48/OS GGT (1996)’ IWMC, Opening Statement by the 
International Wildlife Management Consortium to the 46th Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/46/OS IWMC (1994); IWMC WCT, Opening Statement to the 54th Annual Meeting of 
the IWC IWC/54/OS IWMC (2002). 
506 Global Guardian Trust, Opening Statement IWC/52/OS/GGT (2000); GGT, Global 
Guardian Trust Opening Statement to the 61st Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/61/OS 
GGT (2009); IWMC, Opening Statement by Eugene LaPointe, President International 
Wildlife Management Consortium IWC/47/OS IWMC (1995). 
507 IUCN, Statement to the 35th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/35/OS/IUCN (1983); 
IUCN, IUCN Statement to the International Whaling Commission IWC/39/OS IUCN 
(1987); IUCN, Statement to International Whaling Commission IWC/42/OS/IUCN 
(1990); IUCN, Statement to the 45th IWC meeting IWC/45/OS IUCN (1993); IUCN, 
Statement to the 50th Meeting of the IWC IWC/50/OS/IUCN (1998); IUCN, Opening 
Statement IWC/55/OS IUCN (2003); IUCN, Statement IWC/66/OS IUCN (2016). 
508 Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society (WDCS) and Tusk Force, Joint Statement 
IWC/49/OS WDCS (1997). 
509 Rick Spills and Jennifer Coates, Science Does Not Support Acceptance of the Revised 
Management Procedure IWC/46/OS AWI (1994); Rick Spill, RMP Update: 1994 Scientific 
Committee Papers Indicate Further Flaws Which Need to be Remedied IWC/46/OS AWI-
ANNEX 1 (1994). Interestingly, these Opening Statements contained arguments against 
the RMP, relying on articles and arguments developed by a key proponent of the RMP; 
ORCA, Statement IWC66, Portorož, Slovenia IWC/66/OS ORCA. 
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Generally, the tenor of environmental NGO Opening Statements focuses on 
conservation. However, this is not necessarily a focus on conservation without use. 
Conservation was often characterized as conservation as the antidote to overuse.510 To 
this extent the anti-whaling NGOs’ conservation considerations were initially concerned 
with conservation as a counterpoint to the very real excesses of the whaling industry 
and the Commission’s history of poor regulation and overexploitation.511 Conservation 
was fundamentally about proper regulation so that the whaling industry could recover. 
The position is a political counterpoint to a reality of excessive use.  It may be inferred 
that before evidence of stock rehabilitation sufficient to sustain whaling emerged, 
environmental NGOs considered the full range of object and purpose principles because 
the apparent overemphasis on conservation was in response to the actual overuse of 
whale resources. Written Opening Statements are explored more fully in Chapters Six 
and Seven. 
Use of speaking rights by NGOs to address the Commission agenda 
The 2014 amendments to the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure and Rules of 
Debate have given NGOs the privilege of speaking to the agenda on each agenda item, 
pending approval of the Chair and any time constraints.512 These amendments extend 
to plenary sessions and sessions of Commission subsidiary groups and Committees. Part 
A of the Rules of Debate state that ‘…Observers, which should be allowed to speak only 
after all Commissioners desiring to speak do so. As a general rule, Observers will only be 
allowed to speak once at each Agenda item under discussion, and at the discretion of the 
 
510 Statement to the 35th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/35/OS/IUCN (1983); IUCN, 
Statement to IWC IWC/41/OS IUCN (1989); IUCN, Statement to International Whaling 
Commission IWC/42/OS/IUCN (1990); American Association of Zoological Parks and 
Aquariums; international Association for Aquatic Animal Medicine, International Marine 
Animal Trainers Association; Marine Mammal Interest Group, Opening Statement, 
IWC43/OS AAZPA, IAAAM, IMATA, MMIG (1991); WWF, Opening Statement to the 43rd 
Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/43/OS WWF (1991); ELSA, Opening Statement to the 
45th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/45/OS ELSA (1993); ACS, American Cetacean 
Society Opening Statement IWC/54/OS ACS (2002); IFAW, Opening Statement 
IWC/54/OS IFAW (2002); WWF, Opening Statement IWC/64/OS WWF (2012). 
511 Gillespie, above n 263. 
512 Whaling Commission Rules of Debate, Part A. Right to Speak, section 1. 
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Chair.’513 This creates natural limitations on observers and requires them to decide 
among themselves which representative will speak, and which points shall be brought 
to the Commission’s attention. 
Observers, while restricted from criticizing members in written statements do not have 
the same restriction when speaking to the agenda. In terms of active formal 
engagement, there is a stipulation in the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure that 
Opening Statements of all parties be directed toward the Commission generally and not 
toward any particular Commission member.514 While this rule quells some level of 
agitation for approved observers, it does not prevent it, as many environmental NGOs 
resort to simply writing ‘some IWC members [emphasis added]’ when directing 
criticism toward a member state, and relying on context to make their meaning plain.515  
There has been some use of observer speaking rights in Commission meetings and 
subcommittee meetings in a manner that would breach the Code of Conduct 
requirement to not direct comments toward particular members. In 2014, an NGO 
delegate used speaking rights in the plenary to agitate on New Zealand domestic 
matters, directing criticism to New Zealand on its policies to protect small cetaceans 
 
513 Whaling Commission Rules of Debate, Part A. Right to Speak, section 1.  
514 Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule Q.3 Opening Statements … shall be in 
the form of views and comments made to the Commission in general rather than 
directed to any individual or group of Contracting Governments.’ 
515 WWF, WWF Statement to the 36th Annual Meeting of the IWC, 18-22 June 1984, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina IWC/36/84/OS/WWF (1984); WWF, WWF Statement to the 37th Annual 
Meeting of the IWC IWC/37/OS WWF (1985); Whale Center, Whale Center Statement to 
the 37th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/37/OS WC (1985); IUCN, IUCN Statement to the 
IWC IWC/38/OS IUCN (1986); IUCN, Statement to IWC IWC/41/OS IUCN (1989); IFAW, 
‘Actions for Protection of Whales in Puerto Vallarta and Beyond’: Opening Statement by 
the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) IWC/46/OS IFAW (1994); ITF, 
International Transport Workers’ Federation Statement to the IWC – 1994 IWC/46/OS 
ITWF (1994); JFA, Opening Statement by the Japan Fisheries Association IWC/46/OS JFA 
(1994); AWI, Animal Welfare Institute Opening Statement to the 62nd Annual Meeting of 
the IWC IWC/62/OS AWI (2010); GGT, Opening Statement to the 62nd Annual Meeting of 
the IWC IWC/62/OS GGT (2010); Species Management Specialists, Opening Statement 
IWC/62/OS SMS (2010); Humane Society International, Opening Statement IWC/64/OS 




within their EEZ.516 In 2016, in the Whale Killing Methods subcommittee meeting, an 
NGO delegate directly questioned Japan’s Schedule objection to the ban of the cold 
grenade harpoon.517 Neither delegate was disciplined by the Chair.  
The Code of Conduct requires NGOs to refrain from making defamatory statements in 
‘for-information’ documents distributed outside the meeting room, to refrain from 
disruptive conduct,518 and to ‘behave with due and proper respect for the meeting 
proceedings and to all Contracting Governments and other governments attending IWC 
meetings’.519 Yet, in 2016, an NGO representative520 indicated they wished to speak to 
the agenda item ‘Cooperation with other organizations’; instead they began to make a 
statement on canned whale meat for sale on the internet. The representative was 
allowed to digress from the agenda item for several minutes before being brought to 
order by the Chair after she failed to address his requests to speak to the agenda 
item.521 With the exception of one Opening Statement directly critical of Japan being 
withdrawn from the meeting records in 1998,522 there has been no consensus censure 
of NGO meeting conduct, despite there being clear breaches. Nor has there been 
 
516 Dr Barbara Maas (NABU), Intervention on the Hector’s and Maui dolphins (IWC65; 17 
September 2014) [19.1] directly addressing New Zealand on alleged failure to address 
conservation issues within their domestic waters and not an agenda item (IWC/65/01 
Rev 1). The Chair did not address this breach of conduct.  
517 Humane Society International, Intervention on the Cold Grenade Harpoon (IWC66, 
Conservation Committee; 20 October 2016) directly addressed and criticised Japan 
despite the item not being on the agenda (IWC/66/WKM&WI01). As with NABU, HSI 
was not censured for their breach of the Rules of Debate. 
518 Letter from Dr Nick Grandy, Secretary to the IWC to Mr Jeremy Wales, United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 13 October 2006, Annex 4; IWC Secretariat, 
Draft Code of Conduct for NGOs at IWC meetings and complaints procedures (2018) 
IWC/67/FA/24. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Whale and Dolphin Conservation. 
521 Whale and Dolphin Conservation, Intervention of Whale and Dolphin Conservation on 
agenda item 18; Co-operation with other organizations, observed by candidate at the 
IWC66 meeting (Portorož, Slovenia, 27 October 2016). 
522 Int Wild Coal, Declaration of Concern for Small Island Nations Being Subjected to 
Japanese Influence at International Conservation Treaty Deliberations IWC/50/OS Int 
Wild Coal (1998). 
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reconsideration of lacuna evident in the current rules. These issues are discussed in 
Chapter Eight. 
5.4 Discussion and Conclusion  
5.4.1 Discussion 
The attendance records of the two Commissions demonstrate some key differences in 
how the accreditation process has shaped the relationship between Commissions and 
NGO observers. This is particularly clear from an object and purpose analysis 
standpoint. The CAMLR Commission requires NGO applicants to demonstrate a capacity 
to contribute to the object and purpose principles animating the work of the 
Commission; there has been substantial adherence to these terms in oral and written 
submissions. The repetition of the expectations of the Commission, made clear in both 
meeting reports and in correspondence between NGOs and the Commission has 
reinforced this position. 
The position of the Whaling Commission toward NGO observers, with no documented 
attempts to direct the observer roles toward object and purpose principles animating 
the work of the Commission has resulted in minimal attention paid to the legal 
framework binding the Commission. While it was noted that this is part of a larger issue 
with the attempted reconstruction of the Whaling Convention by states, NGOs and 
academics, there are no clear requirements set out by the Whaling Commission for 
NGOs to refer to or abide by the object and purpose principles of the Whaling 
Convention.  
This is not to say that the object and purpose analysis necessarily demonstrates causal 
connections between adherence to the object and purpose and the value of 
contributions. It is equally possible to observe other correlations between 
characteristics of the Commissions and their observers, and the value or compliance of 
their conduct. For example, larger numbers of observers encourage a very different 
relationship than where small numbers of observers are welcomed. The sheer scale of 
NGO observers at the Whaling Commission has, until the 2014 amendment to the 
Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate, been inversely 
proportionate to the engagement roles available to them. In contrast, the small and 
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consistent number of NGO observers in the CAMLR Commission parallels the steady and 
consistent rights of access to the Commission given to those observers. 
Subsequent Commission responses to NGO behaviour indicate that there are two very 
different relationships in the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions regarding observer 
NGOs. It was noted in 5.3.1 that the CAMLR Commission, its Chair and individual states 
had often thanked ASOC and other NGOs for their contributions to the work of the 
Commission. In the Whaling Commission the absence of such communication in Meeting 
Reports speaks to the lack of material contribution made by NGOs to the work of the 
Commission. This can be attributed to the undisciplined approach to NGO observer 
attendance and meeting rules.  
5.4.2 Conclusion 
The attendance and conduct expectations of Commissions may act as causal factors in 
encouraging NGO observer applicants to adhere to and support the work of the 
Commission in accordance with object and purpose principles. Chapter Eight relies on 
these observations of meeting rules and admittance requirements to discuss possible 
recommendations that might facilitate NGO contributions that are of value to 
Commission work. Chapter Eight also relies on these observations to ask whether object 
and purpose principles may unduly restrict aspects of NGO engagement.  
In the Whaling Commission, amendment of the Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate to 
be consistent with non-criticism expectations on observers submitting Opening 
Statements is a possible means of preventing observers from contributing to or inciting 
fractious meeting proceedings. Similarly, there may be benefits to drafting clear powers 
of the Chair to stop and have struck from the record oral addresses from observers 
where the observer has failed to exercise the speaking right in accordance with the 
Rules of Debate. The Code of Conduct could also bear some alteration to require 
standards of behaviour among NGO observers to minimise the discord clear between 
pro- and anti-whaling factions. All these must be prefaced by clearer and stricter terms 
of admission for observers to require ‘contribution’ rather than ‘interest. 
In the CAMLR Commission, there has been a bulging increase in observer delegation 
attendance. While states may have advisors and other delegation members to assist the 
Commissioner, the capacity of observers to send delegations larger than those of most 
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states may need curtailment. The oversaturation of meeting space, particularly with 
ASOC delegates, may be met with a responsive dilution of the perceived credibility and 
value of their contributions to the work of the Commission. This is particularly so where 
combative positions are taken by delegates in informal spaces.  
The following two chapters engage with two dominant issues that have surfaced in both 
Commissions – the enforcement of law in relation to perceived breaches of the terms of 
the conventions, and the designation of protected areas. These two chapters present an 
in-depth object and purpose analysis of two issues so that the general observations of 




Chapter 6: NGO engagement over catch regulation and 
enforcement  
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five evaluated NGO engagement across the history of the Commissions and the 
admissions processes in the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission through an 
object and purpose framework. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the issue 
of catch regulation measures and enforcement of regulatory measures. It analyzes the 
extent to which NGO observers and non-observer NGOs abide by or refer to the object 
and purpose in the CAMLR Commission and the Whaling Commission when engaging 
with catch regulation measures and enforcement of regulatory measures. The focus in 
the CAMLR Commission is the regulatory and enforcement measures addressing illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing of Patagonian toothfish (dissostichus 
eleginoides) In the Whaling Commission, the focus is on the regulation of scientific 
whaling practices of Japan in the Southern Ocean.   
The importance of catch regulation cannot be understated. IUU fishing threatens global 
fisheries, threatens the capacity of international bodies to sustainably manage fisheries, 
and threatens the health of global marine ecosystems.523 Its operations are increasingly 
being compared to organized crime.524 Because of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean’s 
 
523 FAO, Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (FAO, 2016); Agreement on Port 
State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (Port State Measures Agreement) opened for signature 22 November 2009, UNTS 
54133 (entered into force 5 June 2016). 
524 Lynden Griggs and Gail Lugten, ‘Veil Over the Nets: Unravelling Corporate Liability 
for IUU Fishing Offences’ (2007) 31 Marine Policy 159; Ioannis Chapsos and Steve 
Hamilton, ‘Illegal fishing and fisheries crime as a transnational organized crime in 
Indonesia’ (2018) Trends in Organized Crime https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-018-
9329-8; Henrik Österblom, Andrew Constable, Sayaka Fukumi, ‘Illegal fishing and the 
organized crime analogy’ (2011) 26(2) Trends in Ecology & Evolution 261; Le Gallic, 
Bertrand and Anthony Cox, ‘An economic analysis of illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing: Key drivers and possible solutions (2006) 30(6) Marine Policy 689, 690; 




unique status as ‘last great wilderness’,525 responses to IUU fishing in the CAMLR 
Commission are particularly significant. How NGOs contribute to this important issue is 
worthy of scrutiny.  
Catch regulation in the CAMLR Commission includes legal catch allocation, seasonal 
open and closed areas, and fishing gear regulation in conservation measures.526 It also 
includes the development of measures to prevent IUU fishing of CCAMLR-Area fish 
stocks, particularly Patagonian toothfish (Dissotischus eleginoides). Catch enforcement 
involves the prevention of fishing by IUU fishing vessels, and pursuit of legal action 
against vessel owners.  
IUU fishing in the CAMLR Commission became a focal issue in the 1990s. Numerous 
conservation measures are directed toward understanding and preventing IUU fishing, 
including port and flag states measures such as the Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS), 
the creation of the IUU vessel register, and the implementation of a Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS). As this chapter will discuss, observer NGOs address all these issues as 
part of their participation in the Commission. The intersessional enforcement capacities 
of states and non-states to prevent fishing activities of IUU vessels is an increasingly 
important tool in the fight against IUU fishing. This aspect is focused on through the 
work of the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) and Sea Shepherd.  
This chapter examines scientific whaling in the Whaling Commission from the issue’s 
first appearance in 1977 through to the 2014 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
decision and associated Commission discussions.527 It evaluates the use of Opening 
Statements, protest at meetings, and the intersessional activities of the non-observer 
NGO, Sea Shepherd against Japanese whaling research vessels in the Southern Ocean. 
 
525 Stanley Johnson, Antarctica; The Last Great Wilderness (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1985). 
526 CCAMLR Conservation Measures Category 10 – compliance, Category 22 – Gear 
regulations, Category 32 – Fishing seasons, closed areas and prohibition of fishing, 
Category 33 – By-catch limits, Category 41 – Toothfish. See: CCAMLR, Browse 
Conservation Measures (20 October 2014) https://www.ccamlr.org/en/conservation-
and-management/browse-conservation-measures .  
527 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226. 
 
 182 
Whaling, and scientific whaling is also an important issue. Scientific whaling has been 
one of the most contentious environmental issues of the last twenty years. Scientific 
whaling raises several matters of significance to international law and the global 
environment. The questions of whether some cetaceans can be commercially harvested 
in the Southern Ocean, and whether they should be, are raised. Beyond these, the 
Japanese research programs engaged complex issues of the jurisdiction of the Whaling 
Commission and interpretation of the Whaling Convention. These included the 
obligation of good faith in the issue of special permits, the extent of oversight to which 
the Commission and its Scientific Committee could subject the special permits, and the 
rights of non-states to carry out preventative enforcement measures against states to 
uphold a non-state interpretation of international law.  
Scientific whaling also raised other issues of international law. It brought into question 
territorial claims under the Antarctic Treaty.528 There were also assertions of Australian 
law being breached by the Japanese fleet in whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary,529 
and claims of authority in Sea Shepherd pursuing their course of action against the 
JARPA-II vessels.530 Issues of maritime safety were also raised. The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) turned its attention to Sea Shepherd’s engagement with 
the Japanese whaling fleet, resulting in IMO and Whaling Commission resolutions on 
Safety at Sea. While aspects of the actions of Sea Shepherd have been evaluated from a 
variety of perspectives,531 an object and purpose analysis is a new viewpoint that 
depoliticizes the issue of whaling in general. 
 
528 Antarctic Treaty, Article IV. 
529 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCAFC 116; 
(2006) 154 FCR 425. 
530 Cameron SG Jefferies, ‘Strange Bedfellows or Reluctant Allies?: Assessing Whether 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) Should Serve as Official 
Monitors of Whaling for the International Whaling Commission (2009) 26 Windsor 
Review of Legal and Social Issues 75, 87-94. 
531 Blay and Bubna-Litic, above n 384, 466; Brisman, above n 384, 755; Guevara, above 
n 35, 60; Christopher J Covill, ‘Greenpeace, Earth First! and The Earth Liberation Front: 
The Progression of the Radical Environmental Movement in America (2008) 5 Senior 
Honors Projects. Paper 93, 16, 23, 101-113; Jabour and Iliff, above n 384, 276-285; 
Anton, above n 383, 138, 145; Gerry Nagtzaam, ‘Gaia’s Navy: The Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society’s Battle to Stay Afloat and International Law’ (2014) 38 William & 
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The object and purpose analyzes in this chapter address the observer roles, such as 
documentary and oral submissions, and whether NGO behaviours fit the expectations of 
non-state engagement provisions. This is also applied to the non-observer NGO, Sea 
Shepherd in relation to both the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions and Sea Shepherd 
activities in relation to IUU fishing and scientific whaling.  
In the CAMLR Commission, the NGO roles of documentary and oral submissions are 
considered in relation to hybrid, industry and environmental NGO observers, IUCN, 
COLTO and ASOC. The chapter also evaluates the practical actions of the industry NGO, 
COLTO, to enforce and support compliance with conservation measures, and increase 
Commission access to data on IUU activity.  
in the Whaling Commission, Opening Statements of NGOs from 1977 until 2014 are 
considered. There was some limited input from trade unions that cannot be classified as 
industry NGOs, and so are considered in contrast to the environmental NGOs to provide 
a counterpoint in the discussion. The use of designated meeting protest spaces in 2014 
and 2016 is also discussed in counterpoint to authorized observer NGO engagement. 
How NGOs contribute to protecting the Southern Ocean, and how NGO behaviours 
impact on international cooperation are significant matters in addressing transnational 
crime and state power. IUU fishing and scientific whaling have been divisive issues, and 
to examine the way in which NGOs have affected interactions on them can lead to 
opportunities for greater and more effective cooperation and participation by NGOs 
within the rule of law. It may be possible that NGOs take on a more significant role in 
assisting IGOs in enforcing and upholding international law.532  
The object and purpose analysis applied to behaviours outside of the sanctioned 
position of observer provides insight into why non-observer NGOs may not have sought 
or been granted observer status. But it also determines the extent to which their work 
adheres to the rule of law and is of use to each Commission. The rule of law and utility is 
 
Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 613; Nagtzaam and Lentini, above n 384; 
Fallon, above n 35; Tara Helfman, ‘The Dread Pirate Who? Challenges in Interpreting 
Treaties and Customary International Law in the United States’ (2016) 90 Tulane Law 
Review 805; Whitney Magnuson, ‘Marine Conservation Campaigners as Pirates: The 
Consequences of Sea Shepherd’ (2014) 14 Environmental Law 923. 
532 Jefferies, above n 530. 
 
 184 
defined by consideration of object and purpose principles. Not all non-observer NGO 
behaviour falls short of considering to the object and purpose. Demonstrating which 
behaviours align with the object and purpose principles can assist in understanding 
how NGOs may best direct their work to support the Commissions in their work and set 
an acceptable standard of participation and accountability.  
The analysis in this chapter proceeds in five parts. Part 6.2 outlines the catch regulation 
powers under the CAMLR Convention and Whaling Convention and explains the history 
of IUU and scientific whaling as regulatory problems. Part 6.3 examines the NGO roles 
on these issues in both Commissions. Parts 6.4 and 6.5 evaluate those roles in light of 
the object and purpose of the CCAMLR and IWC, respectively. Part 6.6 reflects on the 
implications of the chapter’s findings. It concludes that NGO contributions that adhere 
to convention object and purpose are most likely to have the highest impact on the work 
of a Commission, even when they do not align with the actions of member states. NGO 
behaviours that only state their political position and provide no tangible contribution 
to the work of the Commission in light of its object and purpose principles are the least 
likely to be noticed or reflected in Commission meeting records, and therefore have the 
weakest impact.  
The analysis of both sanctioned and outlier NGO behaviours demonstrates that it is not 
the position of the NGO but the adherence of its actions to the object and purpose that is 
indicative of the value of those actions to the Commission. This is despite the 
antagonism or hostility of any member state. The implication of this is that the rule of 
law is the best measure for effective engagement, and the standard to which both states 
and non-states must direct their attention.  
6.2 Catch regulation powers  
6.2.1 CAMLR Commission  
The CAMLR Convention was drafted in the late 1970s, largely in response to concerns 
among Antarctic Treaty consultative parties about emergent and unregulated 
commercial interest in the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean.533 IUU fishing 
 
533 Norway, Marine biological resources in Antarctic. Questions concerning necessary 
measures (Paper submitted by Norway) ANT/6 (26 May 1975) 1-2; Working Group, 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (Draft Recommendation submitted by Working Group) 
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first appeared as a central concern on the CAMLR Commission agenda in 1997. In 1990, 
the Commission began to discuss the need to acquire fisheries data from non-member 
states. This was a response to concerns over the accuracy of information about the 
volume of marine living resources being extracted from the Southern Ocean. There was 
a need to understand the extent to which data might indicate unregulated catch taken in 
the Southern Ocean was being landed in non-member state ports and being taken by 
non-member vessels. There was discussion about whether non-member states should 
be informed of and requested to comply with the convention’s objectives.534  
The first formal mention of IUU fishing on the Commission agenda occurred in 1994535 
and again in 1995,536 with an intervention by the IUCN observer.537 In 1996, Norway 
urged ‘that illegal and unreported fishing is currently the greatest threat to CCAMLR’538 
and the delegation of South Africa submitted a Working Paper entitled ‘Report on Illegal 
Fishing’.539 IUU fishing was placed on the agenda in 1997, and has remained an agenda 
item since then.540 
 
ANT/16/Rev.1 (18 June 1975); SCAR, SCOR, SCOR Working Group 54, Biological 
Investigations of Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks (BIOMASS): Summary of objectives 
and programmes ANT/IX/10 Provisional Agenda Item 6 (14 September 1977) Preface; 
United Kingdom, Antarctic Marine Living Resources (Paper submitted by the United 
Kingdom) ANT/IX/6 (14 September 1977) 2. 
534 CCAMLR-IX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 1990, ‘Report of the Ninth Meeting of 
the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 1990) [10.3]. 
535 CCAMLR-XIII Meeting of 26 October – 4 November 1994, ‘Report of the Thirteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 1994) [1.29], 
[1.30], [3.2], [5.11], [5.12], [5.21], [7.2.ix]. 
536 CCAMLR-XIV Meeting of 24 October – 3 November 1995, ‘Report of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 1995) [1.18], 
[1.22], [1.23], [1.37], [2.23-2.25], [2.7] [5.24], [7.3], [7.6-7.9], 7.15]. 
537 Ibid [11.9]. 
538 CCAMLR-XV Meeting of 21 October – 1 November 1996, ‘Report of the Fifteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 1996) [12.13]. 
539 Delegation of South Africa, Report on Illegal Fishing CCAMLR-XV/18 (1996). 
540 CCAMLR-XVI Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 1997, ‘Report of the Sixteenth 




The definition of IUU fishing is not contained in the CAMLR Convention. In terms of 
practice, third party vessels fishing in the area and flagged to non-member states or 
flags of convenience are branded unregulated fishers. There is also a compliance 
mechanism within the Commission to address vessels flagged to member states that 
have caught over their allocated catch.541 These can be, for the duration of their 
unlawful fishing, termed illegal fishing vessels. However, this categorisation cannot be 
addressed here as it is a political issue in the Commission that extends beyond the scope 
of this thesis.542 
The capacity to determine all aspects of marine living resources conservation and 
rational use, such as setting total allowable catches (TACs) and developing responses to 
IUU fishing is contained in Article IX of the CAMLR Convention. Under Article IX, the 
CAMLR Commission is to give effect to the principles and objectives of Article II. It will 
be recalled that Art II provides that conservation is the primary objective of the 
Commission; that rational use is to be considered part of conservation; that an 
ecosystem approach is to be taken and, consistent with developments in international 
law, so is the precautionary approach. Conservation and rational use are predicated on 
the longevity of marine living resource stocks.  Article IX also makes clear that scientific 
 
541 The Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC) addresses IUU 
fishing on the part of member state vessels, and NGOs have submitted on the issue: 
ASOC, The Hongjin 707: Case study and recommended next steps for CCAMLR CCAMLR-
XXXV/BG/08 (2016). However, the issue of ‘IUU’ fishing on the part of member states is 
located in a broader issue of recognition of straddling stocks and the application of the 
United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for 
signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December 2001) to 
the jurisdiction of the CAMLR Commission. 
542 For example: CCAMLR-XXII Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 2003, ‘Report of the 
Twenty-Second Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 
2003) [11.2]. Reference is made to ‘metapopulation’ assessment rather than ‘straddling 
stock’; R Williams, AJ Constable, C Davies and S Candy (Australia), A possible model of 
metapopulation structure of Dissostichus eleginoides in the southern Indian Ocean WG-
FSA-03/72; Fishery Report 2014: Dissostichus eleginoides Kerguelen Islands French EEZ 




research and study and the advice of the Scientific Committee are the basis of all 
decisions of the Commission.543  
IUU fishing hampers the capacity of the Commission to effectively manage the 
conservation of marine living resources and ecosystems. This affects the drafting of 
Conservation Measures, as the extent of IUU harvest is difficult to measure, and cannot 
be fully accounted for in determining Conservation Measures that focus on harvest of 
resources and sustainable use.544 Another issue is that the impact of IUU fishing 
methods cannot always be satisfactorily measured in terms of harm to other species, 
such as seabirds, within the Southern Ocean ecosystem, or the physical landscape.545  
IUU fishing therefore undermines the capacity for the Scientific Committee to give ‘the 
best scientific advice possible’ for conservation measures because of this uncertainty.546 
In so doing, it undermines the fundamental object and purpose of the CAMLR 
Convention. 
The CAMLR Commission’s response to IUU fishing includes: development and 
implementation of the Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS); the Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS); and the IUU vessel register. These responses involved developing 
complex interorganizational and international responses to IUU vessels, catch and 
landing, with cooperation from non-signatory port states, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), Interpol, and companies legally fishing in the Convention Area.  
The Commission’s IUU fishing regulatory powers are exercised with reference to 
conservation including rational use, with a view to long-term, sustainable fisheries. One 
aspect of this is the capacity of the Commission and its Scientific Committee to 
sufficiently determine the impact of legal fishing on fish populations, as well as account 
for IUU fishing impacts in determining TACs for legal operators. This presents an 
intersection of conservation and rational use with an emphasis on the precautionary 
approach, as the uncertainty of stock assessment with IUU impacts necessitates 
conservation-oriented decision-making with uncertain data.  
 
543 CAMLR Convention, Article IX.1.a – f; IX.4. 
544 FAO, Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (FAO, 2016). 
545 Ibid. 
546 CAMLR Convention, Article IX.1.f. 
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6.2.2 Whaling Commission 
Scientific whaling is the harvesting of whales for the purposes of scientific research 
under Article VIII of the Whaling Convention. The scientific whaling mandate requires 
that any whales taken be processed for consumption or sale.547 The scientific whaling 
programs of Japan, under the Japanese Antarctic Research Programs (JARPA), have been 
represented by environmental NGOs as a means of engaging in commercial whaling, in 
defiance of the zero commercial whale catch limit (commonly called the commercial 
whaling moratorium) through a so-called “loophole” in the Whaling Convention.548 This 
perspective was not confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Whaling 
Case judgment in 2014. The Court declined to make a finding on this. It satisfied itself 
with finding that the nature of the JARPA whaling programs failed to satisfy the ‘whaling 
for scientific purposes’ requirement of Article VIII.549 
Scientific whaling permits became a long-standing matter of concern in the Whaling 
Commission immediately after the 1986 finalization of the commercial whaling 
moratorium. This was not restricted to the Japanese delegation; Iceland and Norway 
also issued permits.550 The Japanese voyages to the Southern Ocean to engage in JARPA 
 
547 Whaling Convention, Article VIII.2. 
548 WWF, WWF Statement to the 40th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/40/OS WWF 
(1988); ELSA Nature Conservancy, Open Statement to the 41st Annual Meeting of 
International Whaling Commission IWC/41/OS ELSA (1989); IFAW, Opening Statement 
55th Meeting of the IWC IWC/55/OS IFAW (2003); Animal Welfare Institute, AWI 
Opening Statement IWC/57/OS AWI (2005); Cousteau Society, Opening Statement to the 
57th meeting of the IWC IWC/57/OS CS (2005); WWF, Opening Statement: 58th meeting of 
the IWC IWC/58/OS WWF (2006); AWI, Opening Statement of the Animal Welfare 
Institute IWC/59/OS AWI (2007); Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opening Statement 
IWC/59/OS GP (2007); IFAW, Opening Statement to the 59th annual meeting of the IWC 
IWC/59/OS IFAW (2007); Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening Statement 
IWC/59/OS (2007); WWF, WWF Opening Statement to the 59th meeting of the IWC 
IWC/59/OS WWF (2007); WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/60/OS WWF (2008); 
ACS, American Cetacean Society Opening Statement IWC/61/OS ACS (2009); AWI, 
Animal Welfare Institute Opening Statement to the 61st annual meeting of the IWC 
IWC/61/OS AWI (2009). 
549 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [230]. 
550 IWC 39th Annual Meeting of June 1987, ‘Thirty-Ninth Report of the International 
Whaling Commission – covering the financial year, 1987-1988’ (Bournemouth, UK, 
adopted June 1988) 1, 11-13.  
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I and II drew the most commentary from both the Commission and NGOs. The JARPA II 
program attracted the attention of Sea Shepherd and Greenpeace in 2005. Both NGOs 
attempted to enforce the Australian designation of a whale sanctuary in its claimed 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the coast of Australian Antarctic territory.551 JARPA 
II ended in 2014, with the decision of the ICJ finding that the JARPA programs did not 
satisfy the definition of ‘for purposes of [scientific research]’.552 
In the Whaling Commission, scientific whaling is also called ‘special permit’ whaling.553 
Special permit whaling occurs outside the direct regulatory power of the Commission, 
as issuing special permits is at the discretion of the state.554 The Whaling Convention 
mandates that any whales killed, taken or treated as part of a scientific whaling permit 
‘shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.’555 This exempts scientific 
whaling catches from the operation of the Schedule, and so from the commercial 
whaling moratorium. However, member states that issue special permits are not 
released from research obligations determined by the Whaling Convention.556 This 
results in some oversight of the special permits by the Commission and its Scientific 
Committee, though no veto can be exercised.557 It is important to clarify how the object 
and purpose applies to scientific whaling, as well as how the Whaling Commission has 
jurisdiction over scientific whaling. 
 
551 Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCAFC 116; 
(2006) 154 FCR 425; Blay and Bubna-Litic, above n 362, 466. 
552 IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the July 2012 – October 2014 financial year’ 
(Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) [7.5.2] 16; IWC 66th Annual Meeting of 
October 2016, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2016 – covering 
the October 2014 – October 2016 financial year’ (Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 
2016) [6.2.2], 12. 
553 Whaling Convention, Article VIII. 
554 Whaling Convention, Article VIII. 
555 Whaling Convention, Article VIII.1. 
556 Whaling Convention, Article IV and VIII.3. 
557 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [83]; Whaling 
Convention Schedule, [30]. 
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There are three primary means by which the scientific whaling programs of the 
Japanese Cetacean Research Institute (JCR) can or have been brought within the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. The Whaling Commission provides some regulation 
through the Scientific Committee by way of oversight of scientific research. This is 
supported by the Whaling Case decision.558 Article VIII states that where nationals of a 
member state engage in scientific whaling,559  
Each Contracting Government shall transmit to such body as may be designated by the 
Commission, in so far as practicable, and at intervals of not more than one-year, scientific 
information available to that Government with respect to whales and whaling, including 
the results of research conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article and to Article IV. 
The ‘such body’ is the Scientific Committee. Article VIII makes clear that scientific 
research data is to be collected, transmitted and, according to practice, used to support 
and inform the decisions of the Commission.  
The second means is an interpretive means of inclusion, argued here. In accordance 
with the Vienna Convention,560 all provisions of a treaty must be read in light of the 
object and purpose.561 The exclusion of the regulatory powers of the Whaling 
Convention to scientific whaling does not exclude the object and purpose principles 
from interpreting Article VIII. Interpretation of Article VIII ‘in light of’ the object and 
purpose entails that scientific whaling permits should contribute to object and purpose 
principles, including conservation, use, and the development of the whaling industry for 
future generations.  
A third means, a tack taken by many environmental NGOs, is through challenging the 
nature of scientific whaling programs as being commercial whaling in disguise, and thus 
not truly within the scope of Article VIII and so subject to the Schedule zero catch 
provision. This is fundamentally a ‘bad faith’ argument centred around the 
interpretation and use of Article VIII. It is, however, a politically charged argument, and 
 
558 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [240–241]. 
559 Whaling Convention, Article VIII. 
560 Vienna Convention, Article 31. 
561 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1). 
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not supported by the ICJ decision, by consensus or majority in the Whaling Commission, 
or by this thesis.  
Scientific whaling involves a close examination of the relationship between science and 
the object and purpose principles of the Whaling Convention. Scientific whaling invokes 
the development of the whaling industry, and the support of whale populations to 
ensure intergenerational access to whale resources as well as conservation for the 
purposes of such access and development. The representation of these principles in 
JARPA was challenged by Commission members and NGOs alike and the question of the 
purpose of scientific whaling programs in relation to the Convention became a focus of 
many NGO behaviours.  
6.3 NGO roles in respect of catch regulation and enforcement 
Catch regulation and enforcement in the CAMLR Commission attracted the 
contributions of environmental, hybrid, and industrial NGOs. Scientific whaling in the 
Whaling Commission attracted the input of environmental and hybrid NGOs only. This 
is attributable to development of industry representation in the CAMLR Commission to 
protect industry interests in the Patagonian toothfish fisheries and the absence of 
Whaling Commission regulation for commercial whaling since 1986. However, within 
the environmental NGO category in the Whaling Commission are pro- and anti-whaling 
advocates.  
Environmental NGOs are the most vocal presence in both Commissions, followed by the 
hybrid, IUCN. The industry NGO, the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO), 
has been consistent with input and support since its first attendance at the CAMLR 
Commission meetings in 2003. COLTO has submitted papers, collaborated with ASOC, 
used speaking rights, and made practical contributions in support of conservation 
measures intended to combat IUU fishing. COLTO has challenged the CAMLR 
Commission on responses - its own, and its individual member state, to IUU fishing, 
using document submission and speaking rights to draw attention to the object and 
purpose requirements that bind the member states in combatting IUU fishing. 
In the Whaling Commission, environmental NGOs submitted the majority of Opening 
Statements in the time between 1986 and the final JARPA II whaling expedition in the 
2013/2014 Austral summer. There is a clear tendency in the Opening Statements of 
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environmental NGOs toward opposition to all scientific whaling programs. This was not 
met with equal and opposite views in the Opening Statements by a pro-whaling 
environmental NGO supporting scientific whaling.  
6.3.1. CAMLR Commission 
There has been consistent NGO engagement with the issue of IUU fishing since its first 
year on the agenda in 1997.The observer NGO behaviour on the issue of IUU fishing 
included the authorized use of speaking and document submission rights. Due to the 
complexity and difficulties of pursuit and prevention in the Southern Ocean, an early 
focus was the development of the port state-based Catch Documentation System (CDS), 
a key aspect of the CAMLR Commission’s approach to combatting IUU fishing. 
Environmental, hybrid and industrial NGOs contributed to its development. The 
intersessional conduct of Sea Shepherd in the 2015/2016 Austral summer in pursuit of 
the MV Thunder, a known IUU vessel preying on Patagonian toothfish is also of interest 
here because it engages with direct enforcement of international law by an NGO.  
Document submissions 
Document submissions on IUU fishing were extensive, from the IUCN, ASOC and COLTO.  
Background Papers informed the Commission of NGO work, contributed political 
viewpoints to the Commission, and provided advice and information to support the 
work of the Commission. Most of the Background Papers were uncontentious in nature, 
however, as will be discussed below, in 2003 COLTO used document submission to 
challenge the efficacy of several states’ domestic efforts to combat IUU fishing. 
Oral statements 
Oral statements by the observers to the CAMLR Commission have been permitted each 
year. In several years, NGOs took advantage of the right to address the agenda item of 
IUU fishing. The content of these statements has, as with Background Papers, been 
generally consistent with object and purpose principles, however there were several 
outliers either displaying a lack of clear adherence to the principles or, as with the 2003 
Background Paper from COLTO, were the cause of consternation in the Commission.  
Intersessional and enforcement behaviours 
The primary NGO behaviours in the intersessional period were tracking and preventing 
IUU fishing, IUU fishing methods, and fish catch landings. These behaviours were 
 
 193 
engaged in by COLTO and Sea Shepherd. COLTO has a network of informants and it uses 
available technology to keep track of Patagonian toothfish landings in various ports. 
COLTO gathers and shares information relevant to the data on which TACs are 
determined by the Commission during meeting times. Sea Shepherd acted over the 
2014/2015 Austral summer, with its vessel the Bob Barker. The Bob Barker pursued the 
IUU fishing vessel, the Thunder, one of a fleet of vessels known to illegally fish in the 
Convention Area.  The pursuit of the IUU vessel lasted 110 days. The course of the 
pursuit was reported daily to the CAMLR Commission Secretariat Fisheries Compliance 
and Enforcement manager, with the whereabouts of the Thunder, as well as any salvage 
by the Bob Barker crew of illegal fishing gear and catch.562 The practical enforcement 
and preventative assistance of Sea Shepherd and COLTO in carrying out Conservation 
Measures will be analyzed. Their actions fall in a grey area of international law, and 
evaluation with reference to legal standards will be valuable if such actions occur again.  
6.3.2 Whaling Commission 
NGO engagement in relation to scientific whaling can be grouped into three categories: 
the use of Opening Statements from 1985 to 2016; the use of protest at the 2014 and 
2016 meetings in Slovenia; and the direct-action tactics of Sea Shepherd in the Southern 
Ocean in attempting to prevent whaling activities of Japanese vessels. There was only 
one use of speaking rights by an environmental NGO on scientific whaling, and this is 
discussed in the context of the use of Opening Statements. 
In 2014, the ICJ found that Japanese scientific whaling was unlawful under the Whaling 
Convention.563 The issue explored here is how NGO behaviours engaged with the object 
and purpose. This section does not attempt to revisit the question of the lawfulness of 
scientific whaling. 
 
562 Interview with Interviewee 7 (17 September 2015). 
563 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226; see also Laurence 
Boisson De Chazournes et al., Report of the International Panel of Independent Legal 




1977-2016 Opening Statements 
NGO engagement through Opening Statements in the 1977 – 2016 period came from 
many anti-whaling environmental NGOs, with some sporadic input from pro-whaling 
NGOs, the GGT, as well as from the hybrid NGOs, IWMC WCT and IUCN. There were a 
variety of viewpoints expressed, with many adhering to the object and purpose in terms 
of the significance of genuine scientific data being central to the rehabilitation of whale 
stocks for conservation and use purposes. There were opposing views on the value of 
scientific whaling to the collection of such data564 Many other statements were 
accusatory, and simply indicated a belief that the JARPA programs were exploiting a 
“loophole” in the Whaling Convention to continue commercial whaling in the guise of 
scientific whaling. 
The most significant opening statements for object and purpose adherence argued that 
there was a lack of scientific necessity in scientific whaling because the programs failed 
to contribute to the environmental and scientific communities’ efforts to rehabilitate 
whale stocks for future interests. This argument was later mirrored in the single NGO 
intervention on scientific whaling.  
While environmental NGOs underplayed the commercial and lethal aspects of future 
interests, the need for rehabilitation of whale stocks was emphasized and the failure of 
scientific whaling schemes to support that object and purpose principle was 
highlighted.565 This is an object and purpose compliant argument, as it demands that 
 
564 CSI formerly CCS, Opening Statement by Cetacean Society International (formerly 
CCS) IWC/38/OS CSI (1986); IWMC, IWC: A System of Loopholes IWC/56/OS IWMC 
(2004); WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/56/OS WWF (2004); ITF, Opening 
Statement by the International Transport Workers’ Federation IWC/57/OS ITF (2005); 
AJSU, All Japan Seamen’s Union Opening Statement IWC/57/OS JSU (2005); Natural 
Resources Defense Council, NRDC Opening Statement IWC/57/OS NRDC (2005); WWF, 
WWF Opening Statement IWC/57/OS WWF (2005); All Japan Seamen’s Union, Opening 
Statement to the 58th Meeting of the IWC IWC/58/OS JSU (2006); WWF, Opening 
Statement: 58th meeting of the IWC IWC/58/OS WWF (2006); Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Opening Statement IWC/59/OS (2007); SMS, Species Management 
Specialist Opening Statement IWC/60/OS SMS (2008); Instituto de Conservación de 
Ballenas, Opening Statement to the 61st Meeting of the IWC IWC/61/OS ICB (2009); 
Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opening Statement IWC/65/OS Greenpeace (2014). 
565 Instituto de Conservación de Ballenas (ICB), Intervention on Procedures used by the 
Scientific Committee for reviewing special permits at the IWC66 meeting (Agenda item 
14.3) (IWC66, Portorož, Slovenia, 27 October 2016). 
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there be sufficient scrutiny of scientific whaling programs to indicate that the programs 
can support the underlying principles of the Commission’s work. 
2014 and 2016 protests at Whaling Commission meetings 
The informal use of protest at the 2014 and 2016 meetings in Slovenia involved the use 
of placards to make representations about scientific whaling, including that the 
proposed NEW-REP A research plan was ‘the new rape’ of the Southern Ocean.566 The 
positions espoused on various banners indicated a broader view on the scientific 
whaling issue than that defined by the Whaling Convention. The protests demonstrated 
the broad polemical arguments put forward by anti-whaling environmental NGOs, with 
little reference to the object and purpose principles. The lack of reference to the terms 
of the convention indicated a lack of interest in the carrying out of the Commission’s 
legal duties. Instead, demonstrators presented a political viewpoint, that while perhaps 
of moral value presented little in the way of object and purpose engagement.567  
2005 – 2014 enforcement at sea: Sea Shepherd and the JARPA II vessels 
Sea Shepherd waged a series of campaigns in the Austral summers from 2005 to 2014. 
They protested and interfered with Japanese scientific whaling vessels in the Southern 
Ocean. Sea Shepherd, justifying their actions as legitimate under various international 
legal instruments, particularly Agenda 21.568 Sea Shepherd demonstrated commitment 
to rehabilitation of whale stocks and an interest in an ecosystem and precautionary 
approaches, consistent with trends in international environmental law. However, the 
broader dialogue espoused by Sea Shepherd founder, Paul Watson in his position as 
spokesman for the organization, demonstrated concern for principles and ideas outside 
those governing the Whaling Commission, such as the primacy of the ‘laws of nature’ 
 
566 See Figure 6.1 at page 219. 
567 Jethro W Brown, ‘Sovereignty’ (1906-1907) 18(5) Juridical Review 1. 





over the ‘laws of man’, and a commitment to veganism that excludes any lethal use of 
cetaceans, or other animals.569  
6.4 Do NGO enforcement and regulation activities promote the object and 
purpose of the CAMLR convention? 
NGO submissions to the Commission can be assessed in terms of the object and purpose 
principles of the CAMLR Convention. In analysing formal roles, key indicators of 
concordance with the object and purpose require NGO contributions to refer to primary 
principles of conservation and rational use, evince a precautionary approach founded in 
scientific data, that contributes to the long-term health and useability of ecosystems and 
marine living resources. 
To demonstrate accordance with the object and purpose principles, NGO contributions 
should therefore: 
1. Recognise the interests of states in the use of marine living resources (MLR);  
2. Cite credible scientific data and sources in addressing IUU fishing;  
3. Refrain from pushing beyond the boundaries of the precautionary and ecosystem 
approaches to argue for conservation for conservation’s sake; and 
4. Consider rational use or not exclude it from conservation advocacy.  
NGOs roles bearing on IUU fishing in the CAMLR Commission are evaluated by reference 
to these criteria. 
6.4.1 ASOC  
ASOC made numerous oral statements and submitted numerous background papers to 
the CAMLR Commission from 1997 to 2017. The content of both was largely supportive 
of object and purpose principles. The first significant statement from ASOC on IUU 
fishing was in 1997. ASOC expressed a belief that until IUU fishing was brought under 
control, the Commission had ‘no choice but to set zero TACs’.570 This was on the basis of 
 
569 Paul Watson, ‘On the Precedence of Natural Law’ (1988) 3 Journal of Environmental 
Law and Litigation 79. 
570 CCAMLR-XVI Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 1997, ‘Report of the Sixteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 1997) [12.9]. 
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the inadequacy of the IUU catch estimates used by the Commission for setting its 
TACs.571 The language used connected to the principles of the CAMLR Convention, 
referencing the need for precaution and appealing to the need to make decisions 
grounded in scientific data. The statement indicated a concern for whether the 
conservation and rational use balance of Article II could be met in respect of IUU fishing.  
The Commission answered ASOC’s concerns the following year.572 Using object and 
purpose-oriented language, the Commission referred to the advice it received from its 
Scientific Committee. It stated that decisions were ‘based on the best available data’ and 
that conservation measures effectively addressed IUU fishing without impacting on 
legitimate fishing.573 Up until this point, ASOC’s position adhered to the object and 
purpose principles, and discharged its Article XXIII NGO role of supportive 
contributions. ASOC was supporting the Commission to consider its own decisions in 
light of its object and purpose. However, when the Commission answered the concerns 
of ASOC, further criticism ceased to fulfil the role of an NGO under Article XXIII because 
it was no longer assisting the Commission, it was hectoring the Commission. ASOC 
maintained the critical position in 1999, stating that:574 
a crucial step towards ending IUU fishing is for CCAMLR to place a moratorium on legal 
fisheries for Dissostichus spp. [Patagonian and Antarctic toothfish] Such a moratorium 
would require concomitant trade sanctions under the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species (CITES). … it makes no sense to conduct ‘legal’ fishing when the real 
catch is already far above what CCAMLR itself estimates as a precautionary level…the 
moratorium should be maintained until such time as IUU fishing has been eliminated, all 
Dissostichus spp. stock parameters are available, a trade system for the verification of 
catch origin is in place and incidental catches of seabirds are eliminated. 
 
571 CCAMLR-XVI Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 1997, ‘Report of the Sixteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 1997) [12.9]. 
572 CCAMLR-XVII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 1998, ‘Report of the Seventeenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 1998) [12.18]. 
573 CCAMLR-XVII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 1998, ‘Report of the Seventeenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 1998) [12.19]. 
574 CCAMLR-XVIII Meeting of 25 October – 5 November 1999, ‘Report of the Eighteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 5 November 1999) [12.3]. 
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There are several issues here. The continued repetition of calling for a moratorium 
dismissed the Scientific Committee in supporting Commission decision-making. The 
statement implied that the set TACs were not ‘rational use’. The subordination of the 
jurisdiction of the CAMLR Commission to a cooperative relationship with CITES ignores 
the exclusivity of the ATS as a legal system. Finally, the statement inherently criticizes 
the Commission as failing to meet its own mandate, despite the Commission’s clear 
response to previous years’ criticisms clarifying its means of addressing its own 
mandate.575  
In 2001, when the Catch Document Scheme (CDS) was developed, ASOC supported 
implementation and improvement of the CDS.576 ASOC also aligned its 
recommendations with the work of the Commission in a manner indicative of both 
object and purpose compliant Article XXIII roles, and object and purpose compliant 
content.577 Speaking to its written paper, on evaluation of the CDS, the ASOC 
representative highlighted extensive and useful recommendations578 to increase data 
reliability, improve compliance effectiveness, and develop enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure conservation within the Convention Area would be compatible with the legal 
(rational use) toothfish fisheries.579 This represents a shift toward compliance with 
Article XXIII roles. The content also adhered to the object and purpose principles, with 
functional contributions to the work of the Commission.  
From 2001 – 2017, oral statements of ASOC contained clear connections to the object 
and purpose principles. In 2002, a statement on IUU fishing drew specific connections 
between the regulation of Patagonian toothfish stocks and the conservation principles 
 
575 CCAMLR-XIX Meeting of 23 October – 3 November 2000, ‘Report of the Nineteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2000) [12.17]. 
ASOC relinquished this position after the 2000 meeting. 
576 CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [12.11]. 
577 ASOC, ASOC evaluation of CDS CCAMLR-XX/BG/20 (2001). 
578 ‘Chile expressed appreciation for ASOC’s proposals for improvements to the CDS’: 
CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth Meeting 
of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [2.77]. 
579 CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [2.76]. 
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of Article II of the Convention.580 The supportive position of ASOC was acknowledged 
by Commission members,581 in contrast to earlier views.582 However, from 2003, the 
general purpose of statements was to introduce documentary submissions and iterate 
the content of those papers in lieu of original oral contributions.583 These were 
uncontentious in nature, as the question of object and purpose compliance was diverted 
to the content of the Background Papers. Thus, it is possible to say that for the 2003-
2017 period IUU fishing oral statements from ASOC were generally compliant with a 
supportive role under Article XXIII but contained little evaluable content.584 This overall 
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shift toward Background Papers did not prevent ASOC making critical commentary, in 
reminding the Commission of the conservation mandate it sought to apply.585 However, 
these were isolated, and not representative of overall conduct. 
From 1997, ASOC submitted extensive Background Papers on IUU fishing.586 Issues 
addressed included the CDS and port state measures (PSM),587 VMS,588 IUU vessel 
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register,589 and attempts to create an enforcement regime for the Convention Area590 
The tenor of documentary submissions has varied, with early contributions mirroring 
the oral statements calling for a moratorium on commercial toothfish fishing. 
The development of a cooperative relationship between ASOC and COLTO to support 
the work of the Commission clearly works from an object and purpose standpoint, as 
both conservation and use concerns are represented in this partnership.591 But other 
papers also underscored the development of a nuanced approach to supporting the 
Commission in combatting IUU. In 2016, ASOC submitted a paper that considered the 
integration of MPAs with continued fishing interests as a mechanism to support legal 
fishing.592 
Beginning with the ISOFISH Occasional Reports submitted in 1998, ASOC used 
document submission as a means of drawing the Commission’s attention to significant 
players and issues within the IUU fishing problem. The use of Mauritian ports for 
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unloading IUU fishing hauls was drawn to the Commission’s attention,593 as was the 
involvement of several Norwegian companies and prominent individuals in IUU fishing 
in the Southern Ocean.594 Both reports were critical of the issues, but both reports also 
made clear suggestions for ways to address them. Object and purpose language was not 
used, but the clear concern for upholding the regulatory framework of the CAMLR 
Convention is apparent. Inherently, submissions that seek to assist the Commission in 
combatting IUU fishing, which prevents rational use and conservation, will promote the 
object and purpose of the Convention. 
This position of ASOC is replicated throughout their contributions. The reviews of the 
CDS are examples of the support of ASOC for the principles of the CAMLR Convention, 
wherein ASOC sought to improve measures to prevent IUU fishing by identifying gaps in 
the CDS that undermined the central goal of preventing IUU fish being landed.595 
Similarly, Background Papers on port state jurisdiction,596 and ways in which the 
Commission could integrate its conservation efforts with other international 
conventions,597 sought clearly to balance object and purpose concerns to create a 
sustainable management system. These, and other background papers demonstrate 
ASOC’s capacity to engage fully both with Article XXIII responsibilities and the object 
and purpose principles. 
The 2006 document ‘Measures to prevent and deter IUU fishing’, contains the whole 
approach of ASOC to IUU fishing. 598 The position of ASOC is supportive of the object 
and purpose and the Commission. It recommends how Commission work can make 
effective use of various schemes in place, including the CDS, VMS and the port state 
measures available to the Commission through non-contracting and contracting parties. 
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The document is clearly adherent to the designated supporter role of an observer NGO, 
as it seeks to assist rather than shift the approach of the Commission to IUU fishing. 
In summary, ASOC’s documentary submission are clearly supportive of the object and 
purpose of the CAMLR Commission. While there were some early missteps in oral 
statements, criticism was constructive, and recommendations were made without 
attempting to over-emphasise conservation to the detriment of a sustainable use of 
fisheries. 
6.4.2 Hybrid NGOs: IUCN and IWMC WCT 
The IUCN has contributed broadly across the IUU fishing matter in the CAMLR 
Commission, although the contributions have not been extensive. The roles of the IUCN 
have also been entirely consistent with the supportive and cooperative position 
delegated to NGOs that work with the Commission. 
The first contribution from the IUCN on the topic of IUU fishing was in 1995, with an 
oral statement from its meeting delegate on the pressing nature of the matter.599 In 
1996 the IUCN offered support to the Commission in the form of the IUCN’s General 
Assembly resolutions about combatting IUU fishing.600  From 1997 to 2008,601 the IUCN 
variously expressed ‘deep concern’602, ‘support of CCAMLR’s efforts’,603 the urgency of 
‘strong and effective action’,604 disappointment that stronger action had not been 
 
599 CCAMLR-XIV Meeting of 24 October – 3 November 1995, ‘Report of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 1995), [11.9] – 
[11.10], [11.11], [14.2] – Chile lodged a reservation to the participation of the IUCN. 
600 CCAMLR-XV Meeting of 21 October – 1 November 1996, ‘Report of the Fifteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 1996) [11.14]. 
601 Oral and written submissions from the IUCN on IUU fishing ceased after this time. 
602 CCAMLR-XVI Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 1997, ‘Report of the Sixteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 1997) [12.10]. 
603 CCAMLR-XIX Meeting of 23 October – 3 November 2000, ‘Report of the Nineteenth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2000) [12.12]. 
604 Ibid [12.14]. 
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taken,605 ‘welcome’ for progress on IUU,606 appreciation for ‘the continued and 
exemplary efforts’607, and readiness and willingness ‘to assist CCAMLR’.608  
IUCN’s support, apparent in its oral statements, is reinforced by Background Papers 
encouraging the Commission to develop conservation measures and the CDS to combat 
IUU fishing. The IUCN generally deferred to the Commission but did provide some 
critical commentary in hopes of the Commission’s work better carrying out the 
Commission’s mandate.609 
From 1996, the IUCN contributed numerous papers supportive of the implementation 
and ongoing assessment and refinement of conservation measures countering IUU 
fishing and its impacts in the Southern Ocean.610 IUCN papers supported the object and 
 
605 CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [12.14]. 
606 CCAMLR-XXV Meeting of 23 October – 3 November 2006, ‘Report of the Twenty-Fifth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2006) [16.8]. 
607 CCAMLR-XXVI Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2007, ‘Report of the Twenty-Sixth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2007) [16.3]. 
608 CCAMLR-XXVII Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 2008, ‘Report of the Twenty-
Seventh Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 2008) 
[16.14]. 
609 IUCN, Patagonian toothfish – are conservation and trade measures working? 
CCAMLR-XX/BG/28(2001); IUCN, Antarctic toothfish – an analysis of management, catch 
and trade CCAMLR-XX/BG/29(2001); IUCN, The use of trade related measures in 
fisheries management CCAMLR-XXVII//BG/37 (2008); IUCN, Continuing CCAMLR’s fight 
against IUU fishing for toothfish executive summary of the corporate by TRAFFIC 
international and WWF CCAMLR-XXVII/BG/38 (2008). 
610 IUCN, The CDS under WTO rules CCAMLR-XVIII/BG/48 (1999); IUCN, Report of the 
World Conservation Union (IUCN) to the XVIIIth meeting of CCAMLR SC-
CAMLR/XVIII/BG/13 (1999) 2-3; IUCN, Report to the Nineteenth Meeting CCAMLR-
XIX/BG/41 (2000) 2-3, indicates support of CCAMLR to combat IUU fishing and its 
impacts in resolutions of the IUCN General Assembly; IUCN, CCAMLR-related resolutions 
adopted by IUCN at the 2nd World Conservation Congress CCAMLR-XIX/BG/46 (2000) 
provides the text of various IUCN General Assembly resolutions, including Pirate Fishing 
and Seabird Mortality from Longlining in the Southern Ocean and Adjacent Waters 
(CGR2.PRG049) and Promoting Sustainable Fisheries (CGR2.CNV021); IUCN, Patagonian 
Toothfish – are conservation and trade measures working? CCAMLR-XX/BG/28 (2001); 
IUCN, Patagonian Toothfish – are conservation and trade measures working? CCAMLR-
XX/BG/28 Addendum (2001); IUCN, Antarctic Toothfish – an analysis of management, 
catch and trade CCAMLR-XX/BG/29 (2001); IUCN, Antarctic Toothfish – an analysis of 
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purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention by highlighting sustainable use and 
conservation. IUCN assisted the Commission with assessment of conservation measure 
effectiveness, as well as providing greater access to the best possible information for 
decision-making. Examples of this are particularly clear with the CDS reviews,611 and 
the emphasis on Commission decision-making relying on accurate estimates of IUU 
fishing catch within the Convention Area.612  
There were clear attempts to support the Commission through suggested amendments 
to conservation measures613 and suggested ways of improving the value of CDS data.614 
These were adherent to the roles permitted to NGOs under Article XXIII, and clearly 
supportive of the overall conservation and use principles of the CAMLR Convention. The 
papers recognized the work of the Commission as the primary determiner of content 
and sought to support conservation and use of marine resources with reference to best 
practice and complete data. 
 
management, catch and trade CCAMLR-XX/BG/29 Addendum (2001); IUCN, Report of 
the World Conservation Union (IUCN) 21st meeting CCAMLR-XXI/BG/34 (2002); IUCN, 
Fishery activities and trade of Patagonian Toothfish in South America: a regional 
perspective CCAMLR-XXI/BG/38 Rev 1 (2002); IUCN, Marine fish and the Twelfth 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, Santiago Chile 2002 CCAMLR-
XXI/BG/39 (2002); IUCN, Recommendations on the format of annual summaries of data 
compiled from the CCAMLR CDS CCAMLR-XXII/BG/26 (2003); IUCN, Report of the IUCN 
CCAMLR-XXII/BG/44 (2003); IUCN, Report of the IUCN to the CCAMLR CCAMLR-
XXIV/BG/44 (2005); IUCN, Area-based conservation and management measures utilised 
under CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXV/BG/18 (2006); IUCN, Report of the IUCN CCAMLR-
XXVI/BG/44 (2007); IUCN, The use of trade-related measures in fisheries management 
CCAMLR-XXVII/BG/37 (2008); IUCN, Continuing CCAMLR’s fight against IUU fishing for 
toothfish. Executive summary of the report by TRAFFIC Int’l and WWF Aust CCAMLR-
XXVII/BG/38 (2008). 
611 CCAMLR-XX Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2001, ‘Report of the Twentieth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2001) [12.13]. 
612 Ibid [12.13]; IUCN, Continuing CCAMLR’s fight against IUU fishing for toothfish. Exec 
sum of the report by TRAFFIC Int’l and WWF Aust CCAMLR-XXVII/BG/38 (2008). 
613 IUCN, Continuing CCAMLR’s fight against IUU fishing for toothfish. Executive summary 
of the report by TRAFFIC Int’l and WWF Aust CCAMLR-XXVII/BG/38 (2008). 
614 IUCN, Recommendations on the format of annual summaries of data compiled from the 
CCAMLR CDS CCAMLR-XXII/BG/26 (2003). 
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6.4.3 Industry NGO – COLTO 
COLTO appeared in the Commission record in 2003, and its contributions, both oral and 
documentary have been geared toward the self-interest of legal toothfish operators in 
preventing IUU fishing and ensuring the sustainability of toothfish stocks in the 
Convention Area. 
COLTO has used oral statements to affirm its purpose and commitment to contributing 
to the work of the CAMLR Commission, as well as to introduce papers. For example, in 
2003, with the submission of the Rogues Gallery, COLTO introduced the document in an 
oral statement but the content, which caused significant uproar,615 was contained in a 
Background Paper. The Rogues Gallery identified several vessels allegedly engaged in 
IUU fishing.616 Several were flagged to member states of the Commission.  
In introducing the Rogues Gallery, COLTO took the opportunity to inform the 
Commission of its objective. It said that COLTO was established617  
…to work with CCAMLR Members and other authorities to eliminate IUU fishing 
for toothfish in order to sustain toothfish stocks, seabird populations and the 
livelihoods of legal fisherman.  
It further stated COLTO was established ‘as a result of delays by governments to take 
effective action against IUU fishing for toothfish.’618  
These two statements accord directly with Articles II and XXIII. Support was being 
proffered for the Commission’s work in accordance with the Commission’s object and 
purpose principles. The statement highlighted that COLTO had provided ‘significant 
 
615 CCAMLR-XXII Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 2003, ‘Report of the Twenty-
Second Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 2003) 
[14.28] – [14.33]. 
616 COLTO, Rogues’ Gallery CCAMLR-XXII/BG/42 (2003) withdrawn; COLTO, Rogues 
Gallery – The new face of IUU fishing for toothfish [not in official documentation] 
CCAMLR XXII (2003) (no date) https://www.colto.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Rogues-Gallery-Final.pdf (‘Rogues’ Gallery’). 
617 CCAMLR-XXII Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 2003, ‘Report of the Twenty-





amounts of information on IUU fishing to relevant authorities’619 and intended to 
continue to work with ‘governments, industry, non-government organizations and any 
other parties’.620 Support of the object and purpose is effectively the purpose of COLTO, 
which is to ‘promote sustainable fishing [Article II.2] in an environmentally responsible 
manner [ecosystem and precautionary approaches].’621 
A warm response was extended by many member states to COLTO’s willingness and 
ability to assist the Commission and its members in combatting IUU. However, the 
introduction of the Rogues Gallery was also met with significant disapprobation. The 
paper was withdrawn by COLTO in response to the extensive criticism of member 
states.622 However, the paper had the effect of forcing the Commission as a whole to 
recognize what COLTO termed ‘delays’ to effective government responses to IUU 
fishing. Through an object and purpose analysis, COLTO clearly supports the 
Commission and its object and purpose principles. However, it was willing to call to 
account any state parties that failed to demonstrate commitment to the same principles 
and work. By an object and purpose analysis, the extent to which an actor supports the 
legal mandate is measured, rather than measuring the political desirability of a 
response.  
Since 2003, COLTO has continued to use oral statements to highlight its adherence to 
the principles governing the work of the Commission. In 2005, the COLTO 
representative stated ‘we remain dedicated to providing assistance to CAMLR to 
eliminate IUU wherever possible.’623 This indicates close attention to the terms of 
 
619 Ibid [14.26]. 
620 Ibid [14.27]. 
621 Ibid. 
622 Ibid; supportive members: USA [14.34] New Zealand [14.37] France [14.40] United 
Kingdom [14.41-14.42]; critical members: Uruguay [14.28] China [14.29] Chile [14.30] 
Korea [14.31] Russia [14.32] Spain [14.33] Namibia [14.35] Mauritius [14.39]; neutral 
members: the European community [14.36] Argentina [14.38]; withdrawal [14.43]. 
623 CCAMLR-XXIV Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 2005, ‘Report of the Meeting of 
the Twenty-Fourth Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 2005) [15.13]. 
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Article XXIII, as did oral statements in other years.624 Statements in a number of years 
clearly mark the support of COLTO for the object and purpose principles in their work 
on IUU. COLTO noted it had contributed to a workshop on IUU,625 it had contributed 
funds to encourage monitoring of toothfish stock among commercial operators and 
continued to support various measures to prevent IUU fishing.626 
In 2009, COLTO raised the issue of applying treaty interpretation and emphasized an 
interpretation of the CAMLR Convention that took account of ‘rational use’ within Article 
II. COLTO rejected what it called ‘arbitrary standards’ of judging conservation aims and 
issues627 and sought for the Commission to confirm an approach to fisheries regulation 
that would emphasise ‘the more appropriate aspects under Article II of our Convention 
which support sustainable conservation, including rational use.”628 While this statement 
is clearly self-interested, it is also object and purpose supportive. Self-interest is 
irrelevant to object and purpose analysis. Not only do the COLTO statements of that 
year adhere to the text of Article II, they adhere to the intentions of the drafters of the 
 
624 CCAMLR-XXIII Meeting of 25 October – 5 November 2004, ‘Report of the Twenty-Third 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 5 November 2004) [14.18]; 
CCAMLR-XXV Meeting of 23 October – 3 November 2006, ‘Report of the Twenty-Fifth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2006) [16.14]; 
CCAMLR-XXVI Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2007, ‘Report of the Twenty-Sixth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2007) [16.10]; 
CCAMLR-XXXI Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2012, ‘Report of the Thirty-First 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2012) [9.7]. 
625 CCAMLR-XXIX Meeting of 25 October – 5 November 2010, ‘Report of the Twenty-Ninth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 5 November 2010) [8.19]. 
626 Ibid [14.13]; CCAMLR-XXXI Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2012, ‘Report of the 
Thirty-First Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2012) 
[9.9]; CCAMLR-XXXIII Meeting of 20 – 31 October 2014, ‘Report of the Thirty-Third 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 31 October 2014) [9.14]; 
CCAMLR-XXXIV Meeting of 19-30 October 2015, ‘Report of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of 
the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 30 October 2015) [10.6]; CCAMLR-XXXVI 
Meeting of 16-27 October 2017, ‘Report of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Commission’ 
(Hobart, Australia, adopted 27 October 2017) [10.6]. 
627 CCAMLR-XXVIII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November 2009, ‘Report of the Twenty-





Convention in noting that fisheries allocation and regulation is part of the work of the 
Commission.629  
COLTO has engaged in limited document submission. It submitted four papers 
independently,630 and four in collaboration with ASOC.631 All related to IUU fishing 
through data contributions, recommendations and general information on IUU fishing 
responses.  
The first paper, the Rogues Gallery elicited the strongest member state reactions 
recorded in the CCAMLR Meeting Reports because it identified several member state-
flagged vessels as IUU vessels. The submission of the Rogues Gallery in 2003 by COLTO 
in its first year of attendance highlighted member state complicity in IUU fishing and the 
lack of domestic regulation on the part of several member states.632 The Rogues Gallery 
illustrates that the approval or disapproval of states is not in itself an adequate measure 
of the value of NGO behaviours. 
The material in the Rogues Gallery was supportive of effective conservation and use in 
the Commission. There is clear support of the work of the Commission in identifying 
IUU vessels known to be fishing within the Convention Area. While the Rogues Gallery 
was not supportive of member states in breach of their own obligations under the 
 
629 Australia, Commentary on the Draft Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Treaty Ninth Consultative Meeting, Provisional 
Agenda Item 6 (London, 19 September 1977) ANT/IX/21; United States, Draft 
Recommendation on Antarctic Marine Living Resources submitted by the United States, 
Antarctic Treaty Ninth Consultative Meeting, Agenda Item 6 (London, 23 September 
1977) ANT/IX/43; Working Group, Draft Report of the Working Group on Marine Living 
Resources, Antarctic Treaty Ninth Consultative Meeting, Agenda Item 6 (London, 7 
October 1977) ANT/IX/82 Rev 1. 
630 COLTO, COLTO background information CCAMLR-XXVI/BG/29 (2007); COLTO, 
Commercial fishing in the Ross Sea CCAMLR-XXXI/BG/35 (2012); COLTO, COLTO report 
on toothfish fisheries 2012/13 SC-CAMLR-XXXII/BG/09 (2013); COLTO, Estimates of IUU 
toothfish catches in 2014/15 season CCAMLR-XXXIV/BG/12 (2015). 
631 ASOC and COLTO, Working together to end illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing 
in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XXXIII/BG/23 (2014); ASOC and COLTO, Collaborating 
to eliminate IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XXXIV/BG/23 (2015); ASOC and 
COLTO, Collaborating to eliminate IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-
XXXV/BG/27 (2016); ASOC and COLTO, Collaborating to support effective protection of 
Southern Ocean ecosystems CCAMLR-XXXVI/BG/29 (2017). 
632 COLTO, Rogues’ Gallery, above n 616. 
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CAMLR Convention, the obligation of NGOs under the non-state actor provisions attach 
to the Commission rather than to individual member states. By supporting the purposes 
of the Commission above the individual behaviours of member states, COLTO acted in 
clear pursuit of the object and purpose principles of the Convention. 
Other COLTO background documents indicate strong intersessional engagement 
supporting data sharing for CAMLR Commission decision-making. In 2013, COLTO 
provided information to the Scientific Committee on the tonnage of IUU toothfish catch. 
This information was gathered by and from members to determine the rate of IUU catch 
of toothfish.633 This content adheres to both the Article XXIII role for NGOs, and to the 
object and purpose principles through pursuit of rational use. Significantly, in their 
2015 estimates of IUU toothfish catches, COLTO highlights that they are the sole 
providers of estimates of IUU fishing catch from the Convention Area.634 This is clearly 
adherent to the Article XXIII role as it is supportive of the Commission. It is also 
supportive of the object and purpose principles as it informs conservation including 
rational use, as without sufficient data ‘rational use’ cannot be a clearly articulated part 
of conservation. 
Aside from meeting contributions, COLTO also engaged in intersessional work. In its 
various statements and document submissions, COLTO alluded to their intersessional 
work to combat IUU fishing, both in prevention of catches being taken, and in 
documenting any catches being landed in port.635  
 
633 COLTO, COLTO report on toothfish fisheries 2012/13 SC-CAMLR-XXXII/BG/09 (2013) 
2. 
634 COLTO, Estimates of IUU toothfish catches in 2014/15 season CCAMLR-XXXIV/BG/12 
(2015). 
635 COLTO, COLTO background information CCAMLR-XXVI/BG/29 (2007); COLTO, 
Commercial fishing in the Ross Sea CCAMLR-XXXI/BG/35 (2012); COLTO, COLTO report 
on toothfish fisheries 2012/13 SC-CAMLR-XXXII/BG/09 (2013); COLTO, Estimates of IUU 
toothfish catches in 2014/15 season CCAMLR-XXXIV/BG/12 (2015); ASOC and COLTO, 
Working together to end illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Southern 
Ocean CCAMLR-XXXIII/BG/23 (2014); ASOC and COLTO, Collaborating to eliminate IUU 
fishing in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XXXIV/BG/23 (2015); ASOC and COLTO, 
Collaborating to eliminate IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XXXV/BG/27 
(2016); ASOC and COLTO, Collaborating to support effective protection of Southern Ocean 
ecosystems CCAMLR-XXXVI/BG/29 (2017). 
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There are some enforcement activities attributable to COLTO.636 COLTO acted in 
concert with Sea Shepherd on one occasion to delay the Thunder637 but pursued other 
less obvious means of preventing IUU fishing through legitimate business contacts. 
From the early 1990s, Austral Fisheries, long represented by COLTO, used numerous 
means to find out about ‘toothfish pirates, including hiring former elite soldiers and 
offering $100,000 reward for information on IUU fishing in the Convention Area.638 In 
2003, COLTO adopted the same tactic and reward for information about the fleet of 
vessels including the Thunder that were illegally fishing in the Convention Area.639  
COLTO has consistently sought to cooperate and assist the CAMLR Commission. It has 
demonstrated support of the object and purpose during meeting times and in the 
intersessional period. Within the intersessional period, COLTO undertook joint 
international scientific programs on aspects of Commission work such as reducing 
whale depredation in toothfish fisheries, eliminating seabird interactions with longlines, 
and other collaborative research.640 COLTO also managed real-time responses and 
innovations to combat IUU fishing.641  
This intersessional conduct of COLTO adheres to the expectations on non-state actors 
contained in Article XXIII of the Convention and subordinates itself to the interpretation 
of the object and purpose performed by the Commission in carrying out its work. This 
makes the ongoing behaviour of COLTO object and purpose supportive, as both 
intersessional and meeting roles support the work of the Commission as a whole, 
avoiding factional or divisive support for individual member states. 
 
636 Eksil Engdal, and Kjetil Sæter (Diane Oatley (transl.)), Catching Thunder (Scribe 
Publications, 2018) 26. 
637 Ibid. 25. 
638 Ibid.  
639 Ibid. 42. 
640 Email from Mr Martin Exel, General Manager Environment and Policy, to Lucy 




6.4.4 Sea Shepherd 
Outside of Commission meetings, Sea Shepherd has sought to ‘enforce’ international law 
to prevent IUU fishing. The Sea Shepherd Operation Icefish in the 2014/2015 Austral 
summer, with the Bob Barker was primarily in pursuit of the MV Thunder, although it 
also encountered the Kunlun. Operation Icefish had some legitimacy due to the 
blacklisting of the vessels Thunder, Viking, Kunlun, Yongding, Songhua and Perlon by the 
CAMLR Commission, 642 as well as the listing of the Thunder on the Interpol wanted list. 
The equivocal behaviour of Australian and New Zealand authorities to Sea Shepherd 
and its pursuit of the Thunder also supported the position of Sea Shepherd as ‘enforcers’ 
of international law – no one else was willing to take a stand.643 The Commission, 
through the Secretariat’s daily communications with Sea Shepherd during its pursuit of 
the Viking also provided a level of credibility that was never attained by Sea Shepherd’s 
scientific whaling operations.644 Sea Shepherd not only communicated the location of 
the Thunder, but it also reported on illegal longlines and gillnets found in, and hauled 
from Convention Area waters.645 
Sea Shepherd aimed to prevent IUU fishing by the Thunder. In doing so, it sought to 
uphold the conservation of the Antarctic marine ecosystem and marine living resources. 
This demonstrated fundamental adherence to the principles of the CAMLR Convention as 
it prioritized conservation and contributed to the capacity for the Commission to engage 
in rational use. The communication of the Thunder’s location and the reporting and 
hauling of illegal fishing gear similarly contributed to the Commission’s capacity to 
make decisions on the best data possible, as well as contributing to the capacity to 
engage in rational use.  
Despite having never received accreditation as an observer from the Commission, Sea 
Shepherd’s engagement with the Secretariat indicates at least some knowledge and 
acceptance from the Commission of the Sea Shepherd’s actions in the Southern Ocean 
 
642 Engdal and Sæter above n 636, 10. 
643 Engdal and Sæter above n 636, 29, 46, 47, 65, 71-72, 86. 
644 Interview with Interviewee 6 (15 September 2014). 




on the part of the Commission or some of its members.646 Despite its non-status, Sea 
Shepherd has demonstrated adherence to Article XXIII. Although it has not been ‘sought’ 
by the Commission or Scientific Committee as required by Article XXIII, Sea Shepherd 
has acted co-operatively to contribute to the work of the Commission by enforcing 
conservation measures of the Commission and contributing information for decision-
making purposes. If their contributions had been sought, Sea Shepherd would have 
been compliant with object and purpose as well as NGO roles.  
6.5 Object and purpose analysis of NGO enforcement and regulation roles in the 
Whaling Commission  
To further the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention, NGO engagement on 
scientific whaling should address: 
1. the fundamental relationship between the principles of the object and purpose 
and scientific data;  
2. that conservation is a mechanism for supporting the development and 
rehabilitation of whale stocks;  
3. that conservation is use-oriented for the purposes of supporting and/or re-
establishing the whaling industry. 
Several aspects of the object and purpose principles need to be highlighted in observer 
NGO behaviour around Article VIII scientific whaling. Firstly, the conduct itself needs to 
stay within the bounds of meeting propriety under the Whaling Commission Rules of 
Procedure, Rules of Debate and the Code of Conduct. Secondly, engagement must address 
the function of scientific whaling in terms of conservation and rehabilitation of whale 
stocks. The opposition to, or support of, scientific whaling needed to show that the basis 
for the position was intrinsically connected to a concern for the conservation and use of 
whale stocks. This would be with a view to sustainable intergenerational access to 
whales as a food source.  
 
646 Interview with Interviewee 6 (15 September 2014). 
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6.5.1 Hybrid NGOs: the IUCN and IWMC WCT 
The IUCN is the sole hybrid NGO present in both the Whaling Commission and the 
CAMLR Commission. This makes it a valuable comparator for behavioural consistency 
across Commissions. While there were limited contributions of the IUCN those 
contained careful consideration of the nature of scientific whaling with reference to the 
Whaling Convention. The IWMC WCT addressed issues on scientific permit whaling with 
less frequency, primarily focusing on highlighting the legitimacy of scientific whaling. 
Opening Statements 
In Opening Statements, the IUCN was the first NGO to oppose scientific whaling. The 
opposition was made in light of the spirit of the Whaling Convention. Its early Opening 
Statements opposed the validity of special permits and contested the value of lethal 
scientific whaling to the data record. 
In 1977, the IUCN argued that the Government of Japan setting a quota of 240 Brydes 
whales was ‘contrary to the spirit of the new management policy’.647 The IUCN 
employed firmer words in 1986, stating that scientific whaling ‘as proposed to be 
carried out by some nations represents a serious abuse of the spirit of the IWC, if not the 
letter of the law.’648 The critical position of the IUCN continued in a similar vein in 1988, 
along with advocacy for non-lethal research.649 In 1995, the IUCN suggested that the 
Scientific Committee should have a greater role in determining the utility of scientific 
whaling.650 From this point in time the activities of the IUCN on scientific whaling seem 
to have turned toward work within its own organization. This perspective is evidenced 
by IUCN Opening Statements no longer mentioning scientific whaling, and reference 
from environmental NGOs to IUCN Congress Motions, made after 1995, on scientific 
whaling.651  
 
647 Twenty-ninth meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records: Monday 20th June 1977 
Resource ID 417, 41. 
648 IUCN, IUCN Statement to the IWC IWC/38/OS IUCN (1986). 
649 IUCN, Statement to the International Whaling Commission IWC/40/OS IUCN (1988). 
650 IUCN, Opening Statement to the 47th Meeting of the IWC IWC/47/OS IUCN (1995). 
651 Animal Welfare Institute, Joint Statement of the Animal Welfare Institute, OceanCare 
and Pro Wildlife IWC/66/OS AWI, OC & PW (2016); IUCN General Assembly, Large and 
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The position of the IUCN demonstrated concern for stock rehabilitation and whale 
conservation principles in the object and purpose. The IUCN’s early arguments relate to 
the principles underlying the Whaling Convention, challenging how well special permits 
adhere to the spirit of the Convention. Arguably, the ICJ Whaling decision supports this 
position as the court determined that the JARPA II program did not constitute whaling 
for scientific purposes, and so failed to address object and purpose criteria.  
The IUCN was compliant with Article IV roles for NGOs and supports the object and 
purpose principles of the Whaling Convention. Scientific purposes must be for the 
rehabilitation and conservation of whale stocks. The IUCN position was clearly 
compliant both in terms of its content and its role within Article IV, as the IUCN 
commentary directed the Commission to consider the value of scientific data obtained 
through special permit whaling in terms of the ‘spirit’ or object and purpose of the 
Convention. 
The position of the IWMC WCT was less prominent in Opening Statements, making only 
the one statement in 2004 drawing comparisons between the anti-whaling 
environmental NGO position that scientific whaling was only possible because of 
‘loopholes’; instead arguing that NGO influence was just such a loophole, influencing the 
Commission to move beyond its remit.652  
6.5.2 Environmental NGOs 
A wide variety of NGOs in the environmental NGO category were selected for several 
reasons. Firstly, Opening Statements were considered in terms of comparability with 
the CAMLR Commission, so NGOs that were members of ASOC were included, such as 
Greenpeace and WWF. NGOs were also selected because of the relevance of their 
statements to scientific whaling and understanding or interpretation of the Whaling 
 
small cetaceans Res/15/19/1981 (Christchurch, New Zealand); IUCN General Assembly, 
Whaling Rec/17.46/1988 (San José, Costa Rica); IUCN General Assembly, Cetacean 
conservation and the International Whaling Commission moratorium Rec/18.34/1990 
(Perth, Australia); IUCN General Assembly, Protection of small cetaceans 
Rec/18.35/1990 (Perth, Australia); IUCN General Assembly, Commercial Whaling 
Rec/19.63/1990 (Buenos Aires, Brazil); IUCN General Assembly, Southern Ocean Whale 
Sanctuary Rec/19.64/1994 (Buenos Aires, Brazil); IUCN General Assembly, Motion 058: 
Concerns about whaling under special permits WCC-2016-Res-055 (Honolulu, Hawai’i). 
652 IWMC, IWC: A System of Loopholes IWC/56/OS IWMC (2004).  
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Convention. Another consideration was the prominence of the NGO across the lifetime of 
the scientific whaling agenda item. The final influencing factor was jurisdictional, NGOs 
were selected to provide broad representativeness of environmental NGOs across the 
membership of the Whaling Commission. This includes environmental NGOs from Japan 
and several Latin American member states. 
Opening Statements 
Over twenty environmental NGOs submitted Opening Statements addressing scientific 
whaling. Prominent among these were the anti-whaling environmental NGOs, Animal 
Welfare Institute (AWI), Humane Society International (HSI),653 World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF), Greenpeace, ASOC, Pew Environment Group (PEW), and the 
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW). Some commentary was provided on the 
special permit whaling issue by two pro-whaling environmental NGOs, namely Global 
Guardian Trust (GGT). There were other, smaller NGOs that also submitted Opening 
Statements. 
Most Opening Statements objecting to special permit whaling adhered to an argument 
that relied on the principles of conservation and rehabilitation in the object and 
purpose. Statements from anti-whaling environmental NGOs argued that scientific 
whaling circumvented the moratorium’s purpose of addressing the decline of whale 
stocks and supplementing the inadequate conservation measures that had previously 
been implemented to halt that decline. For example, WWF statements from 2005-
2009654 advocated for inclusion of special permit whaling in the Revised Management 
Scheme (RMS), thus bringing scientific whaling within the regulatory framework for the 
resumption of whaling. The strength of the WWF position on bringing scientific whaling 
permits into the management procedures of the Commission was that it attempted to 
 
653 The Humane Society International (HSI) also acted in the Federal Court of Australia 
seeking to use Australia’s claims to an EEZ in Antarctica to prevent Kyodo Senpashu, the 
company running the whaling voyages for the IRC, from continuing to whale in 
Australia’s declared whale sanctuary: Humane Society International Inc v Kyodo Senpaku 
Kaisha Ltd [2006] FCAFC 116; (2006) 154 FCR 425. 
654 WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/57/OS WWF (2005); WWF, Opening Statement: 
58th meeting of the IWC IWC/58/OS WWF (2006); WWF, WWF Opening Statement to the 
59th meeting of the IWC IWC/59/OS WWF (2007); WWF, WWF Opening Statement 
IWC/60/OS WWF (2008); WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/61/OS WWF (2009). 
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subordinate Article VIII whaling to the principles of the Convention. This is compliant 
with the object and purpose principles as it places these principles as the primary 
reference point for evaluation of any activity undertaken in relation to the Whaling 
Convention. The position of WWF was supported by other anti-whaling environmental 
NGOs, which also argued against scientific whaling as a legitimate means of obtaining 
useful data on whales, whale stocks, and stock rehabilitation; proposing that non-lethal 
research was far more consistent with the purposes of the Convention.655  
A number of anti-whaling environmental NGOs acted to promote benign whaling 
research schemes, including Elsa Nature Conservancy, a Japanese environmental 
NGO.656 But other anti-whaling environmental NGOs simply promoted their 
organization policy of a critical stance on scientific whaling without reference to any 
function that could fall within Article IV NGO participation or the object and purpose.657 
 
655 WWF, WWF Statement to the 37th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/37/OS/WWF 
(1985); ISAP, Opening Statement to the 37th Annual IWC Meeting of the Institute for Study 
of Animal Problems (ISAP) IWC/37/OS ISAP (1985); CSI formerly CCS, Opening 
Statement by Cetacean Society International (formerly CCS) IWC/38/OS CSI (1986); CSI, 
Opening Statement by Cetacean Society International IWC/40/OS CSI (1988); IUCN, 
Statement to the International Whaling Commission IWC/40/OS IUCN (1988); ELSA 
Nature Conservancy, Open Statement to the 41st Annual Meeting of International Whaling 
Commission IWC/41/OS ELSA (1989); IUCN, Statement of IUCN – The World 
Conservation Union to the 43rd Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/43/OS IUCN (1991); 
National Committee for the Defence of the Flora and Fauna, Opening Statement by 
CODEFF IWC/47/OS CODEFF (1995); Dominica Conservation Association, Submission to 
the 47th Meeting of the IWC IWC/47/OS DCA (1995); IFAW, Opening Statement to the 
47th Annual meeting of the IWC IWC/47/OS IFAW (1995); The Cousteau Society, 
Statement of the Cousteau Society/Equipe Cousteau to the 48th Annual Meeting of the IWC 
June 24-28, 1996 IWC/48/OS Coust. Soc. (1996); ACS, American Cetacean Society 
Opening Statement IWC/55/OS ACS (2003); FWSI, Opening Statement of the Finns for the 
Whales Society IWC/55/OS FWSI (2003); ACS, American Cetacean Society Opening 
Statement IWC/61/OS ACS (2009); CSI, Cetacean Society International Opening 
Statement IWC/61/OS CSI (2009); WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/61/OS WWF 
(2009); WWF, WWF IWC66 Opening Statement IWC/66/OS WWF (2016). 
656 ELSA Nature Conservancy, Open Statement to the 41st Annual Meeting of 
International Whaling Commission IWC/41/OS ELSA (1989); Ocean Defense 
International, Opening Statement IWC/53/OS ODI (2001); FWSI, Opening Statement of 
the Finns for the Whales Society IWC/55/OS FWSI (2003); Dolphin and Whale 
Conservation Network, Opening Statement IWC/57/OS (2005). 
657 CSI, Opening Statement to the 46th meeting of the IWC IWC/46/OS CSI (1994); IFAW, 
‘Actions for Protection of Whales in Puerto Vallarta and Beyond’: Opening Statement by 
the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) IWC/46/OS IFAW (1994); APAWC, 
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This lack of engagement with the Whaling Convention was not restricted to anti-whaling 
environmental NGOs. The pro-whaling environmental NGOs and unions also failed to 
engage with either Article IV or the object and purpose, making broad statements of 
support without any critical or collaborative input.658  
The strength and value of positions that made clear, practical contributions brought 
within the parameters of the object and purpose were ultimately supported by the ICJ 
decision that there needed to be a clear connection between the lethal whaling and 
scientific programs that addressed the object and purpose principles of the Whaling 
Convention. However, numerous Opening Statements did not meet the criteria of either 
Article IV positions for non-state actors, or the terms of the object and purpose 
principles because they were simply espousals of an organizational position that did not 
contribute to the implementation of the Whaling Convention as a matter of the rule of 
international law.  
Protest at the 2014 and 2016 meetings 
This part considers the nature of object and purpose principle support among protester 
placards at the 2014 and 2016 Whaling Commission meetings. During the 2014 and 
2016 Commission meetings at the Grand Hotel Bernardin in Portorož, Slovenia a 
designated space was provided by the Secretariat outside the venue for protesters and 
demonstrators for the duration of the two weeks of sub-committee and Commission 
meetings. This space was located across the road from the front entrance of the Grand 
Hotel. Temporary fencing marked out the area. Inside the hotel, security stations with 
electronic card readers in the meeting area prevented anyone except delegates, 
observers, and staff from entering the meeting areas. Security staff were also located at 
 
Association for the Protection of Amazonia and Wildlife – Caribbean Opening Statement 
IWC/47/OS APAWC (1995); National Committee for the Defence of the Flora and Fauna, 
Opening Statement by CODEFF IWC/47/OS CODEFF (1995); American Cetacean Society, 
American Cetacean Society Opening Statement IWC/53/OS ACS (2001); IFAW, Opening 
Statement 55th Meeting of the IWC IWC/55/OS IFAW (2003); Animal Welfare Institute, 
AWI Opening Statement IWC/57/OS AWI (2005); Cousteau Society, Opening Statement 
to the 57th meeting of the IWC IWC/57/OS CS (2005); Greenpeace, Opening Statement to 
the 57th meeting of the IWC IWC/57/OS (2005). 
658 JSWA, Japan Small-Type Whaling Association IWC/45/OS JSWA (1993); IFCNR, 
Opening Statement IWC/52/OS IFCNR (2000); All Japan Seamen’s Union, Opening 
Statement to the 58th Meeting of the IWC IWC/58/OS JSU (2006). 
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the entrances to the hotel to prevent any but hotel guests and meeting attendees from 
entering the lobby or other areas.  
In 2014, there were numerous banners displayed on the temporary fencing of the 
protest area, facing the hotel. Sea Shepherd was present for the duration of the 
Commission meetings. The contents of the banners consistently condemned whaling in 
all forms, and many were directed toward condemning scientific whaling.  
 
Image 6.1 Protest banners at the 2014 Whaling Commission meeting. Portorož, Slovenia. 
Source: © the author  
The text of the banners includes ‘Whaling? Don’t buy it!’; this may refer to the vote 
buying scandal in the Commission.659 There was a Sea Shepherd banner with a logo and 
next to it ‘Japan. Who are you fooling? You must abide by the ICJ ruling.’ On the right of 
this is a banner from ‘Surfers for Cetaceans’. Next to that a banner with graphic pictures 
of dead whales and dolphins with the message ‘end dolphin & whale slaughter’. Other 
banners include ‘respect existence or expect resistance’, and two others promote whale 
watching, one with a crossed out ‘c’ in ‘whale catching’ replaced with a ‘w’. Another, not 
entirely visible in the picture protests the ‘murder’ of a pregnant whale. 
Protesters did not agree to the terms of the Whaling Convention in any form as they are 
not observers, and they do not operate within the sphere of Rules set down by the 
Commission. However, it is important to evaluate the extent to which the banners and 
positions interact with the object and purpose. Ultimately, it can’t be expected that 
protesters will adhere to the object and purpose principles of the Whaling Convention. 
However, in applying the object and purpose analysis it is clear that protester 
 
659 Gillespie, above n 263, 428-440. 
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representations fall outside the scope of the rule of law represented by the Convention. 
Perhaps the issue is that protesters affirm ‘a legal right of resistance where none but a 
moral right could be pretended’.660  
Firstly, the ‘Japan. Who are you fooling?’ misrepresents the nature of the ICJ decision 
and the intentions of Japan regarding future development of scientific whaling 
programs. Japan has abided by the ICJ decision and at the time of the 2014 meeting had 
ended its JARPA-II program. It had announced intentions to develop a new scientific 
whaling program that would satisfy the criteria set out by the ICJ that the program of 
whaling must ‘be for scientific purposes.’ 
The extent to which protesters engaged with the object and purpose can only be 
described as incidental. There are no deliberate attempts to refer to the rule of law – 
except where it intersects with their politics. There is an intense focus on conservation, 
reinterpreting the Whaling Convention for the purposes of a whale watching industry 
rather than whaling, and an anthropomorphizing of whales by using the word ‘murder’. 
This trend was also picked up within the Commission meeting by at least one NGO.661 
Protest banner text addressing the object and purpose is absent. However, some 
banners have a tone of reinterpretation of the object and purpose ‘whale watching not 
whale catching’. There is also accusatory language and goading of Japan and its interests 
in the Whaling Commission – ‘whaling. Don’t buy it’ and ‘Who are you fooling. You must 
abide by the ICJ decision’. This position on Japanese membership practices, alludes to 
vote buying, the “loophole” argument on scientific whaling, and derision about the 
development of the JARPN and NEWREP-A scientific whaling programs. These positions 
were mirrored in the meeting spaces among accredited observers.662 These behaviours 
 
660 Brown, above n 567. 
661 Instituto de Conservación de Ballenas, Opening Statement IWC/66/OS ICB (2016) 
‘whaleity’ being legal recognition of the whale personality.  
662 WWF, Opening Statement IWC/65/OS WWF (2014); IWC 66th Annual Meeting of 
October 2016, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2016 – covering 
the October 2014 – October 2016 financial year’ (Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 
2016) 12-13, 20; WSPA et al, NGO Statement on the Welfare of Whales Subject to 
Commercial Whaling (2007) 
https://www.hsi.org.au/editor/assets/Welfare_pos_state_IWC59.pdf; First Santiago 
Declaration by the Latin American Non Government Organizations for Whale 
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bypass consideration of the object and purpose in favour of political arguments that 
bear little relation to the Whaling Convention. 
 
Image 6.2 Protest banner at the 2016 Whaling Commission Meeting. Portorož, Slovenia. 
Source: Paul Spong/orcalab.org  
The 2016 protest signs were also not connected to the object and purpose of the 
Whaling Convention. There was significant repetition from the 2014 meeting, with 
whale watching signs promoting a re-interpretation of the Convention at both meetings, 
and various anti-whaling banners. New banners were introduced in 2016 including ‘It’s 
time to take whale meat off the menu’, ‘Tradition? Sustainable? There is no excuse for 
animal abuse’ and: 
Japan’s NEW REP-A is their NEW RAPE of the Sth Ocean Whale Sanctuary with the 
MURDER of many thousands of MOTHERS PREGNANT MOTHERS and their UNBORN 
CHILDREN 
This banner clearly sets aside the possibility of there being lethal scientific research that 
meets the object and purpose principles and the scrutiny of the Scientific Committee. It 
objects on moral grounds. The moral grounds are an appeal to the sentience of 
cetaceans as large mammals with the use of the word ‘murder’ and by referring to 
 
Conservation (Santiago de Chile, October 18 2007); Vassili Papstavrou and Patrick 
Ramage, ‘Commercial Whaling by Another Name. The Illegality of Japan’s Scientific 
Whaling: Response to Dan Goodman’ (2010) 13(2) Journal of International Wildlife Law 
& Policy 183 – both authors represent IFAW at Whaling Commission meetings; IFAW, 
‘Second Sydney Panel of Independent Experts – the conformity with international law of 
Japan’s proposed research plan for scientific whaling in the Antarctic Ocean (“NEWREP-




pregnant whales as ‘mothers’, and their calves as ‘children’. This falls outside the scope 
of the object and purpose of the Convention. 
6.5.3 Sea Shepherd, 2005 – 2014  
From 2005–2014 Sea Shepherd engaged in preventative enforcement of an 
idiosyncratic interpretation of the Whaling Convention and international law in the 
Southern Ocean. While Sea Shepherd refers to a number of international legal 
documents as authority to enforce law on the high seas, its primary argument is that 
they have legal authority for all campaigns in Articles 21–24 of the United Nations World 
Charter for Nature (World Charter for Nature).663 Specifically, Sea Shepherd states that 
their authority derives from Article 21(e) of the World Charter for Nature, which reads  
States, and to the extent they are able, other public authorities, international 
organizations, individuals, groups, and corporations shall: safeguard and conserve nature 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
This is a broad remit, and one which, as interpreted by Sea Shepherd, reverses the tenet 
lex specialis derogat legi generali,664 (the specific overrides the general) and instead 
posits that the general law applies in specifically governed situations, displacing the 
mechanisms of the Whaling Commission in the process. Sea Shepherd founder, Paul 
Watson described the position of Sea Shepherd as being concerned with the laws of 
nature rather than of man.665 Similarly, Watson has argued elsewhere that the laws of 
nature must prevail over the laws of man.666  
 
663 Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, International Laws and Charters (2018) Sea 
Shepherd Australia https://www.seashepherd.org.au/who-we-are/about-us/laws-and-
charters.html. 
664 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission GAOR 
66th session, supp no. 10 UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1 (26 April – 3 June and 4 July – 12 
August 2011) 39 and 135; International Law Commission, Draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations UN Doc A/CN.4/L.778 (3 June 2011) Article 
64: Lex specialis. 
665 Engdal and Sæter, above n 636, 22. 
666 Watson, above n 569. 
 
 223 
The World Charter for Nature, which is a key document relied upon by Sea Shepherd in 
claims of jurisdiction, is a General Assembly Resolution.667 If it could be relied upon as 
authority to override the jurisdiction of a whaling-specific convention and Commission, 
the complex relationship between General Assembly Resolutions, treaty bodies, and 
customary international law would be reduced to a simple reversal of the lex specialis 
interpretative rule.668 So, Sea Shepherd’s ideological rejection of the Whaling 
Commission’s regulation fundamentally undermines the Whaling Convention object and 
purpose.  
There is some literature on the question of the legal authority of Sea Shepherd to act as 
it did against Japanese scientific whaling vessels.669 The compliance of Sea Shepherd 
with the terms of the Whaling Convention was not covered in this literature. This thesis 
contributes a consideration of how Sea Shepherd reflects Article IV expectations and 
how Sea Shepherd conduct engages with object and purpose principles of the Whaling 
Convention. 
As discussed, Article IV makes room for non-state actors to be delegated the role of 
administrators, supporters and proponents of scientific research on cetacean stocks and 
their conditions. The Commission is the delegator of such roles. The opposition to 
Article VIII special permits may fall within Article IV where there is some express or 
 
667 World Charter for Nature, GA Res A/RES/37/7 UN GAOR Plenary, 48th sess, 28 
October 1982, Un Doc A/37/PV.48.  
668 Jacob E Gersen & Eric A Posner, ‘Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice’ 
(2008) 61 Stanford Law Review 573, 575; Michael P Scharf, ‘Accelerated Formation of 
Customary International Law’ (2014) 20(2) ILSA Journal of International & Comparative 
Law, 305, 324-328; Stephen M Schwebel, ‘The Effect of Resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly on Customary International Law (1979) 73 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law) 301, 302; Oscar M Garibaldi, ‘The Legal Status of 
General Assembly Resolutions: Some Conceptual Observations’ (1979) 73 Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 324, 326-327. 
669 Blay and Bubna-Litic, above n 384, 466 calling Sea Shepherd direct action a ‘self-help 
remedy’ in relation to an Australian Federal Court decision; Avi Brisman, ‘Crime-
Environment Relationships and Environmental Justice’ (2007-2008) 6 Seattle Journal of 
Social Justice 727, 755 calling direction action ‘coercive conservation’; Nagtzaam and 
Lentini, above n 384; Anton, above n 383, 138 rejecting the World Charter for Nature as 
grounds for Sea Shepherd enforcement capacities, 45 rejects any legal basis arising; 
Roeschke, ‘above n 383, 135 makes untenable, foundation-less claims for Sea Shepherd 
possessing ‘relevant legal authority’.  
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implied acceptance of the actions of an NGO by the Commission. The Whaling 
Commission unanimously condemned the safety at sea issues of Sea Shepherd actions 
against the JARPA II vessels. But, it wasn’t until 2011, after two resolutions670 and one 
intersessional statement,671 that the Commission as a whole was willing to call upon Sea 
Shepherd to desist in its attacks on the JARPA vessels.672 This indicated the division that 
exists in the Commission on the matter of scientific whaling. 
Some member states demonstrated tolerance of Sea Shepherd activities. For example, 
there was unspoken support for Sea Shepherd from the Australian government. Sea 
Shepherd registered their vessels’ port states as Australia and the Netherlands at 
various times,673 and the port of departure for all Sea Shepherd campaigns into the 
Southern Ocean against JARPA II vessels was Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. This was not 
indicative of a broader stance. 
The question of object and purpose compliance for Sea Shepherd two-sided. Formal 
compliance with Article IV of the Whaling Convention is non-existent. Sea Shepherd was 
rejected twice by the Commission in its application for observer status, and the 
impossibility of their attendance made clear.674 However, in opposing scientific 
whaling, despite the stated intentions of the group itself, which is simply to oppose any 
whaling, legal or not, Sea Shepherd has demonstrated object and purpose compliance.  
 
670 Resolution on the Safety of Vessels Engaged in Whaling and Whale Research-Related 
Activities Resolution 2006-2 (IWC) IWC/58/23Rev (2006); Resolution on Safety at Sea 
and Protection of the Environment Resolution 2007-2 (IWC) IWC/59/25 (2007).  
671 Chair’s Report of the 64th Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (2-
6 July 2012 Panama City, Panama) 44. 
672 IWC 63rd Meeting of July 2011, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 2011 – covering the 2010-2011 financial year’ (St Helier, Jersey, adopted 
July 2011) 25; Resolution on Safety at Sea Resolution 2011-2 (IWC) IWC/63/17 (2011) in 
which the Commission calls upon Sea Shepherd to ‘refrain from dangerous actions that 
jeopardise safety at sea’.  
673 There were indications that the Netherlands continued to allow the registration of 
Sea Shepherd vessels only because of difficulties in amending domestic law to prevent 
it: Email from Rene Lefeber, Legal Adviser and Head of the International Law Division of 
the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Dr Julia 
Jabour, Senior Lecture, Institute of Marine and Antarctic Studies, 29th January 2016. 
674 See letters and Annual Report references, above n 436. 
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The interpretation of Article VIII requires lethal research ‘for scientific purposes’ to 
support the orderly development of the whaling industry and conservation. Sea 
Shepherd’s interference in the whaling efforts of the JARPA II vessels constituted 
support of the conservation and future use objectives of the convention, even if there is 
no organizational intention to support use. Object and purpose analysis is an objective 
assessment of behaviours. The actions of Sea Shepherd itself, from 2005–2014 sought to 
prevent a form of the whaling that did not itself meet the terms of the Whaling 
Convention. The actions of the whalers violated the terms of the Convention,675 and 
failed to be for scientific purposes, in light of conservation, industry development and 
future access to resources. In opposing that whaling, Sea Shepherd implicitly upheld the 
object and purpose, despite their own intentions, just as, despite its intentions, the 
JARPA II research program failed to satisfy the requirements of Article VIII.  
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered NGO engagement in the CAMLR Commission and Whaling 
Commission on catch regulation and enforcement, a fundamentally use-oriented issue 
of both Commissions. In relation to scientific whaling and regulation of IUU fishing, 
NGOs have frequently demonstrated engagement with the object and purpose 
principles of the respective Conventions. Observer environmental NGOs in the Whaling 
Commission have, at times, presented their own organizational policies, in lieu of 
engaging with the terms of the convention, but the majority of the content has 
demonstrated strong engagement with object and purpose principles. Similarly, 
industry and environmental NGOs in the CAMLR Commission have presented largely 
supportive positions in relation to the object and purpose principles, both within and 
outside meetings. There was no engagement on these issues by scientific NGOs.  
NGO engagement on IUU fishing in the CAMLR Commission has demonstrated 
significant change since the first early engagement. Environmental NGO, ASOC and its 
member ISOFISH initially engaged with the Commission in calling for a total 
moratorium on toothfish catches within the Convention Area. This trajectory gradually 
shifted and supportive contributions were made to the measures implemented by the 
Commission. Industry NGO, COLTO, attended its first meeting with significant 
 
675 Whaling in the Antarctic (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Reports 226, [218]. 
 
 226 
controversy generated by its paper, Rogues Gallery. It has maintained a steady series of 
contributions intended to support the work of the Commission in preventing as well as 
accounting for IUU fishing. Object and purpose adherence among all NGOs has been 
high. This is possibly due to the nature of IUU fishing, which is a negation of 
conservation values, and so places NGOs in a strong position to emphasise conservation. 
However, the clear adherence to object and purpose principles by the industry NGO, 
COLTO, also indicates that self-interest in rational use tends toward object and purpose 
adherence in the CAMLR Commission’s approach to conservation and use. Sea 
Shepherd, in the intersessional period also engaged with clear adherence to the object 
and purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention.  
The Whaling Commission experiences of NGO behaviours in relation to scientific 
whaling have been more diverse. The engagement of Sea Shepherd, to start, tested the 
objectivity of the Commission members. Seen from an object and purpose perspective, 
while the direct-action campaigns challenged international law on maritime safety, 
there was adherence to the Whaling Convention by virtue of the nature of Japanese 
scientific whaling being found to be unlawful by the ICJ. From observer NGOs, there was 
a broad range of Opening Statements, many of which made significant connections 
between the object and purpose principles and scientific whaling contributions to those 
principles. Others relied heavily on emotive and political urgings.  
While Chapter Five demonstrated that there has been little consistency in NGO 
behaviours over time when measured against object and purpose principles, this 
chapter has found significant engagement with the core principles guiding NGOs in both 
Commissions.  
While there is no method for determining the likelihood of NGO engagement with object 
and purpose principles, some themes can be identified. Firstly, in the CAMLR 
Commission, where there was Commission-led engagement with an issue, a majority of 
NGO behaviours showed engagement with object and purpose principles. This was clear 
in the development of the issue of IUU fishing, with NGO observer engagement generally 
showing supportive, cooperative engagement with the Commission to tackle the 
intersection of use, conservation and common future obligations. The hostile 
behaviours of ASOC and then, more overtly, COLTO, directed toward the Commission or 
Commission members engaged with the object and purpose. The Article XXIII 
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cooperative and supportive relationship became the dominant engagement type very 
quickly for both NGOs, after initial hostility was addressed by the Commission in 
articulating its expectations of observer NGOs. 
In relation to intersessional conduct, the engagement of COLTO and Sea Shepherd to 
prevent IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean and stop the landing of IUU fish catches were 
clearly supportive of object and purpose principles and IUU fishing conservation 
measures put in place by the Commission. Whether there was a lawful basis for such 
engagement is a complicated question beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in 
terms of the object and purpose principles, there were clear attempts to support the 
work of the CAMLR Commission, which is the question that this thesis more broadly 
addresses. 
In the Whaling Commission, there was significant variety in the content of NGO 
behaviours during and around Commission meetings. Some NGO approaches were 
directed toward emotive language and politicised the issue of scientific whaling. 
However, the majority of NGO behaviours focussed on the object and purpose issues of 
scientific whaling by highlighting the inconsistencies of the JARPA programs in relation 
to the object and purpose. These inconsistencies lay between the low scientific value of 
scientific whaling programs and how these programs contributed to conservation, 
industry rehabilitation, and future generations’ access to whale resources. While the 
nature of ‘industry’ and ‘whale resources’ is a contentious issue in itself, engagement 
with object and purpose principles was present in many NGO behaviours. Similarly, the 
intersessional behaviours of Sea Shepherd reflected similar engagement to prevent low 
scientific value activities that were perceived to hinder furtherance of the underlying 
objectives of the Whaling Convention. These perspectives were ultimately borne out by 
the decision of the ICJ. 
The value of considering IUU fishing and scientific whaling is that both issues have 
provided an opportunity to address appropriate behaviour on the parts of states and 
NGOs. This is particularly relevant in considering the balance between principles of use 
and conservation, and contributions from NGOs on how the balance is determined. The 
intensely emotional responses of environmentalists to whaling, and the justice-
response elicited by IUU fishing highlight the need for an objective standard of assessing 
NGO conduct in contributing to the use-conservation balance in Commission decision-
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making. Applying the object and purpose analysis to the variety of NGO conduct has 
demonstrated that an objective assessment of NGO behaviours can separate their 
conduct from the response of member states.  
Following from this chapter, Chapter Seven explores the issue of protected areas. 
Chapter Seven looks at the conservation-oriented issue of protected areas, addressing 
how NGOs engage with this conservation issue, as opposed to the use-orientation of 
catch regulation. With the combination of these three chapters, a full picture of NGO 
behaviour and engagement with object and purpose principles will be presented, across 
the spectrum of object and purpose principles.  
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Chapter 7: NGO engagement over Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs) and Whale Sanctuaries  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how NGOs have engaged with the object and purpose principles 
of the Whaling Convention and the CAMLR Convention on the issue of marine protected 
areas (MPAs) in the CAMLR Commission and whale sanctuaries in the Whaling 
Commission (referred to collectively as ‘protected areas’). Protected areas are key 
conservation tools in marine protection, supporting a range of protective purposes 
including coastal integrity, species replenishment, ecosystem protection, and support of 
sustainable fisheries.676 Protected areas have been significant and/or long-standing 
agenda items in both the Whaling and CAMLR Commissions, generating extensive 
Commission discussion and NGO engagement. The formal and informal roles 
undertaken by NGO observers in relation to protected areas are considered in terms of 
the object and purpose of each Commission’s founding document. Consistent with the 
broader arguments of this thesis, the chapter demonstrates that the value of NGO 
observer contributions should be assessed with reference to the object and purpose 
principles. 
The discussion of NGO engagement over MPAs in the CAMLR Commission focuses on 
the period from 2005 – 2016. The central discussion is around the formal and informal 
engagement mechanisms of accredited observers. In the Whaling Commission, the focus 
on protected areas is on the South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary, from 2010 – 2016, 
examining both formal engagement and informal engagement through Commission 
meetings. Formal engagement involves Opening Statements, and in 2012 and 2014 
addressing the Commission on the agenda. The informal engagement was a 2016 South 
 
676 Ingvild Ulrikke Jakobsen, Marine Protected Areas in International Law: An Arctic 
Perspective (Brill, 2016) Part 1. Marine Protected Areas as a Tool for Conservation and 
Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity. Chapter 1. Introduction, 3-17; Kristina M 
Gjerde and Anna Rulska-Domino, ‘Marine Protected Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Some Practical Perspectives for Moving Ahead’ (2012) 27 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 351, 353-355; Veronica Frank, The European Community and 
Marine Environmental Protection in the International Law of the Sea (Brill, 2007) 10-11. 
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Atlantic Sanctuary promotional meeting with associated promotional materials. There 
is some reference to the previous sanctuary designations – the Indian Ocean Whale 
Sanctuary in 1979, and the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary in 1994. The designation 
of whale sanctuaries for the conservation and development of whale species first 
entered the Whaling Commission agenda in 1979. The continued presence of whale 
sanctuaries on the Commission agenda in a majority of meeting years since that time is 
testament to their continuing importance. 
In marine management terms, protected areas management measures should be 
flexible since there are various aspects of conservation, use, science, and preservation to 
be considered in the designation and implementation of these spaces.677 Protected 
areas are intended for long-term conservation and preservation, based on scientifically 
determined values, with varied levels of protection from exploitation activities. The 
management of protected areas should also reflect diverse objectives through the 
specific terms of the measures regulating use of the area.678 These diverse objectives 
can be reflected in protected areas being multiple use areas, time-limited or activity-
limited, while permitting some commercial or scientific activities. 
International organizations and state governments have placed protected areas high on 
their environmental agendas.679 Emphasizing the significance of protected areas to 
 
677 Graeme Kelleher (ed), Guidelines for Marine Protected Areas (World Commission on 
Protected Areas of IUCN, Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No. 3, 1999) 37-
41; see also Antarctic Treaty System guidelines for the designation of protected and 
managed areas: The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Area 
Protection and Management 1998 ATS 6 (entered into force 24 May 2002) Annex V, 
Articles 3 and 4. 
678 Kelleher, above n 677; Elizabeth A Fulton et al., ‘Modelling marine protected areas: 
insights and hurdles’ (2015) 370 Philosophical Transactions Royal Society of London B 
Biological Sciences 1681; Venetia Alexa Hargreaves-Allen, Susana Mourato and Eleanor 
Jane Milner-Gulland, ‘Drivers of coral reef marine protected area performance’ (2017) 
12(6) PLoS One.  
679 United Nations, ‘Johannesburg Plan of Action: Plan of Implementation of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development’ (2002) GEO 6 Europe Suppl Ref 31.c; FAO, Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Rome, 1995); Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Decision adopted by the Conference of the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
at its Seventh Meeting, VII/5 UNEP, 7th mtg, Agenda Item 18.2, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/5 (13 April 2004); Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) Division 3 – Whales and other cetaceans; Andrew Balmford 
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ecosystem management and marine mammals.680 This indicates the value of Whaling 
Commission discussions and decisions to global environmental and marine agendas at 
large. Similarly, there is significant value in CAMLR Commission practice and discussion 
to the work of other RFBs on protected marine areas.681 
The chapter proceeds in five parts. Following this introduction, Part 7.2 discusses 
protected areas under the Whaling Convention and CAMLR Convention and in their 
Commissions. Part 7.3 defines and describes NGO observer roles in relation to protected 
areas. Parts 7.4 and 7.5 subject NGOs roles to an object and purpose appraisal, first in 
the CAMLR Commission (7.4) and then the Whaling Commission (7.5). Parts 7.4 and 7.5 
also consider interview and survey responses on NGO engagement with protected 
areas. This differs from the structure of Chapter 6. Discussion interview and survey 
responses highlight the diversity of views of stakeholders in both Commissions on the 
value of NGO contributions, and the need for an objective standard of evaluation. 
The chapter concludes in Part 7.6 that misconstruction or avoidance of object and 
purpose principles is evident in the approaches of environmental NGOs in both 
Commissions. Scientific, hybrid and industrial NGOs demonstrated clear support for the 
work of the Commissions and the object and purpose of their conventions in all 
observer NGO roles. This case study demonstrates that NGOs expressing accordance 
with the object and purpose principles is central to the sound functioning of the 
Commissions. This chapter demonstrates the importance of the recommendation, 
expanded upon in Chapter 8, for clear expectations that all NGO observers engage with 
object and purpose principles.  
 
et al., ‘The worldwide costs of marine protected areas’ (2004) 101(26) Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 9694; European Environment Agency, Marine 
protected areas in Europe’s seas – An overview and perspectives for the future EEA Report 
No 3/2015 (Luxembourg, 2015). 
680 Sascha K Hooker and Leah R Gerber, ‘Marine Reserves as a Tool for Ecosystem-
Based Management: The Potential Importance of Megafauna’ (2004) 51(1) BioScience 
27; R Quentin Grafton, Tom Kompas and Viktoria Schneider, ‘The Bioeconomics of 
Marine Reserves: A Selected Review with Policy Implications’ (2005) 7 Journal of 
Bioeconomics 161. 
681 Miller, Sabourenkov, and Ramm, above n 147; Ceo et al, above n 9, 12, 13, 65, 78; 
Miller and Slicer, above n 9. 
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Data sources used for this chapter include the verbatim records of the Whaling 
Commission, archived documents from both the CAMLR Commission and the Whaling 
Commission, meeting records and documents and interviews. The meeting records and 
meeting documents are primary sources of NGO observer roles, however, so are 
pamphlets and documents from various meetings, obtained during the author’s 
personal observations and attendance. Included is data from both the CAMLR and 
Whaling Commissions from Commissioners on state perceptions of NGO engagement 
around MPAs and sanctuaries.682  It is noted that approximately a third of the member 
states for each Commission submitted a completed questionnaire. For the Whaling 
Commission this was forty-member states, for the CAMLR Commission, eight-member 
states. This response rate in the CAMLR Commission is attributable to the author’s 
absence due to attendance at the Whaling Commission meeting, and at the Whaling 
Commission meeting to the sheer size of the meeting itself. Language barriers were also 
an issue, as noted in Chapter 1.  
7.2 Protected areas under the Conventions 
This section considers the nature of protected areas under both conventions and details 
the object and purpose in relation to protected areas, presenting a means of evaluating 
the contributions of NGOs. Both the CAMLR Convention and the Whaling Convention 
make specific reference to protected areas. The Whaling Convention authorises the 
designation of sanctuary areas.683 The CAMLR Convention permits designation of areas 
for protection and scientific study.684 The Commissions have regulatory powers that 
directly relate to protected area measures. These regulatory powers are temporal, 
spatial, species-based, quantity-based, age-, sex-, and size-based, and activity-based.685 
 
682 This data was gathered through confidential questionnaires circulated at the annual 
meetings of both the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions in 2016.  
683 Whaling Convention, Article V.1.c. 
684 CAMLR Convention, Article IX.2.g. 
685 Whaling Convention, Article V; CAMLR Convention, Article IX. 
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7.2.1 Protected areas under the CAMLR Convention  
The CAMLR Commission has the capacity to designate MPAs through conservation 
measures under Article IX of the CAMLR Convention. Under Article V, the Whaling 
Commission has the power to amend the Whaling Convention Schedule to create whale 
sanctuaries,686 and to pass resolutions regarding the intentions or views of the 
Commission, including the subject of whale sanctuaries.687 
The value of MPAs is acknowledged across the spectrum of domestic and international 
conservation practices.688 The discussion within the CAMLR Commission is part of a 
larger global dialogue.689 Discussion has engaged with the practical application of 
principles of conservation and rational use, the precautionary approach,690 the 
ecosystem approach, and scientific evidence as the basis for decision-making.  
The CAMLR Commission began deliberations on MPAs in the CAMLR Convention Area 
as an agenda item in 2005, following a significant intersessional workshop.691 This 
workshop set the framework for MPA discussions, including terms of reference for 
Scientific Committee work, and the utility of MPAs in furthering the objectives of the 
CAMLR Convention. The workshop also highlighted the desirability of engagement with a 
range of stakeholders, including NGOs, at the technical and policy levels.692 Prior to its 
own deliberations, the CAMLR Commission had engaged with the designation of 
protected areas within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) by adhering to conditions to 
 
686 Whaling Convention, Article V. 
687 Whaling Convention, Article V. 
688 IUCN, Marine Protection in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XVI/BG/40 (20 October 
1997); see Jakobsen, Kelleher and others, above n 655 through n 657. 
689 Ceo et al, above n 6; Miller and Slicer, above n 660. 
690 See above n 137. 
691 Report of the CCAMLR Workshop on Marine Protected Areas (Silver Spring, MD, USA, 
29 August to 1 September 2005) SC-CAMLR-XXIV Annex 7. 
692 Report of the CCAMLR Workshop on Marine Protected Areas (Silver Spring, MD, USA, 
29 August to 1 September 2005) SC-CAMLR-XXIV, Annex 7 593 [17]. 
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protect Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) and Antarctic Specially Managed 
Areas (ASMAs) designated under the Madrid Protocol.693 
The goal of MPA deliberations in the Commission has been to establish a representative 
series of MPAs to protect significant Antarctic marine ecosystems. Several proposals for 
MPAs within the CAMLR Area have been put forward. Early proposals were all within 
Contracting Government waters, including Argentinian, South African, and Australian 
waters.694 
The United Kingdom proposal to establish an MPA in CCAMLR waters at the Southern 
Orkney Island southern shelf resulted in the development of Conservation Measure 91-
03, creating the first CCAMLR MPA.695 The South Orkney MPA has been recognised as a 
significant step toward establishing a representative series of MPAs in the Convention 
Area.696 After these early discussions, the Commission focus shifted to three potential 
areas for designating MPAs: the Ross Sea MPA, which was designated in 2016;697 the 
East Antarctic Sea MPA, an ongoing agenda item; and the Weddell Sea MPA.  
 
693 Protection of the values of Antarctic Specially Managed and Protected Areas 
Conservation Measure 91-02 (2012). 
694 Delegation of South Africa, Towards the creation of a Marine Protected Area around 
South Africa’s sub-Antarctic Prince Edward Islands CCAMLR-XXIII/BG/22; Delegation of 
Ukraine, On the determination and establishment of marine protected area in the area of 
the Argentina Islands Archipelago CCAMLR-XXIV/BG/19 (see also CCAMLR-
XXVI/BG/11); Delegation of New Zealand, Scientific justification for a marine protected 
area designation around the Balleny Islands to protect ecosystem structure and function 
in the Ross Sea region, Antarctica: progress report SC-CAMLR-XXIV/BG/25; Delegation of 
South Africa, Conserving patter and process in the Southern Ocean: designing a marine 
protected area for the Prince Edward Islands CCAMLR-XXV/BG/16. 
695 Protection of the South Orkney Islands southern shelf Conservation Measure 91-03 
(2009). 
696 CCAMLR-XXXII Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2013, ‘Report of the Thirty-
Second Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2013) 
[5.77]; CCAMLR-XXXIII Meeting of 20 – 31 October 2014, ‘Report of the Thirty-Third 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 31 October 2014) [5.81] per the 
EU; Andrea Kavanagh, ‘The World’s Largest MPA, Antarctica’s Ross Sea’ (Lecture 
delivered at the Institute of Marine and Antarctic Studies, Hobart, Tasmania, 7 April, 
2017). 
697 Ross Sea Region MPA Conservation Measure 91-05 (2016). 
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The CAMLR Commission discussions around MPAs also demonstrate how NGOs 
contribute to the decision-making process. A range of regulatory powers enables the 
Commission to support management of MPAs. These include the power to designate 
levels of harvesting of specific species, the protection of species, the size, age, and sex of 
species that can be harvested, and measures relating to seasonal closures, fishing gear 
and harvesting methods. The significance of these regulatory powers depends on the 
object and purpose principles informing their interpretation. The regulatory capacities 
are subject to the same interpretive construction as Article IX.2.g, with foremost 
consideration for conservation, including rational use. Scientific evidence, conservation 
and science-dependent precaution must be the tools by which the Commission 
operationalizes an MPA under Article IX.2.   
Under Article IX, the Commission has the capacity to designate ‘the opening and closing 
of areas, regions or sub-regions for purposes of scientific study or conservation, 
including special areas for protection and scientific study’.698 All designations are 
subject to any pre-existing measures implemented under the ATS, for the preservation 
and conservation of living resources.699  The text of the CAMLR Convention Article IX 
creates two types of designation: ‘areas, regions or sub-regions’ and ‘special areas’. 
‘Areas, regions or sub-regions can be opened or closed for scientific study or 
conservation. MPAs fall within this category. They do not fall into the latter because 
‘special area’ refers to areas specifically for protection and scientific study. 
The terminology ‘special area’ is also used in the Madrid Protocol700 within the ATS. 
However, the meaning is not entirely consistent between the Protocol and the CAMLR 
Convention. Within the Protocol are the subcategories of ‘specially protected’ (ASPA) 
and ‘specially managed (ASMA), which themselves separate conservation value 
(protected) and scientific study (managed). The use of ‘special area’ in the CAMLR 
Convention is distinct from the Madrid Protocol, as Meeting Reports indicate that special 
 
698 CAMLR Convention, Article IX. 
699 Antarctic Treaty, Article IX.1.f. 
700 Madrid Protocols, Annex V. 
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areas and MPAs are considered as distinct tools,701 with special areas having a scientific 
focus.702 This means that ‘areas…for conservation’ are distinct from ‘special areas for 
protection and scientific study’ [emphasis added]. ‘Protection’ and ‘scientific study’ are 
to be read conjunctively.703 This clearly connects ‘special areas’ to the science and 
protection principles of the Antarctic Treaty and its Protocol. The general capacity to 
designate areas for conservation is distinctly attached to the CAMLR Convention and its 
purposes. This renders the influence of the Antarctic Treaty on interpretation and 
implementation of the Article IX in designating MPAs a lesser concern than if MPAs fell 
within the definition of ‘special area’.704  
Decisions around designating marine protected areas (MPAs) involve extensive 
sessional and intersessional discussion, with working groups, informal drafting groups, 
and workshops to determine the direction of possible conservation measures, their 
wording, and the scientific basis upon which they will be established. The Commission 
recognizes the significance of Article II in informing the exercises of functions under 
Article IX.705 This is through significant and ongoing engagement with the advice of the 
Scientific Committee in decision-making processes. The CAMLR Commission also 
interprets its obligations under Article IX in light of the object and purpose principles 
and so MPAs must be considered in light of conservation, rational use, and mankind and 
be consistent with the ecosystem approach and the precautionary approach.706 
 
701 CCAMLR-XXXI Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2012, ‘Report of the Thirty-First 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2012) [7.60]. 
702 Ibid [7.86]. 
703 Ibid [8.35 – 8.36]. 
704 Susanna M Grant, ‘The applicability of international conservation instruments to the 
establishment of marine protected areas in Antarctica’ (2005) 48 (9-10) Ocean & 
Coastal Management 782. 
705 Report of the CCAMLR Workshop on Marine Protected Areas (Silver Spring, MD, USA, 
29 August to 1 September 2005) SC-CAMLR-XXIV, Annex 7, 586, 591 [1]; CCAMLR-XXIII 
Meeting of 25 October – 5 November 2004, ‘Report of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the 
Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 5 November 2004) [4.13]. 
706 See Chapter 2 at [2.3.2].  
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7.2.2 Protected areas under the Whaling Convention  
There are two existing sanctuaries designated under the Whaling Convention. These are 
the Indian Ocean Whale Sanctuary and the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary. These 
provide a background to the proposals for the South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary proposed 
and rejected over the 2010-2016 period. The Indian Ocean Whale Sanctuary was 
successfully designated in 1979.707 There is no documentary evidence of engagement 
with the subject of sanctuaries by NGOs preceding this date.708 The Southern Ocean 
Sanctuary generated significant debate, but equal success in 1994.709 This trend has not 
held for the South Atlantic Sanctuary proposal. 
The Whaling Convention confers power on the Commission to designate sanctuary areas 
through amendment of the Whaling Convention Schedule. Article V specifically provides 
that: 
The Commission may amend from time to time the provisions of the Schedule by 
adopting regulations with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale 
resources fixing…open and closed waters, including the designation of sanctuary 
areas.710 
The language of Article V indicates that sanctuary areas are meant to be areas free of all 
whaling activities – a literal sanctuary. This is in contrast to the CAMLR Convention 
Article IX where it is clear that protected areas have geographical delimitation among 
multiple regulatory measures for activities in a protected area. While there is no 
indication in the Whaling Convention Article V that the designation of sanctuaries 
 
707 IWC 30th Meeting of June 1978, ‘Thirtieth Report of the International Whaling 
Commission – covering the 30th financial year 1978-1979’ (London, UK, adopted June 
1979) 27: the vote being 27 for, 3 against and 3 abstentions. 
708 Although an interviewee contemporary with the Indian Ocean proposal in 1979 
indicated that there was informal discussion of the topic of the Indian Ocean Whale 
Sanctuary among a number of parties, both associated with NGOs and the Scientific 
Committee before its appearance on the 1979 Whaling Commission agenda: Interview 
with Interviewee 6 (15 September 2014). 
709 IWC 47th Annual Meeting of May/June 1995, ‘Forty-Seventh Report of the 
International Whaling Commission – covering the financial year 1994-1995’ (Dublin, 
Ireland, adopted June 1995) 28.  
710 Whaling Convention, Article V.1.c. 
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involves any other regulatory measure besides closing waters to whaling, the general 
regulatory capacities of Article V can be applied within a sanctuary area as there is no 
exclusion of such capacity. 
Article V directly incorporates the conservation and use aspects of the Whaling 
Convention object and purpose, noting that regulations are to be made ‘with respect to 
conservation and utilization.’ In referring to open and closed waters, Article V makes 
specific provision for the designation of whale sanctuaries.711 This specific reference to 
sanctuaries amid a raft of general regulatory measures suggests that the use of 
sanctuaries is a key measure available to the Commission to carry out their work 
according to the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention. 
Article V provides some guidelines for the purposes of regulatory measures. There are 
three clear expectations in relation to sanctuaries and other regulatory measures. First, 
regulatory measures emphasise conservation as well as current and future lethal use of 
whale resources.712 Second, decisions to amend the Schedule and develop other 
regulatory measures must be based on scientific findings.713 Third, measures must ‘take 
into consideration the interests of the consumers of whale products and the whaling 
industry’.714 The terms ‘whale products’ and ‘whaling industry’ are the centre of many 
of the interpretative positions among Whaling Commission NGOs, with some NGOs 
interpreting ‘products’ and ‘industry’ to refer to non-lethal activities, particularly eco-
tours and whale watching.  
In the designation of whale sanctuaries, as with all other regulatory powers, Article V 
requires the Commission to consider the multiple facets of the Whaling Convention 
object and purpose, the interaction between conservation and use, the orientation of 
conservation to human consumption and industry, and the need for scientific data to 
 
711 This contrasts with the CAMLR Convention, where MPAs, as a general marine 
conservation tool, have attached to the Article IX.2.g provision. 
712 Whaling Convention, Article V.2.a. 
713 Whaling Convention, Article V.2.b. 
714 Whaling Convention, Article V.2.c. 
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substantiate decision-making.715 These connections are expressly stated in Article V, 
indicating clear expectations of both interpretive and practical application. 
Dialogue in the Whaling Commission around whale sanctuaries, both in their proposal 
stage and later review, has indicated fractures in the Commission in the interpretation 
and execution of Article V powers at the level of the object and purpose. Practice and 
commentary716 have indicated division over the scientific value and validity of the 
whale sanctuaries. There are clear expectations in Article V of the Whaling Convention in 
relation to scientific data and regulations.  
Whether the terms of the Whaling Convention Article V require specific scientific 
comment or advice upon a proposed sanctuary is not clear. For example, in the case of 
the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, in discussion from 1990-1994, the Scientific Committee 
presented a range of advice and viewpoints on the value of a whale sanctuary in the 
Southern Ocean, with a broadly positive view of its implementation.717 However, the 
value to the Commission of this viewpoint, which was based on conjecture rather than 
hard data, was called into question.718 Commission decision-making has been construed 
in two ways. The first is that Commission decisions could be made without reference to 
scientific data.719 The other is that scientific advice is necessary to the decision-making 
of the Commission.720 Neither takes clear precedence in decision-making. However, the 
Whaling Convention requires that the sanctuaries be based on scientific information, 
 
715 Whaling Convention, Article V.2. 
716 Interview with Interviewee 6 (15 September 2014). 
717 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1994 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (1994) 44 
Report of the International Whaling Commission 41, 58-59; IWC Scientific Committee, 
‘1995 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (1995) 45 Report of the International Whaling 
Commission 53; IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1995 Report of the Scientific Committee’ 
(1995) 45 Report of the International Whaling Commission 53, 86. 
718 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1995 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (1995) 45 
Report of the International Whaling Commission 53, 86. 
719 IWC 45th Annual Meeting of July 1993, ‘Forty-Fifth Report of the International 
Whaling Commission – covering the financial year, 1993-1994’ (Glasgow, United 
Kingdom, adopted July 1994) 28, the Chair stating that ‘the Commission has the power 
to make decisions on management or conservation.’ 
720 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘1994 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (1994) 44 
Report of the International Whaling Commission 41, 86.  
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with the clear objective of developing conservation aims for the purposes of enabling 
the whaling industry to continue.721 Considering the Whaling Convention Article V 
against the CAMLR Convention Article IX, there are clear similarities firstly with 
conservation aims, but also in terms of dependence on scientific data for decision-
making, and an expectation of use. 
7.3 Observer NGO roles in respect of protected areas 
Protected area designation in both the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions attracted the 
contributions of environmental NGOs, scientific NGOs, and the IUCN during the study 
periods. Industry NGOs in both Commissions have been less vocal than environmental 
NGOs, with environmental NGOs dominating NGO contributions. The dominant NGO 
contributor on the topic of MPAs in the CAMLR Commission is the environmental NGO, 
ASOC, through the formal oral and documentary mechanisms for observer participation 
in the CAMLR Commission. ASOC has been the sole user of informal protest roles 
available to observers in relation to MPAs and other matters. The scientific NGO, SCAR, 
is the dominant contributor to the practical support of the CAMLR Commission and its 
Scientific Committee on the subject of MPAs. The two industry NGOs, ARK and COLTO, 
made no independent contributions on the topic of MPAs, however ARK did collaborate 
with ASOC and three member-states in discussing the significance of MPAs to krill 
conservation,722 and both industry NGOs contribute to the Commission through the 
provision of catch data.  
The primary contributors in the Whaling Commission on whale sanctuaries have been a 
high number of environmental NGOs. There is a clear division in the contributions of 
environmental NGO observers: Environmental NGOs that are also anti-whaling, 
consistently advocate for the designation of whale sanctuaries. Environmental NGOs 
that are pro-whaling make statements that support the use of the Revised Management 
Procedure (RMP) rather than the designation of whale sanctuaries as the most effective 
 
721 Whaling Convention, Article V.2.b; Preamble.  
722 United Kingdom, Norway, Chile, ASOC and ARK, Bridging the krill divide: 
understanding cross-sector objectives for krill fishing and conservation SC-CAMLR-
XXXIII/BG/34 (20 September 2014) 13 and 15. In this paper the ARK representative 
indicated that there was MPA designation was of little significance to krill fisheries. 
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vehicle for whale conservation. There has been consistent opposition to the designation 
of sanctuaries from pro-whaling industry and environmental NGOs.723  
7.3.1 CAMLR Commission – NGO roles 
In the CAMLR Commission, NGO engagement has presented information to promote a 
consensus vote to designate MPAs. There has been extensive use of the formal 
mechanisms for submitting information papers and speaking to the agenda, and use of 
informal engagement mechanisms, such as staging events and distributing information 
in informal meeting spaces. Contributors to the MPA issue in the CAMLR Commission 
are: the hybrid NGO, the IUCN; environmental NGO, ASOC; and the scientific NGO, 
Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR). Aside from its collaborative work, 
ARK’s engagement with MPAs indicates that MPAs were not high on member company 
agendas.724 Neither ARK nor the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) made 
any direct contribution to the discussion. However, it is important to note that as 
industry NGOs representing many companies operating fishing fleets in the Southern 
Ocean, ARK and COLTO assist the CAMLR Commission in monitoring MPAs. ARK and 
COLTO vessels already contribute to implementation roles in relation to IUU fishing, as 
 
723 ICFA, International Coalition of Fisheries Associations statement to the 44th meeting of 
the IWC IWC/44/OS ICFA (1992); International Coalition of Fisheries Associations, The 
45th Annual IWC Meeting: Opening Statement of the ICFA IWC/45/OS ICFA (1993); ICFA, 
The 46th Annual IWC Meeting, Opening Statement of the International Coalition of 
Fisheries Associations IWC/46/OS ICFA (1994); GGT, Opening Statement of Global 
Guardian Trust IWC/47/OS GGT (1995); JWA, Opening Statement by the Japan Whaling 
Association IWC/47/OS JWA (1995); Riches of the Sea, Opening Statement of the Riches 
of the Sea IWC/47/OS RS (1995). 
724 United Kingdom, Norway, Chile, ASOC and ARK, Bridging the krill divide: 
understanding cross-sector objectives for krill fishing and conservation SC-CAMLR-
XXXIII/BG/34 (20 September 2014) ARK co-submitted this joint report with the United 
Kingdom, Chile and ASOC on cross-sectoral impacts on krill fisheries. This report 
addressed MPAs among other topics. Within the report, it was noted that ARK 
supported initiatives that facilitated the science that supported ecosystem and fisheries 
analysis, which bear indirectly on MPAs. Both of these scientific subjects support the 
designation of MPAs. However, industry representatives, including Aker Biomarine 
(ARK), placed the location of MPAs as low in priority in relation to krill fisheries. This 
was in contrast to several ASOC members and independent NGOs, present at the 
meeting from which the report arose. These ASOC members unanimously identified that 
‘MPAs were important for achieving objectives and aspirations for the krill-based 
ecosystem and fishery’. 
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fishing vessels in the Southern Ocean provide catch data to the Commission, in the 
otherwise uninhabited region.725 
Before the inclusion of MPAs on the Commission’s 2005 agenda, the IUCN had 
contributed background papers to the Commission,726 advocating for discussion of 
MPAs.727 Subsequent to this advocacy, the IUCN participated in the 2005 Workshop that 
informed the ensuing work of the Commission.728 The IUCN contributed expert 
advisers, and a paper to the workshop.729 ASOC contributed to the MPA debate through 
formal and informal means associated with Commission meeting attendance. This 
involved lobbying and demonstrations outside of the formal meeting structure, the 
circulation of informal documents, addressing the Commission on the agenda, and 
submitting information papers for the Commission’s consideration. 
SCAR roles include working paper submissions to the CAMLR Commission.730 However, 
more significant is SCAR’s intersessional work on the Scientific Committee on Antarctic 
 
725 Five-day Catch and Effort Reporting System Conservation Measure 23-01 (2016); 
Ten-day Catch and Effort Reporting System Conservation Measure 23-02 (2016); 
Monthly Catch and Effort Reporting System Conservation Measure 23-03 (2016); 
Monthly Fine-Scale Catch and Effort Data Reporting System for Trawl, Longline and Pot 
Fisheries Conservation Measure 23-04 (2016); Monthly Fine-Scale Biological Data 
Reporting System for Trawl, Longline and Pot Fisheries Conservation Measure 23-05 
(2000); Data Reporting System for Euphausia superba Fisheries Conservation Measure 
23-06 (2012); Daily Catch and Effort Reporting System for Exploratory Fisheries, with the 
exception of exploratory krill fisheries Conservation Measure 23-07 (2016). 
726 IUCN, Marine Protection in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XVI/BG/40 (20 October 
1997); IUCN, Area-based Conservation and Management Measures utilized under 
CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXV/BG18 (19 September 2006); IUCN, A summary of the guidelines 
for applying the IUCN protected area management categories to Marine Protected Areas 
(supplementary to the 2008 Guidelines) CCAMLR-XXXI/BG/18 (22 September 2012). 
727 IUCN, Marine Protection in the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XVI/BG/40 (20 October 
1997); IUCN, Report to the World Conservation Union (IUCN) to the CCAMLR CCAMLR-
XVI/BG/37 (27 October 1997); IUCN, Report of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) 
CCAMLR-XXI/BG/34 (22 October 2002). 
728 Report of the CCAMLR Workshop on Marine Protected Areas (Silver Spring< MD, USA, 
29 August to 1 September 2005) SC-CAMLR-XXIV Annex 7, 591 [5]. 
729 Ibid 592 [8]. 
730 SCAR biology symposium (Curitiba, Brazil, 25 to 29 July 2005) Workshop on marine 
protected areas (27 July 2005) WS-MPA-05/13; SCAR, The CAMLR/SCAR-MarBIN 
Biogeographic Atlas of the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XXX/BG/11; SCAR, Annual report 
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Research – Marine Biodiversity Information Network (SCAR MAR-Bin), a database 
dedicated to the collation of data on Antarctic research. This database facilitates 
scientific research and work within the Antarctic. This clearly supports a core element 
of the CAMLR Convention object and purpose by providing scientific data. As a 
significant NGO within the ATS and in being a scientific organization solely dedicated to 
Antarctic scientific research, SCAR is uniquely positioned. The knowledge enhancement 
contributions of SCAR happen both within meetings and intersessionally to the CAMLR 
Commission and other Antarctic Treaty organs.731  
7.3.2 Whaling Commission – NGO roles 
The 2010 – 2016 period of discussion around the South Atlantic Sanctuary focussed on 
the lead up to the 2016 Sanctuary proposal. While there were several different 
proposals for a South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary from 2001 – 2016,732 the 2016 proposal 
saw substantial hybrid and environmental NGO engagement on the issue of sanctuaries, 
and some opposition from industry NGOs and pro-whaling environmental NGOs 
through Opening Statements. The submission of Opening Statements across the 2010 – 
2016 period demonstrated a divide between NGOs engaging exclusively with 
conservation and those emphasising the need for a scientific approach to conservation, 
bearing in mind future use of whale resources. Global Guardian Trust (GGT), was the 
sole pro-whaling environmental NGO to address the Sanctuary issue through Opening 
 
from SCAR to CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXVIII/BG/34; SCAR, Annual report from SCAR to 
CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXIX/BG/15; SCAR, Annual report from SCAR to CCAMLR CCAMLR-
XXX/BG/15. 
731 SCAR, Annual report from SCAR to CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXX/BG/15, 3. 
732 Voting on proposed Schedule amendments to create a South Atlantic Whale 
Sanctuary (South Atlantic Sanctuary) were not successful over the course of the 15 
years it has been considered by the Commission. From 2001-2004 (IWC-53 – IWC-56) 
both South Pacific and South Atlantic Sanctuary proposals were voted upon. In 2005, 
2007, 2011 (deferred), 2012, 2014 and 2016 (IWC-57, IWC-59, IWC-63, IWC-64, IWC-
65, and IWC- 66) the Commission voted on the South Atlantic Sanctuary. Each year 




Statements. It highlighted the need for a scientific basis for sanctuary designation in 
2010733 but left the issue alone in subsequent years.  
There were diverse pro-whaling environmental NGOs highlighting the conservation 
value of designating a sanctuary in the South Atlantic,734 with some limited references 
to the scientific value of sanctuaries.735 The IUCN expressed support for the South 
Atlantic Sanctuary, referring to ongoing management requirements, and its capacity to 
contribute expertise. It almost avoided the divisions on the lethal use issue by 
recognising the need to defer decision making until a future date. However, the 
exclusion of any lethal activities from designated sanctuary areas under Article V meant 
that the IUCN also excluded consideration of how the sanctuary would impact on 
potential future lethal use of whale resource:736 
‘We see the proposed Sanctuary as a long-term measure that should help ensure 
that potential impacts on cetaceans are taken into account at an early stage in 
future decisions regarding the management and use of marine areas within the 
Sanctuary.’’ 
The words ‘future decisions regarding the management and use of marine areas within 
the Sanctuary’ avoids consideration of lethal use by restricting focus to within the 
sanctuary area.  This reflects the language of its own World Conservation Congress 
 
733 GGT, Opening Statement to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/62/OS GGT 
(2010). 
734 Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening Statement IWC/62/OS NRDC (2010); 
Organización para la Conservación de Cetáceos, OCC Opening Statement IWC/62/OS 
OCC (2010); PEW Environment Group, Opening Statement: PEW Environment Group 
IWC/62/OS PEW (2010); ASOC, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS ASOC (2011); AWI, 
Opening Statement IWC/63/OS AWI (2011); Humane Society International, Opening 
Statement IWC/63/OS HSI (2011); Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening 
Statement IWC/63/OS NRDC (2011); Ocean Care and ProWildife, Joint Opening 
Statement IWC/63/OS OC (2011); WWF, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS WWF (2011); 
Green Vegans, Opening Statement IWC/64/OS GV (2012); NRDC, Opening Statement 
IWC/64/OS NRDC (2012); WWF, Opening Statement IWC/64/OS WWF (2012); Animal 
Welfare Institute, Opening Statement IWC/65/OS AWI (2014); WWF, Opening Statement 
IWC/65/OS WWF(2014); WWF, WWF IWC66 Opening Statement IWC/66/OS WWF 
(2016). 
735 Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opening Statement IWC/65/OS Greenpeace (2014). 
736 IUCN, Statement, IWC/66/OS IUCN (2016). 
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(WCC) resolution on the South Atlantic Proposal. The resolution used language that did 
not refer to the Whaling Convention object and purpose, although it did emphasise the 
broader international law obligations under Article 65 of the Law of the Sea Convention. 
Speaking rights were engaged from in 2012, 2014 and 2016, 737 and informal observer-
associated behaviours were in evidence at the 2016 Whaling Commission meeting.738 
The 2012 amendments to the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure resulted in NGOs 
speaking to the agenda item of the sanctuary in 2012, 2014 and 2016. However, spoken 
statements were limited to expressions of support and contained no reference to the 
basis of the support.739 In 2012, the Green Association of Panama ‘thanked the 
proponents and supporters of the proposal and urged them to continue working to 
make the sanctuary a reality.’740 In 2014, the environmental NGO, Instituto de 
Conservación Ballenas (ICB) and the hybrid NGO, International Wildlife Management 
 
737 IWC 64th Meeting of July 2012, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commissions 2012 – covering the 2011-2012 financial year’ (Panama City, Panama, 
adopted July 2012) 60; Chair’s Report in IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, 
‘Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the July 2012 
– October 2014 financial year’ (Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) [81], 11: 
Chair’s Report IWC 66th Annual Meeting of October 2016, ‘Annual Report of the 
International Whaling Commission 2016 – covering the October 2014 – October 2016 
financial year’ (Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2016) [62], 7.  
738 A primary environmental NGO activity was a ‘South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary’ 
forum. Pens, folders, ribbons and notepads branded with a South Atlantic Whale 
Sanctuary logo were handed out to attendees, and a video and slide show presentation 
were given, with speeches from both NGOs and Latin American member state delegates: 
author’s own observation at Santuario de Balenos de Atlantico Sul – South Atlantic 
Whale Sanctuary presentation, Sunday 4pm, 23rd October 2016). 
739 IWC 64th Meeting of July 2012, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commissions 2012 – covering the 2011-2012 financial year’ (Panama City, Panama, 
adopted July 2012) 60; IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the 
International Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the July 2012 – October 2014 
financial year’ (Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) 12-13; Chair’s Report of the 
66th Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (24-28 October 2016 Portorož, 
Slovenia) 10-11. 
740 IWC 64th Meeting of July 2012, ‘Annual Report of the International Whaling 
Commissions 2012 – covering the 2011-2012 financial year’ (Panama City, Panama, 
adopted July 2012) 60. 
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Consortium World Conservation Trust (IWMC WCT) expressed support for and 
opposition to the sanctuary, respectively.741  
The 2014 verbatim records indicate that the IWMC maintained that decision-making 
should be based on scientific advice, and that ‘science had said that there is no 
ecological justification for the establishment of another sanctuary.’742 However, in June 
2016, the Scientific Committee found that the management plan was adequate to 
establish the South Atlantic Sanctuary.743 With this development, it was unsurprising 
that the IWMC did not speak to this agenda item in 2016. In the same 2014 verbatim 
records, the ICB contribution to Commission discussion on the South Atlantic Sanctuary 
proposal avoided recognising lethal use as a legitimate aspect of the Whaling 
Convention, placing the proposal within the framework of the Law of the Sea Convention 
obligations for marine mammals.744 Connections were made between conservation and 
the sanctuary, as would be expected, but the interest of coastal communities in whale 
watching was posited as a significant aspect of the proposal.745 The framework of the 
Whaling Convention was not the fundamental reference point. 
In 2016, the IUCN and the ICB stated their support for the Sanctuary proposal. The 
IUCN’s work on protected areas, within its World Conservation Congress (WCC)746 was 
 
741 IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the July 2012 – October 2014 financial year’ 
(Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) 12. 
742 IWMC, Statement in Plenary discussion on Agenda Item 5.1, IWC65 (2014) Plenary 
Session 1, 16th October 2014 (from 16:41 audio file) 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=%21collection223&k=. 
743 IUCN World Conservation Congress (WCC), South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary WCC-
2016-Res-091-EN (6.091) (2016, Hawai’i); IWC Scientific Committee, ‘2016 Report of 
the Scientific Committee’ (2017) 18 Journal of Cetacean Resource Management (Suppl) 1 
[19.1.2], 91. 
744 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 
1982, 1883 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) Articles 65 and 194. 
745 ICB, Statement in Plenary discussion on Agenda Item 5.1, IWC65 (2014) Plenary 
Session 1, 16th October 2014 (from 19:28 audio file) 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=%21collection223&k=. 
746 IUCN World Conservation Congress (WCC), South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary WCC-
2016-Res-091-EN (6.091) (2016, Hawai’i). 
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referred to by Costa Rica as part of its reason for a ‘yes’ vote.747 The WCC resolution 
supported the designation of a South Atlantic Sanctuary for reasons that were unrelated 
to the Whaling Convention. No pro-whaling environmental NGOs spoke on the agenda 
item.  
In 2016, the South Atlantic Sanctuary was promoted through a state-sponsored 
presentation on the sanctuary, coordinated with several environmental NGOs, including 
Greenpeace, ICB, and the Organización para la Conservación de Cetáceos (OCC).748 The 
NGOs supporting the initiative are located in South Atlantic countries, particularly 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The presentation was accompanied by promotional 
materials, including ribbons, folders, USB drives, stickers and lapel pins with sanctuary 
branding. A photo display in support of the sanctuary was prominently displayed with 
the state and NGO sponsors emblazoned on the three banners.749 However, there was 
no substantive content of relevance to the Commission or its convention. The primary 
arguments focused on the economic, cultural and social benefits of the sanctuary to 
national populations for the purposes of whale watching and did not reference the 
framework of the Whaling Convention itself. Use was discussed at the presentation, but 
the use was for whale watching and eco-tourism.  
In general, the anti-whaling environmental NGOs presented content that avoided the 
intersection of use, future use and conservation. Developments in the Scientific 
Committee’s review of the South Atlantic proposal meant that despite the absence of 
scientific bases in earlier statements, by 2016 there was clear accord within the 
decision-making of the Commission to allow for consideration of this aspect of the 
object and purpose. However, the statements from NGOs, both oral and written, were 
mixed in terms of the reference to scientific bases for their positions. The IUCN excluded 
consideration of lethal use from its oral and written contributions, referencing a 
document that contained no support for the legal framework of the Whaling 
Commission. Pro-whaling hybrid NGO, IWMC held a position requiring scientific data, 
 
747 Chair’s Report of the 66th Meeting of the International Whaling Commission 24-28 
October 2016 Portorož, Slovenia, 11. 
748 Santuario de Balenos de Atlantico Sul – South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary 
presentation, Sunday 4pm, 23rd October 2016). 
749 See Appendix 4. 
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and in not presenting further oral discussion on the sanctuary in 2016 indicated 
acquiescence to the position taken by the Scientific Committee. 
7.4 Object and purpose analysis of MPA-related NGO roles in the CAMLR 
Commission 
NGO submissions to the Commission can be assessed in terms of their accordance with 
the object and purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention. In analysing formal roles, 
key indicators of accordance with the object and purpose require that subject to the 
primary principles of conservation and rational use, NGO contributions should evince a 
precautionary approach, founded in scientific data, that contributes to the long-term 
health and useability of ecosystems and marine living resources. 
To demonstrate accordance with the object and purpose principles, NGO contributions 
should therefore: 
5. Recognise the interests of states in the use of marine living resources (MLR);  
6. Cite credible scientific data and sources in promoting MPAs as a conservation 
tool;  
7. Refrain from pushing beyond the boundaries of the precautionary and 
ecosystem approaches to argue for conservation for conservation’s sake; and 
8. Consider rational use or not exclude it from conservation advocacy.  
NGO roles bearing on MPAs in the CAMLR Commission are evaluated by reference to 
these criteria. 
7.4.1 ASOC 
ASOC frequently neglected to address the rational use aspect of conservation in Article 
II.2. Accordingly, until 2016, it did not recognise the interests of states in the rational 
use of marine living resources. The emphasis placed upon conservation by ASOC 
arguably excluded the principle of rational use from the conservation dialogue, and so 
failed to address the full range of the Convention’s object and purpose. 
The emphasis of ASOC was primarily on conservation as the objective of the CAMLR 
Convention in Article II.1. The weight of papers presented by ASOC to the Commission 
and the content of the interventions were significantly directed toward conservation. 
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The active use of careful and considered research presenting key scientific findings from 
a variety of sources clearly supported the principle of scientific cooperation and advice, 
as well as the science-reliant precautionary approach. However, the sustained absence 
of rational use prevented object and purpose-compliant contributions from ASOC to the 
MPA deliberations. In other contexts, members of ASOC, such as Pew Charitable Trusts 
have highlighted the value of protected areas to fishing in the form of increases in both 
population size and individual biomass.750 However, this awareness was only 
infrequently emphasised in the Commission.751 
Informally distributed materials were also conservation-oriented or lacked reference to 
object and purpose principles at all. For example, a pamphlet distributed in 2011 by 
ASOC member Antarctic Ocean Alliance (AOA), was titled ‘The world is watching and 
time is ticking’ emphasising that ‘1.3 million people in 121 countries have joined the call 
…. For Antarctic marine protection.’ This included Leonardo DiCaprio, Jacques 
Cousteau’s grandson, and Prince Albert II. In advocating for MPAs, these and other high-
profile individuals received a full page of coverage, while climate change impacts 
received half a page.752 AOA also distributed a pamphlet presenting the reasons for 
establishing MPAs and marine reserves.753 While this paper emphasised the 
precautionary principle, conservation, and scientific endeavours, the section on the 
 
750 Andrea Kavanagh, ‘The World’s Largest MPA, Antarctica’s Ross Sea’ (Lecture 
delivered at the Institute of Marine and Antarctic Studies, Hobart, Tasmania, 7 April 
2017). 
751 CCAMLR-XXX Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 2011, ‘Report of the Thirtieth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 2011) [7.43]; 
ASOC, How fishing and marine protection can coexist in the Southern Ocean: An 
economic analysis of the Ross Sea and East Antarctic MPA proposals CCAMLR-
XXXV/BG/23 (17 September 2016). 
752 Antarctic Ocean Alliance, The World is Watching and Time is Ticking (pamphlet 
distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, October 2011). 
753 Antarctic Ocean Alliance, Key Principles in Designating Marine Protected Areas and 
Marine Reserves, (pamphlet distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, October 2011). 
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benefits of MPAs and marine reserves did not note the significant benefit to commercial 
fisheries that follows on from establishing MPAs.754  
Other informal documents, particularly the ECO publication, distributed by ASOC 
members at CAMLR Commission meetings, placed in break rooms and on delegate 
tables consistently emphasised all aspects of the object and purpose principles except 
rational use.755 While there were elements of light-heartedness to these papers, there 
were quite serious criticisms of member states as ‘cynically delay[ing]’ consensus or 
‘block[ing] to justify short-term objectives’756 There was also rejection of rational use 
concerns.757 This type of engagement is unlikely to be conducive to developing 
consensus, particularly in light of failures identified in ASOC’s networks and abilities to 
engage with member states such as Russia and China.758 The conservation position of 
ASOC accorded strongly with a majority of states within the CAMLR Commission. 
However, the deliberations had to convince fishing member states, which were 
 
754 Kavanagh, above n 750; CCAMLR-XXX Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 2011, 
‘Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 
November 2011) [7.43]. 
755 Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 1: The Heart of CCAMLR (Pamphlet distributed at 
CCAMLR, Hobart, 21 October 2013); Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 2: No title (Pamphlet 
distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, 25 October 2013); Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 3: 
Warning: Zombie MPAs!!! (Pamphlet distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, 31 October 2013); 
Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 1: The ABCs of MPAs (Pamphlet distributed at CCAMLR, 
Hobart, 20 October 2017); Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 2: A wish list for the special area for 
scientific study (Pamphlet distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, 26 October 2017). 
756 Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 1: The Heart of CCAMLR (Pamphlet distributed at 
CCAMLR, Hobart, 21 October 2013) stating MPAs are ‘not about sectoral fisheries 
management – this is about biodiversity conservation’; Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 1: The 
ABCs of MPAs (Pamphlet distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, 20 October 2017) describing 
‘access to fish, fishing and fishing grounds’ as ‘short-term objectives’. 
757 Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 1: The Heart of CCAMLR (Pamphlet distributed at 
CCAMLR, Hobart, 21 October 2013) stating MPAs are ‘not about sectoral fisheries 
management – this is about biodiversity conservation’; Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 1: The 
ABCs of MPAs (Pamphlet distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, 20 October 2017) describing 
‘access to fish, fishing and fishing grounds’ as ‘short-term objectives’; Ah Lee Ming et al., 
ECO No 2: A wish list for the special area for scientific study (Pamphlet distributed at 
CCAMLR, Hobart, 26 October 2017); Ah Lee Ming et al., ECO No 1: The Heart of CCAMLR 
(Pamphlet distributed at CCAMLR, Hobart, 21 October 2013). 
758 Interview with Interviewee 18 (1 December 2014). 
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withholding consensus, of the positive relationship of MPAs to continued fishing 
interests. In this, the failure to address the central object and purpose principle of ‘use’ 
may have contributed to significant delay in the achievement of MPA designation. 
7.4.2 Member state and stakeholder views on ASOC participation in MPA designation 
It was possible to assess the reception of ASOC contributions within the Commission. 
Interviewees associated with the CAMLR Commission demonstrated the wide range of 
views taken of ASOC as an NGO contributor. The efficacy of ASOC in engaging with the 
consensus decision-making structure to push for MPA designation was questioned by 
one interviewee759 but lauded by another.760 This dichotomy was also observable in 
relation to the overall value of NGO contributions to the MPA debate.761 However there 
was also a view that ASOC was fundamentally powerless. One interviewee stated that in 
influencing Commission debate NGOs were ‘almost irrelevant before they start – it’s a 
reality’.762 An interviewee with strong NGO ties noted that ASOC had little capacity to 
‘pick [an issue] up and push an agenda’.763 Another interviewee thought that the ASOC 
push for MPAs was a sideline to and a distraction from the Commission’s core work of 
krill fishery regulation.764 Another described the MPA issue as ‘a circus’ and a 
distraction from the serious regulatory work of the Commission.765 
This divide was also observable in the member state questionnaires answered at the 
2016 CAMLR Commission annual meeting. However, states were far less critical of ASOC 
contributions than the non-state actor interviewees. It is noted that only eight of the 25-
member states returned questionnaires. However, due to confidentiality issues no state 
 
759 Interview with Interviewee 18 (1 December 2014). 
760 Interview with Interviewee 4 (30 October 2014). 
761 Interview with Interviewee 4 (30 October 2014); Interview with Interviewee 18 (1 
December 2014). 
762 Interview with Interviewee 11 (2 November 2015). 
763 Interview with Interviewee 4 (30 October 2014). 
764 Interview with Interviewee 12 (8 December 2014). 
765 Interview with Interviewee 5 (28 April 2016).  
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party interviews were conducted, so these anonymous questionnaires provide the only 
insight into member state views of NGO contributions.  
 
Figure 7.1 Results from 2016 anonymous member state survey on NGO roles in the CAMLR 
Commission  
While five member-states clearly valued the contributions of ASOC to the MPA 
discussion, two member states viewed ASOC contributions as ‘little’, and another 
member state did not respond to this question. Overall, this view is more positive than 
that of interviewees.  
Arguably, the diversity of responses validates the utility of an object and purpose 
analysis. Such analysis can provide a constant reference point to measure NGO 
contributions by the nature of the contributions rather than subjective perception of 
value. The number of contributions from ASOC requires a constant reference point. 
From its first Commission meeting oral and documentary submissions in 2006 through 
to 2016, ASOC submitted 25 background papers and exercised speaking privileges on 
the topic of MPAs 26 times in the same period. In 2015 alone, ASOC addressed the 
Commission seven times on the issue of MPAs. The content of the interventions and 
statements from the ASOC delegation primarily advocated for MPAs,766 with some 
 
766 CCAMLR-XXV Meeting of 23 October – 3 November, 2006, ‘Report of the Twenty-Fifth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2006) [6.5], [16.9]; 
CCAMLR-XXVI Meeting of 22 October – 2 November, 2007, ‘Report of the Twenty-Sixth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2006) [7.17]; 
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significant legal interpretation of the Convention,767 contributions to knowledge 
enhancement,768 minor references to policy development,769 and some discussion of 
 
CCAMLR-XXVII Meeting of 27 October – 7 November, 2008, ‘Report of the Twenty-Seventh 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 2008) [7.14], 
[16.8]; CCAMLR-XXVIII Meeting of 26 October – 6 November, 2009, ‘Report of the Twenty-
Eight Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 6 November 2009) [7.17]; 
CCAMLR-XXIX Meeting of 25 October – 5 November, 2010, ‘Report of the Twenty-Ninth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 5 November 2010) [7.20], 
[14.2]; CCAMLR-XXX Meeting of 24 October – 4 November, 2011, ‘Report of the Thirtieth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November, 2011) [7.43]; 
CCAMLR-XXXI Meeting of 23 October – 1 November, 2012, ‘Report of the Thirty-First 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2012) [7.67], 
[7.104], [9.10]; CCAMLR-XXXII Meeting of 23 October – 1 November, 2013, ‘Report of the 
Thirty-Second Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November, 
2013) [7.57], [9.8]; CCAMLR-XXXIII Meeting of 20 – 31 October, 2014, ‘Report of the 
Thirty-Third Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 31 October, 2014) 
[7.76], [9.12]; CCAMLR-XXXIV Meeting of 19-30 October 2015, ‘Report of the Thirty-
Fourth Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 30 October 2015) [8.52], 
[8.93] [8.122] [9.27] [10.10]. 
767 CCAMLR-XXX Meeting of 24 October – 4 November 2011, ‘Report of the Thirtieth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 4 November 2011) [7.43]; 
CCAMLR-XXXI Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2012, ‘Report of the Thirty-First 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2012) [9.10]; 
CCAMLR-XXXII Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2013, ‘Report of the Thirty-Second 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2013) [5.90]; 
CCAMLR-XXXIII Meeting of 20 – 31 October 2014, ‘Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of 
the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 31 October 2014) [9.12]; CCAMLR-XXXIV 
Meeting of 19-30 October 2015, ‘Report of the Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the Commission’ 
(Hobart, Australia, adopted 30 October 2015) [8.106]. 
768 CCAMLR-XXV Meeting of 23 October – 3 November 2006, ‘Report of the Twenty-Fifth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 3 November 2006) [16.9]; 
CCAMLR-XXVIII (2009) [7.17]; CCAMLR-XXXIII Meeting of 20 – 31 October 2014, ‘Report 
of the Thirty-Third Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 31 October 
2014) [7.76]. 
769 CCAMLR-XXVI Meeting of 22 October – 2 November 2007, ‘Report of the Twenty-Sixth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 2 November 2007) [7.17]; 
CCAMLR-XXIX Meeting of 25 October – 5 November 2010, ‘Report of the Twenty-Ninth 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 5 November 2010) [7.20]; 
CCAMLR-XXXI Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2012, ‘Report of the Thirty-First 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2012) [7.67]; 
CCAMLR-XXXII Meeting of 23 October – 1 November 2013, ‘Report of the Thirty-Second 
Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 1 November 2013) [5.90]. 
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review procedures for evaluating MPAs.770 The advocacy position taken by ASOC was 
supported by topics including climate change,771 historical significance,772 intact 
ecosystem,773 and eventually, the commercial benefits that attached to the designation 
of MPAs.774 
The inclusion of fishing interests in a 2016 background paper recognized the rational 
use element of conservation under Article II of the Convention. Without recognition of 
this principle, the capacity of ASOC to influence the Member states resisting consensus 
was low. While there is no means to draw a causal connection, the movement of the 
ASOC delegation toward accepting rational use as a legitimate consideration of states 
was met with the last resisting states joining consensus in 2016, and the introduction of 
the Ross Sea region MPA conservation measure.775 
A number of comments from interviewees can be aligned with this perspective on the 
ineffectiveness of ASOC in moving forward the agenda on MPAs. The low influence ASOC 
 
770 CCAMLR-XXVII Meeting of 27 October – 7 November 2008, ‘Report of the Twenty-
Seventh Meeting of the Commission’ (Hobart, Australia, adopted 7 November 2008) 
[7.14]. 
771 ASOC, The Case for Special Protection of the Ross Sea CCAMLR-XXVIII/BG/28 (26 
September 2009); ASOC, Climate Change and the Role of CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXIX/BG/19 
(27 September 2010); ASOC, Key Principles in Designating Marine Protected Areas and 
Marine Reserves CCAMLR-XXXII/BG/16 (21 September 2013); ASOC, AOA Briefing 3: 
Climate Change and Ocean Acidification: Benefits of Marine Reserves and Marine 
Protected Areas CCAMLR-SM-II/BG/07 (12 June 2013); ASOC, Incorporating climate 
change into CCAMLR’s decision making processes CCAMLR-XXXIII/BG/21; ASOC, A 
representative system of CCAMLR MPAs: Current proposals and beyond CCAMLR-
XXXV/BG/26 (17 September, 2016). 
772 ASOC, The Ross Sea: A Candidate for Immediate Inclusion in a Network of Marine 
Protected Areas CCAMLR-XXVII/BG/30 (October 2008); ASOC, Protecting the values of 
Antarctic Specially Managed and Protected Areas CCAMLR-XXXI/BG/15 (22 September 
2012). 
773 ASOC, The Ross Sea: A Candidate for Immediate Inclusion in a Network of Marine 
Protected Areas CCAMLR-XXVII/BG/30 (October 2008); ASOC, The Case for Special 
Protection of the Ross Sea CCAMLR-XXVIII/BG/28 (26 September 2009). 
774 ASOC, How fishing and marine protection can coexist in the Southern Ocean: An 
economic analysis of the Ross Sea and East Antarctic MPA proposals CCAMLR-
XXXV/BG/23 (17 September 2016). 
775 Ross Sea region marine protected area Conservation Measure 91-05 (2016). 
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had with swaying consensus-resistant nations, notably China and Russia, is indicative of 
a failure to engage with the nature of the CAMLR Convention and the Commission itself – 
consensus requires addressing all aspects and concerns of the terms of the CAMLR 
Convention as viewed by all parties. One interviewee noted that this was a significant 
failure specifically on MPAs,776 while another viewed this failure as symptomatic of 
NGO engagement.777  
Another perceived issue was that, generally MPAs were a distraction from the 
significant regulatory and scientific work of the CAMLR Commission on krill and other 
Antarctic marine species. By their nature, MPAs promote a whole of ecosystem 
approach to conservation management. However, significant commentators viewed 
MPAs as inhibiting the work of the Commission on other matters.778 As the MPA issue 
was one championed heavily by ASOC, this can be construed as a criticism of ASOC’s 
participation.  
7.4.3 Hybrid NGO: IUCN 
The position of IUCN as an international NGO with broad state, NGO, and individual 
membership places it in a unique position as a body whose decisions represent an 
international viewpoint on environmental issues. There are qualities of the IUCN that 
are generally supportive of the object and purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention. 
For example, its decades-long contributions on protected areas means that it set many 
benchmarks for international designation, regulation, and evaluation of protected 
areas.779 Within the CAMLR Commission itself, the IUCN has acted as an observer and 
 
776 Interview with Interviewee 18 (1 December 2014). 
777 Interview with Interviewee 11 (2 November 2015). 
778 Interview with Interviewee 5 (28 April 2016); Interview with Interviewee 11 (2 
November 2015); Interview with Interviewee 12 (8 December 2014). 
779 Rob Nicoll and Jon C Day, ‘Correct application of the IUCN protected area 
management categories to the CCAMLR Convention Area’ (2017) 77 Marine Policy 9; for 
example, the IUCN has a Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series: IUCN, Best 
Practice Protected Area Guideline Series (no date) 
https://portals.iucn.org/library/taxonomy/term/35899; National Heritage Trust 
Australia, Australian IUCN Reserve Management Principles for Commonwealth Marine 
Protected Areas (Australian Antarctic Division, no date); IUCN, Guidelines for Protected 
Area Management Categories (Gland, Switzerland, 1994). 
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participant at intersessional workshops and meetings. It has recognised the status of 
the Convention Area as qualifying as a Category IV within the IUCN framework of 
protection.780  
The IUCN presented papers in 1997 that suggested the Commission move toward 
placing MPAs on the agenda,781 indicating its prescience and influence as an NGO 
observer within the Commission. The IUCN later supported the work of the Commission 
toward establishing the Ross Sea MPA through its submission of working papers in 
2006 and 2012.782 These papers reference the principles under which the Commission 
works – the ecosystem approach, conservation, and scientific research, while 
recognising the rational use aspect of the Commission’s regulatory jurisdiction.783 The 
intersection of object and purpose principles in the CAMLR Commission’s work is 
clearly recognised in the nature of the advice given by the IUCN. This was demonstrated 
in the 2012 Supplement, in which the best practice standards set by the IUCN 
demonstrate a clear overlap with the conservation-use principles of the CAMLR 
Convention.784 Advice from the IUCN recommended: ‘Marine areas that involve 
extraction need to have defined long-term goals of conservation to be considered 
MPAs.’785 This advice makes clear connections to the object and purpose principles of 
 
780 IUCN, Area-based Conservation and Management Measures utilized under CCAMLR 
CCAMLR-XXV/BG/18 (19 September 2006). 
781 IUCN, Report to the World Conservation Union (IUCN) to the CCAMLR CCAMLR-
XVI/BG/37 (27 October 1997) Recommendation 3; IUCN, Marine Protection in the 
Southern Ocean CCAMLR-XVI/BG/40 (20 October 1997). 
782 IUCN, Area-based Conservation and Management Measures utilized under CCAMLR 
CCAMLR-XXV/BG/18 (19 September 2006); IUCN, A summary of the guidelines for 
applying the IUCN protected area management categories to Marine Protected Areas 
(supplementary to the 2008 Guidelines) CCAMLR-XXXI/BG/18 (22 September 2012). 
783 IUCN, Area-based Conservation and Management Measures utilized under CCAMLR 
CCAMLR-XXV/BG/18 (19 September 2006) 2; IUCN, A summary of the guidelines for 
applying the IUCN protected area management categories to Marine Protected Areas 
(supplementary to the 2008 Guidelines) CCAMLR-XXXI/BG/18 (22 September 2012) 3. 
784 IUCN, A summary of the guidelines for applying the IUCN protected area management 
categories to Marine Protected Areas (supplementary to the 2008 Guidelines) CCAMLR-
XXXI/BG/18 (22 September 2012). 
785 Ibid, 3. 
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the CAMLR Convention, referencing use, conservation, and long-term considerations, 
demonstrating the IUCN’s accordance with the object and purpose. 
7.4.4 SCAR 
The position of SCAR within the ATS provides it with credibility unattainable to most 
other NGOs. Its purposes are fundamentally aligned with the science principles of both 
the Antarctic Treaty and the CAMLR Convention, and it serves no organizational 
principles beyond providing the best data and scientific advice possible within the 
context of the ATS and the Antarctic marine and terrestrial ecosystems.786  
The SCAR observer has been consistently supportive of the object and purpose principle 
of scientific cooperation. The focus of observer background papers on Antarctic marine 
life and ecosystems clearly connects to the conservation and ecosystem foci in Article II 
of the CAMLR Convention.787 The papers do not preclude rational use, although papers 
do not expressly mention it either. However, as SCAR papers are information-driven, 
rather than policy-based, this absence is not remarkable, as science-based papers set 
the parameters of conservation aims by which to then set catch allowances and terms. 
The papers submitted by SCAR routinely reflect its intention to support the work of the 
Commission through knowledge enhancement articulated as scientific cooperation. 
These are key features of the object and purpose of the CAMLR Convention in relation to 
the Antarctic Treaty.788 The content of SCAR background papers is information-driven, 
providing points of possible interest in SCAR’s work for the CAMLR Commission and 
Contracting Governments to consider in furtherance of Commission work. SCAR 
submitted background papers on MPAs to the Commission. These bore directly on 
MPAs as a biodiversity conservation tool.789 These papers connect to the broader 
 
786 SCAR, Welcome to the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (2017) 
https://www.scar.org/. 
787 SCAR, The CAMLR/SCAR-MarBIN Biogeographic Atlas of the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-
XXX/BG/11. 
788 SCAR, Annual report from SCAR to CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXVIII/BG/34; SCAR, Annual 
report from SCAR to CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXIX/BG/15; SCAR, Annual report from SCAR to 
CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXX/BG/15. 
789 Secretariat, Report on the meeting of the International Steering Committee of the 
SCAR Marine Biodiversity Information Network (SCAR-MarBIN) SC-CAMLR-XXVI/BG/12; 
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contributions of SCAR in its database work, and with intersessional engagement, such as 
the Antarctic Science SCAR Symposium outcome.  
SCAR’s practical contribution to the work of the Commission is through the SCAR-
MarBIN, a series of databases that support the work of the CAMLR Commission, its 
Scientific Committee, its Secretariat, its member states, and its observers. Databases 
include: A taxonomic Register of Antarctic Marine Species (RAMS); the Antarctic 
Biodiversity data portal (ANTABIF) –; a Gazetteer of geographical details; a Map 
catalogue; Antarctic field guides; and complex datasets on species, organised by 
taxonomy and geography, on population density, catch quantities, reproductive 
characteristics and other species-based information relevant to conservation and 
fishing.790  
The complexity of an ecosystem approach, as required by Article II of the CAMLR 
Convention is clearly supported by the breadth of coverage of species data in the SCAR-
MarBIN, from electron microscope databases to population and catch records on fish 
and cetaceans. SCAR-MarBIN is specifically a set of support tools, providing scientific 
data and advice for decision makers in the Antarctic.791 It clearly supports a number of 
aspects of object and purpose. The breadth of the data, and its accessibility clearly 
support CAMLR Convention principles of scientific cooperation derived from the 
Antarctic Treaty, the ecosystem approach, and the use–conservation intersection of 
Article II of the Convention. 
In respect of MPAs, SCAR demonstrates support of the CAMLR Convention object and 
purpose through the intersection of scientific cooperation, support for conservation 
objectives, an ecosystem and precautionary approach, and enhancing knowledge for the 
determination of the ecosystem values. These are clear connections between the work 
of SCAR and object and purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention. These aspects are 
 
SCAR, The CAMLR/SCAR-MarBIN Biogeographic Atlas of the Southern Ocean CCAMLR-
XXX/BG/11; SCAR biology symposium (Curitiba, Brazil, 25 to 29 July 2005) Workshop 
on marine protected areas (27 July 2005) WS-MPA-05/13. 
790 Huw J Griffiths, Bruno Danis and Andrew Clarke, ‘Quantifying Antarctic marine 
biodiversity: The SCAR-MarBIN data portal’ (2011) 58(1-2) Deep Sea Research Part II: 
Topical Studies in Oceanography 18. 
791 SCAR, Annual report from SCAR to CCAMLR CCAMLR-XXX/BG/15, 3. 
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central to MPAs, as the focus of MPAs is ecosystem preservation of both significant 
species and areas with unique qualities. 
An important limitation of the SCAR-MarBIN is that the commercially-sensitive data 
generated by the CAMLR Commission is not stored on a SCAR-MarBIN database. This 
data is retained and protected by the CAMLR Commission to prevent IUU fishers 
exploiting publicly available commercial data on fishing locations and catch size. This 
also prevents any intersection of SCAR roles with ‘rational use’ as a commercial concept, 
and limits SCAR’s contributions to this aspect of the object and purpose to the scientific 
basis of ‘rational use’. However, as noted, the information-focussed nature of SCAR’s 
contributions prevents the absence of ‘rational use’ being indicative of a failure to 
address core aspects of the CAMLR Convention. The nature of SCAR’s contributions 
simply prevents direct interaction with this aspect of the object and purpose.  
SCAR is a good example for the argument that there is a causal connection between the 
adherence of an NGO to the object and purpose principles of the CAMLR Convention and 
the value with which the Commission treats NGO contributions. SCAR participation and 
support of the principles of scientific cooperation and objectivity influence the work of 
the CAMLR Commission.792 The scientific data also provides the means by which 
Conservation Measures can be first discussed in the Scientific Committee, indicating the 
value object and purpose compliant NGOs can bring to Article XXIII roles.  
7.5 Object and purpose analysis of sanctuary-related NGO roles in the Whaling 
Commission 
NGO submissions to the Whaling Commission can be assessed in terms of their 
accordance with the object and purpose principles of the Whaling Convention. In 
analysing formal roles, key indicators of accordance with the object and purpose 
 
792 SCAR biology symposium (Curitiba, Brazil, 25 to 29 July 2005) Workshop on marine 
protected areas (27 July 2005) WS-MPA-05/13; ‘Special Issue: IX SCAR International 
Biology Symposium. Evolution and Biodiversity in Antarctica’ (2007) 19(2) Antarctic 
Science ; Keith Reid, ‘Monitoring and management in the Antarctic – making the link 
between science and policy’ (2007) 19(2) Antarctic Science 267-270; Karl-Hermann 
Kock, ‘Antarctic Marine Living Resources – exploitation and its management in the 
Southern Ocean’ (2007) 19(2) Antarctic Science 231-238; Harris et al, ‘A new approach 
to selected Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the Southern Ocean (2007) 19(2) 
Antarctic Science 189-194. 
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require that subject to the primary principles of conservation and rational use, NGO 
contributions should recognise the purpose of conservation for re-establishing the 
whaling industry, the interests of consumers, present and future, of whales and whale 
products, and found position statements on scientific data to support the decision-
making of the Commission. 
To further the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention, NGO engagement on 
whale sanctuaries should address: 
4. the fundamental relationship between conservation and use, in which 
conservation is a mechanism for supporting the development and rehabilitation 
of whale stocks;  
5. that conservation is use-oriented for the purposes of supporting and/or re-
establishing the whaling industry for future generations;  
6. the consumers of whales and whale products; and 
7. the centrality of scientific data to decisions of the Commission to amend the 
Schedule.  
Due to the large number of environmental NGOs that engaged with the issue of the 
South Atlantic Sanctuary this section addresses environmental NGOs as a group, 
highlighting the varying degrees of engagement with the principles of the Whaling 
Convention object and purpose. This allows for a broader coverage than if an 
organization-by-organization approach was taken, as in 7.4 on NGO engagement with 
the CAMLR Commission. 
7.5.1 Environmental NGOs  
Anti-whaling environmental NGOs that pushed for sanctuary designation before 2012 
were fundamentally operating without one limb of the object and purpose – scientific 
evidence. Conversely, pro-whaling environmental NGOs were generally compliant, 
citing the need to consider science in exercising the Article V mandate for sanctuary 
designation.793 This insistence refers back to the terms of the Preamble, with its 
 
793 While only the IWMC and GGT made these observations in relation to the South 
Atlantic Sanctuary: IWMC WCT, Opening Statement IWC/55/OS IWMC (2003); GGT, 
Opening Statement to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/62/OS GGT (2010), 
earlier statements from pro-whaling organizations, both environmental and industrial 
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concerns for future generations and rebuilding the resource of whale stocks. 
Specifically, these NGOs cited the lack of scientific justification for sanctuaries, 
indicating an awareness of, and a frustration with, policy and representations that were 
outside the framework of the Whaling Convention. 
The South Atlantic Sanctuary proposal in 2016 has been the most recent manifestation 
of a broad conflict of positions between pro-whaling NGOs intent on representing a use-
oriented conservation position and anti-whaling NGOs re-interpreting the regulatory 
function of the Commission to be for ecotourism with a conservation position that 
repudiated any lethal use function of the Commission.794 A significant issue was that in 
the pre-2016 proposal period, including an initial 2014 proposal, the scientific 
justification for designation required by Article V was not provided. Rather the potential 
for scientific justification to follow designation was argued as the basis for designation.  
Science 
While the 2014 proposal for a South Atlantic Sanctuary referred to various scientific 
purposes,795 the proposal lacked a substantive management plan, and the Scientific 
Committee requested direction from the Commission on how to proceed with a review 
 
were in a similar vein: ICFA, International Coalition of Fisheries Associations statement to 
the 44th meeting of the IWC IWC/44/OS ICFA (1992); ICFA, The 46th Annual IWC Meeting, 
Opening Statement of the International Coalition of Fisheries Associations IWC/46/OS 
ICFA (1994); GGT, Opening Statement of Global Guardian Trust IWC/47/OS GGT (1995); 
AJSU, Opening Statement IWC/49/OS AJSU (1997); International Coalition of Fisheries 
Associations, ICFA Opening Statement IWC-53 IWC/53/OS ICFA (2001); International 
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Opening Statement IWC/54/OS 
IFCNR (2002);  
794 ELSA, Opening Statement to the 45th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/45/OS ELSA 
(1993); Cetacean Society International, Whale Watching and Whale Conservation 
IWC/52/OS/CSI (2000); Florida Caribbean Conservation Coalition, Opening Statement 
IWC-53 IWC/53/OS FCCC (2001); ACS, American Cetacean Society Opening Statement 
IWC/54/OS ACS (2002); FCCC, Opening Statement to the 54th meeting of the IWC 
IWC/54/OS FCCC (2002); IFAW, Opening Statement IWC/54/OS IFAW (2002); WWF, 
Opening Statement IWC/63/OS WWF (2011); WWF, WWF IWC66 Opening Statement 
IWC/66/OS WWF (2016). 
795 IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the July 2012 – October 2014 financial year’ 
(Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) 12; Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and 
Uruguay The South Atlantic: A Sanctuary for Whales IWC/65/08 (2014). 
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in the absence of one.796 The absence of a management plan in the 2014 South Atlantic 
proposal, and its defeat when voted upon resulted in the South Atlantic proposal in 
2016 containing a management plan for the South Atlantic Sanctuary – an attempt to 
meet the scientific justification criterion of Article V.797 The Scientific Committee 
articulated a tacit acceptance of the Sanctuary’s designation as meeting the terms of 
Article V ‘scientific justification’.798 This is in accordance with the Committee’s review 
role. 
The WWF took the interesting path of advocating the benefits of a sanctuary on behalf 
of states who were not party to the Whaling Convention.799 WWF also put forward 
several arguments that approached the principle of scientific justification through 
emphasising the importance of the South Atlantic to whale populations.800 However, 
there has there been no scientific research or resulting evidence that either of the 
previous sanctuaries – the Indian Ocean Sanctuary or the Southern Ocean Sanctuary has 
contributed to the conservation or increase of whale stocks. The most relevant research 
has indicated that area-based restrictions on acoustic noise may increase the lifespans 
and well-being of marine mammals, including cetaceans.801 This is significant, but was 
never cited by NGOs as a reason for designating a whale sanctuary, indicating, a lack of 
reference to the terms of the convention. 
 
796 IWC 65th Annual Meeting of October 2014, ‘Annual Report of the International 
Whaling Commission 2014 – covering the July 2012 – October 2014 financial year’ 
(Portorož, Slovenia, adopted October 2014) 8. 
797 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘2016 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2017) 18 
Journal of Cetacean Resource Management (Suppl) 1, agenda item 19. 
798 IWC Scientific Committee, ‘2016 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2017) 18 
Journal of Cetacean Resource Management (Suppl) 1, agenda item 19. 
799 WWF, WWF IWC66 Opening Statement IWC/66/OS WWF (2016);  
800 WWF, Opening Statement IWC/65/OS WWF (2014); WWF, WWF IWC66 Opening 
Statement IWC/66/OS WWF (2016). 
801 Rob Williams et al., ‘Quiet(er) marine protected areas’ (2015) 100(1) Marine 




It is clear from Opening Statements that many environmental NGO arguments around 
conservation lacked reference to the relationship between conservation and the 
development of the whaling industry for the purposes of lethal use. A critique of the 
conservation-only position of many environmental NGOs came from pro-whaling 
environmental NGO, Global Guardian Trust (GGT). In their 2010 Opening Statement GGT 
referred generally to the impasse that existed in the Commission on the resumption of 
commercial whaling. GGT wrote that ‘anti-whaling interests continue to place whales 
outside of the broadly accepted framework of sustainable use and [NGOs and states] 
continue their refusal to compromise.’802 [emphasis added] This indicates an awareness 
of the terms of the Whaling Convention object and purpose principles on the part of GGT, 
as well as frustration with the non-engagement with these principles by many NGOs. It 
also provides a general criticism of the approach of anti-whaling environmental NGOs to 
interpretation of the convention in advocating the designation of the South Atlantic 
Sanctuary. The absence of consideration for the framework of the convention in both 
oral and written statements from anti-whaling environmental NGOs constitutes a failure 
to consider the scope of the object and purpose of the convention. 
Reference to the broader international legal framework for marine mammals was 
contained in two Opening Statements on the South Atlantic Sanctuary, and one 
statement to the Commission, from 2010–2016. The first Opening Statement was from 
ASOC, placing the Whaling Convention and its obligations in a web of obligations 
extending from the United Nations (UN) to the ATS.803 The second was from Animal 
Welfare Institute (AWI) placing some members the Whaling Commission under an 
obligation to declare the South Atlantic Sanctuary due to the 2013 Montevideo 
 
802 GGT, Opening Statement to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/62/OS GGT 
(2010). 
803 ASOC, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS ASOC (2011); it is important to note that the 
Scientific Committee has endorsed the cooperation of the Commission with other 
international organizations in management and research in whale sanctuaries: IWC 
Scientific Committee, ‘2016 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2017) 18 Journal of 
Cetacean Resource Management (Suppl) 1 [19.2.2.5]. However, this is in addition to 




Declaration.804 However, the ATS is not relevant to Whaling Commission jurisdiction,805 
and a General Assembly Declaration generally addressing fishing in the South Atlantic 
does not bear on the Whaling Convention. The reference to Articles 65 and 194 of the 
Law of the Sea Convention from the ICB oral statement similarly refers to the 
overarching cooperative agreement of members party to the Law of the Sea Convention, 
bypassing the specifics of the Whaling Convention itself. Other arguments were that 
whales needing ‘protection, not persecution’, and the killing of whales in sanctuaries 
was ‘abhorrent’.806 References to protection, rather than conservation were 
common,807 framing the debate outside the framework of the convention. 
Greenpeace expressed a position that disregarded the Whaling Convention’s definition 
of a voting majority, stating that the South Atlantic Sanctuary was an opportunity to 
‘demonstrate that the IWC can rise above its differences to agree conservation measures 
requested by a majority of its members.’808 This referred not to the necessary three-
quarter majority but a majority of some nature. The WWF also took a similar line, 
supporting the financial interests in conservation of Southern Hemisphere countries as 
significant to the designation of the South Atlantic Sanctuary, irrespective of those 
countries’ membership of the Whaling Commission.809 
 
804 Animal Welfare Institute, Opening Statement IWC/65/OS AWI (2014) – note that 
many of the 24 countries of the ZPCSA are not members of the Whaling Commission; 
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Gabon, South Africa and Uruguay, The South Atlantic: 
A Sanctuary for Whales IWC/66/08 (2016) 11: referencing the context of the Zone of 
Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA): Zone of Peace and co-operation of 
the South Atlantic, GA Res 46/19, 46th sess, 25 November 1991, UN Doc A/RES/46/19, 
Preamble and [12]. 
805 CAMLR Convention, Article VI: ‘Nothing in this Convention shall derogate from the 
rights and obligations of Contracting Parties under the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling…’ 
806 AWI, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS AWI (2011).  
807 AWI, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS AWI (2011); Green Vegans, Opening Statement 
IWC/64/OS GV (2012); Animal Welfare Institute, Opening Statement IWC/65/OS AWI 
(2014). 
808 Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opening Statement IWC/65/OS Greenpeace (2014). 




Much of the discussion around use in relation to the South Atlantic bore on the 
reinterpretation of use of whale stocks for whale watching and ecotourism.810 This 
reinterpretation of the Whaling Convention is inconsistent both with the fundamentals 
of treaty interpretation811 and the consensus work of the Commission on any 
amendments to the convention. 
In 2010, anti-whaling environmental NGOs, the Organización para la Conservación de 
Cetáceos (OCC), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and PEW Environment 
Group (PEW) rejected the possibility of the resumption of whaling. PEW specifically 
stated they rejected all aspects of use that were being negotiated by the Commission in 
2010.812 The OCC referred to the adoption of the precautionary approach by the 
Scientific Committee813 and supported the creation of the South Atlantic Sanctuary in 
this context, clearly locating the Whaling Convention in broader international 
environmental law. The NRDC presented a viewpoint that it welcomed the South 
Atlantic Sanctuary proposal and rejected ‘all efforts to strike, restrict, or otherwise 
impair the management of existing sanctuaries.’814 A viewpoint repeated in the 
following years.815 This demonstrates significant misunderstanding of the conditions 
and benefits of the existing sanctuaries. It also avoids addressing the fundamental 
purpose of conservation under the Whaling Convention, to re-establish whale stocks for 
the development of the whaling industry for current and future generations’ use. 
 
810 See also [7.3.2]. 
811 Vienna Convention Preamble, Article 31. 
812 PEW Environment Group, Opening Statement: PEW Environment Group IWC/62/OS 
PEW (2010). 
813 The satisfaction of the precautionary principle by the terms of the Southern Ocean 
Sanctuary has subsequently been recognised by the Scientific Committee: IWC Scientific 
Committee, ‘2016 Report of the Scientific Committee’ (2017) 18 Journal of Cetacean 
Resource Management (Suppl) 1 [19.2.2.6]. 
814 Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening Statement IWC/62/OS NRDC (2010). 
815 Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS NRDC (2011); 




Anti-whaling environmental NGOs generally focussed entirely on conservation as the 
animating principle for the work of the Commission in relation to sanctuaries, with 
some reference to scientific data. There are some concerning features of environmental 
NGO statements on sanctuaries that indicate a general misunderstanding of the nature 
of the legal framework within which the Whaling Commission operates, with 
reinterpretations of ‘use’ outside the parameters of treaty interpretation and 
Commission practice. There is also an underlying issue with the scientific data aspect of 
NGO engagement. Until 2012, there was no empirical scientific evidence that marine 
sanctuaries had any benefit to increasing the size of cetacean species populations.816 In 
short, there was a dearth of scientific evidence to justify sanctuaries as a recommended 
tool for cetacean management.817 The value of environmental NGO engagement with 
the Commission is undermined by the misunderstanding of the Whaling Convention and 
the absence of scientific evidence. 
7.5.2 Member state and stakeholder views on NGO participation in sanctuary designation 
As with surveys in the CAMLR Commission, the views of Whaling Commission member 
states on environmental NGOs are varied, indicating that the subjective evaluation of 
environmental NGO contributions lacks a common reference point. On the Southern 
Ocean, states were divided, with 25 respondent states viewing environmental NGO 
contributions positively, but 15 states viewed NGO contributions as minimal or limiting 
Commission discussion. Two state respondents used the opportunity to highlight the 
limited opportunity for NGOs to contribute. 
  
 
816 Andrew M Gormley et al., ‘First evidence that marine protected areas can work for 
marine mammals’ (2012) 49 Journal of Applied Ecology 474. One journal article noted 
that mega-fauna might be useful but stated that conservation initiatives ‘had little 
ecological basis and are driven by public affection toward charismatic species’: Hooker 
and Gerber, above n 680. 




Figure 7.2 Perception of environmental NGO contributions to Southern Ocean discussions 
As with the CAMLR Commission, the views of states were divided enough to 
demonstrate that the value-assessment of NGO contributions are too subjective and 
partisan for constructive evaluation. Similarly, interviewees were divided in their views, 
and expressed partiality. 818 While there were negative views from each side of the pro-
whaling and anti-whaling divide toward the other side, there were general positive 
views of their own contributions from both sides.  
The Executive Secretary expressed a clear appreciation for the expertise that NGOs 
brought to the Commission.819 This was a view seconded by a Commissioner of long 
standing.820 While these were valuable insights into Commission and NGO 
contributions, these are not objective measures. Evaluating adherence to the object and 
purpose provides an objective measure that ensures a level of accountability on 
engagement with the rule of law in the Commission. 
 
 
818 Interview with Interviewee 16 (16 September 2014); Interview with Interviewee 
13+14 (12 September 2014); Interview with Interviewee 10 (18 September 2014); 
Interview with Interviewee 9 (17 September 2014); Interview with Interviewee 8 (18 
September 2014); Interview with Interviewee 3 (17 September 2014); Interview with 
Interviewee 2 (16 September 2014). 
819 Interview with Interviewee 1 (21 October 2014). 
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7.5.3 Hybrid NGOs 
Across the history of whale sanctuaries, the IUCN has largely engaged with the terms of 
the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention. For example, as early as 1983, the 
IUCN recognised sanctuaries as an ‘additional safeguard against overexploitation’821 
and discussed whale stocks in terms of ‘stock management’, and in 1990 used terms 
associated with regulation of commercial whaling.822 IUCN engagement with the South 
Atlantic Sanctuary was minimal. It pledged its support for the sanctuary through the 
provision of expertise for implementation and regulatory evolution, indicating 
deference to the primary position of the Commission in decision-making, and its own 
position as a supporting organization.823 However, the connections between the IUCN 
oral statement in 2014 and the resolution of its WCC make clear that it is also beginning 
to marginalise the lethal use aspect of the Whaling Convention in favour of a broad re-
interpretation of use for non-lethal purposes. However, the discussion of the sanctuary 
could also be construed as focusing on temporally relevant questions of conservation 
rather than hypothetical future use. The IUCN is clearly concerned with proper 
management of whale sanctuaries824 and therefore with a scientific basis for the 
sanctuary.  
The position of the IUCN in relation to the South Atlantic Sanctuary shows an awareness 
of the object and purpose principles, and a general compliance with those principles. 
However, it does not engage with the implications of sanctuaries for use-oriented 
conservation, avoiding addressing the interdependence of conservation, use and future 
use. To this end, the IUCN contributions refrain from engaging with the complicated 
issue of where sanctuaries sit in relation to object and purpose principles, and 
considering its pledge of support, defers consideration of object and purpose principles 
to the Commission. This supports its Article IV position, despite avoiding the question of 
use. 
 
821 IUCN, Statement to the 35th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/35/OS/IUCN (1983). 
822 IUCN, Statement to International Whaling Commission IWC/42/OS/IUCN (1990). 




As noted, the IWMC WCT was concerned to emphasise the importance of scientific data 
to decision-making in the Commission. Once the Scientific Committee had indicated 
there were sufficiently clear management guidelines in place, the IWMC WCT withdrew 
commenting, bowing to the clear exercise of the scientific data aspect of the Whaling 
Convention object and purpose.825 
7.5.4 Industry NGOs 
While there was engagement by industry NGOs with the Southern Ocean Sanctuary 
proposals, there was no engagement on the issue of the South Atlantic Sanctuary. 
Looking overall at responses to sanctuary designation, the position of industry NGOs 
stressed the significance of scientific justification having not been met;826 a 
counterpoint to arguments from anti-whaling NGOs that sanctuaries were by their 
nature beneficial and scientifically sound. For example, the industry NGO, the 
International Coalition of Fisheries Associations (ICFA) consistently objected to the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary designation on the basis that there had been no proper 
review of the proposed sanctuary by the Scientific Committee.827 ICFA also referenced 
the rule of law; stating that 
To remain a credible international management organization, the IWC must recognize the 
legitimacy of resource utilization and the steps to return to the principles underlying the 
Convention.828 
This raises a key issue with an international organization being encouraged to ignore its 
legal mandate by NGOs. This issue is as relevant to the South Atlantic Sanctuary as it 
was to the Southern Ocean proposals. If states become party to an international 
 
825 IWMC, IWC: A System of Loopholes IWC/56/OS IWMC (2004); IWMC, Statement in 
Plenary discussion on Agenda Item 5.1 above n 720.  
826 JWA, Opening Statement by the Japan Whaling Association IWC/47/OS JWA (1995); 
Riches of the Sea, Opening Statement of the Riches of the Sea IWC/47/OS RS (1995). 
827 ICFA, International Coalition of Fisheries Associations statement to the 44th meeting of 
the IWC IWC/44/OS ICFA (1992); International Coalition of Fisheries Associations, The 
45th Annual IWC Meeting: Opening Statement of the ICFA IWC/45/OS ICFA (1993); ICFA, 
The 46th Annual IWC Meeting, Opening Statement of the International Coalition of 
Fisheries Associations IWC/46/OS ICFA (1994); International Coalition of Fisheries 
Associations, ICFA Opening Statement IWC-53 IWC/53/OS ICFA (2001). 
828 ICFA, Opening Statement to the 44th meeting of the IWC IWC/44/OS ICFA (1992). 
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organization, those states should act in accordance with the terms of that organization’s 
treaty. A failure to recognise the principles of the Whaling Convention is a failure to act 
in accordance with the rule of law. The conservation of whales for the sake of whales 
themselves may be ethical, meritorious, and even right. But to disregard the rule of law 
in the process of doing so weakens the capacity of the Commission to function under its 
own jurisdiction.  
7.6 Conclusions 
7.6.1 CAMLR Commission  
The most effective way for NGOs to contribute to the work of the CAMLR Commission is 
through collaborative engagement with the Commission. The significant collaborations 
of the scientific NGO SCAR with the CAMLR Commission through the SCAR-MarBin 
illustrated this. SCAR roles were largely restricted to addressing the scientific evidence 
and data requirements of the CAMLR Convention object and purpose, and in facilitating 
the connections between the Commission and the ATS. This ensured contributions were 
objective and geared toward support of the work of the Commission, allowing the 
Commission to decide the balance of Article II ‘conservation includes rational use’ 
without political representations from SCAR. This is contrasted with the contributions 
of the environmental NGO, ASOC. ASOC provided many useful contributions. The 
overemphasis on conservation undermined the value of the work of ASOC from an 
objective perspective as it failed to address the object and purpose. Industry NGOs were 
absent from the dialogue on MPAs, as it was outside their sphere of concern.  
7.6.2 Whaling Commission 
There was a clear difference among environmental NGOs, hybrid NGOs, and industry 
NGOs in furthering the work of the Whaling Commission in accordance with its object 
and purpose mandate under the Whaling Convention. The IUCN supported the work of 
the Commission and recognised the ongoing relevance of use and conservation as well 
as future use aspects of the object and purpose. Its statements leaned heavily toward 
conservation from a precautionary approach perspective, advocating for sanctuaries on 
the basis of a precaution against overexploitation when commercial whaling resumed. It 
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also offered its own scientific expertise.829 However, much as with environmental NGOs, 
science-based advocacy was limited.  
Among environmental NGOs conservation was termed ‘protection’ arguably 
conceptually similar to ‘preservation’ and utterly removed from the potential for 
current or future use. Scientific justification was also noticeably absent. Many position 
statements focussed on reasons for sanctuaries that were unrelated to the principles 
guiding the work of the Commission, including the benefits of sanctuaries to non-
member states in the region of the proposed sanctuaries. There were also unsupported 
claims of the scientifically-evidenced value of designating sanctuaries when literature 
demonstrates only recent confirmations of the hypothesis that sanctuaries increased 
stock sizes and lengthened life spans among cetaceans. The arguments of sanctuaries 
being the basis for increased scientific engagement has not been borne out, with the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary and Indian Ocean Sanctuary having provided no indications 
that sanctuaries contribute to cetacean conservation.  
The primary arguments in relation to conservation and the designation of the 
sanctuaries and others were along interpretative lines with indications of a push for 
reinterpretation of the Whaling Convention, with the WWF arguing ‘the IWC actually has 
greater and more socially constructive task than merely the regulation of whaling by 
setting quotas.’830 While it is accurate to say that the Whaling Commission has a more 
constructive task than simply setting quotas – Article V grants extensive conservation 
and use regulatory powers, the regulation of whaling remains a fundamental principle 
of the Convention and therefore the work of the Commission. 
7.6.3 Significance of findings 
For the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions, the importance of their respective 
conventions lies in the proper construction of their terms according to the literal 
meaning of those words, in light of the object and purpose. To varying degrees, NGOs 
demonstrate awareness of, and accordance with the legal mandate of the Commission 
with which they engage. This case on protected areas demonstrates that the extent to 
 
829 IUCN, Statement, IWC/66/OS IUCN (2016). 




which NGOs aim toward supporting a Commission in its work in light of the object and 
purpose, will be determined by the inclination of the contributing NGO. This position is 
untenable, in that NGOs may actively work to undermine the object and purpose 
principles guiding the work of a Commission, yet no correction is undertaken of the 
methods by which this damage is done.  
As will be discussed in Chapter 8, there is a clear need for the redrafting of the Whaling 
Commission Rules of Procedure to ensure stricter adherence to the principles of the 
Whaling Convention. In both Commissions, editorial directives on the considerations 
that should underpin information papers and oral interventions should be made 
available to NGO observers. The Secretariat should be charged with ensuring 
compliance among NGOs in the content of their papers and statements. 
The Whaling Commission in particular has been charged with dysfunctionality ever 
since the institution of the commercial whaling moratorium.831 A return to the 
consideration of fundamental object and purpose principles and the terms of the 
Whaling Convention for regulation will be a significant step toward genuine dialogue.  
In the next chapter, the discussions of chapters five, six and seven will be brought 
together to make several recommendations for reform of both Commissions’ Rules of 
Procedure and Rules of Debate as well as the admission procedures for the Whaling 
Commission to ensure sufficient scrutiny of the position of NGOs seeking observer 
status to facilitate constructive contributions to the work of the Commission. 
 
831 Gillespie, above n 263, 7; Resolution on the extension of Small Working group on the 
Future of the IWC until the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Commission 2009-1, IWC/61/10 
amended; Progress Report on the September 2008 meeting of the Small Working Group 
(SWG) on the Future of the International Whaling Commission presented by Alvaro de 
Soto, SWG Chairman, St Petersburg, Florida, USA IWC/S08/Rep 1; An overview of the 
elements/issues identified as being of importance to one or more Contracting 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
NGO influence has a significant capacity to impact on state behaviours. While literature 
has focussed on how NGOs contribute to state and international organization decision-
making, there is no literature on the accountability of NGO engagement in accordance 
with treaties. So far, this thesis has addressed the question of whether NGO behaviours 
support the object and purpose of the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission 
under the respective Commission’s treaty. In Chapter Two, the objects and purposes of 
the CAMLR Convention and Whaling Convention were identified. Each convention’s 
object and purpose principles had sufficient commonalities to present the broad 
categories of use, conservation, future generations’ interest, and scientific bases for 
decision-making. In Chapter Three, the history, jurisdiction, substantive powers, 
membership and voting rules of the two conventions were explained, with reference to 
the object and purpose.  Chapter Four went on to contextualise NGO behaviours in 
terms of broader international environmental law and proposed a clear and legal 
definition for ‘NGO’, as well as ‘types’ of NGO according to their purpose. This chapter 
explored NGO roles in the Commissions under the conventions, defining the nature and 
extent of the formal and informal roles available to NGOs as observers in light of the 
object and purpose. It also described unsanctioned NGO behaviours in relation to the 
two Commissions.  
In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, NGO behaviours were described and evaluated through 
an object and purpose analysis framework. Chapter Five considered NGO behaviours 
from their first attendance at Commission meetings, 1963 in the Whaling Commission, 
1982 in the CAMLR Commission, through to 2016 in the Whaling Commission and 2017 
in the CAMLR Commission. Chapters Six and Seven provided case studies of NGO 
engagement in fisheries regulation and enforcement, and protected areas. These 
chapters established that NGO support for the object and purpose of the CAMLR 
Convention and the Whaling Convention varies across NGO type, and that without 
sufficient adherence to object and purpose principles, NGO contributions can be 




This chapter completes the analysis of NGO conduct by asking whether NGO conduct 
should be referrable to or accountable to the object and purpose of the treaty with 
whose Commission they are engaging. Two key arguments are advanced. First, 
compliance with the object and purpose supports the rule of law. Second, it ensures 
support for the work of the two Commissions. This argument is founded in support for 
the rule of law in international forums, but also to reflect the potential power and 
influence NGOs can exert in international diplomacy. In order to act with reference to 
the rule of law, NGOs should comply with convention object and purpose principles, 
despite not being parties to international agreements. 
Part 8.2 summarises the nature of NGO behaviours in the CAMLR and Whaling 
Commissions analyzed in the preceding three chapters. It demonstrates that NGO 
behaviours in the Commissions fit within the broader literature on NGO behaviours and 
influence in international law and decision-making. Part 8.2 also considers other factors 
that may contribute to dysfunctional behaviour in Commissions, aside from negative 
impacts from NGO influence.  
Part 8.3 engages with the question of whether NGOs should support the object and 
purpose. It asks whether NGO conduct should be referable or accountable to object and 
purpose-based expectations, and if so, how that would be done. It refers to the findings 
of Chapters Five to Seven to support an argument that NGO behaviours and roles should 
be subject to control and evaluation with reference to the object and purpose to ensure 
support for the work of the two Commission. This argument is founded in fundamental 
support for the rule of law in international forums, and the need to avoid political 
disruption under the guise of democratic participation. Part 8.4 proposes changes to the 
Rules of Procedure in both Commissions to facilitate clearer NGO engagement with the 
object and purpose to support the work of each Commission. 
8.2 NGO behaviours in the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission 
Chapter Five explored how the admissions process define the Commission expectations 
of NGO consideration of the object and purpose principles as well as the subordinate 
nature of the non-state position in engaging with the Commission. Observations applied 
to all NGO types, but often more particularly to environmental NGOs. The CAMLR 




work of the Commission. Similarly, Article IV of the Whaling Convention provides for a 
supportive role for non-state actors. It also confined contributions to those delegated to 
actors by the Commission, and IV.3 indicated that non-state roles were confined to 
contributing information on whale stocks.  
In the CAMLR Commission, the increase in observer delegation numbers, particularly 
with the ASOC delegation, but also the industry NGOs, ARK and COLTO, was clearly 
connected to the lack of enforcement by the Secretariat or the Commission of earlier 
decisions of the Commission to restrict observer numbers per organization to a single 
attendee. It was also partially a result of there being no number restrictions in the 
CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure. 
In the Whaling Commission, clear connections between NGO behaviours and 
amendments to the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure and Secretariat became 
evident when trends in NGO attendance were analyzed against years in which rules 
were amended. This indicated that NGO behaviour is susceptible to alteration where the 
Commission has a will to amend its rules and processes. The application process also 
highlighted that NGO observer accreditation did not require NGOs to demonstrate an 
understanding of, or organizational concern for the object and purpose principles 
underlying the Commission’s work. This was in contrast to the CAMLR Commission. 
In the Whaling Commission, the content of Opening Statements and the use of speaking 
rights illustrated that the absence of expectations of accord with the object and purpose 
in the application process led to contributions that often failed to support the principles 
underlying Commission decision-making. Methods of addressing disruptive NGO 
observer behaviours were also indirect, such as changing Opening Statements from oral 
presentations to documentary, or simply ignoring NGO breaches of the Rules of Debate 
and Rules of Procedure.  
In the CAMLR Commission, the content of Information Papers and use of speaking rights 
indicated that there were connections between the admissions process requirements to 
demonstrate support for the object and purpose principles and content. This was 
further supported by the direct engagement by Commission members in disciplining 
NGO observers that strayed from the supportive and object and purpose-considered 




Chapter Five presented both the possibility of change, and the likelihood of successful 
confinement of NGO behaviours to supportive engagement where admissions processes, 
and rules were directed toward maintaining the distinction between subordinate non-
state actor roles and the decision-making position of member states. 
Chapter Six engaged with the use-based issue of catch regulation and enforcement in 
the Commissions and provided an object and purpose analysis of NGO observer roles 
and intersessional enforcement behaviours of NGOs. Being a use-based issue, the 
balance to be struck between conservation and use was a consistent aspect of decision-
making, and NGOs were in a position to make significant contributions to the balance 
being conservation-oriented. NGOs were largely successful in both Commissions. 
This chapter looked particularly at sessional behaviours of accredited observers and 
several incidents in the Southern Ocean in the intersessional periods. These were the 
incidents in the 2014/15 Austral summer involving the IUU vessel the MV Thunder and 
Sea Shepherd and COLTO vessels, and the ongoing Sea Shepherd campaign to prevent 
JARPA II vessels from performing scientific whaling in the Southern Ocean. 
This chapter found that behaviours of all NGO types in the CAMLR Commission were 
generally reflective of object and purpose principles, including Sea Shepherd in the 
intersessional period. The industry NGO COLTO was better placed to provide stock and 
catch data, resources and practical assistance to the Commission because of its 
members being active and financially invested in the legal commercial fishing of 
toothfish. The IUCN and ASOC both provided policy-based assistance in developing the 
extensive conservation measures in place to combat IUU fishing, in line with the object 
and purpose principles. An exception was early in ASOC’s engagement when the written 
and oral submissions pushed a conservation line that undermined both the decision-
making of the Commission and the principles of the object and purpose by rejecting 
rational use. 
In relation to the Whaling Commission, anti-whaling environmental NGO observers 
tended to present a diversity of views, many of them not addressing the object and 
purpose. Some NGO Opening Statements addressed tangible issues of the scientific 
value of the JARPA II programs, with reference to the Whaling Convention and its object 
and purpose expectations of sound scientific evidence in decision-making. However, 




simply made statements of position. This applied to all environmental NGOs, anti- and 
pro-whaling. Emotive argument was the dominant theme observable among protesters 
at Commission meetings in 2014 and 2016, where words such as ‘murder’ were used in 
reference to JARPA II programs. By contrast, the IUCN consistently submitted Opening 
Statements that showed consideration of the object and purpose, particularly 
highlighting the importance of connecting scientific whaling to the purposes of stock 
rehabilitation for future use.  
Ultimately, the Whaling Case decision bore out the position of opposition. To this extent, 
the ICJ validated the science-based arguments of NGOs as well as the enforcement of 
activities of Sea Shepherd. Nonetheless, without articulated understanding of the 
relevance of the object and purpose principles to the work of the Commission, many 
environmental NGOs failed to support the decision-making of the Commission.  
In contrast to the use-based issue of catch regulation and enforcement, protected areas 
are a conservation issue. There are interdependencies between the two concepts in 
both the CAMLR Convention and the Whaling Convention – the CAMLR Convention stating 
that conservation includes rational use, and the Whaling Convention highlighting that 
‘the proper conservation of whale stocks’ is integral to the ‘orderly development of the 
whaling industry’.  
In Commission deliberations around designation of the Ross Sea MPA there was scope 
in the CAMLR Commission for the contributions of environmental, hybrid and scientific 
NGOs. In the Whaling Commission the dominant contributors continued to be 
environmental NGOs and the hybrid, IUCN. 
Contributions from ASOC in the CAMLR Commission were primarily focussed on 
advocacy for conservation without recognising the rational use aspect of conservation 
under Article II. In 2016, the year in which the Ross Sea MPA was successfully 
designated, ASOC submissions finally acknowledged the consideration of rational use in 
Commission decision-making for designation. By contrast, SCAR deferred consideration 
of object and purpose principles to the decision-making of the Commission by providing 
raw data in place of advocacy. The IUCN contributed its own work on the designation of 
protected areas as a means of guiding the Commission’s decision-making. It also 





The Whaling Commission deliberations on the South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary from 
2010-2016 saw a variety of engagement from environmental NGOs, including 
collaboration with member states to host an event in support of the 2016 designation 
proposal, the submission of Opening Statements, and the use of speaking rights. The 
support event for the South Atlantic Sanctuary relied on political agitation and the use 
of branded items to promote the sanctuary, such as note paper, pens, ribbons, USB 
drives and folders. There was no engagement with the object and purpose. This 
approach was consistent with the content of oral and written statements of anti-
whaling environmental NGOs, with frequent reinterpretation of the Whaling Convention 
to cover non-lethal use of whales, as opposed to its clear lethal intentions. The IUCN also 
placed the designation of the sanctuary outside the scope of the convention, albeit by 
avoiding the question of rational use. Within in its own WCC resolution on the South 
Atlantic Sanctuary, emphasis was placed, not on the Whaling Convention but on familiar 
themes from environmental NGOs of whale watching and coastal community 
economies.  
Chapter Seven also engaged with data obtained from surveys administered to member 
state delegates in the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission. The data 
demonstrated that there was no consistency among delegates in their view of NGO 
contributions to the designation of protected areas. This in itself highlighted the need 
for an objective reference point, such as the object and purpose, by which to measure 
NGO engagement.  
These chapters established the background necessary to consider how Whaling 
Commission Rules of Procedure, Rules of Debate and Commission or Secretariat 
admission procedures can affect NGO behaviour to ensure consideration of the 
fundamental principles animating the work of both Commissions. The following section 
engages with this consideration and presents some possible amendments to both 
procedures and Rules.  
8.3 Object and purpose principles to promote the rule of law 
NGO behaviour can have significant influence on decision-making. Chapters Six and 
Seven illustrated that NGO behaviours can contribute or detract from Commission 




or accountability. The value of using an object and purpose principles reference point is 
clear. In the CAMLR Commission, where the CAMLR Convention and the Rules of 
Procedure have standards of engagement requiring observer NGO engagement to 
consider the principles under which the Commission works, effective contributions 
from NGOs are the standard across NGO types, with minor deviation from 
environmental NGO, ASOC. The Whaling Commission does not find a parallel insistence 
on supportive engagement in the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure, which do not 
reflect the nature of the Whaling Convention. It is possible that a greater emphasis on 
object and purpose principles may improve the nature of NGO contributions in the 
Whaling Commission. 
This part explores the possibility of using object and principles to regulate NGO 
behaviour to improve accountability of NGOs to the Commissions within which they act. 
Before doing so, the risks of object and purpose principles being used as a tool of 
regulation or accountability, need to be explored. Any move to regulate NGO conduct 
must take account of the importance of NGOs in providing a means for domestic 
audiences to access international decision-making. This function of NGOs promotes 
democratic principles, it engages a global population in decisions that impact on a global 
level. To restrict this important function could be inimical to participatory democracy. 
NGOs also provide funding, expertise, resources, and access for international 
institutions to networks of individuals and groups concerned with the work of that 
institution. These allow the work of international institutions to run more smoothly, 
and for such efforts to connect to pre-existing networks and bodies addressing similar 
issues. These are all valuable contributions and should not be undermined. 
However, NGO roles may be misused. Misrepresentations made by NGOs to a global 
audience can make complex issues more complex. There are also questions of how NGO 
support, be it financial or resource-based, may be used as a means of forwarding a 
political agenda that does not support the legal mandate of an international body. In 
relation to whaling, there are clear indications of a cultural imperialism among anti-




presumptive ideals, that have arisen outside of, and unconnected to cultures that value 
or need whale meat.832  
The stalemate observable within the Whaling Commission on the subject of resuming 
scientifically determined sustainable whaling is a strong argument for the need to 
develop a reference point for accountability and transparency. An objective standard 
could also be a possible means of addressing multiple negative impacts by having a 
reference point and touchstone for dialogue. It would be fair for this reference point to 
affect all international actors – states and non-states alike, and so the object and 
purpose is ideally situated for this purpose. It also has the benefit of supporting the rule 
of law.833 This part tests the proposition that Commissions should regulate sessional 
NGO contributions according to the terms of the treaty. This ensures transparency 
around the meaning of the jurisdiction under the treaty and emphasises a legal mandate 
to support the rule of law. This part also tests whether this proposition would be a 
valuable tool for Commission discussion of intersessional NGO behaviours. Chapters 5 – 
7 have explored whether NGO behaviours adhere to object and purpose principles, and 
in making observations of NGO conduct, the value of conduct, relative to the object and 
purpose, can be assessed by a clear standard. 
There are practical and philosophical reasons that may justify an object and purpose 
regulatory approach. As has been mentioned, the rule of law is a fundamental aspect of 
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international order.834 While there are significant issues with the interplay of political 
power and the international legal regimes, these issues are not a reason to set aside the 
aspiration to develop greater adherence to the rule of law.  A second point is that in 
terms of the two Commission specifically, there is a problem with the philosophical 
position of some NGOs that advocate for animal welfare in such a way that it displaces 
the welfare of humans and human interest as a legitimate focus of the conventions.  
In terms of practical considerations, there are clear benefits to emphasising the object 
and purpose of a treaty as a reference point for NGO engagement, if not all engagement. 
Consider, for example, a position that arose in the Whaling Commission in the 2018 
meeting in Florianópolis, Brazil. The Buenos Aires Group, a bloc of Latin American 
countries working closely with various NGOs,835 put forward a Declaration that 
significantly reinterpreted the object and purpose principles of the Whaling Convention, 
excluding the core meaning of ‘whaling’ as a lethal, use-based activity.836 This position 
clearly diverges from the fundamentals of the Whaling Convention. It fails to adhere to 
elementary rules of treaty interpretation and creates a highly politicised atmosphere in 
what should be a Commission that focuses on the rule of law and decision-making 
within the confines of its jurisdiction.  
NGO engagement and the rules around that engagement are not the cause of the issue 
here – the open membership rules and the simple majority voting, allow for this 
partisan development. However, there is a clear relationship of influence, observable at 
meetings, and the subversion of the object and purpose principles, while not 
attributable directly to NGOs, can be traced in part to their influence. An articulation of 
object and purpose expectations on NGOs would, at the very least, emphasise the issue 
of putting forward a political position in order to twist a legal mandate.  
The strength of the CAMLR Convention is that with the combination of consensus voting, 
clear expectations for object and purpose principle consideration among NGO 
observers, and a selective membership process, there is a necessary emphasis on the 
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fundamental question of how to support the Commission in its work. A comparison of 
the Rules of Procedure for both Commissions demonstrates the absence of 
communicated expectation to NGO observers in the Whaling Commission, and this 
raises the question of whether alteration may improve Commission functionality.  
The CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure on observer participation operate in 
conjunction with Articles XII and XXIII of the CAMLR Convention. Rule 30 provides that 
subject to Article XII of the Convention the Commission may invite observers to attend 
Commission meetings. This reference to Article XII requires the Commission to consider 
observer invitations in light of the fundamental work it undertakes in terms of the 
researching, developing and implementing conservation measures and other practical 
aspects of its work. Similarly, Article XXIII of the Convention, the foundation of NGO and 
observer engagement, predicates observer engagement on the proviso that such 
engagement arises from ‘co-operative working relationships’. These words indicate that 
expectations on observers are co-operative and subject to the benefit of contributions 
proffered by observers to the work of the Commission. The expectations on observers in 
relation to the submission of documents for Commission consideration also highlights 
that such documents ‘shall be relevant to matters under consideration in the 
Commission’.  
While these terms do not explicitly require consideration of object and purpose 
principles, the language of the Rules and the CAMLR Convention turn both the 
Commission and observers to consideration of the work of the Commission, which is 
itself guided by object and purpose principles. The constant and clear reference to the 
work of the Commission is also significant, because it restricts the potential focus of 
NGOs to the matters directly under consideration by the Commission, and not to 
matters an observer NGO may deem to be of interest to the Commission. 
The Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure provide a contrast on all points. However, 
the Whaling Convention does not. Article IV of the Whaling Convention, like the CAMLR 
Convention delineates clear expectations of contributions that bear on the work of the 
Commission. Article IV defines the nature of relationship between the Commission and 
‘public or private agencies’ as collaborative or delegated, and restricted to developing 
the knowledge base around whales, whale stocks, and stock rehabilitation. The Whaling 




To seek admission as an observer, NGOs and others must simply ‘express an interest in 
matters covered by the Convention’ and there is no mention of the Whaling Convention 
Article IV as a defining reference point for engagement. This contrasts with the CAMLR 
Commission Rules, which highlight the interconnection between Article XXIII and 
admission. Further, the Whaling Commission Rules do not require ongoing 
consideration by the Commission of the appropriateness of an invitation, instead 
allowing accreditation to stand, once obtained. The CAMLR Commission Rules make no 
such provision, and in doing so expects ongoing consideration by the Commission of the 
appropriateness of each year’s observer invitations. 
While these are only two case studies, there are lessons to be learned from both their 
failures and successes for other RFBs and treaty bodies. The Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),837 the International Commission for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT),838 the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission (NAMMCO),839 and the Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC)840 are RFBs that engage with NGOs through observer status and could benefit 
 
837 CCSBT, Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (October 2018) 
https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/ccsbt.org/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/basic_docume
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objectives of the Convention.’ 
838 ICCAT, Guidelines and Criteria for Granting Observer Status at ICCAT Meetings 
MISC/05-12 (2005) 
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839 NAMMCO, Procedures & Rules for Observers Attending NAMMCO Meetings (Adopted 
at NAMMCO, 24 February 2016) NAMMCO/24/22 https://nammco.no/wp-
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The NAMMCO Procedures do not mention the criteria by which observer applicants are 
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840 WCPFC, Rules of Procedure (First adopted at the Inaugural Session, Pohnpei, 
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from consideration of these case studies. The World Trade Organization (WTO), if it 
revisited its relationship with NGOs841 to include direct observer status may also 
benefit from consideration of the Rules of Procedure and Debate of the Whaling 
Commission and CAMLR Commission. The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change 
(IPCC) would also benefit as its procedures and policies lack clarity on observer status 
and engagement.842 The successes of the Red Cross and other IHL-related NGOs in 
supporting the principles and purposes of the Geneva Conventions843 should speak 
clearly to the significance of adherence to the object and purpose. 
Clearly, as with this thesis, an in depth analysis needs to be done in order to clarify the 
nature of NGO engagement with the treaty body. However, the limitation of this thesis is 
not a lack of relevance to other organizations or fields but the impossibility of engaging 
more than two case studies in 100,000 words. Further research in environmental treaty 
bodies in particular, testing the benefits of the object and purpose principles as 
significant for guiding NGO engagement is likely to bear out the same result: NGO 
adherence to the contents of a treaty is important to the functionality of a treaty body. 
An example of the benefits of adherence is the status accorded to the hybrid NGO, IUCN. 
The status of the IUCN is commensurate with its work, which aligns clearly with object 
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and purpose principles. This elevated status holds true for the IUCN not just in the 
Whaling Commission and CAMLR Commission, but also in the United Nations, unlike 
any other NGO, where it has permanent observer status.844 
8.4 Amending Rules of Procedure to support object and purpose principles 
It is not possible to hold different NGO behaviours to different levels of accountability. 
Whether the multi-faceted behaviours of NGOs are primarily, for example, lobbying or 
information provision, invocation or termination can be difficult to resolve – many 
documentary submissions fall into multiple categories, such as lobbying, information 
and invocation. Part 8.2 discussed how NGO behaviours in the CAMLR Commission and 
Whaling Commission fell within the broader literature on NGO behaviours in 
international law, underscoring the wide acknowledgement of the influence NGOs wield 
in international institutions. Part 8.3 demonstrated that there has been divergence 
between the two Commission in the success of observer NGO regulation, and resulting 
negative impacts where regulation has fallen short of focussing NGO behaviours on 
object and purpose principles. 
This part proposes amendments to the Rules of Procedure in both Commissions, and the 
Rules of Debate in the Whaling Commission to develop focus on the fundamental role of 
NGOs to assist and support the work of the Commissions – the role assigned to them by 
Article IV of the Whaling Convention and Article XXIII of the CAMLR Convention. These 
broad changes should strengthen expectations on NGOs to act in consideration of the 
legal mandate of the Commissions, and to pursue a supportive role in relation to the 
work of the Commissions. 
There are aspects of the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure that may benefit the 
CAMLR Commission, and vice versa. Alterations to the Rules of Procedure for the CAMLR 
Commission and Whaling Commission would not be parallel however alterations to the 
Rules of Procedure for both Commissions may be beneficial. Considering the 
development of the CAMLR Commission meetings, and the position of NGOs within it 
 
844 United Nations, Permanent Observers: Intergovernmental and Other Organizations 
(no date) https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/intergovernmental-and-
other-organizations/index.html. Despite its formative documents and legal status, the 




under the Rules, the most beneficial amendment would be limitation of delegation sizes. 
Both speaking and documentary rights are functionally directed toward object and 
purpose principles, and the rules of invitation favour the continued development of 
cooperative and supportive roles among NGOs.  
For the Whaling Commission, the lack of connection between the Convention and the 
Rules needs to be addressed, as do the general rules around documentary submission, 
use of speaking rights, and the process of invitation to encourage greater consideration 
of the work of the Commission in light of its Convention’s object and purpose. The 
contributions of observers and NGOs may benefit from clearer articulation of 
expectations to support the work of the Commission, and so support the rule of law 
rather than partisanship.  
8.4.1 The CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure 
The CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure may benefit from clearer definition of the 
size of observer delegations. This is due to the large increases in delegation numbers 
over the last decade, and there being no clear commensurate benefit to this growth. This 
indirectly impacts on object and purpose principle consideration by requiring NGO 
observers to consider the utility of additional advisers and delegates on their delegation 
in terms of how these delegates would contribute to the work of the Commission, or the 
NGO’s position in relation to that work. 
The CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure may also benefit from the provision in the 
Whaling Commission Rules that stipulates there may be seating limitations and so the 
number of observers from each NGO might be limited accordingly. The Whaling 
Commission Rules of Procedure at C. Observers 1(b) reads: 
… Observers from each non-governmental organization will be allowed seating in the 
meeting. However, seating limitations may require that the number of observers from each 
non-governmental organization be limited. The Secretariat will notify accredited non-
governmental organizations of any seating limitations in advance of the meeting. 
The CAMLR Commission Rules have no equivalent provision. As noted in Chapter 5, the 
growth in numbers of NGO delegates has far exceeded the initial 1988 stipulation of one 
delegate per observer organization. Nor are there clear reasons why the expanded number 




delegations, the capacity to engage with the Commission should not be hindered, and so a 
primary and a secondary observer delegate should be permitted, to mirror the Head of 
Delegation and second in charge that is accorded to member states. However, beyond this, 
while member states provide membership dues, there are no financial costs imposed on 
observers to attend Commission meetings beyond their own capacity to attend. The right of 
member states to have large numbers of advisors attend does not accrue to observer NGOs 
that pay no commensurate fee to have a right of attendance. 
A proposed draft paragraph to insert into the CAMLR Commission Rules would allow a first 
and second delegate, to allow full participation if something were to impact on the first 
delegate’s capacity to participate. However, the attendance of further delegates needs to be 
justified by reference to qualifications or capacity to contribute to the agenda and work of 
the Commission. The proposed text is:  
Two delegates for each observer will be allowed seating in the meeting. However, the value 
of the attendance of further delegates must be presented to the Secretariat. Such 
application should contain details of how further proposed representatives within the 
observer delegation can contribute to the work of the Commission.  
While delegation size may seem a small matter, the requirements for a smaller delegation 
size may focus the work of the observer NGOs to ensure that substance is not replaced by or 
overshadowed by size. Ensuring that delegation composition reflects the engagement of the 
NGO with issues before the Commission gives greater credibility. Looking at attendance 
numbers over the course of the Commission’s life, it is clear that the NGOs with the most 
credibility or practical contributions sent the lowest numbers of delegates – SCAR and IUCN 
both consistently sent less than two delegates. Similarly, looking at the composition of the 
COLTO and ARK delegations, delegates are either scientific advisors or representatives from 
companies invested in Southern Ocean resource extraction. The ASOC delegation, by 
contrast, includes delegates from member NGOs that have no direct contribution or 
investment in matters before the CAMLR Commission. While some representatives are 
attached to universities and are present for the purposes of research,845 delegates from 
national NGOs who cannot provide or extract material value from discussions simply clutter 
 
845 Cassandra M Brooks et al, ‘Challenging the ‘Right to Fish’ in a Fast-Changing Ocean’ 
(2014) 33(3) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 289; Cassandra M Brooks et al, 
‘Science-based management in decline in the Southern Ocean’ (2016) 354(6309) 




the appearance of the ASOC delegation. For the sake of economy, efficiency, and substantive 
value, it is recommended that the Commission limit delegation numbers. 
8.4.2 The Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate 
The Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure could benefit from the adaptation and 
inclusion of several aspects of the CAMLR Commission Rules, as well as from some 
reorganization. There are three clear areas for improvement. The first concerns 
expectations around invitations for observer status, and the ongoing status of observers 
once accredited. The second concerns the rules around content in documentary 
submissions. The third and final concerns the Whaling Commission Rules of Debate and 
the Rules of Procedure. This focuses on clearer articulation of the expectations of oral 
statement content, and the consequences for abuse of the Rules of Debate where an NGO 
speaks to the agenda. It is suggested that there be three distinct sections on applications 
and invitations, as is currently contained in the Rules, as well as two distinct sections on 
speaking rights and documentary submission, as currently there is a lack of structure. 
Amendments to the Rules are suggested in terms of object and purpose principles. 
The text on observer invitations in the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure states 
that ‘(b) any non-governmental organization which expresses an interest in matters 
covered by the Convention may be accredited as an observer.’846 The text further notes 
that ‘Once a non-governmental organization has been accredited through the 
application process above, it will remain accredited until the Commission decides 
otherwise.’ The first part of the text is arguably inadequate to the documentary and oral 
rights attached to observer status; it also directs attention to matters in the Convention 
rather than matters before the Commission. The text also places decision making in the 
applicant’s hands. Consider the text of the CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure, which 
state that ‘the Commission may … invite, as appropriate, organizations named in Article 
XXIII(2) and (3) of the Convention.’ The Commission, in this text, decides the invitation.  
In terms of practice, there is also divergence between the two Commissions. At the end 
of each CAMLR Commission annual meeting, the Commission decides which observers 
will have an invitation extended to them for the following year’s meeting. This is in 
contrast to the Whaling Commission, where practice has indicated that without a 
 




significant controversy, observers are automatically reaccredited and allowed to attend 
the next meeting of the Commission.847 
The remedy requires two things. Firstly, the application process for accreditation as an 
observer should follow similar strictures as those imposed in the CAMLR Commission in 
the application process. While the text of the CAMLR Commission Rules is not express in 
expectations of consideration of the object and purpose, the practice of the Commission 
has demonstrated the expectation that NGOs applying for observer status be competent 
to materially contribute to the work of the Commission, subject to its object and 
purpose.848 The text of the Whaling Commission Rules could be amended to: 
Any non-governmental organization which demonstrates a capacity to contribute to the 
work of the Commission, may be accredited as an observer.  
The text on administrative requirements should be retained. However, the text could 
stipulate that where an objection to an NGO applicant is raised by a member state a vote 
will be required. Suggested text may look like: 
Where a member state raises an objection to an NGO observer application, the Commission 
may by post or by other means of textual communication decide by vote whether to extend 
an invitation to the NGO.  
Decision-making on the invitation of an NGO applicant as observer will be taken by a 
simple majority according to Article III.2 of the Convention. Votes shall be communicated 
by member states directly to the Executive Secretary, who will notify the NGO and member 
states of the result of the vote. Decisions shall be made no later than 30 days prior to the 
start of the meeting.  
Including this text gives control of NGO application approval to Whaling Commission 
member states by allowing an objection to be raised. In the CAMLR Commission, the 
capacity of states to object to the attendance of an NGO is supported by the consensus 
voting mechanism and by the application process itself. In the CAMLR Commission, the 
ASOC application for observer status was rejected three years in a row until ASOC was 
able to demonstrate the capacity to contribute to and support the work of the 
Commission Another example of the mechanism for ensuring object and purpose 
 
847 See Chapter 5 at [5.3.3].  




compliance is the objection of Chile to the IUCN observer in 1995. The capacity of states 
to reject NGO observers has ensured ongoing compliant behaviour by the IUCN 
delegate, and the objection was withdrawn the following year upon IUCN 
compliance.849 In the Whaling Commission, text providing for member states to object 
to an NGO applicant may draw clearer lines around the expectations on observer NGOs 
to contribute to the work of the Commission.  
The final aspect of Rule C.1(b) on accreditation and invitations reads: 
Once a non-governmental organization has been accredited through the application 
process above, it will remain accredited until the Commission decides otherwise. 
By providing a mechanism to object to an applicant NGO, the Rules can then allow for 
ongoing accreditation, as the text provides, but with a clearer mechanism for what ‘until 
the Commission decides otherwise’ means. It does not need further amendment.   
 
849 CCAMLR-XIV Meeting of 24 October – 3 November 1995, ‘Report of the Fourteenth 





Current text of Rule C. Observers 1(b) Proposed text of Rule C. Observers 1(b) 
(b) Any non-governmental organization which 
expresses an interest in matters covered by the 
Convention, may be accredited as an observer. 
Requests for accreditation must be submitted in 
writing to the Commission 60 days prior to the 
start of the meeting and the Commission may 
issue an invitation with respect to such request. 
Such submissions shall include the standard 
application form for non-governmental 
organizations which will be provided by the 
Secretariat. These applications shall remain 
available for review by Contracting Governments. 
Once a non-governmental organization has been 
accredited through the application process above, 
it will remain accredited until the Commission 
decides otherwise. 
(b) Any non-governmental organization which 
demonstrates a capacity to contribute to the work 
of the Commission, may be accredited as an 
observer. Requests for accreditation must be 
submitted in writing to the Commission 60 days 
prior to the start of the meeting and the 
Commission may issue an invitation with respect to 
such request. Such submissions shall include the 
standard application form for non-governmental 
organizations which will be provided by the 
Secretariat. These applications shall remain 
available for review by Contracting Governments. 
Where a member state raises an objection to an 
observer application from an NGO, the Commission 
may by post or by other means of textual 
communication decide by vote whether to extend 
an invitation to the NGO.  
Decision-making on the invitation of an NGO 
applicant as observer will be taken by a simple 
majority according the Article III.2 of the 
Convention. Votes shall be communicated by 
member states directly to the Executive Secretary.  
Decisions shall be made 30 days prior to the start of 
the meeting. 
Once a non-governmental organization has been 
accredited through the application process above, 
it will remain accredited until the Commission 
decides otherwise. 
Table 8.1 Suggested amended text for Rule C. Observers 1(b) 
Of greatest significance in these suggestions is that there is an expectation on applicants 
to demonstrate a capacity to contribute to the work of the Commission, rather than an 
interest in matters covered by the convention. The work of the Commission may not 
itself be compliant with its own Convention, and so NGOs demonstrating a capacity to 




observer applicants being put on notice of a higher expectation introduces the 
possibility of more directed contributions. 
The second of aspect of the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure that may be 
amended to engage more fully with the object and purpose principles through the work 
of the Commission concerns the rules on documentary submissions and speaking rights. 
The rules on speaking rights contain one limb of observer documentary submission 
rights. Speaking rights and documentary submission should be distinct and separate. 
The text on speaking rights contains directions on the submission of information 
documents, while Opening Statement submissions are dealt with separately. Below, the 
issues with the text as it stands will be discussed, followed by proposed amendments 
specifically dividing oral and written submissions into two distinct rules in order to 
provide clarity. 
The first suggested amendment is to remove the capacity for observer NGOs to submit 
Opening Statements. On the submission of Opening Statements, the text of the Rules 
reads: 
Q. Commission Documents 
3. Observers admitted under Rule of Procedure C.1.(a) and (b) may submit Opening 
Statements which will be included in the official documentation of the Biennial or other 
Meeting concerned. They shall be presented in the format and the quantities determined by 
the Secretariat for meeting documentation. The content of the Opening Statements shall 
be relevant to matters under consideration by the Commission, and shall be in the form of 
views and comments made to the Commission in general rather than directed to any 
individual or group of Contracting Governments. 
This rule does not distinguish between non-party government observers and 
intergovernmental organizations, under C.1.(a) and NGOs, under C.1.(b). Both 
categories are accorded the same rights to have the text of their Opening Statements 
‘included in the official documentation of the Biennial or other Meeting’. Contrast this 
with the CAMLR Commission Rules of Procedure, which state that documents submitted 
to the Secretariat for distribution to Commission members ‘shall only be considered as 
Commission documents if decided by the Commission.’ Effectively, this permits the 
Commission and its members to challenge documents submitted by observers and have 




which met with significant disapprobation and was removed from the Commission 
documentary record.850 While COLTO did voluntarily withdraw the document, the Rules 
of Procedure make provision for the Commission to reject a document without the 
cooperation of its author. 
A suggested amendment to the Whaling Commission Rules on Opening Statements 
would make a distinction between C.1.(a) and C.1.(b) observers, excluding C.1.(b) 
observers from submitting Opening Statements. 
Observers admitted under Rule of Procedure C.1.(a) may submit Opening Statements 
which will be included in the official documentation of the Biennial or other Meeting 
concerned. They shall be presented in the format and the quantities determined by the 
Secretariat for meeting documentation. The content of the Opening Statements shall be 
relevant to matters under consideration by the Commission, and shall be in the form of 
views and comments made to the Commission in general rather than directed to any 
individual or group of Contracting Governments. 
The submission of Opening Statements is a Commission practice dating back to 1967. 
While Opening Statements from member states, non-party states and 
intergovernmental organizations are significant in establishing the position of decision-
makers, its retention is not essential to the capacity of observer NGOs to contribute to 
the work of the Commission. NGOs are not decision-makers in a formal sense. Their 
position in relation to the agenda or the Commission does not directly presage the 
development of new intergovernmental organization relationships or an increase in 
membership numbers. Whether an NGO has ‘views or comments’ to make is not 
relevant to supporting the work of the Commission.  
The NGO lobbying role and other roles of influence are significant, but in the context of 
observers the NGO roles of information provision and support of the Commission are 
more significant than the repetition of positions clearly advertised in NGO material and 
demonstrated in domestic behaviours. Within the decision-making time frame of a 
Commission meeting, it is the capacity to contribute to that decision-making that 
matters, not the opinion of an observer on how that decision should be made. Emphasis 
needs to be on supporting and contributing to the work of the Commission. 
 




For these reasons, it is advocated that Opening Statements for observer NGOs be 
removed.  
The capacity for observers to submit information documents, contained in Rule C.3 
should be reworked and made a distinct rule. The relevant text in Rule C.3 currently 
reads: 
C.3 … Observers might also submit documents for information to the delegations and 
observers participating in such sessions, provided these are submitted through the 
Secretariat at least 48 hours before the session in which they are intended to be made 
available, and are duly authored or endorsed by the accredited organization making the 
submission, which is to be held responsible for its contents. 
The suggested amendment would be: 
C.4 Observers admitted under Rule of Procedure C.1.(a) and C.1.(b) may submit 
Information Documents for the Commission’s consideration. Information Documents are to 
be submitted through the Secretariat at least seven days before the Biennial or other 
meeting concerned. The content of Information Documents shall be relevant to matters 
under consideration by the Commission. Information Documents shall be directed to the 
Commission in general rather than directed to any individual or group of Contracting 
Governments. 
Information Documents shall be presented in the format and the quantities determined by 
the Secretariat for meeting documentation. Unless a member state objects, Information 
Documents shall be included in the official documentation of the Biennial or other Meeting 
concerned. 
If a member state objects to an Information Document, the matter is to be considered by 
the Commission. If consensus cannot be reached on its inclusion, the document is to be 
excluded from the official documentation of the Biennial or other Meeting concerned. 
The reasoning behind these amendments is an expectation of consideration for the 
work of the Commission under its Convention. Firstly, as NGO observers cannot submit 
Opening Statements, and there are fixed agenda items for the Whaling Commission 
biennial meetings, the ‘48 hours before the session’ is too short a time period for 
submission of documents that are to be included in official documentation. Moreover, 
there should be sufficient time for member state delegations to consider the contents of 




The capacity for member states to object to the inclusion of Information Documents in 
the official documentation is an avenue for states to come to a clearer and stronger 
position in relation to the direction of the work of the Commission, and thus the 
application of the object and purpose principles.  
The capacity to include expectations of format falls to the Secretariat. The Secretariat 
could stipulate a document format that requires a perambulatory introduction that 
indicates the position of the Information Document in relation to the object and 
purpose principles of the Whaling Convention. This removes the subjectivity of ‘views 
and comments’, which is allowed for observers under 3.1.(a), and focuses on support of 
the work of the Commission. 
The final matter concerns both the Whaling Commission Rules of Procedure and Rules 
of Debate and the regulation of NGO engagement with speaking rights. The current 
Rules of Procedure state that 
3. Observers accredited in accordance with rule C.1.(a) and (b) will have speaking 
rights during Plenary sessions and sessions of Commission subsidiary groups and 
Committees to which they are admitted to under C.2, in accordance with the Rules of 
Debate of the Commission.  
In relation to speaking rights, there is no amendment to be made to the Rules of Procedure 
text as this rule is clear, and regulation of speaking rights falls under the Rules of Debate. 
The Rules of Debate on speaking rights read: 
A. Right to Speak 
1. The Chair shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to 
speak, with the exception of accredited Observers, which should be allowed to speak 
only after all Commissioners desiring to speak do so. As a general rule, Observers will 
only be allowed to speak once at each Agenda item under discussion, and at the 
discretion of the Chair. 
2. A Commissioner or Observer may speak only if called upon by the Chair, who may 
call a speaker to order if his/her remarks are not relevant to the subject under 
discussion. 
An issue observable in 2014, 2016 and 2018 in observers exercising access to speaking 




or to directly attack a member state.851 While the current rules indicate that documents 
should be directed to the Commission as a whole and not toward any member state, there is 
no clear prohibition on such behaviour in the use of speaking rights. Nor is there a clear 
remedy for the Chair to direct an Observer where there is more than one call to order. It is 
suggested that the Whaling Commission Rules of Debate852 clearly indicate a difference 
between the speaking rights of member states and observers. Rule A could be extended to 
include:  
5. The Chair has the discretion to stop an Observer from continuing to address the 
Commission, at five minutes and if that Observer is called to order a second time.  
6. Member states have the discretion to call on the Chair to make a point of order if an 
Observer uses speaking rights to direct hostile commentary toward that member state. 
The Chair has the discretion to allow or disallow an Observer to continue where a 
member state so objects.  
The rationale for all changes is simple. The Commission, and its members must have the 
capacity to moderate the content of observer NGO contributions to the Commission’s 
work. By instituting a process where the invitation and accreditation process involves a 
demonstration of a capacity to contribute to the work of the Commission, the focus of 
observer NGO applications is already directed toward material consideration of the 
constituent parts of that work: the animating principles of the object and purpose.  
By removing the capacity for NGO observers to provide Opening Statements, this draws 
a clear divide between decision-makers and decision-making bodies, such as 
intergovernmental organizations. Refocusing on documentary contributions of NGO 
observers on Information Documents also encourages the contribution of work 
intended to support the decision-making work of the Commission. It also supports the 
contribution of work in line with aspects of NGO behaviours, such as information 
building, curtailing the sole focus of Opening Statements on lobbying. 
The introduction of clearer rules of engagement for NGO observers speaking to the 
agenda, also focuses the contributions to engage directly with the work of the 
 
851 See above Chapter 4 at [4.4.3]; above Chapter 5 [5.3.2]. 




Commission, rather than pursue an ulterior agenda that may not support effective 
decision-making among member states. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the behaviours of NGOs in the CAMLR Commission and 
Whaling Commission in light of literature on international NGO behaviours. It has made 
connections between the two Commissions and broader NGO practices. Discussion in 
8.3 considered why object and purpose principles should be considered as a 
fundamental reference point for the rule of law, and accountability of NGOs within 
intergovernmental bodies. Part 8.4 brought together these discussions to consider how 
the Rules of Procedure and Rules of Debate might best be amended to encourage NGO 
engagement that supports the work of the Commissions, and in doing so, creates an 
underlying focus on the object and purpose principles of the Conventions.  
It was observed in Chapter Five, that there is a genuine need for NGOs to 
counterbalance the imbalance of states that themselves deviate from a balanced 
consideration of the object and purpose principles governing their membership of an 
RFB. This was observable in the engagement of NGOs throughout the 1970s and into the 
mid-1980s in advocating strongly for conservation where several member state in the 
Whaling Commission focused too heavily on industry development and use, to the 
detriment of a balanced interpretation of the Whaling Convention object and purpose. 
This was also observed in the CAMLR Commission, in the context of COLTO and the 
Rogues Gallery, as well as the interventions of Sea Shepherd and COLTO to supplement 
the capacity of states to prevent IUU fishing vessels from successful fishing in the 
Southern Ocean. 
However, where there is a balanced engagement of states the primary function of NGO 
observers is to support the work of the Commission. The impasse in the Whaling 
Commission, which developed in the 1990s around the implementation of the RMP, has 
continued for over two decades. A balanced interpretation of the object and purpose 
principles, and their implementation in decision-making has been, in part, inhibited by 
the nature of NGO engagement in meetings, which has been largely ungoverned by 
consideration of the work of the Commission. The contributions of all classes of NGOs in 




functional contributions that can be made by NGOs where the work of the Commission, 
and the instrument under which it acts, are given primary consideration. 
The answer to the question of whether NGOs support the object and purpose principles 
in their engagement with RFBs in the Southern Ocean is that sometimes they do and 
sometimes they don’t. The distinctions between these circumstances has highlighted 
that effective decision-making comes from a balanced engagement with all the 
principles of an object and purpose, rather than selective reading of a treaty’s animating 
principles. While the ethical or moral problem of whaling remains a non-negotiable 
stance of many NGOs, the impasse in the Whaling Commission should not be supported 
by NGOs past its current 20-year stalemate. This is an untenable situation if the rule of 
law is to be considered as a primary aspect of international law and institutions.  
The high degree of politicization of the Whaling Commission is not the sole domain of 
NGOs. There is a degree of fault in the behaviour of various member states in their 
interpretation of the Convention. However, reinforcing the expectation of NGOs to 
support the work of the Commission would underscore the necessity of non-partisan 
engagement by member states to reach decisions that accord with the broad range of 
views on what constitutes acceptable use of whale resources. In a Commission that 
includes culturally diverse viewpoints, even with the exit of Japan, there should be 
consideration of both non-consumptive and consumptive use of whales according to the 
convention. The balance of concerns in the CAMLR Commission should be a reference 
point for the Whaling Commission to move toward more effective deliberations and 
decision-making. The use of the object and purpose principles as an analytical tool may 





Appendix 1: 2014 IWC and CCAMLR questionnaires 






















































































































Appendix 2: 2016 IWC and CCAMLR questionnaires 























Appendix 3: 2014 IWC and CCAMLR interview questions for NGO 
representatives  




4. Length of involvement with organisation 
5. Length of personal involvement with IWC 
6. Activities 
a. Scientific contributions? 
b. Capacity building 
c. Funding 
d. Media 
e. Monitoring and evaluation 
f. Liaison with states or other NGOs 
g. Lobbying 
7. Which bodies of IWC do you engage with? 
8. View of NGO involvement in IWC – how and why is it important? 
9. Has your organisation played a decisive or influential role in any decisions of 
state parties or the IWC? 
10. What was the agenda for your organisation at the IWC65? How did it differ from 
previous years? 
11. View of, and interaction with pro-whaling NGOs? 





13. Has your organisation made material contributions to the development of IWC 
policies, conservation measures, or contributed to significant events in IWC’s 
history? 
14. Do you engage with other RFMOs, conservation organisations or governments on 
the issue of whales? 
15. Does your organisation engage with the idea of the common heritage of all 
mankind and therefore enable NGO intervention in or presence with 
international organisations like IWC? 
16. Indicate the level of the effectiveness of the relationship of your organisation and 
IWC in achieving the goals of your organisation 
a. Very effective; effective; neutral; somewhat effective; not effective at all 
b. Please discuss the areas of this level of effectiveness 
17. Is NGO involvement important at IWC? Is it essential to any conservation issues 
at IWC? 
18. What are the key issues and challenges facing IWC for the next few meetings? 
19. Do you believe IWC has the competency to address these issues? 
20. Is there potential for greater involvement of NGOs in IWC? 
21. What have been the key achievements of your organisation? 
22. Reflecting on IWC65, for your organisation what were the key achievements and 









4. Length of involvement with organisation 
5. Length of personal involvement with CCAMLR 
6. View of NGO involvement in CCAMLR – how and why is it important? 
7. Has your organisation made material contributions to the development of 
CCAMLR policies, conservation measures, or contributed to significant events in 
CCAMLR’s history? 
8. Which bodies of CCAMLR do you engage with? 
9. Other RFMOs, etc.? 
10. Does your organisation engage with the idea that the Southern Oceans constitute 
a commons that are the heritage of all mankind and therefore enable NGO 
intervention in or presence with international organisations like CCAMLR? 
11. Questions elicited by responses of interviewee, such as more details of the 
activities they have engaged in, such as policy or science work, lobbying, 
campaigning, working with state parties outside the meeting or delegations 
during the meeting. 
12. Place the effectiveness of the relationship of your organisation and CCAMLR in 
achieving the goals of your organisation 
a. Very effective; effective; neutral; somewhat effective; not effective at all 
b. Areas of effectiveness 
13. Is NGO involvement important at CCAMLR? Is it essential to any conservation 
issues at CCAMLR? 
14. What are the key issues and challenges facing CCAMLR? 
15. Do you believe CCAMLR has the competency to address these issues? 




Appendix 4: South Atlantic Whale Sanctuary promotional banners at the 
IWC2016 
 






Appendix 5: NGOs in the CAMLR and Whaling Commissions 
Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 
United States; US Code, 1947, section 
501(c)(3). 
Private initiative with no government 
affiliation; funding from member NGOs and 
bodies. 
Other environmental NGOs. 
Purpose:  
‘To preserve the Antarctic continent and its surrounding Southern Ocean; to ensure that the world’s last unspoiled wilderness survives 
intact for future generations.’853 
 




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Centro de Conservación de Cetacea (CCC) 
Chile; not for profit/non-governmental.854 
Initiative of private individuals;855 funding 
comes from donations, membership fees 
and government grants.856 
Not governmental; otherwise unspecified 
beyond ‘team of professionals and experts’.  
Purpose:  
- Promote effective management, conservation and marine protection policies.  
- Develop non-lethal research programs on cetaceans and their maritime ecosystems, with special emphasis on endangered 
species.  
- Identify and evaluate anthropogenic impacts on cetacean populations and propose mitigation measures.  
 
854 Society for Conservation Biology, ‘Role of Cetaceans in Ecosystem Functioning: Defining Marine Conservation Policies in the 21st 
Century’ (26 July 2017, 28th International Congress for Conservation Biology) Workshop Report 14. 
855 Centro de Conservación Cetacea, Directora Ejecutiva del Centro de Conservación Cetacea de Chile Galardonada por la Sociedad de la 









Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
- Promote the sustainable development of coastal communities through high quality marine wildlife viewing activities.  
- Increase public awareness and promote the active and informed participation of citizens / government in the conservation of 
marine biodiversity as well as promote the reduction of anthropogenic impacts.  
- Strengthen national and international cooperation in marine conservation strategies.857 
Cetacean Society International (CSI) 
United States; US Code, 1947, section 
501(c)(3).858 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
funding from the public. 
Members of the public.859 
Purpose:  
‘To stop the killing, capture and display of cetaceans (whales, dolphins, and porpoises); encourage human activities that enhance public 




857 Centro de Conservación Cetacea, About Us (no date) http://www.ccc-
chile.org/article_view.php?areaID=208&cPath=208&key=455&bRedirectByBeOne=true.  
858 Cetacean Society International, What is Cetacean Society International (2018) http://csiwhalesalive.org/csi_about.html.  
859 Cetacean Society International, Donate Now to CSI or Become a Member (2018) http://csiwhalesalive.org/csi_membership.html.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
ELSA Nature Conservancy (ELSA) 
Japan; Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit 
Activities (1998) – similar to US 501(c)(3) 
organisations.861 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
unspecified. 
Members of the public.862 
Purpose:  
‘to protect nature and the environment, from the sky to the ground’ and ‘with the aim of global nature and environmental protection 
across a broad spectrum’.863 
 
861 Japan NPO Center, Legal Framework (2019) https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/legal-framework/.  
862 ELSA Nature Conservancy, About Us (2019) http://en.elsaenc.net/about-us/. 





Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
Various, including Australia, Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 
2012 (Cth) and United States; US Code, 
1947, section 501(c)(3). 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
no government membership; funding from 
various sources but no government 
funding.864 
Members of the public, also private affiliate 
organisations.865 
Purpose:  
Relevant to the CAMLR Commission and Whaling Commission, ‘FoE understands that in an era of globalisation and international 
environmental problems, a global and co-operative response is required. FoE [Australia] seeks to develop strong relations with 
environmental social justice movements in all parts of the world.’866 
 
864 Friends of the Earth (Australia), Annual Report 2016-2017, 18-20. 
865 Ibid 21. 




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Greenpeace 
Various, including Australia, Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 
2012 (Cth) and United States; US Code, 
1947, section 501(c)(3); Greenpeace 
International is incorporated in the 
Netherlands.867 
Private initiative indicated by legal 
status;868 Greenpeace International 
receives funding from other Greenpeace 
entities;869 subsidiary Greenpeace entities 
rely on private contributions.870 
Members of the public.871 
Purpose:  
‘to create a green and peaceful world where all life on Earth can flourish.’872 
 
867 Greenpeace International, Stichting Greenpeace Council and related entities Annual Report 2017, 2. 
868 Weyler, above n 245; Greenpeace, Stichting Greenpeace Council and related entities Annual Report 2017, 2.  
869 Greenpeace, Stichting Greenpeace Council and related entities Annual Report 2017, 2. 





Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Global Guardian Trust (GGT) 
Japan; Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit 
Activities (1998) – similar to US 501(c)(3) 
organisations.873 
Private initiative of  ‘individuals and 
corporations … leaders and experts in 
natural resource management and other 
fields’;874 funding unspecified.  
Members of the public and corporations.  
Purpose:  
‘to ensure that resource uses are the thoughtful and responsible result of reliable data and study. This is not altruism. Ecosystems 
conservation is critically important to the survival of human beings ... promote the sustainable use of natural resources as a conservation 
tool.’875 
 
872 Greenpeace International, Our Values (2019) https://www.greenpeace.org/international/explore/about/values/.  
873 Japan NPO Center, Legal Framework (2019) https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/legal-framework/. 
874 Global Guardian Trust, Home (no date) http://www.ggt.or.jp/en/index.html.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Humane Society International (HSI) 
Various, including Australia Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 
2012 (Cth) and United States; US Code, 
1947, section 501(c)(3). 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
public donations, bequests, grants, sales 
and other.876 
Members of the public.  
Purpose:  
Extensive objectives, including ‘protection of all living things from cruelty and neglect’ and ‘to promote the enhancement and 
conservation of all wild plants and animals.’877 
 
876 Humane Society International, Annual Report 2018, 19. 





Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Instituto de Conservación de Ballenas (ICB) 
Argentina; ‘non-profit civil organisation’878 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
funding and support received from 
‘government agencies, foundations, society 
organizations, academic institutions, 
companies, media and individuals.’879 
Volunteers and experts.880 
Purpose:  
‘Healthy oceans and a world free of threats and negative human impacts for whales.’881 
 
878 ICB, About (2018) https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://ballenas.org.ar/&prev=search.  






Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) 
Various, including Australia, governed by 
the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission Act 2012 (Cth); and the United 
States, US Code, 1947, section 501(c)(3) but 
also (Belgium, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Kenya, Malawi, 
Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and 
Zambia).882 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
funding and support from members of the 
public.883 
Members of the public.  
 
882 International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), Annual Report (July 2015-June 2016) 27. 




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
IFAW cont… 
Purpose:  
‘In order to achieve IFAW’s vision of a world where animals are respected and protected, we follow key principles in our hands-on 
projects with animals and in our advocacy work to secure better animal welfare protection in policy, legislation and society:  
- It should be recognised that animals have intrinsic value and are sentient beings.  
- Policy should be based on sound science within an ethical framework for animals.  
- Conservation decisions should be guided by ecological sustainability and biological sustainability, the precautionary principle 
within an ethical framework for animals.’884 
 




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Organización para la Conservación de Cetáceos /Uruguayan Cetacean Conservation Organization (OCC) 
Uruguay; small non-government 
organisation.885 
Private initiative indicated by legal status 
and history;886 some funding from other 
NGOs;887 and by public donation.888 
Members of the public; NGO affiliation, 
indicated by funding sources. 
Purpose:  
promote ‘awareness and education programs for the effective conservation of the southern right whale (Eubalaena australis) and its 
coastal marine habitat’.889 
 
885 Waitt Foundation, Uruguayan Cetacean Conservation Organization (2019) http://waittfoundation.org/rocspotlight/organization-for-
the-conservation-of-cetaceans-marine-sanctuary-in-uruguayan-waters/.  
886 IUCN, A new approach to marine and costal conservation in Uruguay (2019) https://www.iucn.org/news/commission-
environmental-economic-and-social-policy/201710/new-approach-marine-and-coastal-conservation-uruguay.  
887 OCC, Campaign to Return Uruguay to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) (23 February 2005) 
https://ballenafranca.org/article/campaign-to-return-uruguay-to-the-international-wh/.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
PEW Environment Group (PEW) – PEW is part of the PEW Charitable Trust 
United States, US Code, 1947, section 
501(c)(3). 
A ‘global research and public policy 
organization, still operated as an 
independent, non-partisan, non-profit 
organization dedicated to serving the 
public.’890 Funding from donations, grants, 
investment, program revenue.891 
Membership is through donation or 
investment.892 
 
889 OCC, Contents (no date) https://occ.org.uy/index.php#.  
890 PEW Charitable Trusts, How We Work (2019) https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/how-we-work.  
891 PEW Charitable Trusts, Form 990, 2016 Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax (no date) https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2018/06/thepewcharitabletrustsyear2017form990.pdf?la=en&hash=8F2696DF99B200B3A423BE7855F146627B2181
0D.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
PEW Environment Group cont… 
Purpose:  
PEW Charitable Trusts and its Environment Group focus on improving public policy through ‘rigorous analysis’ and aim to ‘invigorate 
civic life by encouraging democratic participation and strong communities.’893 In oceans conservation this ‘includes efforts to create 
large marine reserves; end illegal fishing; protect key species … establish policies that protect, maintain, and restore the health of marine 
ecosystems.’894 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
Various, including Australia, governed by 
the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission Act 2012 (Cth); and the United 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
established to work collaboratively with 
conservationists and conservation 
organisations.895 Funding comes from 
Members of the public; 897 partnerships 
with governments, local communities, 
businesses and individual donors.898 
 
893 PEW Charitable Trusts, Mission and Values (2019) https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/mission-and-values.  
894 PEW Charitable Trusts, Oceans Conservation (2019) https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/topics/oceans.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
States, US Code, 1947, section 501(c)(3)  individuals, in-kind support, government 
grants, foundations, networks and 
corporations.896 
Purpose:  
to advocate ‘for governments and international institutions like the World Bank to adopt, enforce and strengthen policies that promote 
biodiversity and responsible natural resource management.’899 Its purpose is also to act as ‘an international fundraising organization to 
work in collaboration with existing conservation groups and bring substantial financial support to the conservation movement on a 
worldwide scale.’900 
 
897 WWF-US, WWF-US 2018 Annual Report, 30. 
898 WWF, Partnerships (2019) https://www.worldwildlife.org/pages/partnerships.  
896 WWF, Financials (2019) https://www.worldwildlife.org/about/financials.  
899 WWF, Influencing Policy (2019) https://www.worldwildlife.org/initiatives/influencing-policy.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Whale and Dolphin Conservation (WDC) 
Primary organisation incorporated as a 
charity in the United Kingdom under the 
Charities Act 2011 (UK). Also active in 
Australia governed by the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 
2012 (Cth); United States, US Code, 1947, 
section 501(c)(3), Argentina and 
Germany.901 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
funding from donations, legacies, 
merchandise, royalties and investments.902 
Members of the public and corporate 
partners,903 although works collaboratively 
with governments.904 
 
901 WDC, Introduction to WDC (no date) https://au.whales.org/about-us-2/introduction-to-wdc.  
902 WDC, Whale and Dolphin Conservation Report and Financial Statements 2014-2015 (United Kingdom), 13; WDC, 2017 Annual 
Review (United Kingdom), 18-19. 
903 WDC, Supporters View – Why WDC makes a difference (no date) https://au.whales.org/about-us-2/supporters-view-why-wdc-makes-
difference.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
WDC cont… 
Purpose:  
‘To reduce the numbers [of whales] killed and the numbers of countries whaling.’905 
HYBRID NGOS 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
 




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Switzerland; 210 Swiss Civil Code, 1907, 
Chapter III, Articles 80-89. 
Founded by the Swiss League for the 
Protection of Nature, with the formative 
cooperation of governments and other 
conservation organisations in its 
foundational documents and processes;906 
member contributions. 
State; government agency, international 
non-government organisation, national 
non-government organisation; indigenous 
people; affiliate.907 
Purpose: 
Its Constitution notes that its purpose is to ‘encourage and facilitate co-operation between governments and national and international 
organizations concerned with, and persons interest in, the Protection of Nature.’908 
 
906 International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN), IUPN Established at Fontainebleau 5 October 1948 (no date) 
https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/1948-001.pdf.  
907 IUCN, IUCN Members (2019) https://www.iucn.org/about/members/iucn-members.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
International Wildlife Management Consortium World Conservation Trust (IWMC WCT) 
Canada; non-profit/charitable 
organisation.909 
Private initiative indicated by legal status; 
specific project funding from government 
grants.910  
‘A variety of governments, governmental 
ministries, departments, agencies, etc., 
involved in the management of wildlife, at 
any level of government, in any sovereign 
state, country, province, state or territory; 
regional associations of governments and 
their agencies involved in the management 
of wildlife; non-governmental associations 
or organizations having a direct and 
 
909 IWMC World Conservation Trust, Home (2019) http://www.iwmc.org/.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
genuine interest in the management of 
wildlife.’911 Self-identified as an 
environmental NGO. 
Purpose:  
‘to ensure that international instruments – particularly CITES – have a positive impact on wildlife and natural habitats by instituting 
management measures and procedures that promote the recovery and conservation of endangered species.’912 
INDUSTRIAL NGOS 
Association for Responsible Krill Fisheries (ARK) 
Not for profit under Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas); Tasmania, 
Initiative of krill harvesting companies; 
member contributions.914 
Krill harvesting companies 
 
911 IWMC WCT, Membership (2019) http://www.iwmc.org/about-iwmc/membership.html.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Australia.913 
Purpose: 
Facilitate ‘an industry contribution to an ecologically sustainable krill harvest’ with a commitment to long term krill fisheries, obtaining 
and providing data and information about ‘the fishery, krill stocks and Southern ocean ecosystems’ and contributing to ‘a sustainable 
krill harvest into the future.’915 
Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO) 
Not for profit;916 Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth); Western Australia;917 Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA).918 
Initiative of legal toothfish operators; 
member contributions 
Fishing companies from various member 
states of the CAMLR Commission.919 
 
914 Email from Genevieve Tanner, Public Officer Secretary (ARK) to Lucy Smejkal, PhD candidate, 31 August 2015. 
913 Email from Genevieve Tanner, Public Officer Secretary (ARK) to Lucy Smejkal, PhD candidate, 1 September 2015. 
915 ARK, Home (no date) http://www.ark-krill.org/.  
916 COLTO, Articles of Association (no date) https://www.colto.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/COLTO-Constitution-Jan2019.pdf 




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
COLTO cont… 
Purpose: 
To ‘promote sustainable toothfish fishing and fisheries; facilitate its Members working together and with others, including through 
continued provision of high quality scientific data to CCALR and other bodies; and to provide effective representation for its 
Members.’920 
 
917 COLTO, Certificate of Registration of a Registrable Australian Body (no date) http://www.colto.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Australian-Registered-Body-cert.pdf.  
918 COLTO, Certificate of Incorporation (no date) http://www.colto.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Certificate-of-Incorporation.pdf.  
919 COLTO, Members (no date) https://www.colto.org/about-us/members/.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
International Coalition of Fisheries Association (ICFA) 
Recognised as an NGO.921 No indication of 
state of association or incorporation. 
Corporate initiatives to provide 
representation of fisheries interests; 
membership funding.922 
National fish and seafood industry trade 
associations.923 
Purpose:  
‘to provide decision-makers a unified voice on global fish and seafood issues. ICFA members advocate policies for the long-term 
sustainable use of living marine resources for the benefit of global food security and prosperity. ICFA members are deeply committed to 
science-based and fully participatory fishery conservation and management processes.’924  
 
921 National Fisheries Institute, International Coalition of Fisheries Associations (2019) https://www.aboutseafood.com/international-
coalition-of-fisheries-associations-3/; Union of International Associations (UIA), International Coalition of Fisheries Associations (ICFA) 
(2018) https://uia.org/s/or/en/1100054791. 
922 National Fisheries Institute, International Coalition of Fisheries Associations (2019) https://www.aboutseafood.com/international-
coalition-of-fisheries-associations-3/. 
923 Ibid. 




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Japan Fisheries Association (JFA) 
Japan; unclear, but ‘business’ of the JFA is to 
act within the private and government 
sectors to promote fisheries and fisheries 
interests.925 
Corporate and individual initiative to 
provide representation of fisheries 
interests; membership funding. 
400 members; fisheries-related associations, private 
companies and individuals 
Purpose:  
‘to promote the fishing industry and contribute to the economic well-being and cultural heritage of our country.’926 
SCIENTIFIC NGOS 
Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) 
United Kingdom, The Companies Acts 1985 National scientific academies or research  
 
925 Japan Fisheries Association, Major Business Activities (2008) http://www.suisankai.or.jp/daisui_e/gyomu_e.html.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
and 2006 (UK).927 SCAR is a registered 
company (6564642) and registered charity 
(1124840). 
councils ‘of countries that are active in 
Antarctic research.’928 
Purpose: 
Initiate, develop and coordinate ‘high quality international scientific research in the Antarctic region (including the Southern Ocean), 
and on the role of the Antarctic region in the Earth system. SCAR provides objective and independent scientific advice to the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meetings and other organizations such as the UNFCCC and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
on issues of science and conservation affecting the management of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean and on the role of the Antarctic 
region in the Earth system.’929 
 
927 Articles of Association of Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (May 2018) https://www.scar.org/library/governance/5116-
articles-may18/file/.  
928 SCAR, SCAR Member Countries and Unions (2017) https://www.scar.org/about-us/members/detailed-information/.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Scientific Committee for Oceanic Research (SCOR) 
Maryland, United States, US Code, 1947, 
section 501(c)(3). 
No government membership; funding 
comes from national membership 
contributions, grants and contracts from US 
federal agencies, private foundations and 
international organizations.930 
Membership from the scientific community 
since 1957. 
Purpose:  
The purpose of SCOR ‘is to further international scientific activity in all branches of oceanic research.’931 
 
930 SCOR, Financial Support to SCOR (no date) https://scor-int.org/scor/about/finance/.  




Legal status; country of 
incorporation 
Private / Funding Membership 
Oceanites Inc. (Oceanites) 
United States, US Code, 1947, section 
501(c)(3) 
No government membership; utilising 
public donations, government awards and 
grants from foundations and institutes.932 
Has private membership from a variety of 
professional disciplines related to Antarctic 
research.933 
Purpose: 
To monitor and analyze ‘penguin and seabird population changes across the vast Antarctic Peninsula’. ‘To provide actionable 




932 Oceanites Inc, Oceanites Funding (2018) https://oceanites.org/oceanites-funding/.  
933 Oceanites Inc, Board of Directors and Members (2018) https://oceanites.org/board-of-directors-and-members/.  
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Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1975, IWC/27/12-1 
Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1976, Resource ID 416 
Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1977, Resource ID 417 
Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1978, Resource ID 419  
Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1979, Resource ID 421 
Thirty-second meeting of the IWC, Verbatim Records, 1980, Resource ID 422 
ICB, Statement in Plenary discussion on Agenda Item 5.1, IWC65 (2014) Plenary Session 
1, 16th October 2014 (from 19:28 audio file) 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=%21collection223&k=  
IWMC, Statement in Plenary discussion on Agenda Item 5.1, IWC65 (2014) Plenary 
Session 1, 16th October 2014 (from 16:41 audio file) 
https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=%21collection223&k= 
IWC Documents 
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay The South Atlantic: A Sanctuary for Whales 
IWC/65/08 (2014) 
Australia, Austria, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States, non-
governmental organisation accreditation and participation in IWC Annual Meetings: a 
recommended approach IWC/58/24 Agenda item 23 (19 June 2006) 
Bellazzi, Gabriela, Ricardo Orri, Silvana Montanelli, Update of the report ‘Entanglement 
of Southern Right whales (Eubalaena australis) in Golfo Nuevo, Chubut, Argentina’ 
IWC/65/WKM&AVI13 
Currie, Duncan E J (submitted by Austria), Ecosystem-Based Management in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: Progress towards Adopting the Ecosystem Approach in the 
International Management of Living Marine Resources IWC/59/18 
IWC Secretariat, Draft Code of Conduct for NGOs at IWC meetings and complaints 




IWC Resolutions – by year 
2001 
Resolution on Transparency within the International Whaling Commission, Resolution 
2001-1 IWC/53/23Rev (2001) 
Resolution on the Conduct of Non-Governmental Organisations Resolution 2001-not 
adopted IWC/53/33Rev (2001) 
2003 
The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the International 
Whaling Commission, Resolution 2003-1 IWC/55/4Rev2 (2003) 
2004 
Resolution on Japanese Community-based Whaling Resolution 2004-2 IWC/56/21Rev1 
(2004) 
2006 
St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration Resolution 2006-1 IWC/58/16 (2006) 
Resolution on the Safety of Vessels Engaged in Whaling and Whale Research-Related 
Activities Resolution 2006-2 (IWC) IWC/58/23Rev (2006) 
2007 
Resolution on Safety at Sea and Protection of the Environment Resolution 2007-2 (IWC) 
IWC/59/25 (2007) 
Resolution on the non-lethal use of cetaceans Resolution 2007-7 IWC/59/29 (2007) 
2009 
Resolution on the extension of Small Working group on the Future of the IWC until the 
62nd Annual Meeting of the Commission 2009-1 IWC/61/10 amended (2009) 
2011 
Resolution on Safety at Sea Resolution 2011-2 (IWC) IWC/63/17 (2011) 
2018 
Draft Resolution. The Florianópolis Declaration on the Role of the International Whaling 
Commission in the Conservation and Management of Whales in the 21st Century 
IWC/67/13.Rev 1 (plenary agenda item 12) 
IWC meeting documents – by year 
2008 
Chair’s summary of the outcome of discussions on the future of the IWC. Annex A: 




SWG on the Future of the IWC, Progress Report on the September 2008 meeting of the 
Small Working Group (SWG) on the Future of the International Whaling Commission 
presented by Alvaro de Soto, SWG Chairman, St Petersburg, Florida, USA IWC/S08/Rep 1 
(2008) 
An overview of the elements/issues identified as being of importance to one or more 
Contracting Governments in relation to the future of the IWC IWC/S08/SWG 3 (2008) 
Government of Japan, Conference for the Normalization of the International Whaling 
Commission February 13-15, 2007 Tokyo, Japan Chair’s Summary IWC/M08/INFO 2 
(2008) 
Government of New Zealand, Chair’s Summary: Symposium on the State of the 
Conservation of Whales in the 21st Century 26th April 2007 IWC/M08/INFO 3 (2008) 
Government of Argentina, Buenos Aires Group IWC/M08/INFO 4 (2008) 
Buenos Aires Group, Latin American Cooperation Strategy for the Conservation of 
Cetaceans IWC/M08/INFO 7 (2008) 
Governments of Argentina and the Netherlands, The Second Pew Whale Symposium, 
Tokyo, 30-31 January 2008 Chairman’s Summary IWC/M08/INFO 9 (2008) 
2016 
Delegates and Observers attending the 66th Annual Meeting IWC/66/03Rev1 (2016) 
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Gabon, South Africa and Uruguay, The South Atlantic: 
A Sanctuary for Whales IWC/66/08 (2016) 
International Whaling Commission observer opening statements 
1981 
International Transport Workers’ Federation, Statement by ITF Observer to the 33rd 
Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/33/OS ITF (1981) 
Assembly of Rabbis, Statement by the Assembly of Rabbis IWC/33/OS Assembly Rabbis 
(1981) 
IUCN/WWF Statement on Whaling – 1981 IWC/33/OS IUCN (1981) 
World Society for the Protection of Animals, Opening Statement to the 33rd Meeting of 
the IWC IWC/33/OS WSPA (1981) 
Connecticut Cetacean Society, Opening Statement by Dr Robbins Barstow, Observer for 
CCS IWC/33/OS CCS (1981) 
1982 
World Society for the Protection of Animals, Opening Statement to the 34th Meeting of the 
IWC IWC/34/OS WSPA (1982) 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Inuit Circumpolar Conference Statement on Whaling 1982 
IWC/33/OS ICC (1982) 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Small Whale Species IWC/34/OS ICC (1982)  





ICC, Inuit Circumpolar Conference Statement IWC/35/OS/ICC (1983) 
IUCN, Statement to the 35th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/35/OS/IUCN (1983) 
WWF, WWF Statement to the 35th annual meeting of the IWC 18-23 July, Brighton, U.K. 
IWC/35/OS-WWF (1983) 
1984 
CCS, Opening Statement by Connecticut Cetacean Society IWC/36/OS/CCS (1984) 
AGAPAN, Statement by Jose Truda Palazzo Jr. Vice-President of the AGAPAN to the 
Opening Session of the 36th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Buenos Aires, 18 June 1984 
IWC/36/OS/AGAPAN (1984) 
WWF, WWF Statement to the 36th Annual Meeting of the IWC, 18-22 June 1984, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina IWC/36/84/OS/WWF (1984) 
1985 
CCS, Opening Statement by Connecticut Cetacean Society IWC/37/OS CCS (1985) 
ISAP, Opening Statement to the 37th Annual IWC Meeting of the Institute for Study of 
Animal Problems (ISAP) IWC/37/OS ISAP (1985) 
IUCN, Opening Statement to the 37th Annual IWC Meeting IWC/37/OS IUCN (1985) 
PCAP, Preservation and Conservation of Animal and Plant Life Opening Statement 
IWC/37/OS PCAP (1985) 
Whale Center, Whale Center Statement to Commissions on Observers at the 37th annual 
meeting of the IWC, Bournemouth, England IWC/37/OS-Whale Center (1985) 
WWF, WWF Statement to the 37th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/37/OS/WWF (1985) 
1986 
AAZPA, Opening Statement of the American Association of Zoological Parks and 
Aquariums to the 38th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/38/OS AAZPA (1986) 
AJSU, The Position of All Japan Seamen’s Union on the 38th Annual Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/38/OS AJSU (1986) 
CSI formerly CCS, Opening Statement by Cetacean Society International (formerly 
Connecticut Cetacean Society) IWC/38/OS CSI (1986) 
IAAAM, Opening Statement of the International Association for Aquatic Animal Medicine 
to the 38th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/38/OS IAAAM (1986) 
IMATA, Opening Statement by the International Marine Animal Trainers Association to 
the 38th meeting of the IWC IWC/38/OS IMATA (1986) 
IUCN, IUCN Statement to the IWC IWC/38/OS IUCN (1986) 
Waterlife Association, Opening Statement for the Waterlife Association for the 38th 
Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/38/OS WA (1986) 





AAZPA, Opening Statement of the American Association of Zoological Parks and 
Aquariums to the 39th meeting of the IWC IWC/39/OS AAZPA (1987) 
CSI, Opening Statement by Cetacean Society International IWC/39/OS CSI (1987) 
FOE, Opening Statement by Friends of the Earth International IWC/39/OS FOE (1987) 
IAAAM, Opening Statement of the International Association for Aquatic Animal Medicine 
to the 39th meeting of the IWC IWC/39/OS IAAAM (1987) 
IMATA, Opening Statement to the 38th [sic] meeting of the IWC IWC/39/OS IMATA 
(1987) 
IUCN, IUCN Statement to the International Whaling Commission IWC/39/OS IUCN 
(1987) 
WWF, WWF Statement to the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/39/OS WWF (1987) 
1988 
CSI, Opening Statement by Cetacean Society International IWC/40/OS CSI (1988) 
IUCN, Statement to the International Whaling Commission IWC/40/OS IUCN (1988) 
Waterlife Association, Opening Statement for the Waterlife Association IWC/40/OS WA 
(1988) 
WWF, WWF Statement to the 40th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/40/OS WWF (1988) 
1989 
CSI, Opening Statement by Cetacean Society International IWC/41/OS CSI (1989) 
ELSA Nature Conservancy, Open Statement to the 41st Annual Meeting of International 
Whaling Commission IWC/41/OS ELSA (1989) 
IUCN, Statement to IWC IWC/41/OS IUCN (1989) 
1990 
IUCN, Statement to International Whaling Commission IWC/42/OS/IUCN (1990) 
1991 
American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums; international Association for 
Aquatic Animal Medicine, International Marine Animal Trainers Association; Marine 
Mammal Interest Group, Opening Statement, IWC43/OS AAZPA, IAAAM, IMATA, MMIG 
(1991) 
CSI, opening Statement by Cetacean Society International IWC/43/OS CSI (1991) 
ICFA, Time To Remember Objectives of the Convention IWC/43/OS ICFA (1991) 
ICFA, Time To Remember Objectives of the Convention IWC/43/OS ICFA Addendum 
(1991) 
ITF, Statement to the 43rd Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/43/OS ITF (1991)  
IUCN, Statement of IUCN – The World Conservation Union to the 43rd Annual Meeting of 




WSPA, World Society for the Protection of Animals Opening Statement to the 43rd Annual 
Meeting, IWC/43/OS WSPA (1991) 
WSPA, World Society for the Protection of Animals, Resolution of the Board of WSPA 
IWC/43/OS WSPA Supplement (1991) 
WWF, Opening Statement to the 43rd Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/43/OS WWF 
(1991) 
1992 
ASOC, Opening Statement by the ASOC to the 44th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/44/OS 
ASOC (1992) 
Assembly of Rabbis, Statement IWC/44/OS AR (1992) 
CSI, Opening Statement by Cetacean Society International IWC/44/OS CSI (1992) 
ELSA Nature Conservancy, Open Statement to the 44th Annual Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/44/OS ELSA (1992) 
ECBD, Opening Statement to the 44th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/44/OS ECBD 
(1992) 
HSI, An Ethical Examination of the Killing of Whales IWC/44/OS HSI (1992) 
ICFA, Opening Statement to the 44th meeting of the IWC IWC/44/OS ICFA (1992) 
IUCN, Opening Statement to the 44th meeting of the IWC IWC/44/OS IUCN (1992) 
WWF, Opening Statement to the 44th meeting of the IWC IWC/44/OS WWF (1992) 
1993 
AAZPA & Alliance, Opening Statement of the AAZPA and Alliance IWC/45/OS AAZPA & 
ALLIANCE (1993) 
AWI, Executive Summary from ‘A Critical Analysis of the Revised Management Procedure 
(RMP)’ by Rick Spill for the Animal Welfare Institute IWC/45/OS AWI (1993) 
Cetacean Society International, Statement to the 45th meeting of the IWC IWC/45/OS CSI 
(1993) 
ELSA, Opening Statement to the 45th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/45/OS ELSA (1993) 
International Coalition of Fisheries Associations, The 45th Annual IWC Meeting: Opening 
Statement of the ICFA IWC/45/OS ICFA (1993) 
IUCN, Statement to the 45th IWC meeting IWC/45/OS IUCN (1993) 
JSWA, Japan Small-Type Whaling Association IWC/45/OS JSWA (1993) 
WSPA, Opening Statement from the WSPA to the 45th meeting of the IWC IWC/45/OS 
WSPA (1993) 
WWF, WWF Opening Statement to the 45th meeting of the IWC IWC/45/OS WWF (1993) 
1994 
Rick Spills and Jennifer Coates, Science Does Not Support Acceptance of the Revised 




Rick Spill, RMP Update: 1994 Scientific Committee Papers Indicate Further Flaws Which 
Need to be Remedied IWC/46/OS AWI-ANNEX 1 (1994) 
Cetacean Society International, Opening Statement to the 46th meeting of the IWC 
IWC/46/OS CSI (1994) 
International Association for Aquatic Animal Medicine, Opening Statement IWC/46/OS 
IAAAM (1994) 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) and International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs (IWGIA), Joint Opening Statement by the Observers for ICC and IWGIA to the 46th 
Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/46/OS ICC-IWGIA (1994) 
ICFA, The 46th Annual IWC Meeting, Opening Statement of the International Coalition of 
Fisheries Associations IWC/46/OS ICFA (1994) 
ICFA, Addendum to the Opening Statement of the International Coalition of Fisheries 
Associations IWC/46/OS ICFA Addendum (1994) 
IFAW, ‘Actions for Protection of Whales in Puerto Vallarta and Beyond’: Opening 
Statement by the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) IWC/46/OS IFAW 
(1994) 
ITF, International Transport Workers’ Federation Statement to the IWC – 1994 
IWC/46/OS ITWF (1994) 
IUCN, Opening Statement IWC/46/OS IUCN (1994) 
IWMC, Opening Statement by the International Wildlife Management Consortium to the 
46th Meeting of the IWC IWC/46/OS IWMC (1994) 
JWA, Opening Statement by the Japan Fisheries Association IWC/46/OS JFA (1994) 
WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/46/OS WWF (1994) 
1995 
AJSU, Statement by All Japan Seamen’s Union to the 47th Annual meeting of the IWC 
IWC/47/OS AJSU (1995) 
APAWC, Association for the Protection of Amazonia and Wildlife – Caribbean Opening 
Statement IWC/47/OS APAWC (1995) 
AWI, Opening Statement of the Animal Welfare Institute to the 47th Annual Meeting of the 
IWC IW/47/OS AWI (1995) 
CSI, Opening Statement IWC/47/OS CSI (1995) 
National Committee for the Defence of the Flora and Fauna, Opening Statement by 
CODEFF IWC/47/OS CODEFF (1995) 
Dominica Conservation Association, Submission to the 47th Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/47/OS DCA (1995) 
James Cameron for Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, 
Opinion of Law: Executive Summary IWC/47/OS FIELD (1995) 





HSI, Proposed Modifications to the ICRW: Recommended Minimum Requirements for 
Supervision and Control IWC/47/OS HSI (1995) 
ICFA, The 47th Annual IWC Meeting Opening Statement of the International Coalition of 
Fisheries Associations IWC/47/OS ICFA (1995) 
IFAW, Opening Statement to the 47th Annual meeting of the IWC IWC/47/OS IFAW 
(1995) 
IUCN, Opening Statement to the 47th Meeting of the IWC IWC/47/OS IUCN (1995) 
IWMC, Opening Statement by Eugene LaPointe, President International Wildlife 
Management Consortium IWC/47/OS IWMC (1995) 
Japan Fisheries Association, Opening Statement by the JFA IWC/47/OS JFA (1995) 
JST, Opening Statement by Japan Small-Type Whaling Association IWC/47/OS JST (1995) 
JWA, Opening Statement by the Japan Whaling Association IWC/47/OS JWA (1995) 
RS, Opening Statement of the Riches of the Sea IWC/47/OS RS (1995) 
WWF, Wanted Alive! Whales in the Wild IWC/47/OS WWF (1995) 
1996 
All Japan Seamen’s Union (AJSU), Statement by All Japan Seamen’s Union to the 48th 
Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/48/OS AJSU (1996) 
Association for the Protection of Japanese Fisheries, Opening Statement of the APFJ to 
the 48th Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/48/OS APFJ (1996) 
Arbeitsgruppe Zum Schutz der Meeressauger Schweiz (ASMS), Opening Statement to the 
International Whaling Commission’s 48th Annual Meeting IWC/48/OS ASMS (1996) 
Animal Welfare Institute, Opening Statement of the AWI to the 48th Annual Meeting of the 
IWC: The U.S. Proposal to Obtain An Annual Quota of Five Gray Whales for the Makah 
Tribe Does Not Satisfy Established IWC Requirements Under the Aboriginal Subsistence 
Whaling Category IWC/48/OS AWI (1996) 
Breach, It’s Time to Abolish the Inhumane Commercial Slaughter of Whales IWC/48/OS 
Breach (1996) 
The Cousteau Society, Statement of the Cousteau Society/Equipe Cousteau to the 48th 
Annual Meeting of the IWC June 24-28, 1996 IWC/48/OS Coust. Soc. (1996) 
Dominica Conservation Association (DCA), Opening Statement presented at the 48th 
International Whaling Commission meeting held in Aberdeen, Scotland, June 1996 
IWC/48/OS DCA (1996) 
Duetsches Tierhilfswerk (DT), Opening Statement Deutsches Tierhilfswerk, Germany, 
Aberdeen, 1996 IWC/48/OS DT (1996) 
Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals, The Electric Lance: An Ineffective and 
Inhumane Way to Kill a Whale IWC/48/OS EAW (1996) 
Friends of Animals, Statement, IWC/48/OS FOA (1996) 
- Global Guardian Trust, Opening Statement of Global Guardian Trust to the 48th 




Henke & Associates, Ltd (Conservation Consultants), Opening Statement, Henke & 
Associates, Ltd IWC/48/OS H&A (1996) 
Humane Society International, Why the IWC Should Not Grant the Makah Indians an 
Aboriginal Quota IWC/48/OS HSI (1996) 
International Coalition of Fisheries Associations, The 48th Annual IWC Meeting Opening 
Statement IWC/48/OS ICFA (1996) 
1997 
All Japan Seamen’s Union, Opening Statement IWC/49/OS AJSU (1997) 
Eastern Caribbean Coalition for Environmental Awareness (ECCEA), Opening Statement 
IWC/49/OS ECCEA (1997) 
Henke & Associates, Opening Statement IWC/49/OS H&A (1997) 
IFAW, Opening Statement by the International Fund for Animal Welfare IWC/49/OS 
IFAW (1997) 
Japan Whale Conservation Network, Opening Statement of JWCN IWC/49/OS JWCN 
(1997) 
Seafinding Associates, Opening Statement of Seafinding Associates IWC/49/OS SA 
WWF, Greenpeace, IFAW, Joint Statement to the IWC in Monte Carlo, 20-24 October 1997 
IWC/49/OS WWF (1997) 
1998 




American Cetacean Society, Opening Statement IWC/52/OS ACS 
AWI, Opening Statement of the Animal Welfare Institute IWC/52/OS AWI (2000) 
Cetacean Society International, Whale Watching and Whale Conservation 
IWC/52/OS/CSI (2000) 
Global Guardian Trust, Opening Statement IWC/52/OS/GGT (2000) 
Humane Society International, Evolving IWC/52/OS/HSI (2000) 
IFCNR, International Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources Opening 
Statement IWC/52/OS IFCNR (2000)  
IFAW, Opening Statement IWC/52/OS/IFAW (2000) 
IUCN, Statement to the 52nd Meeting of the IWC IWC/52/OS/IUCN (2000) 





American Cetacean Society, American Cetacean Society Opening Statement IWC/53/OS 
ACS (2001) 
CMEPS, Canadian Marine Environment Protection Society Opening Statement, 
IWC/53/IOS CMEPS (2001) 
Florida Caribbean Conservation Coalition, Opening Statement IWC-53 IWC/53/OS FCCC 
International Coalition of Fisheries Associations, ICFA Opening Statement IWC-53 
IWC/53/OS ICFA (2001) 
Ocean Defense International, Opening Statement IWC/53/OS ODI (2001) 
2002 
ACS, American Cetacean Society Opening Statement IWC/54/OS ACS (2002) 
Animal Welfare Institute, IWC Opening Statement IWC/54/OS AWI (2002) 
Campaign Whale, Opening Statement to the 54th Annual Meeting IWC/54/OS CW (2002) 
Canadian Marine and Environment Protection Society, Opening Statement to the 54th 
Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/54/OS CMEPS (2002) 
DWAN, Opening Statement of Iruka (Dolphin) and Kujira (Whale) Action Network 
IWC/54/OS DWAN (2002) 
FCCC, Opening Statement to the 54th meeting of the IWC IWC/54/OS FCCC (2002) 
Fundacion Cethus, Opening Statement IWC/54/OS FC (2002) 
Greenpeace, Opening Statement IWC/54/OS GP (2002) 
Humane Society International, HSI opening Statement to the 54th Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/54/OS HSI (2002) 
International Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Opening Statement 
IWC/54/OS IFCNR (2002) 
IFAW, Opening Statement IWC/54/OS IFAW (2002) 
IUCN, Statement to the 54th Meeting of the IWC IWC/54/OS IUCN (2002) 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening Statement IWC/54/OS NRDC (2002) 
Robin des Bois, Opening Statement 54th plenary session of the IWC IWC/54/OS RDB 
(2002) 
Whaleman Foundation, Opening Statement for the 54th Annual Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/54/OS WF (2002) 
WWF, Whales, Whaling & the International Whaling Commission: Position Statement May 
2002 IWC/54/OS WWF (2002) 
2003 
ACS, American Cetacean Society Opening Statement IWC/55/OS ACS (2003) 
Canadian Marine Environment Protection Society, Opening Statement to the 55th Annual 




Center for Respect of Life and Environment, Opening Statement to the 55th Meeting of the 
IWC IWC/55/OS CRLE (2003) 
FWSI, Opening Statement of the Finns for the Whales Society IWC/55/OS FWSI (2003) 
Florida Caribbean Conservation Coalition, Opening Statement IWC/55/OS FCCC (2003) 
Greenpeace, Opening Statement 55th Meeting IWC/55/OS GP (2003) 
HSI, Opening Statement IWC/55/OS HSI (2003) 
IFAW, Opening Statement 55th Meeting of the IWC IWC/55/OS IFAW (2003) 
IUCN, Opening Statement IWC/55/OS IUCN (2003) 
IWMC WCT, Opening Statement IWC/55/OS IWMC (2003) 
NRDC, Opening Statement IWC/55/OS NRDC (2003) 
Sierra Club, Opening Statement IWC/55/OS SC (2003) 
2004 
HSI, Humane Society International Opening Statement IWC/56/OS HSI (2004) 
ILPC & IOI (Sidney Holt), The Myth of ‘Full Utilisation’ IWC/56/OS ILPC (2004) 
IWMC, IWC: A System of Loopholes IWC/56/OS IWMC (2004) 
Safety First, Larger Whale Meat Market Means Increased Consumer Health Risks 
IWC/56/OS SF (2004) 
WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/56/OS WWF (2004) 
2005 
Animal Welfare Institute, AWI Opening Statement IWC/57/OS AWI (2005) 
Cousteau Society, Opening Statement to the 57th meeting of the IWC IWC/57/OS CS 
(2005) 
Dolphin and Whale Conservation Network, Opening Statement IWC/57/OS (2005) 
Greenpeace, Opening Statement to the 57th meeting of the IWC IWC/57/OS (2005) 
HSI, Humane Society International Statement to the 57th meeting of the IWC IWC/57/OS 
HSI (2005) 
ITF, Opening Statement by the International Transport Workers’ Federation IWC/57/OS 
ITF (2005) 
JSU, All Japan Seamen’s Union Opening Statement IWC/57/OS JSU (2005) 
Natural Resources Defense Council, NRDC Opening Statement IWC/57/OS NRDC (2005) 
WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/57/OS WWF (2005) 
2006 
AWI, Opening Statement IWC/58/OS AWI (2006) 





Canadian Marine and Environment Protection Society, Opening Statement IWC/58/OS 
CMEPS (2006) 
Cousteau Society, Opening Statement to the 58th meeting of the IWC IWC/58/OS CS 
(2006) 
Greenpeace, Opening Statement of Greenpeace for the 58th meeting of the IWC 
IWC/58/OS GP (2006) 
Japan Seamen’s Union, Opening Statement to the 58th Meeting of the IWC IWC/58/OS JSU 
(2006) 
Species Management Specialists Inc, Opening Statement to IWC58. SMS Message Official 
bulletin of Species Management Specialists Inc IWC/58/OS SMS (2006) 
WWF, Opening Statement: 58th meeting of the IWC IWC/58/OS WWF (2006) 
2007 
AWI, Opening Statement of the Animal Welfare Institute IWC/59/OS AWI (2007) 
CSI, Cetacean Society International Opening Statement IWC/59/OS CSI (2007) 
Dolphin & Whale Action Network, Opening Statement IWC/59/OS DWAN (2007) 
Greenpeace, Greenpeace Opening Statement IWC/59/OS GP (2007) 
HSI, Humane Society International Opening Statement to the 59th Annual meeting of the 
IWC IWC/59/OS HSI (2007)  
Instituto de Conservación de Ballenas (ICB), Opening Statement to the 59th meeting of the 
IWC IWC/59/OS ICB (2007) 
IFAW, Opening Statement to the 59th annual meeting of the IWC IWC/59/OS IFAW 
(2007) 
ITF, Opening Statement by the International Transport Workers’ Federation IWC/59/OS 
ITF (2007) 
JSU, All Japan Seamen’s Union Opening Statement IWC/59/OS JSU (2007) 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening Statement IWC/59/OS (2007) 
WDWA, Whale and Dolphin Watch Australia Opening Statement IWC/59/OS WDWA 
(2007) 
WWF, WWF Opening Statement to the 59th meeting of the IWC IWC/59/OS WWF (2007) 
2008 
ABIMA: Marine Biology Association of Guatemala, Opening Statement of Asociación de 
Biología Marina de Guatemala ANTE la Comisión Ballenera Internacional IWC/60/OS 
ABIMA (2008) 
ACS, American Cetacean Society Opening Statement IWC/60/OS ACS (2008) 
ASOC, Opening Statement IWC/60/OS ASOC (2008) 
AWI, Opening Statement of the AWI IWC/60/OS AWI (2008) 





International Transport Workers’ Federation, Opening Statement IWC/60/OS ITF 
(2008) 
All Japan Seamen’s Union, Opening Statement IWC/60/OS JSU (2008) 
Organización para la Conservación de Cetáceos – Uruguayan Cetacean Conservation 
Organization, OCC Opening Statement IWC/60/OS OCC (2008) 
SMS, Species Management Specialist Opening Statement IWC/60/OS SMS (2008) 
WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/60/OS WWF (2008) 
2009 
ACS, American Cetacean Society Opening Statement IWC/61/OS ACS (2009) 
AWI, Animal Welfare Institute Opening Statement to the 61st annual meeting of the IWC 
IWC/61/OS AWI (2009) 
CSI, Cetacean Society International Opening Statement IWC/61/OS CSI (2009) 
GGT, Global Guardian Trust Opening Statement to the 61st Annual Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/61/OS GGT (2009) 
Humane Society International, Opening Statement to the 61st meeting of the IWC 
IWC/61/OS HSI (2009) 
Instituto de Conservación de Ballenas, Opening Statement to the 61st Meeting of the IWC 
IWC/61/OS ICB (2009) 
All Japan Seamen’s Union, Opening Statement IWC/61/OS JSU (2009) 
PEW Environment Group, PEW Statement to the 61st meeting of the IWC IWC/61/OS PEG 
(2009) 
Species Management Specialists, Opening Statement IWC/61/OS SMS (2009) 
WWF, WWF Opening Statement IWC/61/OS WWF (2009) 
2010 
GGT, Opening Statement to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the IWC IWC/62/OS GGT (2010) 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Opening Statement IWC/62/OS NRDC (2010) 
Organización para la Conservación de Cetáceos, OCC Opening Statement IWC/62/OS 
OCC (2010) 
PEW Environment Group, Opening Statement: PEW Environment Group IWC/62/OS 
PEW (2010) 
2011 
ASOC, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS ASOC (2011) 
AWI, Opening Statement IWC/63/OS AWI (2011) 
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